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Pieman333272
Guest
I object on the ground that you’re defining “god” as a mind without parts without evidence, while we don’t even know what a mind without parts is since all minds that we know of have parts. It’s basically defining “god” out of having the same problem that natural phenomenon would have. Now if it could be demonstrated that there is a mind without parts, that would be an excellent topic of a new thread.
Perhaps an analogy would clarify my objection. I realize that this analogy is imperfect, but I think you’re smart enough to get what I’m trying to say anyways. Lets say that someone claimed that the Wright Brothers designed an aircraft that didn’t use any power whatsoever to fly. One could make up a word (say “besba”) and define it as “an aircraft that doesn’t use any power whatsoever to fly,” and consider the problem solved: The Wright Brothers designed a “besba”. However, this doesn’t actually solve the problem. A better explanation would be that they designed a glider that uses kinetic energy built up by something or someone taking high up and letting it go. Even if we lacked evidence of something (such as an airplane that gave it a lift) giving energy to it, that alone doesn’t confirm that there really is an aircraft that doesn’t use any power whatsoever to fly, and throwing “an aircraft that doesn’t use any power whatsoever to fly” into the definition of a word doesn’t mean that that entity has that characteristic.
In the case that Dawkins lays out, he says that a designer god cannot be used to explain organized complexity in the universe since that god would demand the same explanation in his (her?) own right. It’s like going from “what made the universe” to “what made god”. The same problems apply to a god even if someone tries to define god as an entity that somehow doesn’t have those problems.
Truthseeker claims that we cannot say God is a mind with no parts (the standard objection to Dawkins’ “Improbability of the Designer” argument or whatever) because we have neither A) evidence of this being possible in the world or B) even the concept of a mind without parts because all minds we know of have parts.Let me say that there does not need to be a natural equivalent to every possible trait God has for it to be possible. For the sake of example, it is possible for God, provided he exists, to be eternal even though nothing in the natural world is known to be eternal. I think you would agree with me here and if not I can expand on this point.
I object that God doesn’t need an equivalent or evidence of a trait of his in this world in order for it to be possible. I am working on a more comprehensive objection but I want to think it through first.
To all, feel free to reply to either of our points. Truthseeker, I hope to see your reply soon.