P
Peter_Plato
Guest
Given that I have made two rather prolonged attempts to answer your “argument” and you have made not even an iota of an attempt to defend your lack of faith, it seems you are engaging in some serious black pot calling, yourself.Says I? No, say all the apologists who bend over backwards to create some excuse for God’s inaction. They all see a need to defend God. They all realize the contradiction between God’s alleged loving nature, and the actual state of affairs. They consider the “problem of evil” to be a very pertinent issue. It is you who stand alone, and say: “God’s actions need no defense”. And that is not a very good way to defend your faith.![]()
Be that as it may, I offer a third reply, to which I assume you will have no more of a response to offer than to my two previous attempts and further conclude that your blustery winds have run their course even if that course ends in another round of self-congratulatory applause on your part for your job well done despite that it hasn’t been done at all.
Let me start with a quote to add some prerspective.
Assume that, as some versions of the argument from evil put it, God is a “morally perfect being”. Assume also that suffering exists in the world. To make the second fact tell against the first, we need to articulate a code of divine ethics, and locate prohibitions against suffering somewhere on it.
It would seem relatively unarguable that human beings have NO moral duties towards plants and probably none with regard to invertebrates or other vegetative or sentient things which are frequently used as sources of food.To approach this, start with the following moral claim: it is wrong to take the life of X merely because it vexes us. Clearly, the truth of the claim depends on what X is. We could make a list of descending values (M) like this: the act would be a terrible thing to do to a child, a perverse thing to do to some highly valued animal or possession, a pretty insensitive thing to do to a dog, an unobjectionable thing to do to a mole, a perfectly understandable act to do to a moth, and to do it to a weed would almost seem to have no moral significance at all. So when we try to articulate God’s ethics with respect to, say, allowing the suffering of the innocent, what is its analogue on M?
thomism.wordpress.com/2014/08/27/taking-gods-moral-perfection-seriously/
What is interesting here is, as Fulton Sheen once pointed out, that higher levels of existence serve to “lift up” those at lower levels by consumption. Thus, inorganic minerals become part of a higher life form by being taken up by, for example, the carrots and potatoes in our garden. In turn, carrots become part of a still higher life form by being eaten by, say, a rabbit. Rabbits, in turn, become a part of an ontologically higher life by being eaten by, for example, your great-aunt Mabel.
What is interesting to note here, is that, although – ontologically speaking – the rabbit, by sacrificing itself to become a part of a reality far superior to itself must abandon its old existence in order to be received into the new. A fact that the rabbit may not much want to do. (Cf. CS Lewis’ Man or Rabbit?)
The same pheneomenon occurs even within a particular species relative to its own existence. A caterpillar, mealworm or maggot must “lose itself” to become a butterfly, beetle or fly – arguably a “higher” form of life than previous.
Now, suppose the opportunity was afforded to one form of life to share in the highest form of life of all? That is, say, for a chicken to share in the divine, eternal life of God. That chicken (let’s call her Flo) would have to forsake her own chickenness – leave it behind completely – in order to share in the life of the eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, Ipsum Esse Subsistens of God.
Now do you suppose that Flo would hold against God – offering such an opportunity to her –the fact that God allowed the other chickens in the pen to kick, pluck, ridicule or otherwise abuse her, knowing all along that “chickenhood” was only a stage, a larval step towards her higher destiny? Would it be wise of Flo to decline God’s offer BECAUSE she contends that God failed to protect her from those other back-biting, insulting, rapacious chickens? Wouldn’t it be far more prudential of Flo to “keep her eye on the prize,” so to speak and not be pulled down by mealy chicken behaviour and, herself, risk losing the offer BECAUSE she was too attached to what it means to be a chicken, knowing that “losing” her chickenness was precisely what would be required of her anyways?
Further suppose that God has his standards, that he only offers this ultimate sharing of divine Life to those chickens who have lived exemplary chicken lives or at least are wiling to forsake their former “less-than chicken” existence in order to accept their new graced nature.
So, God wouldn’t be at all pleased with back-biting, callous, rapacious or, even, rapist chickens since those qualities would, indeed, PREVENT the chickens exhibiting them from receiving the offer of new fullness of living.
However, BEING abused, bit or raped would not prevent one from receiving or sharing in God’s life; in fact, being so treated might even make one more amenable to forsaking one’s old, lesser form of existence to receive the higher, much more desireable new one.