Capital Punishment

[Ender]

Selectively citing the Catechism, the Bishops’ Statement on Capital Punishment - 1980, and Avery Dulles to support claims that capital punishment is the primary and preferred means for redress to crime will just not do. Heresy takes its meaning from the Greek haresis, to pick and choose (and ignore the totality).

It seems a bit unreasonable to fault me for not providing references to support my assertions, and then to reject the citations when I provide them because you infer they do not properly represent the “totality” of church teaching. The fact of the matter is this: I can substantiate my claims.

As for claiming that “capital punishment is the primary and preferred means for redress to crime”, since I never made such a claim all I can suggest is a more careful reading of my comments.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Suggesting that the State even has an obligation to impose the death penalty for certain crimes would not be a clear “paraphrase” of this CCC article nor of the NT nor of the mind of Christ I suggest.

I didn’t suggest anything. I stated that the State has the right and the duty to punish the wicked, to which you responded that this was “indicative of a cold mild hate.” You find fault with me even when I paraphrase the catechism.

Simply because death may be a proportionate response that does not make it by that fact alone a necessary response let alone a moral response.

I have not claimed it is a necessary response, but if a punishment is proportionate to the crime it is by definition a moral response. As to whether it ought to be used in particular circumstances is an altogether different question.

To think in that glass half empty sort of way and to moralise in that way is indicative of the very interior misanthropy that Jesus warns against re calling one’s brother renegade.

Interior misanthropy…if one was to judge the force of an argument by the insults it generates from those trying to rebut it, it would be a good indication of the accuracy of my position.

A point comes when raw justice, administered without consideration of equally proportionate but more difficult alternatives that better instantiate reformative intent, is not justice at all.

I have from the beginning recognized the general validity of prudential opposition to the use of capital punishment. What I have always rejected was the implication that prudential objections were also somehow moral objections.

Ender

 

[Ender]

That you don’t welcome my remark is of no note. Misrepresent others and expect to be pulled up.

Thank you.

Ender

 

[Rau]

It is fully consistent with the CCC…

I might come back to the CCC in a later post. But first, can we think about examples of “killing a non-innocent” and see how they might arise and whether they could be a direct (‘intended’) act or not and what this means practically and morally?

1. CP.
2. Acts in just war causing death.
3. Acts in self-defence causing death.

[2 and 3 have to be expressed this way to reflect that acts in war and self-defence do not have death as intrinsic outcomes.]

We agree these types of acts (when properly undertaken) are moral acts. [To be clear & to avoid potential tangents - if any of these acts are undertaken by a motivation (first font) to see the death of the other person as an end in itself, then those acts are immoral regardless of anything else.]

On the surface, CP seems ‘direct’, since without death, there is no CP. But (2) and (3) can certainly be indirect - eg. the lethality of the blow might not have been specifically intended (even if foreseen), but that was nevertheless the outcome.

I understand you to hold that only acts of killing (ie. acts causing death) wherein the killing is “indirect” can be moral. The question that arises then is what does that mean in so far as one’s practical actions (in war, in self-defence) are concerned? Does it mean that one may not knowingly choose an act (as means) which inherently has as its proximate end the death of the other? [eg…does it forbid pushing the assailant off a skyscraper or finding a means to detonate the suicide vest of an aggressor prematurely?] I suspect we may agree on the answer - it does not forbid any such act (so long as we are acting reasonably in the circumstances.)

In light of this, the direct/indirect distinction in these cases (where one deliberately chooses death of a non-innocent as means) is seen to be remarkably subtle, and ultimately, changes nothing in terms of concrete acts deliberately chosen. Thus, in respect of acts of self-defence and war, does it matter whether the commandment is understood as:

• Thou shall’t not directly Kill; or
• Thou shall’t not murder

I note in passing that to deliberately choose/intend death of an innocent as a means is always immoral.

And I do concur that we are counselled against killing generally - not an absolute (other than directly killing innocents, which is an absolute), but as a preferred orientation - the first option to consider.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I might come back to the CCC in a later post. But first, can we think about examples of “killing a non-innocent” and see how they might arise and whether they could be a direct (‘intended’) act or not and what this means practically and morally?

1. CP.
2. Acts in just war causing death.
3. Acts in self-defence causing death.

[2 and 3 have to be expressed this way to reflect that acts in war and self-defence do not have death as intrinsic outcomes.]

We agree these types of acts (when properly undertaken) are moral acts. [To be clear & to avoid potential tangents - if any of these acts are undertaken by a motivation (first font) to see the death of the other person as an end in itself, then those acts are immoral regardless of anything else.]

On the surface, CP seems ‘direct’, since without death, there is no CP. But (2) and (3) can certainly be indirect - eg. the lethality of the blow might not have been specifically intended (even if foreseen), but that was nevertheless the outcome.

I understand you to hold that only acts of killing (ie. acts causing death) wherein the killing is “indirect” can be moral. The question that arises then is what does that mean in so far as one’s practical actions (in war, in self-defence) are concerned? Does it mean that one may not knowingly choose an act (as means) which inherently has as its proximate end the death of the other? [eg…does it forbid pushing the assailant off a skyscraper or finding a means to detonate the suicide vest of an aggressor prematurely?] I suspect we may agree on the answer - it does not forbid any such act (so long as we are acting reasonably in the circumstances.)

In light of this, the direct/indirect distinction in these cases (where one deliberately chooses death of a non-innocent as means) is seen to be remarkably subtle, and ultimately, changes nothing in terms of concrete acts deliberately chosen. Thus, in respect of acts of self-defence and war, does it matter whether the commandment is understood as:

• Thou shall’t not directly Kill; or
• Thou shall’t not murder

I note in passing that to deliberately choose/intend death of an innocent as a means is always immoral.

And I do concur that we are counselled against killing generally - not an absolute (other than directly killing innocents, which is an absolute), but as a preferred orientation - the first option to consider.

I think it is too much to expect a different conceptual moral framework to provide the sort of new practical judgements you seem to be looking for.
Just as the same building we can all see could be supported by many different types of structures that we cannot see.

But I believe the angle of view I am suggesting is able to harmonise a little better and a little more widely the various poor bedfellows who are the usual suspects here on CAF: CP, translations of the 5th, better insights into contraception issues such as Zika, Congo nuns, prostitutes and condoms, self defence, some active irregulars allowed Communion, grave sins of thought, the counsels versus the commandments, the universality of negative prohibitions, and conscientious objectors.

No moral system can well handle objective indications as to when an intention is direct or indirect as by definition the distinction is primarily determined internally.

Perhaps the most we can do is state those deeds that are unlikely to ever be able to anchor an indirect intention…and if killing can allow this it’s hard to think of many others that cannot…including a previously married woman actively cohabiting with a never before married man.

The Church is largely only interested in material, public “morality” and “disposition” when it comes to enforced prohibitions, and wisely so.

Yes I tend to agree that directly choosing to kill is always immoral whether as an end or a means. That was the debate I was hoping to have last month on the other thread to see where this went…but what’s his name wouldn’t really engage.

Though there may be understandings whereby choosing something as a means could be construed as but another way of discovering an indirect intention. Depends what is meant by means I suppose.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I didn’t suggest anything. I stated that the State has the right and the duty to punish the wicked, to which you responded that this was “indicative of a cold mild hate.” You find fault with me even when I paraphrase the catechism.
I have not claimed it is a necessary response, but if a punishment is proportionate to the crime it is by definition a moral response. As to whether it ought to be used in particular circumstances is an altogether different question.
Interior misanthropy…if one was to judge the force of an argument by the insults it generates from those trying to rebut it, it would be a good indication of the accuracy of my position.
I have from the beginning recognized the general validity of prudential opposition to the use of capital punishment. What I have always rejected was the implication that prudential objections were also somehow moral objections.

Ender

Your alleged paraphrase of the CCC seems at best a Freudian slip of the glass half empty sort of the older brother type, at worst an awkward OT holding of NT wineskins.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

if a punishment is proportionate to the crime it is by definition a moral response. As to whether it ought to be used in particular circumstances is an altogether different question.
Ender

There may well be times when the “just” response is not truly a “moral” response.
This is exactly the glass half empty disposition I am suggesting.

 

[Rau]

…if a punishment is proportionate to the crime it is by definition a moral response. As to whether it ought to be used in particular circumstances is an altogether different question…

The morality of an act is judged in “particular circumstances”, just as the crime is judged in its particular circumstances. Perhaps we can say it is not intrinsically evil to apply CP when it is “proportionate to the crime” (I skirt around the question of alternatives…), but if we are to assess it as a moral course of action, I believe it’s necessary to consider the particular circumstances.

 

[Rau]

Well Blue, I sense your response to my post is itself somewhat “indirect”

…But I believe the angle of view I am suggesting is able to harmonise a little better and a little more widely the various poor bedfellows who are the usual suspects here on CAF: CP, translations of the 5th, better insights into contraception issues such as Zika, Congo nuns, prostitutes and condoms, self defence, some active irregulars allowed Communion, grave sins of thought, the counsels versus the commandments, the universality of negative prohibitions, and conscientious objectors. No moral system can well handle objective indications as to when an intention is direct or indirect as by definition the distinction is primarily determined internally.

Determined internally - that can so; an ulterior motive or a concealed malice might be hard to observe externally. Did you shoot that man because that was the necessary act of self-defence, or for another reason? But in at least one of the cases you enumerate, there is a causal connection between a particular act and a desired outcome, which IMO fixes the moral object. viz: Avoiding a risky pregnancy first requires avoiding pregnancy. Moreover, there are known moral and immoral ways to achieve the latter. There does not appear to be any way to get around this and choosing contraception is the known immoral way. Or do you believe we can get around it by internally asserting something like:

- “Were I younger, there’d be less far less risk of Downs, Tay-Sachs, etc., so I would not be contracepting. But given my age, taking the pill / using the condom is not “direct” contraception, because it’s really only these diseases that I am (directly) wishing to avoid”.

Do you believe if one can make this statement internally, the contraception has become indirect?

Note that my analysis above does not in any way deny the existence of acts which might actually be “indirect contraception”, just as we know “indirect abortion” is possible (eg. a pregnant woman with cancer elects treatment fatal to the child). But in neither of these do we directly choose a moral evil. The rape victim cannot choose the moral evil of contraception because she never chose to be inseminated (if I may put it that way). And the mother choosing the cancer treatment is not choosing to end her child’s life for that contributes nothing to her medical care.

Yes I tend to agree that directly choosing to kill is always immoral whether as an end or a means.

By always, I assume you mean even when the one killed is not an innocent? Perhaps then you can respond “directly” to my earlier question:

The question that arises then is what does that mean in so far as one’s practical actions (in war, in self-defence) are concerned? Does it mean that one may not knowingly choose an act (as means) which inherently has as its proximate end the death of the other? [eg…does it forbid pushing the assailant off a skyscraper or finding a means to detonate the suicide vest of an aggressor prematurely?]

 

[o_mlly]

Finally, if capital punishment has become unjust, how can the catechism allow it under any circumstances, which it clearly does? Why would it not be inherently evil if it inherently unjust? Ender

Capital punishment as a state act has not changed and remains neither inherently evil nor just. See below.

Of course it has. Pretty much everything can be used unjustly, but the question is whether its use can be just. Since the catechism allows it (regardless of how constrained the circumstances) it would seem that it can in fact be justly used. That said: doesn’t this mean that capital punishment is a just punishment for the crime of murder? That is, the severity of the punishment is commensurate with the severity of the crime, which is pretty much the definition of a just penalty. Ender

The point we seem to disagree on is what novelty is in the teaching of Evangelium Vitae. I see no change in the procedure to determine the morality of a particular capital punishment execution. The act itself remains neither intrinsically evil nor good so the intent and circumstances of the act determine its morality. JPII teaches one circumstance has changed substantially – the technology of incarceration. The protection of society element of penalty can now be bloodless.

You seem to argue that while not disagreeing with JPII’s judgment on the improvements to incarceration technology as sufficient to meet the societal protection element of penalty that the retributive element in the case of a murderer cannot be satisfied through incarceration. Further, you assert that in the redress of justice that the retributive element is and always has been in Catholic teaching primary. He (and Benedict and Francis and Dulles and the USCCB and I) disagree.

 

[Ender]

Yes I tend to agree that directly choosing to kill is always immoral whether as an end or a means. That was the debate I was hoping to have last month on the other thread to see where this went…but what’s his name wouldn’t really engage.

I have tried to get you to expand on your distinction between direct and indirect killing by asking you to distinguish between an execution committed by mobsters and an execution committed by the State. What is it that makes the former direct and the latter indirect? I disagree with your categorization of a formal execution as indirect.

Ender

 

[Ender]

The morality of an act is judged in “particular circumstances”, just as the crime is judged in its particular circumstances.

Yes, it is, but we haven’t been discussing particular acts, rather we have been debating a class of acts. We have addressed the general rather than the particular, therefore it is reasonable to speak of what is generally true.

Perhaps we can say it is not intrinsically evil to apply CP when it is “proportionate to the crime” (I skirt around the question of alternatives…), but if we are to assess it as a moral course of action, I believe it’s necessary to consider the particular circumstances.

It is appropriate to address sentencing in steps. First, can we say that death is a proportionate response to the crime of murder? The answer is obviously yes. Second, are there circumstances that make it inappropriate or unwise to apply that response in this situation?

The question of whether applying the death penalty in a particular case is a moral course of action is not immediately clear. For a punishment to be moral it should be of commensurate severity with the crime. Determining whether the particular circumstances make it advisable to apply a lesser sentence is less obviously a moral question. Given that it deals with prudential choices, about which reasonable people may reasonably disagree, the most I would accept is that the decision can involve moral distinctions, but only as the circumstances become more extreme. In the general case I do not believe deciding on the best course involves questions of morality.

Ender

 

[Rau]

The question of whether applying the death penalty in a particular case is a moral course of action is not immediately clear. For a punishment to be moral it should be of commensurate severity with the crime. Determining whether the particular circumstances make it advisable to apply a lesser sentence is less obviously a moral question. Given that it deals with prudential choices, about which reasonable people may reasonably disagree, the most I would accept is that the decision can involve moral distinctions, but only as the circumstances become more extreme. In the general case I do not believe deciding on the best course involves questions of morality.

I understand your point. If it comes down to a balance of consequences judgement (prudential judgement), arguably no one can make the “right”'assessment with certainty. The best we can say is that if the ones pursuing capital punishment do so in the belief that it causes more harm than good, then acts by them to pursue it are immoral acts.

 

[Ender]

The point we seem to disagree on is what novelty is in the teaching of Evangelium Vitae. I see no change in the procedure to determine the morality of a particular capital punishment execution. The act itself remains neither intrinsically evil nor good so the intent and circumstances of the act determine its morality. JPII teaches one circumstance has changed substantially – the technology of incarceration. The protection of society element of penalty can now be bloodless.

I pretty much agree with this interpretation. As to whether protection can be effectively achieved through incarceration alone is open to debate, as is the assertion that technology has made prisons more secure than in the past. I have serious doubts about the accuracy of both claims.

You seem to argue that while not disagreeing with JPII’s judgment on the improvements to incarceration technology as sufficient to meet the societal protection element of penalty that the retributive element in the case of a murderer cannot be satisfied through incarceration.

Yes.

Further, you assert that in the redress of justice that the retributive element is and always has been in Catholic teaching primary.

Almost - I am saying that “redressing the disorder” and retribution are synonymous; the phrases are interchangeable.

He (and Benedict and Francis and Dulles and the USCCB and I) disagree.

No, I think this is a serious misunderstanding of their position, and I think this is precisely the area that needs to be discussed and clarified. I cannot, however, make any progress if you dismiss my citations without considering them. If you won’t let me cite even the catechism how are we to debate this?

Ender

 

[Ender]

I understand your point. If it comes down to a balance of consequences judgement (prudential judgement), arguably no one can make the “right”'assessment with certainty. The best we can say is that if the ones pursuing capital punishment do so in the belief that it causes more harm than good, then acts by them to pursue it are immoral acts.

Yes, exactly. This is why there is no moral distinction between the choice of execution or incarceration so long as the intent behind the choice is to do what seems best.

Ender

 

[Rau]

firstthings.com/article/2001/04/catholicism-amp-capital-punishment

Cardinal Dulles

"Pope John Paul II spoke for the whole Catholic tradition when he proclaimed in Evangelium Vitae (1995) that “the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral.” But he wisely included in that statement the word “innocent.” He has never said that every criminal has a right to live nor has he denied that the State has the right in some cases to execute the guilty.

Catholic authorities justify the right of the State to inflict capital punishment on the ground that the State does not act on its own authority but as the agent of God, who is supreme lord of life and death. In so holding they can properly appeal to Scripture. Paul holds that the ruler is God’s minister in executing God’s wrath against the evildoer (Romans 13:4). Peter admonishes Christians to be subject to emperors and governors, who have been sent by God to punish those who do wrong (1 Peter 2:13). Jesus, as already noted, apparently recognized that Pilate’s authority over his life came from God (John 19:11)."

IMO, neither the statement from JP II nor the comments from Dulles are consistent with the idea that CP is an indirect killing. It is authorised by God and implemented by his agents.

JP II in addressing directly the question of the intrinsic evil of “direct killings” limited the scope to direct killings of the innocent. He would clearly have considered the simpler, all encompassing statement, but rejected it.

 

[Ender]

IMO, neither the statement from JP II nor the comments from Dulles are consistent with the idea that CP is an indirect killing. It is authorised by God and implemented by his agents.

There is little doubt that the intent behind killing in war and capital punishment is more than simply killing. It is killing as a tool to achieve a greater goal. It doesn’t seem reasonable, however, to assert that those killings were indirectly intended. When you line a person up in a gun’s sights and pull the trigger the intent to kill is immediate and direct whether you are in a firing squad, are a sniper, or an assassin. The reasons for committing the act are different, but the intent of the act in each case is to kill. Despite the fact that the church has always allowed it, modern sensibilities are hard pressed to accept the idea that killing can be acceptable.
Q. 1276. Under what circumstances may human life be lawfully taken?
A. Human life may be lawfully taken:
1. In self-defense…
2. In a just war…
*3. By the lawful execution of a criminal… *(Baltimore Catechism)
Ender

 

[o_mlly]

It seems a bit unreasonable to fault me for not providing references to support my assertions, and then to reject the citations when I provide them because you infer they do not properly represent the “totality” of church teaching. The fact of the matter is this: I can substantiate my claims.

As for claiming that “capital punishment is the primary and preferred means for redress to crime”, since I never made such a claim all I can suggest is a more careful reading of my comments.

Ender

If one cites, as an appeal to authority, the publications of an institution or the personal publications of an individual then is it not reasonable to accept as equally authoritative the entire opus, especially the conclusions drawn at least in those same publications? I think so. But I don’t believe you accept those documents as authoritative in their entirety. Therefore, citing them as your authority in part seems incongruous to me.

 

[o_mlly]

…
I have from the beginning recognized the general validity of prudential opposition to the use of capital punishment. What I have always rejected was the implication that prudential objections were also somehow moral objections.

Ender

leaderu.com/ftissues/ft0108/dulles.html
Activists on both sides may see my position as too nuanced. I insist on the moral and theological relevance of prudential considerations. Kevin Doyle fears that people who use their own prudence will be imprudent; but I would hold that they are **morally accountable if they disregard the prudential judgment of the hierarchical leaders, **who speak with authority even when they are not handing on the word of the Lord (cf. 1 Corinthians 7:25). Since prudence is a moral virtue, I cannot accept the dichotomy implied in George Blair’s statement, “Arguments against the death penalty are prudential, not moral.” The decision whether and when to apply the death penalty cannot be properly made on the basis of abstract dogmatic considerations alone. Christian moral reasoning calls for a high degree of prudence. Avery Dulles (Emphases mine)

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The morality of an act is judged in “particular circumstances”, just as the crime is judged in its particular circumstances. Perhaps we can say it is not intrinsically evil to apply CP when it is “proportionate to the crime” (I skirt around the question of alternatives…), but if we are to assess it as a moral course of action, I believe it’s necessary to consider the particular circumstances.

This likely goes to the heart of the matter.
Ender approaches moral analysis so abstractly that the most that particular details can ever contribute to moral judgements, if anything, is the best way (or least morally evil)of going about whatever has already been morally predetermined. In other words differences in the actual particular details cannot change the already generically decided object but only the consequences or possibly degree of culpability or severity of the offence.

Clearly some CP is not just nor moral because particular details or circumstances may lead us to believe it is not CP but State murder or execution.