Can God justify objective morality?

[balto]

Well, I will try to expand a little bit. We are for sure are rational and emotional beings. These are our only main attributes. Each act we perform is based on situation which that dictate how our emotions are and how we analyze the situation rationally and make decisions. Our emotions are like engine pushing us forward for an end and our rationality give us proper direction, to fulfill our emotions the best. This means that there can be no act/no motion without emotions. That is what I mean with “feeling is the end”. Everything that we do is because of feelings whether us who are arguing or a thief who is stealing, etc.

Thank you this does help clarify things. I think the fact that you brought rationality into the equation is crucial. I should have amended our earlier definition of morality because I think the one I offered was a bit too general. Morality only applies to rational ends for rational creatures, do you agree with that?

The strange thing is that I think I can mostly agree with what you have written above, depending on how rationality is to be interpreted and what role it plays. To me rationality suggests consideration of something that has a degree of universality about it, where as feelings do not have any universality. You said that emotions are like an engine pushing us forward and rationality gives us proper direction. This I think is accurate. But then at the end you say that “everything we do is because of feelings.” Do you mean to say the goal of morality is acquisition of feelings?

If so, in your first post you asked us to assume that God can justify objective morality, but then argued that if we suppose this then any human being can justify objective morality. Since you said that feelings are the end of human morality (feelings being interpreted more generally as a “particular end” rather than a universal end), presumably these particular feelings are what would justify morality. And the assumption in the first post seems to be that God and humans justify morality in the same way, so then it would follow that God’s ends also consist in particular things. Does that explain your thinking?

But this is the wrong way to think about God’s willing. God properly speaking only wills His own goodness as an end, which is universal and transcends particularities. Particular goods are effects of this willing of His own goodness as His end, He does not will particular things as ends in themselves. If God does will particular goodnesses as ends in themselves, then I can see why you are having this difficulty. However, it is this universal goodness that would justify objective morality.

 

[STT]

Thank you this does help clarify things. I think the fact that you brought rationality into the equation is crucial. I should have amended our earlier definition of morality because I think the one I offered was a bit too general. Morality only applies to rational ends for rational creatures, do you agree with that?

Morality only applies to feeling as a end. We however could have different rational ends. Think of thief who is tempted to steal something. He in one hand is derived by his feeling to steal. He in another hand is afraid of been caught. Therefore he has two ends in his disposal. But that is feeling which allows him to has two different ends, one is desire to steal and another being afraid of been caught.

The strange thing is that I think I can mostly agree with what you have written above, depending on how rationality is to be interpreted and what role it plays. To me rationality suggests consideration of something that has a degree of universality about it, where as feelings do not have any universality. You said that emotions are like an engine pushing us forward and rationality gives us proper direction. This I think is accurate. But then at the end you say that “everything we do is because of feelings.” Do you mean to say the goal of morality is acquisition of feelings?

Well, think of it this way, no feeling no motion. Having rational capacity then is useless since there is no motion. That is why I say that feeling is the end. I also describe this in more details in the example in the previous comment.

If so, in your first post you asked us to assume that God can justify objective morality, but then argued that if we suppose this then any human being can justify objective morality. Since you said that feelings are the end of human morality (feelings being interpreted more generally as a “particular end” rather than a universal end), presumably these particular feelings are what would justify morality. And the assumption in the first post seems to be that God and humans justify morality in the same way, so then it would follow that God’s ends also consist in particular things. Does that explain your thinking?

The idea is to accept the fact that feeling is the end when it comes to morality. People have different feeling in a given situation. Therefore there is no objective morality.

But this is the wrong way to think about God’s willing. God properly speaking only wills His own goodness as an end, which is universal and transcends particularities. Particular goods are effects of this willing of His own goodness as His end, He does not will particular things as ends in themselves. If God does will particular goodnesses as ends in themselves, then I can see why you are having this difficulty. However, it is this universal goodness that would justify objective morality.

Do you feel good about God’s goodness?