The Cosmological Argument
There are many cosmological arguments with numerous objections leveled against them including Aquinas’ first 3 ways (considered to be cosmological arguments), various PSR arguments like Stephen Davis’ leibnizian cosmological argument popularized by William Lane Craig, Gale and Pruss’ version, etc. Fact is, whether you think any of these succeeds depends on a number of factors which differ from individual to individual. e.g., ignorance, how critically the premises were examined, background knowledge etc.
An atheist must believe that God does not exist in at least one possible world: the actual world. But, if something exists necessarily, it exists in every possible world. Thus, in denying God’s existence in a possible world, the atheist is denying God’s existence in every possible world. That’s why the atheist qua atheist cannot accept an Ontological Argument, the theist would first have to defeat his atheism, but then…he’s not giving an ontological argument.
The Argument from Morality
If some true moral propositions are necessarily true, then they don’t require anything outside themselves to ground them. The moral argument commits us to very bizzare ideas like all true moral propositions being contingently true, and there being no intrinsic value. I think we should go with Richard Swinburne on these and say they’re are no good axiological arguments.
The Argument for the Unmoved Mover/to Pure Act
- If something moves, then it is moved.
- If something is moved, then it is moved by another.
- Therefore, if something moves, then it is moved by another.
- Therefore, if God moves, then God is moved by another.
The Argument from First Cause
- All things are caused.
- God is a thing.
- Therefore, God is caused.
- What is caused is caused by something else.
- Therefore, God is caused by something else.
The Argument from Degrees
We get along fine with superlative properties without referencing any ultimate perfection.
The Argument from Contingency
As Richard Gale has pointed out, this is a fallacious inference. There is no way to logically infer that there is some time at which no contingent thing existed from the proposition that for each contingent thing, there is some time when it failed to exist.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason
As Gale has pointed out, there really are no arguments that demonstrate the PSR, and appeal to the practicality of it is irrelevant to the rationality of it. Further, the WPSR is equivalent to the SPSR. Finally, if Swinburne is correct and atheists are committed to the inexplicability of the initial state of the universe (etc.), then atheists qua atheists must reject the PSR. i.e., it begs the question.
The Anthropic/Teleological/Fine-tuned Universe Argument
As Draper pointed out in his debate with Robin Collins, these arguments commit the fallacy of understated evidence. That aside, there are serious concerns with the principle(s) of indifference these need.
The Argument from Reason/Transcendental
Yeah, the atheist can just adopt emergent dualism or some such. That said, the
vast majority of philosophers of mind are functionalists, not dualists.
The Argument from the Hard Problem of Consciousness/Qualia
This wouldn’t do much to atheism, especially if it’s established that dualistic properties supervene on brains.
The Christological Argument
There are alllll sorts of objections I’d want to wage against an argument from resurrection. But, for here, it’d suffice to note that P(God raised Jesus from dead|E & k) > 0.5 iff God exists, and God would want to raise Jesus from the dead. Hence, you need to demonstrate theism before anything.
The Argument from Properly Basic Belief/from Warrant
Atheism is basic for some. They observe suffering, evil, non-belief or whatever and just find themselves with the belief that atheism is true. Regardless, it seems difficult to say atheists can grant that theistic basic belief is properly basic and remain atheists.