Can someone help me on Aquinas' Second Way?

[Betterave]

Actually the point is that we cannot describe an entirely sensible chain, because at least one element is inevitably non-sensory. You should check out “The Argument Sketch”!

Why can’t we describe an entirely sensible chain? Please note that the fact that we can’t describe an entirely sensible chain that terminates in the First Cause does not imply that we can’t describe an entirely sensible chain.

Why should I check out “the argument sketch” (whatever that is - do you mean Monty Python?)?

 

[wolfwalker]

I believe energy and matter are eternal in nature and exist in a form of infinite and recursive relativity.

Thus God is the Alpha and Omega and exists everywhere and in everything. He is one and all.

There is no separation of cause and effect in God. Otherwise God would exist nowhere and in nothing.

He created us out of pure love, which is himself, that has no cause.

 

[charlescritt]

Hammiesink and the second way,
Very good question. It’s an Aristotelian fact that you can’t be both nice and mean about the same thing, to get to the Essence of a thing requires a total dedication of concentration on the substance of that thing. It’s not possible to consider any accidents when considering pure substance. If you try to consider accidents, then your not totally focused in on the true substance or soul of the substance. The pure soul is separate from the properties of the soul. The first argument or cosmological way can only be concerned, as a lover for the wounded beloved, not on who hurt the beloved, but only on whether or not the beloved is unhurt- this was the traditional argument from substance. Then when the nature of the substance has been revealed, the arguments as to the accidents can begin. They called St. Thomas the “Dumb Ox”, but there is a “Wild Bull” corollary that that many miss. For while he may have approached the substance of nature as a dumb ox, he was not reluctant to defend the objective verification of his senses when it came to the accidents, which was the second way.

 

[JonathanAquino]

Well, it’s just a powerpoint video presentation, so I don’t need to actually draw anything. I’m just having a problem even picturing a hypothetical example. A human body’s essence and existence are conjoined by… what? Which has its essence and existence conjoined by… what? The human body at one end and God at the other are easy to picture, but what are the intermediate members of this series?

I am interested in this also, so I will try.

1. A human body’s existence happens because of cellular activity.
2. The cellular activity happens because of molecular interactions.
3. The molecular interactions happen because of interactions between atoms.
4. The interactions between atoms happen because of the fundamental physical forces (electromagnetism, gravitation, the strong force, and the weak force).
5. The fundamental physical forces happen because of (as yet undiscovered law of physics).
6. (As yet undiscovered law of physics.)
7. (As yet undiscovered law of physics.)
8. (As yet undiscovered law of physics.)
9. The (as yet undiscovered law of physics) happens because of the First Cause.
10. The First Cause.

Another example would be the existence of a table, which has a slightly shorter causal chain:

1. A table’s existence happens because of molecular interactions.
2. The molecular interactions happen because of interactions between atoms.
3. The interactions between atoms happen because of the fundamental physical forces (electromagnetism, gravitation, the strong force, and the weak force).
4. The fundamental physical forces happen because of (as yet undiscovered law of physics).
5. (As yet undiscovered law of physics.)
6. (As yet undiscovered law of physics.)
7. (As yet undiscovered law of physics.)
8. The (as yet undiscovered law of physics) happens because of the First Cause.
9. The First Cause.

Note that I have not studied philosophy - I am just a reader of Feser’s TLS. So I too am looking for examples of causal chains for the Second Way. I am not sure if going down the “laws of physics” route is correct for the Second Way. But it seems feasible.

 

[JonathanAquino]

Also note that I start with “X’s existence happens because” but then I soon switch to “X happens because”. I’m not sure if by doing that I switch from the Second Way (the argument from cause of existence) to the First Way (the argument from change). I suspect not, because I don’t explicitly mention change anywhere.

Instead of “molecular interactions happen because”, would it be closer to the Second Way to say “molecular interactions exist because”? Or should we strive to make it “molecules exist because”? In other words, do we have a false Second Way argument if we talk about the existence of interactions between things rather than the existence of the things themselves?

I do not think so. Otherwise, we would arrive at the fundamental physical “things” (strings or whatever) and stop. But if we can ask what causes the interactions between them, we can get into the laws of physics, and what causes them, and continue down the chain to the First Cause, as in the examples above.

 

[charlescritt]

In Quantum Mechanics there’s this newest theory coming out that has some experimentation behind it, called quantum entanglement which is sort of at the top of the chain of causation. They are learning that the adaptation of cells to hot and cold produces this state which is on the edge between order and chaos, it’s critical entanglement can account for the causation. Yet, like Aquinas they can’t just produce a laundry list of events saying this happened first, this second, this 23rd or that 123rd and so on. Like Erwin Schrodinger’s Cat, whose both alive and dead at the same time, depending on the placement of a single atom, Entanglement binds particles together into an indivisible whole.
See Scientific American June 2011 Issue, “Living in a Quantum World.”

Aquinas claimed we had a particular exigency for quantity. Why he brought this out, is some what beyond me, but he was ahead of his time in noticing the effects of pecuniary emulation. In accordance with Aristotle’s teachings, the efficient cause of things is characterized by it’s ability to bind other things into a unity. In any Sophistical Refutation, which the highest form of refutation, binding other things into a unity over some topic is the goal- it is generative and restorative without compromise, although it may take destruction, retribution and compromise in order to get there. The efficient cause is like the King who can untie any knot and free himself and others from any entanglement. Counting quantum particles if need be, Christ’s sacrifice on the cross was an expiation for our sins, but also a price paid for entanglement.

 

[hammiesink]

OK, I emailed Feser himself and he told me that one possible reading of the Second Way is that there are no middle members of the per se series. That God himself is directly causing the sustained existence of things right now. And that Aquinas uses the idea of a series of causes only as a “for the sake of argument”, to show that it can’t go on to infinity.

This reading of the Second Way uses Aquinas’ argument from On Being And Essence.

The idea is that it is not an essential property of things to exist. An elephant has to have a trunk, big ears, etc to be an elephant and not a crocodile, but it doesn’t have to have *existence *to be an elephant and not a crocodile. *What *a thing is is separate from *that *it is.

Thus, since existence is not an essential property of an elephant, the elephant must be getting his existence (constantly, since he doesn’t possess it as an essential property) from something else. And, being a per se and not per accidens series, this must terminate in something which *does *have existence as an essential property. I.e., God.

There are of course other ways to read the Second Way, but my feeling is that if you are using the cellular state of the body, the molecular state of the cells, etc then you are talking about *material *causes and not efficient ones, and Aquinas is explicit in the Second Way that he is talking about *efficient *causes.

 

[JonathanAquino]

Thus, since existence is not an essential property of an elephant, the elephant must be getting his existence (constantly, since he doesn’t possess it as an essential property) from something else.

Interesting. I have actually been racking my brain for the past several days trying to understand the First Cause argument in Dr. Feser’s “The Last Superstition”, so this helps a lot. Thanks.

Unfortunately the idea that things need to be getting their existence constantly (since they don’t possess it as an essential property) isn’t as convincing as I had hoped. I will accept it and try to internalize it, but I’m afraid that a materialist will simply say, “things persist - they stick around - they don’t spontaneously vanish - end of story.” At least I see how Aquinas’s argument goes - I will ponder it some more.

 

[hammiesink]

Interesting. I have actually been racking my brain for the past several days trying to understand the First Cause argument in Dr. Feser’s “The Last Superstition”, so this helps a lot. Thanks.

Unfortunately the idea that things need to be getting their existence constantly (since they don’t possess it as an essential property) isn’t as convincing as I had hoped. I will accept it and try to internalize it, but I’m afraid that a materialist will simply say, “things persist - they stick around - they don’t spontaneously vanish - end of story.” At least I see how Aquinas’s argument goes - I will ponder it some more.

Make sure you read Feser’s Aquinas. It goes into a bit more detail (but warrants very slow and careful reading, more so than TLS).

But yeah, the essence/existence distinction gets a little far out.

Sure is fascinating, though, either way.

 

[JonathanAquino]

Dr. William Lane Craig summed up the argument from contingency in a convincing way here: reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5847

Note that it takes a different tack than the “getting their existence constantly” idea. I find Dr. Craig’s presentation of the argument easier to stand behind. It focuses more on the cause of something’s existence rather than the cause of something’s continuing existence, which I find tougher to swallow.

 

[charlescritt]

Concerning the second way of Aquinas, we must give up all lock and key analogies of God for we can never know him completely. We approach him only and if we come too close to him we will experience a quantum or qualitative entanglement concerning his creation.
Essence requiring determinism and existence requiring freewill are the two poles that help us approach God through Knowledge; between these two poles there is a critical line of demarcation. Just as we cannot be both nice and mean at the same time, so too we cannot have and not have God in our lives. He is either present to us or not and our points of entanglement are his response to our situation. It is an area in between our irascible and concupisible appetites where reason loses or gains the knowledge to understand him. In a way God is the author of both unity and diversity, the author of how we are the same and how we are different existing as one.
The second way I believe is God’s way of teaching us to grow as individuals within his creation.

 

[hammiesink]

Dr. William Lane Craig summed up the argument from contingency in a convincing way here: reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5847

Note that it takes a different tack than the “getting their existence constantly” idea. I find Dr. Craig’s presentation of the argument easier to stand behind. It focuses more on the cause of something’s existence rather than the cause of something’s continuing existence, which I find tougher to swallow.

Do note that these are two completely different arguments. The contingency argument is from Leibniz.

Personally, I am not a big fan of Craig’s formulation of it. This version is longer and not in formal argument form but check it out: mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/02-03/01w/readings/taylor.html

 

[JonathanAquino]

Make sure you read Feser’s Aquinas. It goes into a bit more detail (but warrants very slow and careful reading, more so than TLS).

I’m in the middle of TLS but am pondering whether I should buy Dr. Feser’s Aquinas and start on that instead. Will it better help me to really understand the ideas of hylomorphism, teleology/final causes, the immortality of the soul, etc. and make them “my own”? I’m reading TLS and - I don’t know - the ideas/arguments aren’t really “sinking in”. How did you find reading Dr. Feser’s Aquinas vs. TLS?

 

[hammiesink]

I’m in the middle of TLS but am pondering whether I should buy Dr. Feser’s Aquinas and start on that instead. Will it better help me to really understand the ideas of hylomorphism, teleology/final causes, the immortality of the soul, etc. and make them “my own”? I’m reading TLS and - I don’t know - the ideas/arguments aren’t really “sinking in”. How did you find reading Dr. Feser’s Aquinas vs. TLS?

Both are good, and I think reading both a few times will help. I’ve read TLS three times now, and Aquinas twice. They are not difficult per se, but they are dense and represent a different way of thinking.

 

[JonathanAquino]

Have you read W. Norris Clarke’s “The One And The Many”? I’m wondering whether to obtain a copy of it. Would it be an “easier” way to get into the basic Aristotelian-Thomistic ideas - perhaps a precursor to Dr. Feser’s books?

 

[hammiesink]

My only experience is via Feser.

Is there anything in particular you are having problems understanding?

 

[JonathanAquino]

My only experience is via Feser.

Is there anything in particular you are having problems understanding?

I want to be convinced of the arguments, to feel them “in my bones” - something I’m not getting with the presentation in TLS. So I thought a more basic, intuitive presentation, perhaps with more examples, would help.

For example, act and potency - what’s so important about them? Why does Feser think them so crucial? To my simple (and mistaken) mind, it is basically what something should be and what something could be. I need more explanation of act and potency (with examples). Is potency just a way of thinking about things, or does it have a “reality” of its own?

Teleology/final causes - Feser seems to think this quite important. But if, as he says on a blog post, it is “that where there is an efficient causal connection between A and B, then generating B is the final cause of A in the sense that A inherently “points to” B or is “directed at” B as its natural effect. That’s it.” (i.e., if A is the efficient cause of B, then B is the final cause of A) then what’s the big deal? I must be missing something about how this is crucial. More examples of final causes would help me, I think.

Hylomorphism - How do we know it is true? Can we really believe it? I’d like to see more examples and explanation. If a spoon has the form of a spoon and a fork has the form of a fork, what about a spork? Think about a table left to deteriorate in the forest - at what point does it lose the form of a table? But mainly, how do we know that hylomorphism is true?

Clearly, I don’t “get it” - perhaps Feser’s arguments go too fast for me, and I need a book that goes slower and offers more examples? People seem to enjoy Clarke’s “The One and the Many”, so I thought that may be a gentler way to immerse myself in these ideas. (People also seem to like Lear’s “Aristotle: The Desire to Understand”, which I do own but have only skimmed - I think I may pause my reading of Feser and see if Lear illumines things).

 

[hammiesink]

I want to be convinced of the arguments, to feel them “in my bones” - something I’m not getting with the presentation in TLS. So I thought a more basic, intuitive presentation, perhaps with more examples, would help.

Well, I myself am agnostic so I’m not convinced either. I just allow myself to be a non-judgmental fly-on-the-wall, absorbing the information but not making any strong decision one way or the other.

No philosophical argument will ever be a 100% slam dunk. In fact, some would even say that all philosophical arguments fail.

But either theism is true, or materialism is true; they can’t both be. So you have to ask yourself what the arguments are for materialism as well, and how well they account for the evidence. And then compare them. Just because the theistic arguments might not be completely convincing, the arguments for materialism may (or may not be) even less so.

For example, act and potency - what’s so important about them? Why does Feser think them so crucial? To my simple (and mistaken) mind, it is basically what something should be and what something could be. I need more explanation of act and potency (with examples). Is potency just a way of thinking about things, or does it have a “reality” of its own?

Feser had a whole blog post on this one; can’t find it now. If I do, I’ll post it here.

Potentiality is the potential to be something else. A glass is potentially shards of glass, or liquid glass. A wood house is potentially a pile of blackened carbon. Water is potentially a solid. Solid water is potentially liquid.

The idea is that the change from one state to another requires a force acting upon it.

Teleology/final causes - Feser seems to think this quite important. But if, as he says on a blog post, it is “that where there is an efficient causal connection between A and B, then generating B is the final cause of A in the sense that A inherently “points to” B or is “directed at” B as its natural effect. That’s it.” (i.e., if A is the efficient cause of B, then B is the final cause of A) then what’s the big deal? I must be missing something about how this is crucial. More examples of final causes would help me, I think.

Think of the induction problem. The idea that we have no way of justifying that the laws of nature will continue to hold tomorrow, and we just take it on faith that they will. David Hume argued that there really is no connection between cause and a specific effect; we just get used to it being that way but there is no strict connection between a cause and its effect.

The opposite of that idea is that causes *are *tied to a specific effect, and that effect is the final cause of the cause. The regularity inherent in nature. Bouncy balls always bounce, and never break or turn into birds and fly away. That regularity is what the Fifth Way argues must be guided by an intelligence, because the causes themselves are unconscious.

Hylomorphism - How do we know it is true? Can we really believe it? I’d like to see more examples and explanation. If a spoon has the form of a spoon and a fork has the form of a fork, what about a spork? Think about a table left to deteriorate in the forest - at what point does it lose the form of a table? But mainly, how do we know that hylomorphism is true?

Philosophical positions, like hylomorphism, must be *argued *for. There is no way to make them 100% true. Defenders of hylomorphism will try to convince you that it solves all the problems of materialism and dualism. But materialism is no different. Ultimately, you’re kinda stuck in the middle and you just have to decide which one is the best.

 

[JonathanAquino]

Thanks hammiesink - these are the sorts of unvarnished insights I’m looking for. I will ponder them.

I’m a Catholic myself, but lament that I have had zero exposure to philosophy, neither from my education nor from the pulpit. Would that philosophy were more generally taught!

 

[JDaniel]

I’ve seen conflicting information. One idea is that Aquinas is talking about an essentially ordered series of essence and being, with “essence” acting as potentiality and “being” acting as the actuality. Thus, your existence now depends on the cells in your body, which depends on the atoms, which depends on the weak nuclear force, etc. And so it can’t go down to infinity because it’s essentially ordered.

But I’ve heard other interpretations as well, that seem to think he is talking about an accidentally ordered series. For one thing, the above interpretation would mean that he is talking about *material *causes, from what I can tell (your body is materially caused by cells, which are materially cause by atoms, etc).

But as he himself says he is talking about *efficient *causes in the Second Way, which seems to imply an *accidentally *ordered series and not an essentially ordered one. But if that’s the case, then how does he justify terminating the chain?

In short, I’m having problems reconciling “efficient causes” as mentioned in the Second Way, with “essentially ordered series” and thus the justification for “it can’t go to infinity.”

Hammie:

Welcome to CAF.

The simplest way that I know of - and even this takes a little forgiveness of some liberties that will be taken - is to envision an old-timey TV set. I don’t know if you have ever looked inside one, but they consisted of numerous solid state parts, transistors, resistors and capacitors, some had tubes, there were wires, circuits, etc. Maybe several hundred bits and pieces. At the front of the TV set was an off-on switch/volume control. The end result (the being desired, if we may take some liberty) was the picture shining forth from the picture tube and the sound ebbing from the loud speaker.

Now, although it took the picture tube some moments to warm up, think of the electric current traversing all of these components virtually instantaneously the moment the switch is turned to ‘On’. And, out from the front of the set are picture and sound, the instantiated being desired to come into existence.

The electricity, of course, was supplied via another set of similar components, but, let’s just take it from the point of origin at the power supply of the TV set. The switch is turned to On. The current travels virtually instantaneously from there, through all of the circuits, through each of the solid state and perhaps tube components, to the picture tube and loud speaker.

That is analogical to coming-to-be. As an analogy it is not a proof, as you no doubt know. Consider all of the circuits, tubes, transistors, picture tube, speaker as subordinately ordered efficient causes. For without them, the end-being would not exist.

Here is where we can view our analogic causes much as the real ones are in reality. The material cause is the box sitting there, with no sound or picture. Yet, it has the potential for sound/picture. Comes along the agent (the efficient cause) who flips the switch allowing the matter (material cause) to educe the formal cause, thus uniting with it, resulting in the final cause, which is the production of sound/picture for the enjoyment of the viewer.

The coming-to-be of new life is very much like the above. Consider the bits and pieces of all of the precursors of a zygote. There are: cells, male and female (usually) strands of DNA, fluids, amino acids, atoms, electromagnetic forces, etc. Now, all this stuff needs is someone to flip the switch. St. Thomas says, we call that someone, “God,” or “First Cause,” or “Principle.”

God bless,
jd