Elzee:
But doesn’t the Church teach that if we are in a state of mortal sin and have lost sanctifying grace from our soul that the judgment is hell?
Yes, if one dies impenitent of *formal *mortal sin.
It sounds like you’re saying the sin may be mortal, but the *judgment is subjective even though the sin is mortal. *
Yes. Objectively grave sin required subjective elements to be present for the sin to be formally mortal sin. Otherwise it is said only to be materially a mortal sin, which carries the guilt of venial sin or no guilt at all if invincible ignorance is the cause.
For example, I’m shooting my gun at a box for target practice. I had no way of knowing that inside the box, a child was hiding. Killing the child was a grave sin (materially), but I was ignorant of my sin (lack full advertence) and did not perfectly will to commit grave sin. I may be partially culpable insofar as I may have done more to know that a child was hidden in the box (ie. vincibly ignorant). Yet, as voluntariness diminishes, so too does culpability.
The other case is also true… I THINK that I’m about to shoot someone and kill them. However, I don’t know that someone put blanks in the gun. Although I do not actually kill the guy, I am guilty of grave sin for attempting to do so. If I had full advertence and perfect consent to commit murder (a grave matter) and deliberately acted in order to do so, my act was formally a mortal sin, even if the guy didn’t even get shot.
I thought the Church taught it the other way around - if the sin is mortal, then you lose sanctifying grace and spiritual death follows. If there is room for subjective judgment, then the sin wasn’t a mortal sin for that particular person. Doesn’t mean it wasn’t serious, but it doesn’ t cause spiritual death. Do I have this wrong?
Perhaps. I’m not clear on what you are saying.
According to St. Thomas Aquinas,
… a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act…This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is destroyed. (ST IIa, 88, 6)
Lack of “deliberate reason” required for a moral act means the lack of full advertence and perfect consent.
What this means is…
What is an objectively mortal sin can carry
no culpability, if the moral act
completely lacks deliberate reason (e.g., an accidental killing).
What is an objectively mortal sin can carry some but not complete culpability, if the moral act
partially lacks deliberate reason. This can be cause by many number of impediments to one’s intellect or will (as in a very immature child or an adult with dimished capacity to reason or act voluntarily).
It is a subjective judgment indeed, but it is a judgment made by only God. No other person can know with perfect knowledge whether the subjective elements of mortal sin are present.
Mortal sin requires: 1) grave matter, 2) full advertence of the intellect, 3) perfect consent of the will.
The Church has the competence and authority to determine what is objectively mortal sin, that is, what is a sin of grave matter. She also teaches us that subjective elements must be present to be culpable for the full guilt of mortal sin.
Murder is grave matter. However, if a child (or an adult) lacks full advertence OR perfect consent, then the objectively mortal sin is said to lack the proper “form” of a mortal sin, and as such is said not to be “
formal sin” but merely “
material sin.”
God’s justice and mercy are perfect, and they take the subjective impediments to each individual soul into consideration. A sin must be fully voluntary to be fully culpable. And you can’t fake ignorance or involuntariness with God. So, we trust God will make the right judgement on such matters.
To insist strictly upon the “age of seven” as being the magical number of accountability is a bit absurd. It is intended, I think, as a “rule of thumb” for canonical purposes, but as St. Thomas states, law is for the good in general, but not necessarily in particular (cf. *Summa Theologica *IIa, 96, 6). That’s precisely why we have such a thing as “dispensation” from the law, because in particular, the Law-giver’s spirit and intent may not be fulfilled by the letter of the law for particular circumstances.