S
sw85
Guest
Science appears to do these things. I cannot take them at face value without an a priori assumption that (a) reality is objective and independent of our senses, and that (b) our senses are nevertheless basically capable of discerning its nature. If I can’t make those assumptions that I cannot rely on what I am observing, which could after all just be a figment of my imagination, an improper extrapolation of a brain that seeks patterns and is willing to read them where none exist, etc.While it could be argued that seeking after Truth[sup]®[/sup] was always a waste of time.
Science furnishes lots of evidence for its validity: vaccination does its job, your computer confirms the applied science that went into its development and so on.
But these are not empirical assumptions – i.e., they are logically prior to any empirical observation, and any empirical proof of those assumptions could not be assumed to be valid without making those assumptions – yet without them, the scientific endeavor falls apart.
So clearly, then, it is not the case that empirical observation is the sole source of knowledge. Otherwise, we could not possibly know whether or not the claim “empirical observation is the sole source of knowledge” is true. To say that we can is, from a scientistic perspective, an unprincipled exception. If we can know this one unempirical thing, what reason is there to believe we cannot know any other unempirical thing? Well, there is no reason. That’s why it’s an unprincipled exception.
That’s a cute story, but the issue here is that the idiot philosophers who can’t bring themselves to acknowledge common sense in this case are the proponents of scientism, not their detractors. It’s the proponents of scientism whose ideas, rigorously applied, lead to counterintuitive absurdity, such as the idea that there can be efficient causation (X acting so as to produce Y) without final causation (X having the power to produce Y), or belief in nominalism (the idea that there is no objective human form or essence, so that you and I are no more necessary alike than a starfish is to a skyscraper).Richard Feynman made a little joke about philosophers - youtube.com/watch?v=X8aWBcPVPMo![]()
Often these silly beliefs interact in sillier ways. For instance, I have never empirically observed my own intestines. I can assume I have them because I’m a human who is alive and healthy and because healthy, living humans have intestines, plus this would explain the occasional burbling in my stomach after a large meal and the fact that I use the bathroom regularly. But these intuitions rely on formal realist assumption, and scientism rejects formal realism. I cannot make the assumption that “healthy, living humans have intestines” because (according to nominalists) that’s a linguistic sleight of hand with no necessary objective correspondence to reality. After all, I cannot “observe” a form or essence!
So I am left in the position of believing that there is no particularly sound reason to believe my own intestines exist – the best I can say is that this explanation might perhaps fit the evidence (i.e., having intestines explains burbling and digestion), even if there’s no way to know if it fits the evidence better than any other possible explanation of which I’m ignorant short of cutting myself open and taking a peek!
Of course, no one thinks or talks like this. We all know we have intestines, and we know we have it because we are all humans and because humans by nature have intestines. Because we all know intuitively that formal realism is correct, no matter how much smart people try to talk themselves into believing otherwise.
We all also know that teleological realism is correct, which is why we have no problem saying that a “healthy heart” is one that pumps blood and an unhealthy (i.e., disordered, diseased) heart is one that does not pump blood well – either pumping it too fast, too slow, with too much pressure or too little, unevenly, etc. Pumping blood is the telos (end) of a heart, and the goodness of a vital thing is its successful execution of its telos – thus a good heart pumps blood, a bad heart pumps blood badly or not at all. Like the kids say, duh. Technically, though, we’re not allowed to acknowledge this, either, because we can’t observe a telos empirically. So we’re left with the idiotic belief that hearts don’t have any particular necessary function from which deviation is problematic, which, rigorously applied, leaves medical science a totally unworkable mess.
So in fact even scientism itself winds up embracing realism informally even as it repudiates it formally! This kind of silliness and internal incoherence is a sure sign that scientism is both false and stupid.