Capital Punishment

[Rau]

…Doesn’t it seem odd that it permits the execution of a person who threatens to kill, but not the person who actually kills? Can we really justify a more severe punishment for the threat than the act?

Actually the reasoning which you critique here is casting CP in the first example as solely an act of community defense; arguably not an act of punishment at all.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

It is reasonable to argue that today the use of capital punishment does more harm than good. If so, that would be a good reason to refrain from employing it, but that is a practical judgment, not a moral one, and it is one which each of us is free to make for himself, even though it is a position taken by the last three popes.

Ender

Perhaps you mean practical judgement versus principled or speculative judgement?
Both are in fact judgements re morality.

 

[Rau]

It is reasonable to argue that today the use of capital punishment does more harm than good. If so, that would be a good reason to refrain from employing it, but that is a practical judgment, not a moral one, and it is one which each of us is free to make for himself, even though it is a position taken by the last three popes.

Ender

Agreed. To be clear, the judgement about the consequences is prudential, but that is the means to gauge the morality of the act (CP) in question. To pursue CP after concluding that it will likely do more harm than good is immoral.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Actually the reasoning which you critique here is casting CP in the first example as solely an act of community defense; arguably not an act of punishment at all.

Agreed.
Also, if Punishments primary end were to restore order then rehab of the criminal should be an overriding consideration. Is this not JPs “medicinal.”

Secondly Expiation also restores order…hard to do when dead.
Thirdly, protecting society from the criminal restores order he continuously threatens.
Doesn’t JP2 consider all these as aspects of punishment therefore?

In this day and age life imprisonment is now a reasonable option and would seem far more effective to that end than CP.

 

[Ender]

Actually the reasoning which you critique here is casting CP in the first example as solely an act of community defense; arguably not an act of punishment at all.

I don’t think this approach works either. We punish someone because he has done something that deserves it. He has earned his punishment by his actions; punishment is therefore an act of retribution…of justice. What you are proposing is that a person may be executed without having done something to deserve it, which is ironic because this approach does not recognize any action as deserving death yet finds an excuse to impose it anyway.

I wonder if you recognize the implication here: surely if we can execute a person because we believe he threatens us we should be able to impose lesser “punishments” for lesser threats. Why, for example, should we need to wait for proof of guilt before imprisoning known drug dealers? If penalties may be imposed for what we believe a person threatens to do then proof of past guilt is irrelevant.

We have of course completely abandoned the concept of justice.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Perhaps you mean practical judgement versus principled or speculative judgement?
Both are in fact judgements re morality.

This is too vague: what constitutes a “judgment re morality”? People may legitimately disagree on practical matters - about which approach will yield the best result. This has nothing to do with morality. People may even legitimately disagree about which response in a particular situation is morally appropriate; that is simply a debate about the proper application of the relevant moral laws. In none of this, however, is there disagreement about the laws themselves.

If you view the debate about capital punishment as a disagreement about which approach will lead to the optimum outcome then that is an entirely practical concern and there is no moral component to the discussion. If you see it as a disagreement over what the law actually is then it is indeed a moral concern. If you accept that the comments of the last three popes are prudential then we can still argue the usefulness of capital punishment, but it is not a moral debate. If you believe, however, that the church has changed her teaching about capital punishment itself then you have to defend that position against the weight of 2000 years of teaching on the matter.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Agreed. To be clear, the judgement about the consequences is prudential, but that is the means to gauge the morality of the act (CP) in question. To pursue CP after concluding that it will likely do more harm than good is immoral.

It is by definition immoral to do anything one believes to be wrong. If I choose one option that I expect to have a bad outcome over another that I expect to yield a better result, I have sinned. That said, if I choose what I think will lead to the better result and it turns out badly, I have not sinned. Erred yes, sinned no. Nor does the fact that you think my choice is harmful mean that I have sinned in choosing it. It is my belief about the validity of my act that matters, not yours.

The problem I have with turning every disagreement into a question of morality is that it always degenerates into allegations of “I’m good, you’re evil.” Let’s at least keep it at the level of “I’m right, you’re wrong.”

Ender

 

[Ender]

Also, if Punishments primary end were to restore order then rehab of the criminal should be an overriding consideration. Is this not JPs “medicinal.”

Secondly Expiation also restores order…hard to do when dead.
Thirdly, protecting society from the criminal restores order he continuously threatens.
Doesn’t JP2 consider all these as aspects of punishment therefore?

• The purposes of criminal punishment are rather unanimously delineated in the Catholic tradition. Punishment is held to have a variety of ends that may conveniently be reduced to the following four: rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, deterrence, and retribution. *(Cardinal Dulles)
  The church has said that “redressing the disorder” is the primary objective of punishment. Dulles identified all four objectives of punishment. Pick out the one that corresponds to “redressing the disorder.” It is extremely unfortunate that the catechism used such a vague phrase as it facilitates approaches like yours in evading what the words actually mean.

Ender

 

[Rau]

I don’t think this approach works either. We punish someone because he has done something that deserves it. He has earned his punishment by his actions; punishment is therefore an act of retribution…of justice. What you are proposing is that a person may be executed without having done something to deserve it, which is ironic because this approach does not recognize any action as deserving death yet finds an excuse to impose it anyway.

I wonder if you recognize the implication here: surely if we can execute a person because we believe he threatens us we should be able to impose lesser “punishments” for lesser threats. Why, for example, should we need to wait for proof of guilt before imprisoning known drug dealers? If penalties may be imposed for what we believe a person threatens to do then proof of past guilt is irrelevant.

We have of course completely abandoned the concept of justice.

Ender

You misunderstand. I’m not proposing that at all. I’m just identifying that what you were critiquing was an interpretation of CP as community defense. I’m not saying that is appropriate.

 

[mikekle]

Why, for example, should we need to wait for proof of guilt before imprisoning known drug dealers? If penalties may be imposed for what we believe a person threatens to do then proof of past guilt is irrelevant.

Ender

Sadly this is the norm now, once someone is even accused of a crime, majority of people instantly convict them mentally, but that is not what this country is supposed to be like, its INNOCENT until proven guilty, someone should be ASSUMED to be innocent until a court finds otherwise, even if they are a known drug dealer…after all, who gets the job of determining if someone is a ‘known’ drug dealer or not…police? So as a society we have reached a point where their word is as good as a courts? Sheesh!! LOL

 

[Rau]

It is by definition immoral to do anything one believes to be wrong. If I choose one option that I expect to have a bad outcome over another that I expect to yield a better result, I have sinned. That said, if I choose what I think will lead to the better result and it turns out badly, I have not sinned. Erred yes, sinned no. Nor does the fact that you think my choice is harmful mean that I have sinned in choosing it. It is my belief about the validity of my act that matters, not yours.

All correct.

 

[Ender]

You misunderstand. I’m not proposing that at all. I’m just identifying that what you were critiquing was an interpretation of CP as community defense. I’m not saying that is appropriate.

I believe the explanation of capital punishment in the catechism has had several unfortunate side effects. One is this idea that we can justify the use of capital punishment not as punishment but as preemptive defense. Now I don’t necessarily oppose the idea of preemptive defense, say in the case of going to war, but I cannot see the justification for preemptively going to war if one has rejected the idea of war itself. In the same sense (or lack thereof) I cannot see how the death penalty can be used preemptively after its use has been declared improper.

Secondly, we now have a defective understanding of punishment itself. If we reject the concept of retribution, as the catechism in 2267 appears to do by implicitly denying the use of capital punishment as an act of retributive justice, we separate punishment from justice itself. If we are not to punish a person because his actions merit it, how do we justify any punishment? That it is in our own personal best interests regardless of whether the person deserves it?

Beyond even this, the discussion over what the church really teaches on the matter has led to arguments that eat away at some of her foundational principles. It is almost as if some would have her adopt the Islamic principle of abrogation: that whatever comes later simply replaces what came earlier without regard for the Traditional teaching. Those teachings become immaterial, and are abandoned. Along with this comes the idea that morality can be defined by the temporary occupant of the Chair of Peter. This is to misapprehend the nature of moral law.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

• The purposes of criminal punishment are rather unanimously delineated in the Catholic tradition. Punishment is held to have a variety of ends that may conveniently be reduced to the following four: rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, deterrence, and retribution. *(Cardinal Dulles)
  The church has said that “redressing the disorder” is the primary objective of punishment. Dulles identified all four objectives of punishment. Pick out the one that corresponds to “redressing the disorder.” It is extremely unfortunate that the catechism used such a vague phrase as it facilitates approaches like yours in evading what the words actually mean.

Ender

It would seem you are criticising JPII .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

This is too vague: what constitutes a “judgment re morality”? People may legitimately disagree on practical matters - about which approach will yield the best result. This has nothing to do with morality. People may even legitimately disagree about which response in a particular situation is morally appropriate; that is simply a debate about the proper application of the relevant moral laws. In none of this, however, is there disagreement about the laws themselves.

Ender

You just denied Aquinas’s well accepted analysis of how humans come to make a final decision re any moral act .
It always involves two basic steps, the first are judgements of the speculative intellect re possibly applicable moral principles,es/laws. The second is how they relate/apply to the complexities of a particular situation and attendant circumstances. These judgements belong to the practical intellect and prudence.

I have noted in previous discussions you have strong Platonising tendencies believing all these moral judgements can be made in the abstract and application to particular concrete circumstances is trivial and secondary.

So the judgements of practical intellect also have everything to do with actual morality and actual sin…though little to do with lists of abstract objective sins and different types of sin that dwell in the ether or in dusty tombs.

Further, once we say a moral question is prudential this suggest circumstances are the final arbiter of whether even theoretic grave matter or evil is present in the current level of analysis.
Thus if proportionality is judged not present then self defence will be a degree of murder not
a just act.

So you are quite mistaken to belive practical prudential judgements have no place at all in deciding morality.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Secondly, we now have a defective understanding of punishment itself

Let’s more accurately phrase that:
Ender personally belives the Maigisterium has been in error re this teaching since the time of JPII.
If we reject the concept of retribution, as the catechism in 2267 appears to do by implicitly denying the use of capital punishment as an act of retributive justice.
The Magisterium is doing what it always does: clarifies and precisions past teachings and word definitions in the light of deeper understanding with the passing of time and changing circumstances as has been and still is the case with countless issues of faith, morals and (Communion) disciplines of the past.
It’s just that you have got snagged on the ones you, for reasons probably due to poor formation, personally are more likely to be defective on .
I suggest that on CAF forum by all means admit the difficulty but perhaps dial back on so confidently identifying who is in error.

If we are not to punish a person because his actions merit it, how do we justify any punishment?

I would think life imprisonment is a rather severe punishment, even harsher than death.
What “any punishment” are you thinking of apart from CP that would be left scrambling for a reasonable justification?

Along with this comes the idea that morality can be defined by the temporary occupant of the Chair of Peter.

Ender
Ender may I observe that you continue to mildly rage your way down an overly intellectualised path that will not give you inner peace and which if pursued to the end will see you being a Catholic in name only.
Already you are starting to sound like the intelligent but disaffected slightly loopy fellas over at the Remnant website.
Just sayin.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The church has said that “redressing the disorder” is the primary objective of punishment. Dulles identified all four objectives of punishment. Pick out the one that corresponds to “redressing the disorder.”
Ender

I would think all four of them together do from different angles.

 

[BornInMarch]

Is or is not capital punishment considered right or moral in the Catholic Church even though it is premeditated murder by human beings. Who gives them the right to kill. Jesus surely does not, or can you show me where He does in the bible. I understand in war it is legal to kill, but I can not see why other than war or self defense it would be justifiable.
Thank you for your answers. Brenda

It is not murder. Murder is an unlawful premeditated killing of one human by another. While the “premeditated killing part” is met, the “unlawful” part might not be. For instance, some argue that moral law/natural law allows for a human to be killed if that person has committed an offense heinous enough to make him deserving of death (Christianity leaves no room for Moral Subjectivism or Moral Relativism, so I’m making this argument using Moral Universalism).

For instance Mosaic Law mandated execution as punishment for a variety of crimes, and the Catechism of the Catholic Church also allows the death penalty.
Catechism of the Catholic Church:

2266 The efforts of the state to curb the spread of behavior harmful to people’s rights and to the basic rules of civil society correspond to the requirement of safeguarding the common good. Legitimate public authority has the right and duty to inflict punishment proportionate to the gravity of the offense. Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense. When it is willingly accepted by the guilty party, it assumes the value of expiation. Punishment then, in addition to defending public order and protecting people’s safety, has a medicinal purpose: as far as possible, it must contribute to the correction of the guilty party.67

2267 Assuming that the guilty party’s identity and responsibility have been fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to the death penalty, if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.

vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm
Exodus 21:12:

Whoever strikes someone a mortal blow must be put to death.

Exodus 21:16:

A kidnapper, whether he sells the person or the person is found in his possession, shall be put to death.

Exodus 21:19:

… if an ox was previously in the habit of goring people and its owner, though warned, would not watch it; should it then kill a man or a woman, not only must the ox be stoned, but its owner also must be put to death.

biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Exodus+21&version=NABRE

 

[mikekle]

It is not murder. Murder is an unlawful premeditated killing of one human by another. While the “premeditated killing part” is met, the “unlawful” part might not be. For instance, some argue that moral law/natural law allows for a human to be killed if that person has committed an offense heinous enough to make him deserving of death (Christianity leaves no room for Moral Subjectivism or Moral Relativism, so I’m making this argument using Moral Universalism).

For instance Mosaic Law mandated execution as punishment for a variety of crimes, and the Catechism of the Catholic Church also allows the death penalty.

vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm

biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Exodus+21&version=NABRE

Arent all those OT laws? The NT, (new covenant) did away with all those.

 

[Ender]

It would seem you are criticising JPII .

Deal if you can with the arguments I present; this comment is simply a way to avoid the debate.

Ender

 

[Ender]

I have noted in previous discussions you have strong Platonising tendencies believing all these moral judgements can be made in the abstract and application to particular concrete circumstances is trivial and secondary.

A better approach would be to respond to my actual comments without first characterizing them and then responding to your characterization.

Further, once we say a moral question is prudential this suggest circumstances are the final arbiter of whether even theoretic grave matter or evil is present in the current level of analysis.

I can be pretty sure I never said a moral question was prudential. It would be useful to make an effort to understand the points I’m trying to make rather than just find ways my comments can be interpreted so that they make no sense.

Yes, there are always limits to what may morally be done, but within those limits disagreements over what act should or should not be taken do not involve moral choices; the decisions are entirely practical. They are amoral. We do what we think is best and hope things turn out.

So you are quite mistaken to believe practical prudential judgements have no place at all in deciding morality.

What moral choice is involved in getting my neighbor’s car to start? What moral choice is involved in determining the best solution for our immigration problems?

Ender