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aclausen
Guest
I think solipsism is ludicrous, but you’re refutation is little more than circular reasoning.
The fact is there is no way to refute solipsism, and no point in trying, since even the advocates act as if it is false.
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The fact is there is no way to refute solipsism, and no point in trying, since even the advocates act as if it is false.
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Lucretius
Guest
It’s not circular, although I can see why you might say that. The better way of putting it is that idealism must assume idealism to prove itself.
My argument is that the solipsist doesn’t understand consciousnesses.
Christi pax,
Lucretius
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aclausen
Guest
And the circularity comes from the fact that a solipsist would level the same accusation against you, for attempting to limit consciousness to a definition that serves to win your own point.
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Lucretius
Guest
Then the solipsist doesn’t understand the essence of consciousness, which would mean that the problem is not with my reasoning, but with his ignorance (willful or otherwise). If he doesn’t have the insight into the nature of consciousness, then there is nothing more to do but pity him.
I’m not redefining the word to win the argument. I’m contemplating the essence of it, and pointing out simply that we can be conscious unless we are conscious of something.
Christi pax,
Lucretius
A
aclausen
Guest
The problem is that no one really understands consciousness at this point, so if that were the way to disprove solipsism, I’d say your view of consciousness is as much an ad hoc means of winning the argument as his assertion of his view of consciousness would be to him.
As I said, I think the mere fact that a solipsist does not act as if his world view is true suggests to me that there aren’t any real solipsists out there. It’s more of a devil’s advocate position than a sincerely held belief.
That being said, I have met one omphalist I was reasonably certain was sincere, and at the end of the day you run up against the same problem. Even if it’s true, it’s irrelevant.
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Lucretius
Guest
My argument is simply that being is prior to thought.
We might not be able to explain it in terms of modern science either, but that isn’t and wasn’t possible even in principle.
Christi pax,
Lucretius
Of course we know what consciousness is (even if we don’t know much about it). I know what a mountain is, even if I don’t know much about mountains.
We might not be able to explain it in terms of modern science either, but that isn’t and wasn’t possible even in principle.
Yes
Christi pax,
Lucretius
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Lucretius
Guest
“The first step on the realist path is to recognize that one has always been a realist; the second is to recognize that, however hard one tries to think differently, one will never manage to; the third is to realize that those who claim they think differently, think as realists as soon as they forget to act a part. If one then asks oneself why, one’s conversion to realism is all but complete (E. Gilson).”
Christi pax,
Lucretius
Christi pax,
Lucretius
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Partinobodycula
Guest
Forgive me for the delay, I’ve been thinking again.
The problem with saying that if we know consciousness, then we must know objects, and if we know objcts, then they must be real, is that the mind can’t possibly do anything else. It must always be the observer of things, the dreamer of things, the thinker of things. Its identity will always be an indirect one, as the experiencer, and not the experience. However this is true whether its experiencing “reality”, or a dream, or an hallucination, or an out of body experience. It’ll always be the experiencer, because that’s what it is.
But we know that in many instances, what the mind experiences isn’t objectively real. As in dreams, hallucinations, and optical illusions. But how are we to know that what the mind experiences is ever “real”? Your argument seems to be that since the mind is the experiencer of things, it can’t pre-exist the things it experiences. I would agree that this is true, but that says nothing about whether those things are real. It really doesn’t. It merely suggests that the mind isn’t the source. It isn’t the first cause. It must arise from something else.
I’ve sincerely tried to follow your line of reasoning, but the rabbit hole becomes very confusing after a while. Until once again I come to the point of concluding that I just don’t know. And that it’s best to simply accept that I don’t know. I could be like aclausen and conclude that such lines of reasoning are pointless and irrelevent, but some of us at least, are drawn to follow them anyway. But I always keep in mind, that questioning the nature of reality doesn’t necessarily mean questioning the value of reality. Indeed, wondering why I am, may be as much a part of life, as knowing that I am.
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Lucretius
Guest
Appeals to illusions presuppose knowledge of non-illusions. We know perceptions are illusions because we can reference real things.
It only says nothing on whether they are real or not if we reject any attempt to knowledge a priori. But since the solipsist argues we can know the self, knowledge of the self presupposes knowledge of being. If we don’t know the self, we can still deny the external world, but then we would have to deny the internal world as well. Solipsism must reduce either to realism or to universal skepticism (and universal skepticism isn’t a intellectual position at all, but a pure assertion).
To put it this way, ontology is prior to epistemology. We cannot consider how we know until we know something. Another way is to say that the intellect doesn’t awaken until it encounters true knowledge, and so the intellect cannot consider itself until it considers something else. If we didn’t encounter real being, then we can’t encounter the intellect.
Arguing against the self-evident can do that
Even the most stubborn idealists argue that we must live a “practical realism.” The only practical idealists are in straightjackets.
Christi pax,
Lucretius
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Lucretius
Guest
“Without pretending to span within such limits the essential Thomist idea, I may be allowed to throw out a sort of rough version of the fundamental question, which I think I have known myself, consciously or unconsciously since my childhood. When a child looks out of the nursery window and sees anything, say the green lawn of the garden, what does he actually know; or does he know anything? There are all sorts of nursery games of negative philosophy played round this question. A brilliant Victorian scientist delighted in declaring that the child does not see any grass at all; but only a sort of green mist reflected in a tiny mirror of the human eye. This piece of rationalism has always struck me as almost insanely irrational. If he is not sure of the existence of the grass, which he sees through the glass of a window, how on earth can he be sure of the existence of the retina, which he sees through the glass of a microscope? If sight deceives, why can it not go on deceiving? Men of another school answer that grass is a mere green impression on the mind; and that he can be sure of nothing except the mind. They declare that he can only be conscious of his own consciousness; which happens to be the one thing that we know the child is not conscious of at all. In that sense, it would be far truer to say that there is grass and no child, than to say that there is a conscious child but no grass. St. Thomas Aquinas, suddenly intervening in this nursery quarrel, says emphatically that the child is aware of Ens. Long before he knows that grass is grass, or self is self, he knows that something is something. Perhaps it would be best to say very emphatically (with a blow on the table), “There is an Is.” That is as much monkish credulity as St. Thomas asks of us at the start. Very few unbelievers start by asking us to believe so little. And yet, upon this sharp pin-point of reality, he rears by long logical processes that have never really been successfully overthrown, the whole cosmic system of Christendom (G. K. Chesterton).”
Christi pax,
Lucretius
Christi pax,
Lucretius
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Lucretius
Guest
Another way of explaining this, courtesy of James Chastek, is that being transcends both subject and object, and so neither can be reduced to the other.
You actaully proposed something like this earlier, correct?
Christi pax,
Lucretius
You actaully proposed something like this earlier, correct?
Christi pax,
Lucretius
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Lucretius
Guest
inters.org/Gilson-Realist-Handbook
A lot of these arguements for solipsism are also used by idealists, which Gilson critiques. Many of my responses have already been articulated by him!
Christi pax,
Lucretius
A lot of these arguements for solipsism are also used by idealists, which Gilson critiques. Many of my responses have already been articulated by him!
Christi pax,
Lucretius
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John_Lazarus
Guest
I’m not going to enter either side of this discussion – just wanted to say that part of the above reminds me of the Prayer of St Francis.
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Partinobodycula
Guest
I’m sorry that I don’t meet your expectations of a solipsist. Perhaps you think that I should be more indifferent, but questioning the nature of the world around me doesn’t necessarily mean that I question the importance of the world around me. Indeed in some way it may even give me a greater appreciation of it. For what am I…without you. What do I know of pain, and sorrow, and love, and joy…without you. Nothing. Which means that I can appreciate injustice, even while abhorring it. I can appreciate suffering, even while enduring it. I can appreciate life, even while questioning it.
I don’t regard the world as nothing. I regard it as everything. Everything that I have ever known, or loved, or experienced, is because of you. It’s not you who are nothing without me, it’s I who am nothing without you. So I forgive you, even while screaming for you to change. I cherish you, even while begging for you to listen. I love you, even when you don’t love me.
Someone earlier questioned my “christianism”, and I know that I’ll never live up to what they expect a Christian to be. I try instead to live up to what I imagine Christ to be. If that’s not enough for them, then I’m sorry.
So that’s two things that I’m sorry for. I’m sorry that I’m not the solipsist that you expect me to be, and I’m sorry that I’m not the Christian that others expect me to be. I guess my description of being a “Christain Solipsist” isn’t a very good, for I seem to have failed to live up to either one of them.
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