Can immaterial things have parts?

[Birdmanman]

I think I have read somewhere that immaterial things cannot have parts (that is, all immaterial things are simple, not composite).

But it seems at least possible that immaterial things can have parts; after all, I can conceive of a proposition that has a propositional meaning composed of the meanings of a subject, a predicate, and a copula. But meanings are immaterial things, as are propositional meanings; so the propositional meaning of a proposition appears to be composed of the meanings of its parts (I am not denying that the propositional meaning of a proposition is more than the sum of its parts, of course).

Can someone attempt to show me how we know immaterial things cannot have parts? I believe the argument I read somewhere earlier indicated that because immaterial things are without extension, they are without parts, but extension (like, extension in space), does not seem to bear on my example above dealing with propositional meaning.

 

[tonyrey]

Propositions consist of parts because we think discursively in this world but it doesn’t follow that all thought is discursive.

 

[Theophorus]

I think that your argument rests on a univocal use of being, when according to Thomistic and classical philosophy “being is said in many ways”, to quote the Philosopher. Propositions don’t exist in reality, in the same way a person or a rock, or immaterial beings(Such as God or other separated substances) do. Propositions signify reality, and truth and falsity derive from their agreement with reality, but they are not themselves ontological realities in the primary sense of the word being.

It is not an argument from extension per se, rather it is an argument from the coming together of matter and form(the what something is/its essence). Material beings are composite of matter and form and in such things the form(i.e ‘humanness’) is individuated by the matter(i.e this Man/Aristotle). Now in things composed of matter and form, essence must differ from the individual," because the essence connotes only what is included in the definition of the form; such as all the individualising accidents, which are not included in the definition of the form(in the way having brown eyes or being six feet tall is not a part of the definition of what it is to be human, in ones humanness). Where we have this combination of matter and form, the parts, we get the individual member of the species.

Immaterial beings obviously lack matter and only comprise of the form, which subsists in itself rather than being individuated in matter, and therefore lack parts.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think that your argument rests on a univocal use of being, when according to Thomistic and classical philosophy “being is said in many ways”, to quote the Philosopher. Propositions don’t exist in reality, in the same way a person or a rock, or immaterial beings(Such as God or other separated substances) do. Propositions signify reality, and truth and falsity derive from their agreement with reality, but they are not themselves ontological realities in the primary sense of the word being.

It is not an argument from extension per se, rather it is an argument from the coming together of matter and form(the what something is/its essence). Material beings are composite of matter and form and in such things the form(i.e ‘humanness’) is individuated by the matter(i.e this Man/Aristotle). Now in things composed of matter and form, essence must differ from the individual," because the essence connotes only what is included in the definition of the form; such as all the individualising accidents, which are not included in the definition of the form(in the way having brown eyes or being six feet tall is not a part of the definition of what it is to be human, in ones humanness). Where we have this combination of matter and form, the parts, we get the individual member of the species.

Immaterial beings obviously lack matter and only comprise of the form, which subsists in itself rather than being individuated in matter, and therefore lack parts.

Excellent answer.

Linus2nd

 

[Lynxdk]

Father, Son, Holy Spirit…

I see parts implied there…

“Can someone attempt to show me how we know immaterial things cannot have parts?”

How can you show something to be a way that it “cannot” be, if you can show how clearly it already Is?

Still waking up a little… need more coffee I think…

If my body is Whole, then my hand is just a part of me… if I cut it off, then it is Away from me.

 

[tonyrey]

Father, Son, Holy Spirit…

I see parts implied there…

“Can someone attempt to show me how we know immaterial things cannot have parts?”

How can you show something to be a way that it “cannot” be, if you can show how clearly it already Is?

Still waking up a little… need more coffee I think…

If my body is Whole, then my hand is just a part of me… if I cut it off, then it is Away from me.

Your hand is not a part of** you**. It is a part of your body. A person is an indivisible entity. There is no such thing as half a person!

 

[Lynxdk]

Your hand is not a part of** you**. It is a part of your body. A person is an indivisible entity. There is no such thing as half a person!

lol! I was just using it as a reference point =)

But I’ll argue about a person being indivisible to a certain extent. True, Father Son and Holy Spirit, also a good example of a Whole person that Cannot be divided, but is still Plural, written right into the first “We” in the bible, and confirmed, time and again, in so many ways.
=)

 

[polytropos]

Immaterial beings obviously lack matter and only comprise of the form, which subsists in itself rather than being individuated in matter, and therefore lack parts.

Hmmmm. To be composed of matter and form is one way not to be simple. But cannot immaterial entities (say, angels) still be composed of essence and existence, which is to say that (unlike God) it is not in their nature to exist, and that they exist is distinct from what they are?

 

[belorg]

Hmmmm. To be composed of matter and form is one way not to be simple. But cannot immaterial entities (say, angels) still be composed of essence and existence, which is to say that (unlike God) it is not in their nature to exist, and that they exist is distinct from what they are?

I would think so. God is supposed to be simple and uncomposed and unique, but once you posit other immaterial beings, they will have to differ from God, and, they will have to differ from each other, so I don’t think maintaining that immaterial things cannot have parts is a tenable position for a theist.

 

[tonyrey]

lol! I was just using it as a reference point =)

But I’ll argue about a person being indivisible to a certain extent. True, Father Son and Holy Spirit, also a good example of a Whole person that Cannot be divided, but is still Plural, written right into the first “We” in the bible, and confirmed, time and again, in so many ways.
=)

The “plurality” of God exists only in our hopelessly inadequate description of the Blessed Trinity with words. The onus is on you to give examples of “immaterial things” which have parts because the Creator certainly doesn’t belong to the category of creatures - or any human category for that matter.

In a court of law a person is always regarded as an entity rather than a compound!

 

[Birdmanman]

I think that your argument rests on a univocal use of being, when according to Thomistic and classical philosophy “being is said in many ways”, to quote the Philosopher. Propositions don’t exist in reality, in the same way a person or a rock, or immaterial beings(Such as God or other separated substances) do. Propositions signify reality, and truth and falsity derive from their agreement with reality, but they are not themselves ontological realities in the primary sense of the word being.

It is not an argument from extension per se, rather it is an argument from the coming together of matter and form(the what something is/its essence). Material beings are composite of matter and form and in such things the form(i.e ‘humanness’) is individuated by the matter(i.e this Man/Aristotle). Now in things composed of matter and form, essence must differ from the individual," because the essence connotes only what is included in the definition of the form; such as all the individualising accidents, which are not included in the definition of the form(in the way having brown eyes or being six feet tall is not a part of the definition of what it is to be human, in ones humanness). Where we have this combination of matter and form, the parts, we get the individual member of the species.

Immaterial beings obviously lack matter and only comprise of the form, which subsists in itself rather than being individuated in matter, and therefore lack parts.

Thanks for your help, Theophorus! Yes…I have always been imprecise, when I use the word, about what I mean by ‘being’.

So if I can restate the argument in your third paragraph:

1. Immaterial beings (by definition) lack matter, and are thus only comprised of form
2. Form (the form of immaterial beings) is not individuated by matter.
3. Therefore, form lacks parts because it is not individuated.

a. How do we know that matter and form are the only things for beings to be made up of?
b. Why cannot something besides matter individuate form?
c. Why can form not be itself individuated, or how do we know that it is not individuated?
d. Why is it that something that is not individuated cannot have parts?

[When I originally asked this question, I was actually hoping to use the conclusion arrived at, that immaterial things do not have parts, in order to show that they must subsist in themselves. But it appears, unfortunately, that the statement that immaterial things subsist in themselves is part of the argument for immaterial things being without parts.]

Throughout, I use the definition of individuation as: “distinguishing something within the same species (or having the same form) from other members of the same species (or other things having the same form)”