I
Inquiry
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Because space made it easier to highlight the fundamental problem with your argument. One you are still avoiding.Oh my, “locking someone in a room” and a “space station.” Why not stay on planet earth.
Because space made it easier to highlight the fundamental problem with your argument. One you are still avoiding.Oh my, “locking someone in a room” and a “space station.” Why not stay on planet earth.
Not avoiding at all. To get the correct answer, start a new thread.Because space made it easier to highlight the fundamental problem with your argument. One you are still avoiding.
Read the OP. It’s a new topic.It is not a new topic.
“We” weren’t talking about anything.It’s relevant to what we are talking about. Read your own post.
The bystander does not act morally to push the wheelchair in front of the madman because he is using the death of the one in he wheelchair as the means of preventing the deaths of others. This is not allowed by double effect because the evil outcome can never be the means by which good is done. This is unlike the trolley problem in which the evil outcome of the one man being struck by the trolley is not the means by which the five are saved. This is most easily seen by considering what would happen if the one man were not there and if the person in the wheelchair were not there. In the trolley case, the bystander could throw the switch, same as before, and save the five. The death of the one is not needed. But in the case of the madman and the shotgun, if the one in the wheelchair were not there, the bystander would not have that option. So they are very different.Here’s one for you:
A madman has roped together 4 people and levels his 12 gauge at them. You are a quadriplegic in your wheelchair next to the madman. A bystander comes on the scene, asses what is going on. Foresees that if he does not act, 4 will die. If he pushes the wheelchair only 1 will die. He pushes your wheelchair in front of the madman’s shotgun. The madman proceeds in his attempt to kill the 4 but kills you instead. Did the bystander act morally?
For those who will try to wiggle out, change the ordinance to a grenade launcher.
The part Ender left out was:Ender:![]()
Why did you not quote all of CCC#2269 as I did? My post clearly referred to the sentence you conveniently chose not to quote. ???There is no caveat there that permits “ doing anything with the intention of indirectly bringing about a person’s death ” if that person is already in danger. Such action is forbidden whether he is in danger or not.
This also does not apply to the trolley problem because the man on the track was already in mortal danger, being tied to a track. And there was grave reason to act. And the bystander certainly would have untied the one man on the track, if he could. There is no issue of “refusing help.”The moral law prohibits exposing someone to mortal danger without grave reason, as well as refusing assistance to a person in danger.
The sentence I omitted does not alter the one I cited. It is an additional restriction, not a caveat on the one just expressed, and that is the point: the restriction that we may not intend to indirectly bring about a person’s death is not lifted because he is already in danger.Why did you not quote all of CCC#2269 as I did? My post clearly referred to the sentence you conveniently chose not to quote. ???
The pilot faces exactly the same choice: do nothing and let the plane kill a large number of people, or reroute the plane so that fewer people are killed. In both cases the actor is making a choice of who is going to die. There is no moral difference whatever between sending a trolley at someone and sending a plane.No, the bystander choice, as I wrote, is to directly kill an innocent, or not. Big difference. No matter what the pilot chooses, the pilot’s act does not directly kill anyone.
The bystander chooses to reroute the trolley. The pilot chooses to reroute the plane. In both cases someone will die who would have lived had no action been taken. That the pilot has several choices and the bystander only one in no way changes that nature of their actions.The bystander’ option is to directly kill an innocent human being, or not.
Welcome to the club, @Inquiry! I have been on o_mlly’s “ignore” list for quite some time, and because of that, o_mlly is totally unaware the responses I have been giving. It is really rather an advantage to have my responses go unchallenged, and I quite enjoy it.Looks like it’s the “No Fly” list (again).
Of course it doesn’t. Such a inconsistency in the catechism would be scandalous.The sentence I omitted does not alter the one I cited.
And, does not your bystander indirectly will to kill the innocent one? Yes, it appears he does. We covered this many posts ago. As I recall, you were not familiar with the moral understanding of indirect (there’s that inconvenient word again) willing in moral theology. I gave a citation.… the restriction that we may not intend to indirectly bring about a person’s death is not lifted because he is already in danger.
That a person is “already in danger” does not change what we may morally do to him. … Nothing about being in danger changes the object of the action.
Au contraire, there is a moral difference which you ignore. As I wrote, your pilot is acting to mitigate the bad effects of a present physical evil. Your bystander chooses to commit a moral evil.There is no moral difference whatever between sending a trolley at someone and sending a plane.
Ok, you think it moral to target someone only if they are already at risk of dying.Your plane scenario differs in that all the people in the range of the falling plane are at risk of the physical evil of that plane falling on their heads. Whatever the pilot does intending to mitigate the loss of human life does not put anyone into peril who was not already in danger. The innocent one on the track is in no peril until the bystander throws the switch.
I disagree there. In the future it may become possible to save the baby and the mother would still live. It’s immoral because it targets the baby. My old rule of thumb works here. If the tube was going to rupture for any other reason the treatment would not be appropriate.The essential difference between these two is that in salpingostomy, the removal of the baby is the means by which the mother’s life is saved. In the trolley problem, the death of the one man on the track is not the means by which the five are saved.
The pilot is acting to mitigate the bad effects of the present physical evil of the plane running out of gas. The bystander is acting to mitigate the present physical evil of a trolley headed toward five people tied to the tracks. Still the same thing.Ender:![]()
Au contraire, there is a moral difference which you ignore. As I wrote, your pilot is acting to mitigate the bad effects of a present physical evil. Your bystander chooses to commit a moral evil.There is no moral difference whatever between sending a trolley at someone and sending a plane.
The time factor can really dictate how culpable and perhaps even remove it if someone is not aware of what is being done. For example in the trolley problem being given only seconds to act instead of minutes means someone is not able to rationally asses the situation and may act out of impulse to save lives, very different than assessing and therefore intentionally choosing to commit an evil act.Paddy1989:![]()
This is not quite analogous. For one thing, telling a lie to save a Jew violates the “Means” condition of double effect. The lie is exactly the means by which the Jew is saved, and not merely a consequence. This is unlike the trolley problem where the death of the one man on the tracks is NOT the means by which the five are saved.
By the way, the moral analysis of the “lying to save a Jew” problem can be justified on entirely different grounds. It can be argued that the Nazi looking for the Jew does not have a right to that truth. But that is for a different argument.
Maybe not as culpable, but certainly culpable, for this is a very clear case of doing evil so that good may come of it. The only mitigating factor would be the lack of time to consider what one is doing so that one is not fully aware of the morality of what he is doing. But if he had plenty of time to think about it, and still did it, he would be very culpable for pulling the trigger, regardless of the circumstances.
But you changed who was killed as a result of the action, thus it’s potentially immoral.Once the trolley was diverted from hitting the 5 people on the track, the bystander’s act is over. What happens afterwords to that trolley is no longer of any concern to him.
I never claimed it was morally superior, only that it wasn’t morally inferior.LeafByNiggle:![]()
But you changed who was killed as a result of the action, thus it’s potentially immoral.Once the trolley was diverted from hitting the 5 people on the track, the bystander’s act is over. What happens afterwords to that trolley is no longer of any concern to him.
You cannot justify killing one in order to save five. You make a decision - either you keep course which means you kill five or you change course which means you kill one. Neither is morally superior or inferior. And is it a person who’s driving the train or an engineer who pulls a switch?
If you dodged the five people and didn’t know about the one, it was a moral superior decision as the one was incidental. But if you know about both the 5 and the 1, it’s not morally superior.