Can anyone give me some facts to help defend the existence of God?

[Trevor_Stamm]

Yeah fair point Trevor. An atheist qua atheist needn’t be interested in these arguments outside a case for theism, and probably accepts their conclusions as exemplified by Hawking.

Although independent of the whole theism discussion, I think the eternality of motion precludes an unmoved mover. I understand the attempts to show not only that they’re compatible but that an unmoved mover has to exist, regardless of whether motion is eternal. But the more I’ve reflected on things like ST 1, Q. 46, A. 1, objection 5, and response to objection 5; and of course ST 1, Q. 45, A. 2 reply to objection 2, I don’t see how an unmoved mover could exist if it does anything.

Implying that the unmoved mover is the only agent that should exist or implying that the unmoved mover was the only agent subject to motion and put itself into motion thus no longer being unmoved?

 

[Perplexity]

Implying that the unmoved mover is the only agent that should exist or implying that the unmoved mover was the only agent subject to motion and put itself into motion thus no longer being unmoved?

Sorry, I mean, I don’t see how it’s possible for something to move but not be moved. It seems to me, that if anything whatsoever ‘moves’, then it is moved. Hence, if there is a Pure Act, it doesn’t do anything, doesn’t efficiently cause anything etc.

 

[Perplexity]

Christ almighty, my average post is the length of a short story! Argh. I made my bed in which I now must lay. No wonder I usually set the terms…

Did you think I was hoping for Kalam because I defend it against numbnuts probably twice a week? As the great Shakespeare once wrote, “LOL”. The Wiley-Blackwell piece is also the last that I have studied, and, I believe, the best. (I was kind of hoping for a chance to try to use Plantinga’s ontological argument, since the logic is so complex you can’t use it verbally.)

I’m the same, which is ironically why I’ve found this format to be so good. It’s forced me, in past debates, to be as clear and concise as possible. Abiding by Grice’s maxim of quantity is always a plus But, yeah whenever you’re ready, fire away. Plantinga’s argument would be a goodun too. Although, no ontological argument is as complex as Maydole’s ontological argument in the BCTN. That’s a like a math text book. lol.

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

Sorry, I mean, I don’t see how it’s possible for something to move but not be moved. It seems to me, that if anything whatsoever ‘moves’, then it is moved. Hence, if there is a Pure Act, it doesn’t do anything, doesn’t efficiently cause anything etc.

I recognize this objection, and it is good however when Aquinas was speaking of potentiality in things, he was describing it as privation of actuality. When pure act puts things in motion, it is not for it’s own sake to aquire actuality nor can it be subject for any motion. In essentially ordered series, I don’t see how it’s possible for there not to be termination in the series to a first cause who is pure act.

 

[Perplexity]

I recognize this objection, and it is good however when Aquinas was speaking of potentiality in things, he was describing it as privation of actuality. When pure act puts things in motion, it is not for it’s own sake to aquire actuality nor can it be subject for any motion. In essentially ordered series, I don’t see how it’s possible for there not to be termination in the series to a first cause who is pure act.

I don’t see how anything could put things in motion unless (i) it had the potential to put things in motion, and (ii) this potential was actualized. It’d follow that whatever puts something in motion accrues some actuality it didn’t always have, or didn’t have of necessity at least. For example, if nothing else than standing in a new relation: being the mover.

But, for anything to accrue any kind of actuality (substantial or accidental) is for that thing to not be Pure Act.

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

I don’t see how anything could put things in motion unless (i) it had the potential to put things in motion, and (ii) this potential was actualized. It’d follow that whatever puts something in motion accrues some actuality it didn’t always have, or didn’t have of necessity at least. For example, if nothing else than standing in a new relation: being the mover.

But, for anything to accrue any kind of actuality (substantial or accidental) is for that thing to not be Pure Act.

I have to ask this, are you presupposing that there needs to be something in it for the mover out of causing motion or is this a conclusion of yours?

 

[Perplexity]

I have to ask this, are you presupposing that there needs to be something in it for the mover out of causing motion or is this a conclusion of yours?

It’s really just the argument given in ST. 1, Q. 46, A. 1, O. 5, which says:

“Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement. Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.”

That’s why I said “I don’t see how anything could put things in motion unless (i) it had the potential to put things in motion, and (ii) this potential was actualized.”

The idea of ‘putting things in motion’ seems to entail a beginning of movement, which as the above argument illustrates entails prior movement and so forth.

 

[Khalid]

“Motion” is better described as “change” in our modern language. Something doesn’t have to change (in essence, which is the metaphysics he was working with - incidentally the most correct metaphysics - those of Aristotle) in order to cause change. Motion had different connotations then. I made a tract out of this one:

It’s 600k, so it may take a minute to load:

imageshack.us/photo/my-images/252/firstway.jpg/

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

It’s really just the argument given in ST. 1, Q. 46, A. 1, O. 5, which says:

“Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement. Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.”

That’s why I said “I don’t see how anything could put things in motion unless (i) it had the potential to put things in motion, and (ii) this potential was actualized.”

The idea of ‘putting things in motion’ seems to entail a beginning of movement, which as the above argument illustrates entails prior movement and so forth.

Ah, yes you’re right ‘putting things in motion’ does entail that, which is why Aquinas in his reply made a distinction between change and creation of the first movable thing but first reaffirming the point the mover is not subject to change. It is an article of faith to say creatio ex nihilo and cannot be proven in demonstration but can be reasonably argued. I need to read those Aristotle reads Aquinas referred to in his answer of this article about this topic, putting it off for RCIA.

 

[Khalid]

Perplexed, I’ve not forgotten of this thread, but I’m waiting to get my math textbook back in case I have to look something up, which should be later today.

 

[Khalid]

I got my math textbook () back. You decide who opens. As standard, whoever opens does not close. Seventy-two hour rounds sound good?

 

[Perplexity]

I got my math textbook () back. You decide who opens. As standard, whoever opens does not close. Seventy-two hour rounds sound good?

Kewl. Hm, well since you’re affirming Kalam and I’m denying, how about you start? Yep, sure, 72 hours sounds good.