Can unintended bad consequences make an act immoral?

[Ron_Conte]

Some persons claim that, if the reasonably anticipated bad consequences of an act are unintended, those consequences are an “unintended side effect” and therefore cannot make the act immoral. This is not true. It is a misunderstanding of the principle of double effect. Here is a good summary of that principle:
ascensionhealth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81&Itemid=171

Notice this indispensable condition: “The object of the act must not be intrinsically contradictory to one’s fundamental commitment to God and neighbor (including oneself), that is, it must be a good action judged by its moral object (in other words, the action must not be intrinsically evil);”

An act with an evil moral object, in other words, an intrinsically evil act, can never be justified by the principle of double effect.

Neither can any intention or circumstance transform an intrinsically evil act into an act that is moral.

Pope John Paul II: "“If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain ‘irremediably’ evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person… Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act ‘subjectively’ good or defensible as a choice.” (Veritatis Splendor, n. 81).

But even if the moral object of an act is good, the unintended bad consequences still carry moral weight when evaluating the font of morality called circumstances. It is always a sin to act, knowing that your act will do more harm than good. So if the reasonably anticipated bad consequences – unintended though they may be – outweigh the reasonably anticipated good consequences, then the choice of that act is a sin.

In the principle of double effect, this is described thusly: “The foreseen beneficial effects must be equal to or greater than the foreseen harmful effects (the proportionate judgment);”. So when we evaluate the circumstances of an act, we must consider which is greater, the good effects or the bad effects. If the bad effects are greater, even if they are unintended, then the act is a sin.

 

[Khalid]

An action with intended good consequences but which nevertheless has a negative consequence can not be immoral according to the principle of double effect. The classical illustration of this is pain management in palliative care: the good consequence is that the patient need not suffer needlessly. The unintended negative consequence is that it may hasten death. In that case, the act of providing pain relief is not immoral.

From this one example, most applications of the principle can be deduced.

 

[Ron_Conte]

An action with intended good consequences but which nevertheless has a negative consequence can not be immoral according to the principle of double effect. The classical illustration of this is pain management in palliative care: the good consequence is that the patient need not suffer needlessly. The unintended negative consequence is that it may hasten death. In that case, the act of providing pain relief is not immoral.

From this one example, most applications of the principle can be deduced.

The principle of double effect does not ignore the moral weight of unintended bad consequences. The bad effects must be outweighed by the good effects AND not be sought as the intended end of the act.

See this explanation of the principle of double effect.

 

[Jaaanosik]

Can unintended bad consequences make an act immoral?

Sure it can. That’s the double effect principle in a nutshell. That’s how morality of an act is checked.
In other words, the end result does not justify the means. The act is immoral if it brings evil effects.
The tricky part is that based on this an act can be immoral for one person but moral for another.
… there are more things to be considered per case basis.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Sure it can. That’s the double effect principle in a nutshell. That’s how morality of an act is checked.
In other words, the end result does not justify the means. The act is immoral if it brings evil effects.
The tricky part is that based on this an act can be immoral for one person but moral for another.
… there are more things to be considered per case basis.

Yes, that’s right. The circumstances vary from one case to another, and the moral evaluation of the good and bad consequences in the circumstances can be tricky.

But the principle of double effect never justifies an intrinsically evil act.

 

[Jaaanosik]

Yes, that’s right. The circumstances vary from one case to another, and the moral evaluation of the good and bad consequences in the circumstances can be tricky.

But the principle of double effect never justifies an intrinsically evil act.

Correct, but not only that. Even an intrinsically good act can be immoral if it brings evil effects.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Correct, but not only that. Even an intrinsically good act can be immoral if it brings evil effects.

Yes. Nothing prevents an act that is immoral under one font from being also immoral under other fonts. If any one font of morality is bad, the act is a sin. But some sins have two or three bad fonts.

If an intrinsically evil act has greater bad consequences than good consequences, then the act is a sin due to an evil moral object and due to the circumstances.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I am trying to get a better understanding re object, purpose (intended end) and circumstances (as defined by Aquinas) by means of the following question raised in another thread (but noone appears able to clarify):

For example fornication, adultery and conjugal sex … they appear to exhibit the same external behaviour (sexual intercourse).
(1) Is intercourse the “object” of these different human acts (which therefore have the same object)?
(2) Can the legal state of the persons involved be considered within the compass of “circumstances” (i.e. in fornication the couple are both unmarried, in adultery the couple are married but not to each other, in conjugal sex the couple are married to each other)? If not why not?
(3) How would you understand “intention” in the above. What exactly does “intention” target in these cases: obviously the external behaviour (the “object”?) must be intended as a minimum otherwise it would not be a human act, it would be the act of a man (like sleep-walking). I am not sure that people “intend” to “fornicate” or to “commit adultery” … rather do they seek comfort or to satisfy lust or whatever … but hardly do they directly seek to sin against their state (“circumstance”?) in life (e.g. single or married) though that is objectively what they do also.
(4) What exactly is the difference between “external behaviour”, “the object of a human act” and the “human act” itself in the above examples.
(5) And just to confuse things more … what about mistaken Oedipus bedding his mother thinking she was legally his wife? Was that fornication (or worse) or conjugal sex?
(6) What exactly are Oedipus’s intention, circumstance and object here that appear to make fornication OK (until their true state(“circumstance”?) is known?
(7) If fornication is intrinsically evil then Oedipus’s mistaken intention or mistaken circumstances should not make this act morally acceptable?

I suspect the evolved English words “intention, object and circumstance” no longer well translate the meaning of the Latin equivalents.

Any enlightenment appreciated.

 

[Uzziah1]

Some persons claim that, if the reasonably anticipated bad consequences of an act are unintended, those consequences are an “unintended side effect” and therefore cannot make the act immoral. This is not true. It is a misunderstanding of the principle of double effect. Here is a good summary of that principle:
ascensionhealth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81&Itemid=171

Notice this indispensable condition: “The object of the act must not be intrinsically contradictory to one’s fundamental commitment to God and neighbor (including oneself), that is, it must be a good action judged by its moral object (in other words, the action must not be intrinsically evil);”

An act with an evil moral object, in other words, an intrinsically evil act, can never be justified by the principle of double effect.

Neither can any intention or circumstance transform an intrinsically evil act into an act that is moral.

Pope John Paul II: "“If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain ‘irremediably’ evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person… Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act ‘subjectively’ good or defensible as a choice.” (Veritatis Splendor, n. 81).

But even if the moral object of an act is good, the unintended bad consequences still carry moral weight when evaluating the font of morality called circumstances. It is always a sin to act, knowing that your act will do more harm than good. So if the reasonably anticipated bad consequences – unintended though they may be – outweigh the reasonably anticipated good consequences, then the choice of that act is a sin.

In the principle of double effect, this is described thusly: “The foreseen beneficial effects must be equal to or greater than the foreseen harmful effects (the proportionate judgment);”. So when we evaluate the circumstances of an act, we must consider which is greater, the good effects or the bad effects. If the bad effects are greater, even if they are unintended, then the act is a sin.

If the bad consequences on an act – speeding through a neighborhood street in your car at 80 mph so that you smash into and kill little Johnny – are reasonably anticipatable, God will charge you with the responbsibility of causing the harm.

If the bad consequences of an act – just calling, “JOHNNY, IT’S TIME FOR DINNER!” and as little Johnny crosses the street in response, a car whips around the corner at 80 miles per hour and smashes into him and kills him – are not reasonably anticipatable, God will not charge you with the responsibility of causing the harm by just calling, “JOHNNY, IT’S TIME FOR DINNER!”

 

[Ron_Conte]

I am trying to get a better understanding re object, purpose (intended end) and circumstances (as defined by Aquinas) by means of the following question raised in another thread (but noone appears able to clarify):

The three fonts of morality:

1. intention
2. moral object
3. circumstances

The second font is perhaps the most difficult to understand. It is the deliberately chosen (intentionally chosen, voluntarily chosen, knowingly chosen) objective act (for example an exterior action or an interior act in the mind and heart), with its inherent moral meaning before God (its moral nature or moral ‘species’ – the type of act in terms of morality), as determined by the moral object. The moral object is the morally-immediate (proximate) end, toward which the chosen act is intrinsically ordered. It is this inherent ordering of the act towards its proximate end that makes the act intrinsically evil or intrinsically good (good or evil by the type of the act), not the attainment of that moral object.

For example fornication, adultery and conjugal sex … they appear to exhibit the same external behaviour (sexual intercourse).

We cannot separate the external behavior from its inherent moral meaning. In the case of natural marital relations open to life, the act has its proper threefold moral object: the marital, unitive, and procreative meanings. So the act is intrinsically good. In the case of fornication, the act is non-marital. Adultery is non-marital, and it also has a second evil moral object, the breaking of marital vows. Contracepted sex within marriage is immoral because it thwarts the procreative meaning. Any deprivation of the marital or unitive or procreative meanings in a sexual act makes that act intrinsically evil, due to an evil moral object.

(1) Is intercourse the “object” of these different human acts (which therefore have the same object)?

The term intercourse is a partial description of each of these acts; it is only partial because it lacks information needed to determine the moral object – are the marital, unitive, and procreative meanings present or absent?

(2) Can the legal state of the persons involved be considered within the compass of “circumstances” (i.e. in fornication the couple are both unmarried, in adultery the couple are married but not to each other, in conjugal sex the couple are married to each other)? If not why not?

The term circumstances in moral theology refers to future consequences, good or bad, which can be reasonably anticipated at the time that the act is chosen, based on the past and present situation. The term does not have the same meaning as in common parlance. Any factor that pertains to the moral object, to the nature of the act itself, is not a circumstance.

(3) How would you understand “intention” in the above. What exactly does “intention” target in these cases: obviously the external behaviour (the “object”?) must be intended as a minimum otherwise it would not be a human act, it would be the act of a man (like sleep-walking). I am not sure that people “intend” to “fornicate” or to “commit adultery” … rather do they seek comfort or to satisfy lust or whatever … but hardly do they directly seek to sin against their state (“circumstance”?) in life (e.g. single or married) though that is objectively what they do also.

The human will is the source of all three fonts:

1. the will chooses an intended end, the purpose or reason for choosing the act
2. the will intentionally chooses the act, with its inherent moral meaning as determined by its moral object
3. the will makes these choices in the reasonable anticipation of the good and bad consequences of the act.

Each font proceeds from the human will to a different type of end:

1. the intended end
2. the moral object (the proximate end toward which the act is ordered)
3. the end results (consequences)

But the intentional choice of an intrinsically evil act, even for a good intended end, is always immoral. Intention has a different application to each font.

(4) What exactly is the difference between “external behaviour”, “the object of a human act” and the “human act” itself in the above examples.

The human act includes three parts: the external behavior (or the interior ‘behavior’ for an interior act), its moral nature (inherent moral meaning before God), and its moral object.

(5) And just to confuse things more … what about mistaken Oedipus bedding his mother thinking she was legally his wife? Was that fornication (or worse) or conjugal sex?

All intrinsically evil acts are intentionally chosen, i.e. deliberately chosen. So, for example, if a person asserts a falsehood, believing that it is true, he is not deliberately asserting a falsehood. And so his act is not even objectively a lie. He chose a type of act ordered toward expressing a truth; his act failed to attain that end, but he still chose the right type of act.

In the case of Oedipus, he was invincibly ignorant; he did not deliberately choose a disordered type of act, and so his act (marrying a close relative) was not intrinsically evil.

 

[Bookcat]

Catechism of the Catholic Church:

I. THE SOURCES OF MORALITY

1750 The morality of human acts depends on:

• the object chosen;
• the end in view or the intention;
• the circumstances of the action.

The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.

1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.

1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one’s whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one’s neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it.

1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).39

1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.

II. GOOD ACTS AND EVIL ACTS

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).

The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.

1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

IN BRIEF

1757 The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the three “sources” of the morality of human acts.

1758 The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing accordingly as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil.

1759 “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). The end does not justify the means.

1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

1761 There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s1c1a4.htm

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Catechism of the Catholic Church:

I. THE SOURCES OF MORALITY

1750 The morality of human acts depends on:

• the object chosen;
• the end in view or the intention;
• the circumstances of the action.

The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.

1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.

1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one’s whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one’s neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it.

1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).39

1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.

II. GOOD ACTS AND EVIL ACTS

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).

The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.

1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

IN BRIEF

1757 The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the three “sources” of the morality of human acts.

1758 The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing accordingly as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil.

1759 “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). The end does not justify the means.

1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

1761 There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s1c1a4.htm

Bookcat
Thanks for this - I too am a great fan of grounding discussions on solid sources. I did read this and VS three to four times over before making my post.

This is actually a very difficult topic and different schools of thought (even amongst Thomists) start disagreeing over some points (not just the fine ones) as soon as the scalpal gets below the surface. English translation only makes the topic more fraught and easily confusing.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The three fonts of morality:

RonConte
Thankyou for your considered response. There is a lot to digest here and so prob best done slowly. Initially there are some ambiguities and jargon that needs to be further elucidated before I can get a good handle on your contribution.

(1) "The moral object is the…chosen objective act (for example an exterior action)…with its inherent…moral nature. It is…the immediate end.
This is a bit confusing. Can you define what you man by “objective act”?

In english “objective act” tends to mean observable exterior behaviour/action that can be described independently of the subjective views/judgements of the actor or other witnesses. Thus “homicide” is an observable act of killing someone but “murder” is not quite the same because it involves a further judgement of “unjust” (e.g. by a court or witness hearsay) and cannot be “observed”. Therefore “murder” is not an “objective exterior action” precisely because this word adds “unjust” to the definition.

Thus by “objective” we usually seek to expressly exclude moral judgements concerning the external behaviour. An “object”, precisely because it is “objective” is, in modern thinking, without inherent moral nature. Thus “killing” or “sexual intercourse” “in itself” is neither good nor bad. It is just externally observed behaviour. Therefore when you say the “object” can be exemplified by “an exterior action” I do not think this is correct - even in Thomistic terms… unless **“exterior action” ** means something completely different from what colloquial english means by that phrase.

Are you able to re-define what you understand the “object” of a human act to be without re-using the words “objective”, “act” or “action?” Using the word “behaviour” would be helpful.

(2) "We cannot separate external behavior from its inherent moral meaning. In…natural marital relations…the act has its proper threefold moral object… In the case of fornication, the act is non-marital."
Again, not sure what you mean here. It seems to me that we, by definition, do separate “external behaviour” from “inherent moral meaning” . That is what makes “external behaviour” external by definition.

That may be why this statement is probably incomprehensible to the average intelligent lay person. “Fornication” is abstract and technical and does much more than simply describe “external behaviour.” Testosterone fired (or “brainwashed”) swingers generally don’t intend to “fornicate” - they intend to have “pleasurable sex” without any further thought or meaning given to it. “Fornication” is the definition that a jurist would use and requires the assistance of law (whether positive or natural or divine) to make a few extra judgements.

The use of such juridical criteria to further conclude that sexual behaviour is “non marital” or “fornication” seems to add something on to the “external behaviour” which therefore means we are no longer dealing with pure “external” behaviour? So we again come back to the problem identified in (1) above.

(3) "Intercourse is a partial description of each of these acts; it is only partial because it lacks information needed to determine the moral object - are the marital, unitive, and procreative meanings present or absent?"
This well sums up the difficulties raised above. If we are truly talking about “external behaviour” then “intercourse” does appear to be perfectly sufficient to define the object of intention in a human act. Understandably this is not the case so far as your exposition is concerned.

Therefore an “exterior action” cannot be an example of the “object.” Therefore “exterior action” is not the same as “external behaviour”.

So the problem is - what does “exterior action” actually mean?

(4) "The term circumstances in moral theology refers to future consequences. Any factor that pertains to the moral object, to the nature of the act itself, is not a circumstance."
This is an unusual view I have never seen before. Circumstances can involve consequences (the need for foresight) but, as I have seen it, Aquinas generally holds they refer to factors that diminish/increase responsibility (e.g. coercion is not a consequence).
What is your source for this view?

(5) "The human act includes three parts: the external behavior…its moral nature and its moral object."
Can you provide your source for this understanding, I have never seen this before.
I thought you were saying that it was the “(moral) object” that can be divided into external (or internal) action and inherent moral meaning. Yet now you are saying it is the “human act” that is divided up so?