Can the Absolute Being contain created substance?

[Goblin_Taters]

I’m taking a metaphysics class in which we are learning Aristotilean and Thomistic distinctions. We covered the differences between absolute and contingent being, as well as between essence and existence, and so on.

I wonder how these might all apply to Trinitarian thought.

Supposedly, God is the efficient cause of the world. The efficient cause of the world cannot have any cause of its own, since that would indicate contigency and so God would not be the absolute being. But Scripture indicates that it is the Word (who is God as the second person of the Trinity, the Son) who is the creator of all things. God the Father spoke the Word and things came into being. The question I firstly have: is the Father the efficient cause of the Son? The Son is eternally begotten by the Father, and the Son receives all knowledge, power, mission and judgment from the Father. Is God the Father therefore the efficient cause of the Son? Or, does the immanent Trinity fall outside causality, being eternal?

A second question I have: Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Word is fully divine and fully human (in all ways but sin). His full divinity comes from the Word (God) and his full humanity comes through Mary, his natural mother. Since Jesus Christ is fully human, does this mean that he, at least in regards to his humanity, his flesh, blood and soul, is created and not uncreated? Is Jesus Christ fully uncreated (by virtue of the Word) and fully created (by virtue of the creation of his human body and soul)? If Christ in any way possesses created substance, can He be called absolute being? Or, would one have to say that he is contingent, created being? In other words, can absolute being contain created substance? It seems to me yes, but I’m interested in what others have to say. It also seems that the Christian concept of deification (that we are actually transformed into God, at the level of energies) lends credence to the belief that absolute being can contain created substance (human beings being deified)

 

[Eileen_T]

I don’t know how to answer you as it’s been a while since I read up on metaphysics stuff like this, but will bump this for you.

Have you read the Summa Theologica? I would recommend A Shorter Summa by Peter Kreeft. He also wrote Summa of the Summa, which is a much larger book, although not as large as the Summa Theologica.

 

[Truthstalker]

maybe Summa will help:

regarding the Trinity; newadvent.org/summa/1027.htm

regarding the Ascension: Look around question 57:
newadvent.org/summa/4.htm

I’m not sure this will fully answer your questions but it may.

 

[RobNY]

Supposedly, God is the efficient cause of the world. The efficient cause of the world cannot have any cause of its own, since that would indicate contigency and so God would not be the absolute being. But Scripture indicates that it is the Word (who is God as the second person of the Trinity, the Son) who is the creator of all things. God the Father spoke the Word and things came into being. The question I firstly have: is the Father the efficient cause of the Son? The Son is eternally begotten by the Father, and the Son receives all knowledge, power, mission and judgment from the Father. Is God the Father therefore the efficient cause of the Son? Or, does the immanent Trinity fall outside causality, being eternal?

The Father is the source of the Godhead, I do believe, for He both generates the Son and spirates the Spirit. However, we must take note of the distinction, “begotten, not made.” I’m not sure it would be proper to ascribe the term, ‘efficient cause’ to the process-- I’d rather stick with begetting/begotten.

A second question I have: Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Word is fully divine and fully human (in all ways but sin). His full divinity comes from the Word (God) and his full humanity comes through Mary, his natural mother. Since Jesus Christ is fully human, does this mean that he, at least in regards to his humanity, his flesh, blood and soul, is created and not uncreated? [etc…]

Ok. This seems to call for the communicatio idiomatum-- the communication of idioms. Developed in response to Nestorius, it finds the proper way of speaking of the divine person of Christ, and His two natures.

…/ N(D)
…/
P
…
…\ N(H)

The, “P” represents the divine Person, or the Subject. The N(D) represents the divine nature. The N(H) represents the human nature.

The communcation of idioms works thus: whatever we can predicate of the natures, we can predicate of the person. However, the opposite is not true. Whatever we predicate of the divine nature cannot be predicated of the human nature. Whatever we predicate of the human nature cannot be predicated of the divine nature.

My diagram is slightly lacking-- note that the lines are leading from a nature to the person in one direction only. It would be best represented with arrows pointing toward person, which I cannot do.

Now, this leads to some rather interesting things. When we speak of the subject-- whether we say, “Jesus,” or, “the Son” or, “God” we can affirm anything proper to either nature. So if we can say, “God was crucified,” and, “Jesus is the creator of the world” we are correct.

Let’s have a hand at this now:

Since Jesus Christ is fully human, does this mean that he, at least in regards to his humanity, his flesh, blood and soul, is created and not uncreated?

As regards His human nature He is created. It is legitimate to say, “Jesus is created.”

Is Jesus Christ fully uncreated (by virtue of the Word) and fully created (by virtue of the creation of his human body and soul)?

Jesus is uncreated. Jesus is created. But this seems contradictory, so to be a bit more specific: Jesus is uncreated according to His divine nature and Jesus is created according to His human nature.

If Christ in any way possesses created substance, can He be called absolute being? Or, would one have to say that he is contingent, created being? In other words, can absolute being contain created substance? It seems to me yes, but I’m interested in what others have to say.

As long as it is remembered that both natures in Christ are united hypostatically (that is, in the person), such that they are neither confused nor merged, yet remain distinct, but indivisibly united, then we’re doing fine. As such we know that Christ’s divine nature is uncreated, ‘absolute’ being, pure act, etc…

It also seems that the Christian concept of deification (that we are actually transformed into God, at the level of energies) lends credence to the belief that absolute being can contain created substance (human beings being deified)

Do you have an Eastern point of view? I’m just wondering, because I didn’t think people usually used the terminology of, “energies” except when using Eastern theology (not that there’s anything wrong with that, of course).

You’ll have to be more specific about what you mean when you say that, “absolute being can contain created substance.”

I would say this. The deified/divinized human being *becomes by grace what God is by nature. *This seems to speak more about the human nature containing the divine then vice versa. Although in John Jesus does seem to refer to a type of mutual indwelling. I’d look there for more food for thought on your question.

-Rob

 

[DanteAlighieri]

Goblin Taters (great nickname, btw!):

I think the notion that the Trinity, being eternal, is beyond the scope of causality is the correct track. It’s been years since I studied Aristotle or Aquinas, and even then I wasn’t as diligent as I ought to have been. Nonetheless, it seems that Aristotle’s notion of causality implies a linear sequence of events, which you see in Aquinas’ use of Aristotitelian terminology to prove the existence of God – not of each Person of the Trinity.

What I’m saying is that before all change was set in motion, there was God (the Trinity being eternal). Prior to the beginning of the history of the universe, there was no “change”, per se. Thus, in Aristotelian/Thomistic terms, God (the Trinity) is the efficient cause of all change – i.e., the Unmoved Mover.

It is God’s nature to be Triune; there was no “before the Son was created”.

I hope this makes sense – and I hope I haven’t embarrassed myself…

Peace,
Dante

 

[DanteAlighieri]

My diagram is slightly lacking-- note that the lines are leading from a nature to the person in one direction only. It would be best represented with arrows pointing toward person, which I cannot do.

Is this what you had in mind?



Peace,
Dante

 

[Ghosty]

It also seems that the Christian concept of deification (that we are actually transformed into God, at the level of energies) lends credence to the belief that absolute being can contain created substance (human beings being deified)

We are “contained” by God not in the sense of us making up a part of Him, but in that we categorically fall under “Divine” according to Grace. Divinity is uncreated in itself, but our sharing in it is created by definition.

This is where St. Thomas Aquinas’ theology of “participation” becomes critical to understand, and it’s best to read the Summa for that. There’s a sense in which we are contained by Divinity, in a categorical way, and a sense in which we contain Divinity, in the sense of personal possession by participation. In lay terms, Divinity envelopes us, and we utilize it by our own operation rather than merely being operated upon by God.

You can think of it like fire and iron, a classic theological example utilized by the Fathers and by Aquinas. When iron is heated, fire contains the iron categorically, since the iron becomes a “firey thing”. The essence of fire doesn’t change, however, just because iron shares in it; fire remains exactly what it was before iron came in contact with it, and will remain exactly the same if iron leaves contact. Iron also remains unchanged in a certain sense, since it doesn’t become fire essentially (it remains as iron), but it does share completely in fire in a way that fire doesn’t share in iron; the iron becomes completely “firey” whereas the fire doesn’t become “iron-y”. It’s a one-way sharing in that sense, with the mutable form (iron, since it’s potentially firey by nature) aquiring from the immutable form (fire, since it doesn’t have the potential of aquiring the form of iron).

Of course the Incarnation is a whole other ball of wax, with a union of natures occuring in the Person, as opposed to it happening on the level of nature (which would lead to Monophysitism). The Person of the Son assumes a created human nature, and operates on the level of creatures, without losing the Divine Nature, operating eternally on the level of God. The created humanity of Christ DOES have the same kind of Grace that we can have too, however, so the above does apply to Christ on that level; the “iron” of Christ’s humanity is heated and becomes “firey” by Divine Grace.

St. Thomas Aquinas spends a great deal of time going over the unique aspects of the Incarnation in the Summa, so it’s worth reading. RobNY’s run down is an excellent starter, however.

 

[ricmat]

I suspect the answer to your question is “no.”

I’m attempting to read a book right now that is way over my head (it’s mostly philosophy, written by a physics PHD).

This book “The Science before Science” goes into your question in great detail. It might be worth reading (if you have a talent for this sort of thing).

 

[Nita]

I’m taking a metaphysics class in which we are learning Aristotilean and Thomistic distinctions. We covered the differences between absolute and contingent being, as well as between essence and existence, and so on.

I wonder how these might all apply to Trinitarian thought.

Supposedly, God is the efficient cause of the world. The efficient cause of the world cannot have any cause of its own, since that would indicate contigency and so God would not be the absolute being. But Scripture indicates that it is the Word (who is God as the second person of the Trinity, the Son) who is the creator of all things. God the Father spoke the Word and things came into being. The question I firstly have: is the Father the efficient cause of the Son? The Son is eternally begotten by the Father, and the Son receives all knowledge, power, mission and judgment from the Father. Is God the Father therefore the efficient cause of the Son? Or, does the immanent Trinity fall outside causality, being eternal?

The portion underlined contains the answer to your two questions. If the Father were the efficient cause of the Second Person, the Son, that would mean the Son would be a contingent being and therefore not absolute being, not God. We know that the Son IS God, therefore the relationship between Him and the Father cannot include the Father being efficient cause.

I think.

Nita