Can someone help me on Aquinas' Second Way?

[hammiesink]

I’ve seen conflicting information. One idea is that Aquinas is talking about an essentially ordered series of essence and being, with “essence” acting as potentiality and “being” acting as the actuality. Thus, your existence now depends on the cells in your body, which depends on the atoms, which depends on the weak nuclear force, etc. And so it can’t go down to infinity because it’s essentially ordered.

But I’ve heard other interpretations as well, that seem to think he is talking about an accidentally ordered series. For one thing, the above interpretation would mean that he is talking about *material *causes, from what I can tell (your body is materially caused by cells, which are materially cause by atoms, etc).

But as he himself says he is talking about *efficient *causes in the Second Way, which seems to imply an *accidentally *ordered series and not an essentially ordered one. But if that’s the case, then how does he justify terminating the chain?

In short, I’m having problems reconciling “efficient causes” as mentioned in the Second Way, with “essentially ordered series” and thus the justification for “it can’t go to infinity.”

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

Aquinas, Beginner’s Guide, by Dr. Feser

The Second Way, first & second paragrapgh

The proof from causality begins by nothing that the senses reveal to us an order of efficient causes. But nothing can be the cause of itself, for it were then “it would be prior to itself, which is impossible” (Summa Theologica 1.2.3). Now in a series of efficient causes, the first cause is the cause of the intermediate cause or causes, which are in turn the cause of the ulmtimate cause. So if there were no first cause, then there would be no intermeditate or ultimate causes at all (and thus no causes of the sort we started out acknowledging that we know through the senses). But if the series of efficient causes regressed to infinity, then there would be no first cause. Hence the series cannot go on to infinity, and “therefore it is neccessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God” (Summa Theologica 1.2.3).

Let us note first (and yet again) that Aquinas does not say, here or elsewhere, that “everything has a cause”; rather he begins the argument by saying that there are efficient causes and that nothing can cause itself. The implication is that if something is caused, then it is something outside the thing being caused that is doing the causing; and as we have seen in chapter 2, Aquinas is commited in particular to the principle of causality, according to which that which comes into being, or more generally that which is contingent, must have a cause. Needless to say, this is not the same thing as to claim that everything without exception has a cause. So the argument is in no way vulnerable to the stock objection aimed at the stock caricature of cosmological arguments (i.e. "If everything has a cause, then what caused God?) We have also already seen in chapter 2 how the principle of causality might be defended against the sorts of objections raised by Hume.

Peter Kreeft does well at explaining it too peterkreeft.com/topics/first-cause.htm

 

[hammiesink]

Thanks, but that doesn’t really answer my question. I’ve actually read both Feser’s Aquinas books twice.

I’m asking about what kind of series Aquinas is talking about in the Second Way. Feser says it is per se. But Aquinas’ language suggests per accidens.

 

[Betterave]

I’ve seen conflicting information. One idea is that Aquinas is talking about an essentially ordered series of essence and being, with “essence” acting as potentiality and “being” acting as the actuality. Thus, your existence now depends on the cells in your body, which depends on the atoms, which depends on the weak nuclear force, etc. And so it can’t go down to infinity because it’s essentially ordered.

But I’ve heard other interpretations as well, that seem to think he is talking about an accidentally ordered series. For one thing, the above interpretation would mean that he is talking about *material *causes, from what I can tell (your body is materially caused by cells, which are materially cause by atoms, etc).

But as he himself says he is talking about *efficient *causes in the Second Way, which seems to imply an *accidentally *ordered series and not an essentially ordered one. But if that’s the case, then how does he justify terminating the chain?

“…which seems to imply…” - can you explain this?

 

[Moontown_Rabbit]

But as he himself says he is talking about *efficient *causes in the Second Way, which seems to imply an *accidentally *ordered series and not an essentially ordered one. But if that’s the case, then how does he justify terminating the chain?

If you substitue “motion” with “being”, the explanation for per se causality is shared by the First and Second Way. When Aquinas talks about efficient causes ordered per accidens he describes a series where individual causes act independently of each other. For example, if you space out 10 billiard balls and hit the first one into the second, when the second hits the third the first is no longer involved (it could even have ceased to exist). Aquinas says that such a series could in theory regress to infinity and have no first cause. If however you place all 10 balls so that they are touching each other, and then carefully push the first ball, all 10 balls move simultaneously. This represents a series of efficient causes ordered per se. Such a series cannot regress to infinity because it is a type of motion that requires “instrumentality”. The chain is not temporally spread out so if you observe motion it must be the immediate cause of an instrument, i.e. whatever pushed the first ball. Aquinas calls this the first mover not because it is temporally first (all of this happens simultaneously) but because it is at the top of the hierarchy of motion and is therefore the “principal moving cause”.

 

[hammiesink]

If however you place all 10 balls so that they are touching each other, and then carefully push the first ball, all 10 balls move simultaneously. This represents a series of efficient causes ordered per se. Such a series cannot regress to infinity because it is a type of motion that requires “instrumentality”. The chain is not temporally spread out so if you observe motion it must be the immediate cause of an instrument, i.e. whatever pushed the first ball. Aquinas calls this the first mover not because it is temporally first (all of this happens simultaneously) but because it is at the top of the hierarchy of motion and is therefore the “principal moving cause”.

Ah. Duh. Efficient causes do not necessarily imply a time component. Thanks.

OK, then can you help me figure out a good example of the Second Way? I am trying to make a video explaining it for laymen. My thought was that your body’s essence is made actual by the cells, and the cells essence is made actual by the molecules, and so on. But this strikes me as material cause, and not efficient.

 

[Moontown_Rabbit]

OK, then can you help me figure out a good example of the Second Way?

It might be difficult to illustrate that, because in the Second Way he switches from potential becoming act (resulting in motion) to essence conjoining with an act of existence (to make something real). We’re talking about causes in both cases, but in the latter the focus is on chains of “acts of existence”, something not easily seen. I like your idea of using the human body. One way to picture the chain would be to imagine what would be destroyed if a human body lost the conjunction of essence and existence. As you already described the order of hierarchy would be flesh, organs, and cells. If you ripped everything apart you would also lose molecules, atoms, nucleic particles, and maybe even smaller stuff. Going the other way, you can imagine things that would destroy the body if destroyed, such as the earth, the solar system, and the surrounding universe. At the end of the chain is God, the “principal causer” that terminates every immediate chain of being. No idea how you would get a purely divine act of existence into a video. The other problem is that while the macro end of the chain must be terminated, are we able to terminate the micro end? They claim to keep discovering smaller and smaller particles. Are quarks reducible?

 

[Betterave]

It might be difficult to illustrate that, because in the Second Way he switches from potential becoming act (resulting in motion) to essence conjoining with an act of existence (to make something real). We’re talking about causes in both cases, but in the latter the focus is on chains of “acts of existence”, something not easily seen. I like your idea of using the human body. One way to picture the chain would be to imagine what would be destroyed if a human body lost the conjunction of essence and existence. As you already described the order of hierarchy would be flesh, organs, and cells.

That doesn’t make sense, does it? If a human body lost the conjunction of essence and existence… wouldn’t it simply cease to exist?

If you ripped everything apart you would also lose molecules, atoms, nucleic particles, and maybe even smaller stuff. Going the other way, you can imagine things that would destroy the body if destroyed, such as the earth, the solar system, and the surrounding universe. At the end of the chain is God, the “principal causer” that terminates every immediate chain of being. No idea how you would get a purely divine act of existence into a video. The other problem is that while the macro end of the chain must be terminated, are we able to terminate the micro end? They claim to keep discovering smaller and smaller particles. Are quarks reducible?

I don’t understand what bigger and smaller has to do with it. Can you explain?

 

[Moontown_Rabbit]

I don’t understand what bigger and smaller has to do with it. Can you explain?

I used the terms macro and micro to order the hierarchy of causation. In both the First and Second Way Aquinas specifies that causes ordered per se must have a first cause. Such chains of causality are not ordered by time, since everything happens at once, but they do have a hierarchy. This is why he can identify a first cause, x number of intermediary causes and a final cause. Instead of “bigger” I could have used the word “higher” to describe causes closer to the first cause. With the human body analogy “bigger” seemed appropriate because a body happens to be bigger than a lung and the existence of the body is a prerequisite for the existence of a lung. As you pointed out, if the body lost the conjunction of essence and existence it would cease to exist. But then so would the lung for its being is linked to a human body in an immediate causal chain.

 

[hammiesink]

It might be difficult to illustrate that, because in the Second Way he switches from potential becoming act (resulting in motion) to essence conjoining with an act of existence (to make something real). We’re talking about causes in both cases, but in the latter the focus is on chains of “acts of existence”, something not easily seen. I like your idea of using the human body.

Well, it’s just a powerpoint video presentation, so I don’t need to actually draw anything. I’m just having a problem even picturing a hypothetical example. A human body’s essence and existence are conjoined by… what? Which has its essence and existence conjoined by… what? The human body at one end and God at the other are easy to picture, but what are the intermediate members of this series?

 

[Betterave]

I used the terms macro and micro to order the hierarchy of causation. In both the First and Second Way Aquinas specifies that causes ordered per se must have a first cause. Such chains of causality are not ordered by time, since everything happens at once, but they do have a hierarchy. This is why he can identify a first cause, x number of intermediary causes and a final cause. Instead of “bigger” I could have used the word “higher” to describe causes closer to the first cause. With the human body analogy “bigger” seemed appropriate because a body happens to be bigger than a lung and the existence of the body is a prerequisite for the existence of a lung. As you pointed out, if the body lost the conjunction of essence and existence it would cease to exist. But then so would the lung for its being is linked to a human body in an immediate causal chain.

“Higher” certainly sounds less suspicious to me than “bigger.” I’m still not seeing what you mean with the example of body and lung. Do you mean to say that the the body is the efficient cause of the lung? How can the body be a prerequisite for the existence of a lung? As far as an essential ordering goes, surely the lung is just as much a prerequisite for the existence of a human body as vice versa?

 

[Moontown_Rabbit]

As far as an essential ordering goes, surely the lung is just as much a prerequisite for the existence of a human body as vice versa?

As mentioned “acts of existence” ordered per se are not easily observable, so whatever model we try to come up with is going to be an imperfect analogy. I think the relationship between body and lung does capture many of Aquinas’s ideas. The body is in fact a prerequisite for the lung and not the other way around. This can be seen intuitively by recognizing that the body can live without a lung (although not without both) but a lung cannot live apart from a body. More precisely, the body supplies the lung with its four causes (material, formal, efficient, and final). Without these causes, the lung becomes nothing but potential without act which in Aquinas’ view means it does not exist as a lung. When a lung is on ice before a transplant we still call it a lung, but I imagine that Aquinas would refrain from doing so until it was breathing in another human body. The other feature of the body/lung relationship is that it is immediate and continuous. The body sustains the lung at all times, just as Aquinas claims the divine essence is an “act of existence” that sustains all per se chains of being. It would be a lot easier if we just said “God holds all things in being”, but Aquinas identified chains of being in order to lead non-believers back to the source. I share the frustration of the OP in trying come up with a complete example of one of these chains. The tricky part is eliminating the time component. You might say that the knowledge I gain from a book receives its act of existence from the words I am reading, which receive their act of existence (in the immediate sense) from the paper, which receives its act of existence from the paper manufacturer. That last step doesn’t fit though, because it occurred in the past. I want to know what is causing the existence of the paper at this exact moment, and it is difficult to see that particular act.

 

[levinas12]

I share the frustration of the OP in trying come up with a complete example of one of these chains. The tricky part is eliminating the time component.

I completely sympathize. With the “demise” of Aristotle’s concentric spheres, which Thomas relied upon for his argument, it is difficult to come up with a contemporary example of a hierarchy of simultaneous efficient causes (please see the Unmoved Mover thread).

How about oscillating strings as the first moving mover? I know - this doesn’t sound right - but it’s just a last ditch effort to save the argument.

 

[Betterave]

As mentioned “acts of existence” ordered per se are not easily observable, so whatever model we try to come up with is going to be an imperfect analogy.

If this is true, then it is a serious objection against the argument, is it not? The argument claims that we find an order of efficient causes in sensible things.

I think the relationship between body and lung does capture many of Aquinas’s ideas. The body is in fact a prerequisite for the lung and not the other way around. This can be seen intuitively by recognizing that the body can live without a lung (although not without both) but a lung cannot live apart from a body.

No, the body cannot live without a lung (i.e., at least one lung); it can only live without two lungs. So your point is incorrect: the body cannot live without a lung any more than a lung can live without a body.

More precisely, the body supplies the lung with its four causes (material, formal, efficient, and final).

How so? The lung is an integral part of the body. It is not an effect of the body.

Without these causes, the lung becomes nothing but potential without act which in Aquinas’ view means it does not exist as a lung. When a lung is on ice before a transplant we still call it a lung, but I imagine that Aquinas would refrain from doing so until it was breathing in another human body. The other feature of the body/lung relationship is that it is immediate and continuous. The body sustains the lung at all times, just as Aquinas claims the divine essence is an “act of existence” that sustains all per se chains of being.

But again, this works both ways: The lung also sustains the body at all times.

It would be a lot easier if we just said “God holds all things in being”, but Aquinas identified chains of being in order to lead non-believers back to the source. I share the frustration of the OP in trying come up with a complete example of one of these chains.

Sure, but unless you can explain away my objections, I hope we can come up with something better than what you’ve offered so far.

The tricky part is eliminating the time component. You might say that the knowledge I gain from a book receives its act of existence from the words I am reading, which receive their act of existence (in the immediate sense) from the paper, which receives its act of existence from the paper manufacturer. That last step doesn’t fit though, because it occurred in the past. I want to know what is causing the existence of the paper at this exact moment, and it is difficult to see that particular act.

Wouldn’t it just be the paper’s own matter and form which are causing its existence at this exact moment?

 

[Betterave]

I completely sympathize. With the “demise” of Aristotle’s concentric spheres, which Thomas relied upon for his argument, it is difficult to come up with a contemporary example of a hierarchy of simultaneous efficient causes (please see the Unmoved Mover thread).

How about oscillating strings as the first moving mover? I know - this doesn’t sound right - but it’s just a last ditch effort to save the argument.

I don’t know much about oscillating strings, but I once heard an argument that Hawking’s M-theory was effectively the “mind-of-God”-theory: the most general explanation of the physical causation of the universe which would take us as close as possible to discovering the mind of God - insofar as God is the creator of the empirically discoverable universe. So maybe! God causes the reality that M-theory describes, M-theory produces the visible universe with its particular natural laws, all of these particular laws, operative at different levels and relative to different contexts of understanding/analysis, determine and sustain the particular beings that are found in the universe.

 

[Moontown_Rabbit]

If this is true, then it is a serious objection against the argument, is it not? The argument claims that we find an order of efficient causes in sensible things.

We can find a chain of causes in sensible things, but not all causes are sensible. In particular the first cause in all such chains is a divine act of existence. As far as I know we cannot detect this with our regular senses. This does not invalidate the argument, it simply makes it difficult if not impossible to describe an entire chain in sensible terms.

No, the body cannot live without a lung (i.e., at least one lung); it can only live without two lungs. So your point is incorrect: the body cannot live without a lung any more than a lung can live without a body…The lung is an integral part of the body. It is not an effect of the body.

As I said, if you remove just one lung the body would persist but if you removed both the body would die. I thought this would clarify the idea that the body provides the lung with causation rather than the other way around. I see now that this was a mistake since persistence and causality are not invariably related. You can take out both eyes and the body persists, but if you take out the heart the body dies. Each organ receives its material, formal, efficient and final causation from the body, but that does not imply that the body can live without it (as I wrongly assumed). Your next question asks how it is that the body provides the four types of causes to the lung. This question is best answered by looking up the description of each type of causation.

Wouldn’t it just be the paper’s own matter and form which are causing its existence at this exact moment?

According to Aquinas the only kind of being that can cause its own existence is a being whose essence is identical with its existence, and this is only God. Every other contingent being must have a cause that is outside itself.

 

[levinas12]

I don’t know much about oscillating strings, but I once heard an argument that Hawking’s M-theory was effectively the “mind-of-God”-theory: the most general explanation of the physical causation of the universe which would take us as close as possible to discovering the mind of God - insofar as God is the creator of the empirically discoverable universe. So maybe! God causes the reality that M-theory describes, M-theory produces the visible universe with its particular natural laws, all of these particular laws, operative at different levels and relative to different contexts of understanding/analysis, determine and sustain the particular beings that are found in the universe.

I think M-theory is like a “harmony” of the various string theories (no pun intended). But I’m not sure if this sort of activity could be retrofitted into Aquinas’ proof. But there is simultaneity and a chain of movers. It’s just that it’s from the opposite end of cosmos (with the smallest size imaginable, Planck’s constant) - instead, the outermost sphere of fixed stars - does it still enough gravitas (no pun intended)

 

[levinas12]

It’s just that it’s from the opposite end of cosmos (with the smallest size imaginable, Planck’s constant) - instead the outermost sphere of fixed stars - does it still enough gravitas (no pun intended)

Meant to say: instead of the outermost sphere of fixed stars - does it still have enough gravitas (no pun intended).

 

[Betterave]

We can find a chain of causes in sensible things, but not all causes are sensible. In particular the first cause in all such chains is a divine act of existence. As far as I know we cannot detect this with our regular senses. This does not invalidate the argument, it simply makes it difficult if not impossible to describe an entire chain in sensible terms.

That is beside the point. You haven’t provided a sensible basis for the argument. Providing one does not entail “describ[ing] an entire chain in sensible terms,” so bringing this up is just a red herring, isn’t it?

Your next question asks how it is that the body provides the four types of causes to the lung. This question is best answered by looking up the description of each type of causation.

And once we have done that, isn’t it best answered by saying that it doesn’t, i.e., the body doesn’t provide the four types of causes to the lung?

According to Aquinas the only kind of being that can cause its own existence is a being whose essence is identical with its existence, and this is only God. Every other contingent being must have a cause that is outside itself.

No, according to Aquinas, no being can cause its own existence. God is the uncaused cause, not the self-caused cause. And yes, every other being is caused by another, but is also caused by its own intrinsic principles, by which it subsists once it has been brought into being.

 

[Moontown_Rabbit]

That is beside the point. You haven’t provided a sensible basis for the argument. Providing one does not entail “describ[ing] an entire chain in sensible terms,” so bringing this up is just a red herring, isn’t it?

Actually the point is that we cannot describe an entirely sensible chain, because at least one element is inevitably non-sensory. You should check out “The Argument Sketch”!