Capital punishment and protection from error

  • Thread starter Thread starter sw85
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
Will you please respond to the rest of the post?
OK
God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice (this does not mean just punishment and something else besides. Indeed, it can mean something more complete than, yet different from the just punishment);
I have already noted that there are times when it is inappropriate to impose the just punishment (the one the crime deserves), nor can anything I’ve said be taken to mean I oppose mercy. When you write that* "it **can *mean" something else that is a bit ambiguous. Unless justice **always **means something more complete than the “just punishment” then there are times when that punishment (in this case, execution) should be used, and I’ll point out again that the justness of a punishment is determined by the severity of the crime, not by any other usefulness it has to society.
The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: “Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven you” (Ephesians 4:32)
This is the obligation of the individual. The obligation of the State is to punish the wicked.
Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy.
I agree. In some cases mercy is appropriate but in others it is justice that* “appears more forcibly.”* This again supports the idea that the death penalty has its place as an act of justice that is independent of what is needed to protect society.

Now - will you respond to the question I asked in post #218?

Ender
 
I have already noted that there are times when it is inappropriate to impose the just punishment (the one the crime deserves), nor can anything I’ve said be taken to mean I oppose mercy. When you write that* “it **can ***mean” something else that is a bit ambiguous. Unless justice **always **means something more complete than the “just punishment” then there are times when that punishment (in this case, execution) should be used, and I’ll point out again that the justness of a punishment is determined by the severity of the crime, not by any other usefulness it has to society.
This thread is about the normative, not the extreme. In other words, we are discussing most cases, not all cases.
This is the obligation of the individual. The obligation of the State is to punish the wicked.
Is not the State composed of a collection of individuals? Should the State not act in harmony with their collective will?
I agree. In some cases mercy is appropriate but in others it is justice that* “appears more forcibly.”* This again supports the idea that the death penalty has its place as an act of justice that is independent of what is needed to protect society.
By parsing the quote more fully per the rules of grammar, we arrive at “in some [works] justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy [appears more forcibly]”

Therefore, since mercy can indeed “appear more forcibly”, the statement neither supports the use of the death penalty nor opposes it as a concept.
Now - will you respond to the question I asked in post #218?
You have yet to address “punishing short”
 
The discussion is really about the proper punishment for the guilty.
But the death penalty debate needs to involve more than that, otherwise its callous and immoral. Can you safely make sure that you don’t execute an innocent man?
This is the obligation of the individual. The obligation of the State is to punish the wicked.
The obligation of the state is also to protect the innocent.
 
This thread is about the normative, not the extreme. In other words, we are discussing most cases, not all cases.
2267 holds that the only valid reason to execute someone is if it is needed to protect society and that this is true even in the most extreme cases. The point being that the position fails if it can be shown to be incorrect even at the extremes.
Is not the State composed of a collection of individuals? Should the State not act in harmony with their collective will?
No. The right and the duty to avenge crimes has been taken from the individual and handed to the state. The individual must not punish but the state must not fail to punish.
By parsing the quote more fully per the rules of grammar, we arrive at “in some [works] justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy [appears more forcibly]”
Therefore, since mercy can indeed “appear more forcibly”, the statement neither supports the use of the death penalty nor opposes it as a concept.
True. But this means that mercy does not apply in all cases, which - again - is inconsistent with 2267.
You have yet to address “punishing short”
Sure I have; it’s just another term for mercy and I have said that while it is surely justified in some cases it is just as surely not justified in all.

Now, about that question in #218 …

Ender
 
But the death penalty debate needs to involve more than that, otherwise its callous and immoral.
I think the moral question is resolved by determining the “proper punishment for the guilty.” Surely if we apply the punishment that is appropriate to the circumstances we have done exactly what should be done.
Can you safely make sure that you don’t execute an innocent man?
Punishment presupposes “full ascertainment of the identity and responsibility of the offender.” (2267) The question we are debating is - once this condition has been met - what is the proper punishment for (e.g.) murder and can it be execution?
The obligation of the state is also to protect the innocent.
Yes it is, but what will your response be if social scientists determine that more of the innocent will be spared if capital punishment is greatly expanded? If your opposition to capital punishment is based solely on protecting the innocent then your position could be completely reversed in the future. In fact it might be that you would have to support it in one country and oppose it in another which clearly shows that the issue has left the realm of morality and become merely a practical consideration.

Ender
 
2267 holds that the only valid reason to execute someone is if it is needed to protect society and that this is true even in the most extreme cases. The point being that the position fails if it can be shown to be incorrect even at the extremes.
Yet, within the punishment of murderers, there is also a normative and an extreme. For your typical, loner Joe Murderer, there is no possiblility of him extending further harm if he is merely locked away with limited contact with others. It is therefore possible to protect society in the proposed manner. This is true for over 99% of cases.

The extreme is the sociopathic mass murderer with a cult-like following (such as bin Laden). Such an individual could inspire great violence even by being totally removed from contact from any human being by merely being alive.
No. The right and the duty to avenge crimes has been taken from the individual and handed to the state. The individual must not punish but the state must not fail to punish.
I wrote nothing about individuals punishing. I did write that the State can act in harmony with the collective will of the individuals of which it is comprised. That is: If the people find it distasteful to execute criminals who can be safely locked away then the State is within its right to act in that manner.
True. But this means that mercy does not apply in all cases, which - again - is inconsistent with 2267.
I don’t understand this objection - especially from one who so vehemently opposes the language of 2267
the cases in which the execution of the offender is an absolute necessity "are very rare, if not practically non-existent."
Sure I have; it’s just another term for mercy and I have said that while it is surely justified in some cases it is just as surely not justified in all.

Where have I ever asserted “all”?
Now, about that question in #218 …

Ender

You are incorrect in your assumption.
 
I think the moral question is resolved by determining the “proper punishment for the guilty.” Surely if we apply the punishment that is appropriate to the circumstances we have done exactly what should be done.

Punishment presupposes “full ascertainment of the identity and responsibility of the offender.” (2267) The question we are debating is - once this condition has been met - what is the proper punishment for (e.g.) murder and can it be execution?
When debating the death penalty, the consequences and implications of the death penalty need to be involved.
Yes it is, but what will your response be if social scientists determine that more of the innocent will be spared if capital punishment is greatly expanded? If your opposition to capital punishment is based solely on protecting the innocent then your position could be completely reversed in the future. In fact it might be that you would have to support it in one country and oppose it in another which clearly shows that the issue has left the realm of morality and become merely a practical consideration.
I would not be opposed to capital punishment in a case where a hypothetical state could safely make the guarantee that they are sure they are never executing innocent men. It is morally wrong for a state to accept even a tiny number of innocent men executed as “collateral damage”. That would actually be murder on the part of the state, and would be no different than the abused child in “The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas” or the tribute sent to the minotaur.
 
I would not be opposed to capital punishment in a case where a hypothetical state could safely make the guarantee that they are sure they are never executing innocent men.
Are we then agreed that it is moral to execute a murderer known to be guilty as a matter of justice whether or not it is needed to safeguard society?
It is morally wrong for a state to accept even a tiny number of innocent men executed as “collateral damage”.
The Church has never taken the position that perfect justice is required and she doesn’t have that position today.
That would actually be murder on the part of the state, and would be no different than the abused child in “The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas” or the tribute sent to the minotaur.
This is not at all true. Murder is the deliberate killing of an innocent person. There is no argument to be made that our penal system is indifferent to whether or not the innocent are wrongly condemned. We take great pains and have extensive safeguards to see that it doesn’t happen. That said, there is no guarantee that an innocent person won’t be executed despite those precautions, but no one can properly call that murder.On the contrary,* Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): “When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us.” Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty.* (Aquinas)
Ender
 
Are we then agreed that it is moral to execute a murderer known to be guilty as a matter of justice whether or not it is needed to safeguard society?
That premise is simply irreconcilable with CCC 2267, which does state that when the State has other means to safeguard society, it should employ them.
On the contrary,* Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): “When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally* cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us.” Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty. (Aquinas)
The problem with using this quote to justify continuance of capital punishment is that capital punishment is, by definition, intentional harm. The only lack of intention in the execution of a non-guilty person is that of conviction of a crime that person did not commit. Everything that follows (condemnation, execution) is clearly intentional.

By his use of the term “chance,” it seems plain that Aquinas is writing concerning accidental death.
 
That premise is simply irreconcilable with CCC 2267, which does state that when the State has other means to safeguard society, it should employ them.
CCC 2267 is completely silent on the subject of justice, which is what I was discussing with Lujack. It is his position I am trying to clarify, not yours. I’ve about given up trying to debate with you as you won’t address the points I raise.
The problem with using this quote to justify continuance of capital punishment is that capital punishment is, by definition, intentional harm. The only lack of intention in the execution of a non-guilty person is that of conviction of a crime that person did not commit. Everything that follows (condemnation, execution) is clearly intentional.
Word play is not interesting. The concept being explained here is that if harm results from something done from a “good and lawful purpose” there is no blame. Is a person sent to prison not harmed? Is it not done intentionally even if an innocent person is imprisoned? Your interpretation makes the statement devoid of any practical meaning.
By his use of the term “chance,” it seems plain that Aquinas is writing concerning accidental death.
This is word play again. Something that happens “by chance” is something unplanned; there is no reason to insist that the outcome must be entirely the result of uncontrollable forces. Person A does something for a good and lawful purpose that results in the undeserved death of Person B. The question Aquinas is addressing the responsibility of Person A, not the particulars of what he did.

Ender
 
CCC 2267 is completely silent on the subject of justice,
In light of Aquinas (cited in post #217), it has everything to do with Justice.
I’ve about given up trying to debate with you as you won’t address the points I raise.
If there is some “point” I have not addressed, it is either because I am in agreement or because I did not interpret it as a point to be held.
Word play is not interesting. The concept being explained here is that if harm results from something done from a “good and lawful purpose” there is no blame. Is a person sent to prison not harmed? Is it not done intentionally even if an innocent person is imprisoned? Your interpretation makes the statement devoid of any practical meaning.
You demonstrate the point. Any punishment is harm. If it is done to a guilty person, it is justice. If it is done to an innocent person, it is an injustice. I did not write anything of blame.
This is word play again. Something that happens “by chance” is something unplanned; there is no reason to insist that the outcome must be entirely the result of uncontrollable forces. Person A does something for a good and lawful purpose that results in the undeserved death of Person B. The question Aquinas is addressing the responsibility of Person A, not the particulars of what he did.
So it is your assertion that no planning whatever goes into the execution of a convict? And you accuse me of playing with words?
 
I’ll be unsubscribing from this thread in the interests of charity. By no means have I yielded the argument.
 
I’m not renewing my subscription here, but this was in today’s news:

Wrong man was executed in Texas, probe says
By Chantal Valery | AFP

He was the spitting image of the killer, had the same first name and was near the scene of the crime at the fateful hour: Carlos DeLuna paid the ultimate price and was executed in place of someone else in Texas in 1989, a report out Tuesday found.

DeLuna, 27, was put to death after “a very incomplete investigation. No question that the investigation is a failure,” [law professor James] Liebman said.

The report’s authors found “numerous missteps, missed clues and missed opportunities that let authorities prosecute Carlos DeLuna for the crime of murder, despite evidence not only that he did not commit the crime but that another individual, Carlos Hernandez, did,” the 780-page investigation found…
 
In light of Aquinas (cited in post #217), it has everything to do with Justice.
Yes, Aquinas discusses capital punishment in terms of justice. CCC 2267, however, does not. It ignores that concern. My comment was about 2267.
You demonstrate the point. Any punishment is harm. If it is done to a guilty person, it is justice. If it is done to an innocent person, it is an injustice. I did not write anything of blame.
True, you did not discuss blame but since that was the point Aquinas was addressing you should have.
So it is your assertion that no planning whatever goes into the execution of a convict?
I wonder how you could come to such a conclusion. It should be pretty clear that that wasn’t what I was asserting. If you reach a conclusion that seems absurd on its face you should assume that your assumption is in error.

Ender
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top