I’ve heard this argument quite a bit recently. Basically, a lot of people say that we can’t really choose our beliefs. It’s usually supported by the person challenging everybody to believe in absurd thing X for a certain amount of money. You can say you believe it, but as the argument goes, you can’t choose to actually believe something.
Now if this argument goes through, it has some implications on the justice of Hell, because if heresy is a mortal sin like (I think) the Catholic doctrine is, then God sends people to Hell for a belief that the person couldn’t choose to not have.
What is your response to this?
Well, obviously giving a single counterexample in this case shows only that “it is not the case that you can choose
all of your beliefs.” That much seems fairly obvious. It of course does not follow that you cannot choose
any of your beliefs.
Take confirmation bias, for example. In such a case, one resists evidence contrary to one’s beliefs. I imagine in some cases (though certainly not all), confirmation bias is consciously willed, and that seems to be a case of choosing your beliefs.
Arguably much of our hypothetical investigations in the sciences (and even mathematics) require adopting beliefs (sometimes conditionally). A scientist who has some evidence for a proposition might start believing that it is true. He conducts more research and finds that it is in fact false. Part of his inquiry was guided and marked by the belief that it was true (though he may have understood that belief to be provisional). I suspect similar cases are at play in mathematics (my field); it is difficult to motivate a proof for a proposition without coming to believe it first. Even if you
don’t know whether it is true, as you are attempting to prove it, you have adopted it as a conditional belief.
(This is a positive sense in which choosing beliefs is central to the scientific enterprise. However, it seems likely that scientific beliefs are chosen in negative ways as well… Read some of the recent technocrats writing about artificial intelligence or transhumanism, for example.)
I suspect much knowledge acquired through authority and testimony can also be chosen, where observational grounds are not directly accessible but where rational belief is still possible. For instance, someone tells you that a bridge is not safe–though it looks safe to you. But you desperately need to get to the other side. You will weigh the relative benefits of the risk of injury with your need to get to the other side. Your valuation of your safety or the good on the other side, which I’d contend is a matter of choice, will determine your course of action.