Hi, sorry for the hiatus (again).
I didn’t say ‘be killed’ for a reason. For example, prescribing a lethal dose of medication is not killing someone but would be
…would be…?
Okay, that’s a different case - I thought your remarks included advance directives to kill, not just to prescribe. That’s what I was directing my remark toward.
I’ve read some of it in a seminar a couple years ago. My point was that you seemed to be arguing that societies–as a whole–have some rights. If this is a terminology issue that’s fine but it seems to be more than that.
It does? Okay… I’m not sure how. Basically rights are meaningless without freedom, and negative freedom is meaningless without positive freedom. Preservation of any kind of freedom requires a renunciation of individual freedom which amounts to granting society rights over individuals. (I’m sure this isn’t news to you.)
I’m not saying that the lack of that ability necessarily implies that right but that your argument doesn’t apply in this case.
True enough then. My argument was an a-fortiori type of argument, as in “one *certainly *doesn’t have the ‘right’ to x in such and such circumstances.” I think the basic good-of-society reasons take care of the exceptional cases where the more obvious argument doesn’t apply.
I don’t think that (to pick one of the examples I cited) Social Security exists to support the social good but rather for the good of individuals. Insofar as taxation is anti-libertarian you are correct in that criticism. I was just saying that your argument that lack of an ability can sometimes imply a right at least in modern liberal democracies.
*All *social goods are for the good of individuals. Society is for the good of individuals. Individuals are inherently social (deny this if you dare!) so the two can’t be separated. Anyway, yes, lack of an ability implies a ‘right’ to something, but my point is that this ‘right’ is based on principles that cannot (unambiguously at least) be used to support your position.
Fair enough regarding ‘we can say’ but I think we both knew what I meant. It was my understanding, however, that you granted my point on being justified in saying we would rather die than experience even without experiencing them. If you haven’t there are examples–rather graphic ones–which I can give to prove my point.
I granted your general point, but not its specific application.
I don’t think we have to agree on the data so much
What constitutes ‘data’ as such?? What good is there in appealing to data that we don’t agree on?
Fair enough. I meant that in your worldview there is an omnipotent lawgiver which is a far different state of affairs than in my worldview. I do indeed deny that we are not the owners of life (namely our own lives); we can own nothing if we are not first and foremost the owners of ourselves.
That is a non sequitur and an abuse of language. We own
things. We own *ourselves *at best in a metaphorical sense.
I am aware that the Hobbsean account of the coming together out of the state of nature is conceptual but do you deny the notion he describes of rights in the state of nature? I think he properly conceptualizes what is arguably continuous in society vis-a-vis rights and limitations thereon.
I haven’t read much Hobbes first-hand, but I think I do deny it. Could you say more clearly what it is that I may or may not want to be denying here? (Here’s a hint as to probably why I deny it: the ‘state of nature’ is irrelevant to any *actual *state of *human *nature.)
So the Genesis story is fictional? I was just saying that’s where my anthropology comes from for comparison not necessarily for dissection. Given the ban of atheism as a topic I fear dissecting mine without the ability to dissect yours seems a bit one-sided.
Yes, Genesis is certainly fictional, at least in some sense. (That’s not a bad thing - ‘fiction’ isn’t a dirty word.) Hobbes’ little story is also (unquestionably) fictional. But that is irrelevant to our discussion of the truth or falsity of the anthropological claims made in each story.