Catholicism and Circular Reasoning: Take Two

[CTuck]

II. Is a notorious misunderstanding of infinity.

To say the amount of bodies regress infinitely is to say their regress had no beginning—not a beginning infinitely remote. That is, there is no first cause in an infinitely regressing series of bodies. He’s looking at this like a number line in which we start at the number 1 at the far left and continue from that point rightwards, infinitely. But, no one advocating the possibility of an infinite regress is gonna grant this. i.e., there is no beginning to this number line.
.

This is a misunderstanding of what was said.

.Now it we have an infinite series of movers (progression) and things moved (regression), there will no longer be a first mover and all are intermediate movers. Therefore, if the action of the first mover is wanting, nothing will be moved and there will be no movement in the world. .

It is plain to see that he has given the series in question both infinite regression and progression. In effect, he is saying that since we do not observe a motionless world, infinite regression is logically inconsistent. Thus, a first mover, that by nature exists and is self-perpetuating, must exist as it is logically necessary.

 

[Perplexity]

CTuck:

The second reason proving the impossibility of infinite regression is this. When a series of movers and things moved are ordered, that is, when they form a series where each one moves the next, it is inevitable that, if the first mover disappeared or ceased to move, none of the rest would any longer be either a mover or moved. It is the first mover, indeed, which confers the power of moving on all the others. Now it we have an infinite series of movers and things moved, there will no longer be a first mover and all are intermediate movers. Therefore, if the action of the first mover is wanting, nothing will be moved and there will be no movement in the world.

Here it is explicitly stated that each member of an ordered series of infinitely regressing bodies only moves if the serie’s first mover does, but since there is no first mover in an infinite regress then nothing could move, since everything would be an intermediate mover. That’s Aristotle’s argument.

But, of course in an ordered series of infinitely regressing bodies the ‘first mover’ does not confer the power of moving on all the others. The concept of a first mover confering causal powers on all other movers in the series is unintelligible outside of a finite regress. He’s picturing something like a line of dominoes and saying if there was no first domino that fell, then none of the other dominoes could fall. But, on an infinite regress there is no first domino, they regress infinitely. The kind of series which Aristotle is talking about only exists in a finitely ordered series. So, he fallaciously holds an infinite regress to a standard only applicable to a finite regress.

 

[CTuck]

CTuck:

Here it is explicitly stated that each member of an ordered series of infinitely regressing bodies only moves if the serie’s first mover does, but since there is no first mover in an infinite regress then nothing could move, since everything would be an intermediate mover. That’s Aristotle’s argument.

The part that you emboldened in your last post concerning the first mover of a series was not to be seen as the first mover of an infinitely regressive chain, that would make no sense. We know this because of his next statement:

“Now if we have an infinite series of movers and things moved,** there will no longer be a first mover** and all are intermediate movers.”

Here he’s given the theory of Infinite regression to the tee, as well as defined his previous statement by contrast.

The first example is of a regressively finite series. He gives it, not just because it has a first mover, but also because it is not theoretical. These things we know to exist, the infinitely regressive chain will always be theoretical. Even if infinite regression were true, it could consist of an infinite number of regressively finite series of causation that are each defined by their first mover(s) and are potentially part of greater and greater series unto infinity yet to each the principle of a first mover would still apply due to their regressively finite nature. But this is where infinite regression is constantly begging the question of, “what caused this?” yet doesn’t allow you to ask “what caused all of this?”

The theory is not intellectually satisfying. On the other hand, that sentiment will come from all sides. If you adhere to the infinite regression theory and are asked, “what caused all this motion?,” you could really only answer, “an infinity of previous motion to which there is not a first,” even though the previous motion is also in question. But then this also begs the question of how is it possible to be the effect of a cause separated by an infinite amount of intermediary causes? How is it possible that we arrive hear from infinity ago?

 

[Sarpedon]

We’re not speaking about the magisterium though, but the papacy.

"And this infallibility which the Divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed in defining doctrine of faith and morals, extends as far as the deposit of Revelation extends, which must be religiously guarded and faithfully expounded. - Lumen Gentium, n. 25.

“For the Holy Spirit was not promised to Peter and his successors so that by His revelations they might propose new doctrine but that by his assistance they might jealously guard and faithfully explain the revelation or deposit of the faith handed down by the apostles.” - Vatican Council, De Ecclesia, chap. 4.

So if the magisterium defines anything infallibly, that thing must be contained within the DOF.

The magisterium has defined the papacy infallibly.

Therefore, the papacy must be a member of the DOF.

First, you’re really speaking of the infallibility of the papacy, not the papacy as the bishopric of Rome. The latter is properly historical, as well as theological.

The DOF is the body of doctrine left behind by Jesus. The magisterium is the teaching authority of Jesus as manifested in the Church.

It’s true that the idea of the Magisterium and the papacy is present in the DOF, but the Magisterium and papacy themselves are not ideas. They are actions. Your premise is correct insofar as you consider the idea of the papacy- the idea of the papacy is a member of the deposit of faith. The practice of the papacy, however, is an act and therefore outside of the DOF.

As an analogy, consider political power. The idea of political power is present in the Constitution. The actual practice of political power, however, is completely separate from the Constitution. There is nothing circular about this. A person can refer to either the idea of political power or actual political power as they choose.

Looking at your original conclusion:

'Therefore, only if the Catholic presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God can s/he show that the papacy is a truth revealed by God. [From (1), (2) by Modus Ponens]"

You’re finding circular reasoning because you’re viewing the papacy as an idea within the DOF. The idea of the papacy is indeed a truth revealed by God and inside the DOF. You then conclude that since the papacy and magisterium are the source of the DOF, a circle results. This circle only occurs, however, if the idea of the papacy is professed by the idea of the papacy. When the idea of the papacy is professed by the acting, historical institution known as the papacy, no such circle results. The papacy and the Magisterium proper are historical entities, not ideas. While we can use ideas to argue for the papacy (as I have done), we are not arguing for another idea, but rather the validity of a concrete historical institution.

So, if religious experience aren’t a method which apply evenly across the board because not everyone has one, then Catholicism doesn’t/didn’t apply evenly across the board, at least, at the inception of Catholicism, when it was inaccessible to most of humanity. To be consistent with your principle here is for atheism to win the debate; because, there is no alleged communication of God which can meet that criteria.

True, but even then natural law existed as the precursor to Catholicism, and every bit as valid at that time. It actually makes sense, in my view, that the presence of God’s communication should increase with time. As society as grown larger and more sophisticated, and more capable of technological advances and decisions on a vast scale, it makes sense for God to “upgrade” the communication machine. Natural law may have worked well enough for desert nomads, but it would be insufficient in the modern world. Catholicism will continue to develop philosophically over time, and the structure of Catholicism allows for this. The ability of the Church to rule definitively over time allows her to keep pace with the changing world. That’s why Catholicism can comment on things like cloning that would be unknown in ancient times. You’ll notice that the Bible, Koran, and Torah say nothing about cloning, but the Church exists to fill that gap.

You can claim that no one dies without encountering God in some relevant sense so Catholicism does have some kind of universal extension. But, then I don’t see why we can’t say everyone will have a religious experience before they die and therefore RE’s have universal extension.

It’s possible that everyone will have a religious experience. What about other things, though? What about making moral decisions throughout your life? Why would God wait until right before death to communicate? That makes no sense. If religious experience is the way God chooses to act, why do so many atheists not hear the message during their life when the most is at stake, in terms of actions and their consequences?

 

[Sarpedon]

I. “If we go back to infinity is the series of movers and things moved, we must affirm that there is an infinite number of bodies…”

This is a red herring and should be rejected. No one is saying there are an actually infinite number of bodies all instantiated within finite time now, only a potentially infinite amount. That is, at no time t is there an infinite amount of bodies within finite time.

Is that really possible, though?

In an infinite regress of causes, everything that exists is an intermediate cause. For a thing to be an intermediate cause, it must have an antecedent and subsequent cause. If something did not have an antecedent cause, then it is uncaused, and we are done. If, on the other hand, something does not have a subsequent cause, then it is not a cause in the first place. Therefore, in an infinite regress of causes, everything has a antecedent cause and a subsequent cause. As an analogy, consider an infinitely regressing chain. Every link has an antecedent link and a subsequent link.

You might be tempted to say “this is true, but since the chain stretches across time, this just means that there are endless potential links to instantiate.” The problem with this is that it requires time. St. Thomas, of course, is arguing not from causation across time, but causation in the present moment. Aquinas is considering a singular moment and the network of causes that sustain everything in that singular moment.

If, in this singular moment, causation is infinitely regressive. then everything must have an antecedent and a subsequent cause of something. If we ever reached the edge of the web and found something that had no antecedent, or had no subsequent, then the web would not really be infinite after all, and we are done. The critic, however, is obliged to maintain that in this singular moment, the network of causation is infinite. This means that the network of things being caused by other things and causing other things is infinite. In turn, there are infinite numbers of things connected by infinite acts of causation.

So, if the causation is infinite, then there must be infinite numbers of things (bodies) at any given moment.

This is problematic for a number of reasons. Maintaining infinite numbers of actually real objects is always questionable. Aquinas, though, identifies time as the main problem. If we have infinite numbers of things moving, then we have infinite numbers of things moving inside of time, which is itself finite. Regardless of whether you agree that time is finite (metaphysically, not in duration- of course time has probably an infinite duration), the problem of infinite numbers of real objects is just as problematic.

 

[Sarpedon]

II. Is a notorious misunderstanding of infinity.

To say the amount of bodies regress infinitely is to say their regress had no beginning—not a beginning infinitely remote. That is, there is no first cause in an infinitely regressing series of bodies. He’s looking at this like a number line in which we start at the number 1 at the far left and continue from that point rightwards, infinitely. But, no one advocating the possibility of an infinite regress is gonna grant this. i.e., there is no beginning to this number line.

Aquinas doesn’t take such a simplistic view. This is how Gilson describes it, from the second proof where this is brought out more fully:

Finally, it should be pointed out that if the proof from the efficient cause, like that from the first mover, rests on the impossibility of carrying the series of causes to infinity, it is because in this case too causes arranged according to the order of essences are causes arranged hierarchically. An infinite series of efficient causes within the same species is not only possible, but even, in the Aristotelian hypothesis of the eternity of the world, necessary. A man can beget a man who, in his turn, begets another, and so on to infinity. A series like this has no internal order, because it is as man and not as the son of his father that a man begets another. But do we want to find out the cause of his own specific form as such, the cause in virtue of which he is man and able to beget another? It is clearly no longer in his own kind but in a being of a higher degree that we shall discover it. And just as this superior being explains at once the existence and the causality of the beings whose species is subordinated to its own, so it holds in its turn its own being and causality from a still higher being. Hence, the necessity of a first term: the first term contains virtually the causality of the entire series and of each of the terms belonging to it. In the doctrine of St. Thomas one cannot say that there is just one efficacy, but there is only one solitary source of efficacious causality for the entire world. No thing gives existence, save inasmuch as there is in it a participation of the divine power. This is also why, in the order of efficient causes as in that of moving causes, we must proceed to and stop at a supreme degree.

(67-8)

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Here is my new toy. Lets see if we can break it.

A common statement of the infinite regress objection is something like this.

**
…since the chain of events is eternal, the chain itself does not need a cause…**

1. …since… This word can be expressed as an equality from its context, (=)

2…the chain of events is eternal,…

This statement can be expressed as infinite series of contingent beings, let this statement be (x)

3…the chain itself does not need a cause…

This statement can be expressed as necessary being let this statement be

Therefore this statement can be reduced to…x=y (A=notA)!!!

Applying the Law of Identity we see an immediate contradiction. Therefore infinite regress arguments that fit the form of the statement since the chain of events is eternal, the chain itself does not need a cause" are logical contradictions.

Anyone interested feel free to beat on it a bit so I can see if its worth pursuing this line of argumentation. My standard response now is to refuse to talk about a single element of the set and refer to the entire set as a being contingent on the person who posed the argument to me. That works, but I would like a more elegant and brief demonstration so I can pass it around.

 

[Sarpedon]

III. Seems to be exactly what Mackie is objecting to.

It’s hard to know what Mackie is objecting too, because he has about three sentences of metaphysical material in his quote. Aquinas has a lot more (to the bane of many students )

Number lines are abstract representation of properties. A number is a representation of a quantity, but a quantity is a property of individual things grouped together. I think atheists like to call them “emergent attributes.” Our brain recognizes certain emerging patterns and attributes, even though they are not directly “in” the subject.

Here’s a thought experiment. Consider an infinite number line. As an atheist, you can’t say that numbers are real objects (as a Platonist might- the Form of Number 3, for instance), because they emerge from matter. So, step back from your own mental grouping of the attributes, and consider what lie beneath them- individual objects. Assign pieces of gravel as the basis for each number. For example, the number 3 on the number line is actually three little pieces of gravel. From a mathematical perspective, that’s what is really represented by numbers.

So, you have an infinite number line, which means you have an infinite number of little pieces of gravel. This is problematic. However, you might say: “There is no problem in this, because given infinite time, an infinite number of pieces of gravel can be instantiated without them all existing at the same time.” Incidentally, this is the same sort of scenario that Gilson and Aquinas recognize and refer to in regards to the “man begetting son” in an infinite chain of a species.

The problem is, of course, that you can’t cop out by appealing to time. Aquinas wants to think in terms of a single moment, and you have to follow him into that single moment if you want to refute his argument. An infinite number line in a single moment necessarily implies an infinite number of little pieces of gravel in that single moment. This is exactly what was said above. An infinite number line is comforting in abstract theory, but once we use an infinite number line on actual things in a singular moment infinity becomes much harder to maintain.

 

[Sarpedon]

IV. 1. If whatever moves is moved and God moves, then God is moved. 2. Whatever moves is moved. 3. God moves. 4. Therefore, God is moved.

“Thus there will be a first mover that is not moved by another” is inconsistent with your starting point. Now, you can change it to say ‘Almost all things which move are moved’ so as to exclude God, but then you can’t reach your conclusion.

God is not a thing (ontological entity). He is an act.

You’ve correctly seen the implication of the argument. Aristotle only went so far. Aristotle saw the greatest god as the the maximal thing that existed. It was the greatest thing that existed. This god was an ontological entity, though indeed the maximal ontological entity.

Aquinas realized the limitations of this, and went far beyond them. Aquinas realized that God could not be an ontological entity/thing/body, for the reasons you point out, among others. As a consequence, Aquinas realized that God cannot be the highest existing thing, because to be so would to be still bound by existence. God, then must be existence itself, the act-of-being. God is not a thing, He is an action, an act. Aquinas calls this the “act-of-being,” or in Latin, “actus essendi.” This then in turn resolves your objection and allows for a chain of causes which are rooted not in an entity, which would be problematic as you point out, but rather in an act itself.

A very important note- the above could be read as a sort of pantheism. Aquinas does not accept this, however, and explains his position on the relationship between actus essendi and ens. That’s really a whole new topic though.

Perhaps most importantly though, almost all of these bank on Aristotelian philosophy, something a lot of folks entertaining this argument aren’t gonna agree with. For instance…the idea of movement [the reduction of potency to act]. Nowadays we have 4 dimmensionalism and temporal parts theory to account for change.

True, many people think they can substitute modern day science for metaphysics, even though they aren’t the same thing. That’s pretty much modern philosophy in a nutshell.

 

[Perplexity]

First, you’re really speaking of the infallibility of the papacy, not the papacy as the bishopric of Rome. The latter is properly historical, as well as theological.

Well the magisterium has defined a number of things about the papacy besides infallibility. For instance, its universal jurisdiction and that the bishops of Rome succeed Peter in the primacy etc.

I include these dogmas contained in the DOF as ‘the papacy.’ So, not so much the idea of the papacy but all those papal dogmas contained in the DOF.

You’re finding circular reasoning because you’re viewing the papacy as an idea within the DOF. The idea of the papacy is indeed a truth revealed by God and inside the DOF. You then conclude that since the papacy and magisterium are the source of the DOF, a circle results. This circle only occurs, however, if the idea of the papacy is professed by the idea of the papacy. When the idea of the papacy is professed by the acting, historical institution known as the papacy, no such circle results. The papacy and the Magisterium proper are historical entities, not ideas. While we can use ideas to argue for the papacy (as I have done), we are not arguing for another idea, but rather the validity of a concrete historical institution.

The idea is that if a Catholic wants to show that ‘the papacy’ is a member of the DOF, (i.e., that God has revealed it) then s/he’s gonna have to appeal to the DOF at some point in order to do so. But, s/he must presuppose that the papacy is a member of the DOF if s/he appeals to the DOF.

Therefore, in showing that the papacy is a member of the DOF, s/he’ll have to employ a premise (i.e., appeal to the DOF) which s/he couldn’t be justified in believing in without presupposing the truth of the conclusion s/he intends to support (that the papacy is a member of the DOF).

As far as natural law goes:

You said it is “it is irrational to think that God would use a method that doesn’t apply evenly across the board.”

As you’ve conceded, Catholicism at least didn’t apply across the board at one time. Therefore, it follows that “it is irrational to think that God would use” Catholicism as his mean communication, at least at that point.

So, if you can dismiss religious experience because there is some time t where it isn’t universally applied (i.e., at least not everyone has a religious experience during their life time, perhaps they will immediately before they die, or afterwards etc.) then I can dismiss Catholicism because there is some time t where it isn’t universally applied.

If the fact that Catholicism wasn’t universally applied doesn’t matter because of natural law or whatever then why should it matter that religious experiences aren’t universally applied at some time? Also, I could just appeal to natural law.

This whole issue seems highly speculative. To me, personally.

 

[Perplexity]

So, if the causation is infinite, then there must be infinite numbers of things (bodies) at any given moment.

Imagine a number line with 0 at the far right and an infinite amount of negative integers proceeding left-wards. You can arbitrarily pick any negative integer as a starting point and traverse from that point toward zero without having to pass by an infinite amount of negative integers first.

For example, let’s pick -1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000. Beginning at the number negative sextillion and count right-wards on the line until we reach 0, even though the number is ginormous, we need only cross a finite amount of numbers.

If time is infinite, it doesn’t matter what point you choose to traverse from until reaching the present, you’ll still cross a finite amount of time between those two points.

Suppose that each ‘point’ on this number line is a given moment in time. Since there aren’t an infinite amount of causers existing at any given point (as there are some which won’t come to exist until other points etc.) then you cannot say that at each point there are an infinite number of things. And this despite the fact that the number line is infinite.
That is, you can continue leftwards forever without finding its end.

 

[Perplexity]

Aquinas doesn’t take such a simplistic view. This is how Gilson describes it, from the second proof where this is brought out more fully:

This topic is just too big, there seems to be too many issues to adequately address. I was responding to what you said were Aristotle’s arguments against infinite regresses not Aquinas’. But, I find Aquinas’ theory of causality highly suspect. I don’t take a lot of metaphysical issues like it very seriously so they don’t carry a lot of persuasive power for me.

Aquinas wants to think in terms of a single moment, and you have to follow him into that single moment if you want to refute his argument.

I’m not sure what we’re talking about any longer. It doesn’t seem like Aquinas is concerned with single moments in either of his first ways.

God is not a thing, He is an action, an act. Aquinas calls this the “act-of-being,” or in Latin, “actus essendi.” This then in turn resolves your objection and allows for a chain of causes which are rooted not in an entity, which would be problematic as you point out, but rather in an act itself.

Well, the original argument I proposed didn’t mention “things”:

1. If whatever moves is moved and God moves, then God is moved. 2. Whatever moves is moved. 3. God moves. 4. Therefore, God is moved.

I’ve constructed a Thomistic argument against the existence of God based on the motion principle in 1, before. It seems like, granting that God isn’t a thing, it can still be the case that God is moved…granting that ‘whatever’ [whether thing or action] moves is moved.

I think I may have to bow out of this convo though. I’m spending too much time on the forums

Thanks for the engaging debate Sarpedon.

 

[jenniferpet88]

ok let me take a shot at this…personally when reading this the third step of argument 1 seemed like an illogical conclusion…but that is just an opinion i will now analyze it closer, and to be fair i will try not to make distinction but argue it on it’s own grounds and look at the “worst case scenario”-----here goes

let’s see what the revelation says about coming to know God…the bible says that the only way one can know God is through Jesus Christ and the only way one can know Jesus is through the Holy Spirit aaaaannnnnndddd the only way to have the Holy Spirit is to obey God’s law which was set forth in the bible…how’s that for a circular argument? the problem is though if we dismiss that logically we are not following the instructions for the experiment…if you follow God’s law (obey the 10 commandments including love god with your whole heart and soul) then God’s existence should be proven to you and after that happens it will no longer matter how circular the argument is because you will realize that you have left out two essential components…God’s grace and Free Will

Believing in God is not a matter of the intellect if it was the devil wouldve never rebelled…believing in God is a matter of the Will…it is only AFTER we believe in God that we come to know more about Him…

2nd problem…even if you go and do this and prove God to yourself how do you know Catholics are right when there are thousands of religions…well you would have to give up your ego and relinquish your will to God—this makes no sense unless you complete step 1— if you give your will over to God and the Catholic Church is true He will lead you to it

I love how my post is completely ignored but i know why because any person who makes an argument that cant’ be refuted gets ignored as usual and the only people that get responded to are ones that have refutable arguments…you’re not looking for the truth

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…I don’t take a lot of metaphysical issues like it very seriously so they don’t carry a lot of persuasive power for me…

Why is that?

Did you miss post #117? We have yet to reach a conclusion on your OP argument. At this point either conclusion you reached seems to be troublesome. If we are begging the question, then logic begs the question itself and any syllogism falls to the same charge, or if we are committing circular reasoning, then your argument only instructs insofar as it points out that the truth of our beliefs are not guaranteed by the logical structure you propose. which would make it so trivial as to be meaningless because technical validity says nothing about the truth of the premise’ or conclusion.

 

[levinas12]

A very important note- the above could be read as a sort of pantheism. Aquinas does not accept this, however, and explains his position on the relationship between actus essendi and ens. That’s really a whole new topic though.

Sarpedon:

Do you have some info (e.g., a Thomas cite) about the relationship between actus essendi and ens? Is the actus essendi of a creature the same as God’s esse? Do creatures “participate” in God’s esse?

There is the principle that “esse” is received according to the “mode” of the essence.
Does this mean that the creature’s esse is ontologically distinct from God’s esse?

Certainly, there is something like a real distinction between esse and essence (for created ens).

I know this topic is off thread … but any help you can provide would be appreciated.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…
Does this mean that the creature’s esse is ontologically distinct from God’s esse?..

We are pan-en-theists. The distinction between our substance and G-d’s is the necessary/contingent dichotomy as I understand it.

 

[Sarpedon]

The idea is that if a Catholic wants to show that ‘the papacy’ is a member of the DOF, (i.e., that God has revealed it) then s/he’s gonna have to appeal to the DOF at some point in order to do so. But, s/he must presuppose that the papacy is a member of the DOF if s/he appeals to the DOF.

Therefore, in showing that the papacy is a member of the DOF, s/he’ll have to employ a premise (i.e., appeal to the DOF) which s/he couldn’t be justified in believing in without presupposing the truth of the conclusion s/he intends to support (that the papacy is a member of the DOF).

The bolded part is the key element in your argument from my perspective. Your argument banks on demonstrating the veracity of the papacy by appealing to revelation. The papacy is part of revelation, and therefore you see a circular appeal. The problem is, though, that there is no need to appeal to revelation in this case. While we can appeal directly to revelation, this is problematic when relating the papacy to something extrinsic to Catholicism. That’s why we more properly use reason and philosophy to appeal to the veracity of the papacy. You’re identifying a methodological problem. A naive Catholic philosopher could indeed make the mistake you point out. Despite this, you can’t conclude from an methodological mistake that the metaphysics of Catholicism are flawed. A human being could make the mistake you mention- but we are not obligated to make that mistake, and therefore the mistake does not affect Catholicism as an objective theological and philosophical system.

If the fact that Catholicism wasn’t universally applied doesn’t matter because of natural law or whatever then why should it matter that religious experiences aren’t universally applied at some time? Also, I could just appeal to natural law.

Because universality is only part of what we would expect the true method to be. You also have to consider the organization of the method, whether it can effectively function as a dynamic voice of God. Some traditions simply don’t pass this test, even if they pass the universality test. Do personal religious experiences properly equip an individual with the knowledge they need to live a good life? If the experience is withheld from atheists until death, why are the atheists denied access to the knowledge that would benefit them? Can personal religious experiences effectively inform political processes? How do we know which experiences are genuine and which are fake when considering them collectively, and when we have to make a group decision? In Catholicism, everything is out in the open. Nothing is secret, and secrecy knowledge is anathema to the Church (case in point- the gnostic heretics were defeated at the very beginning). This is why Catholicism works very well as a theological, philosophical, political, and moral system.

This whole issue seems highly speculative. To me, personally.

It is speculative, in a way that, say, the hardcore metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas are not. Nevertheless, I see very convincing lines of evidence in these speculations. Isn’t philosophy speculating and then finding justifications for those speculations? What’s so different between what I am doing and, say, Nietzsche saying “God is dead?”

 

[Sarpedon]

Imagine a number line with 0 at the far right and an infinite amount of negative integers proceeding left-wards. You can arbitrarily pick any negative integer as a starting point and traverse from that point toward zero without having to pass by an infinite amount of negative integers first.

Yes, but in an infinite regress of causes, every cause has both an antecedent and subsequent cause. Therefore, we cannot “stop” at point X- merely reaching point X in an infinite chain of intermediate causes automatically necessitates point X-1 and X+1, and so on- because every intermediate cause must have an antecedent and subsequent. The consequence, then, is that we can’t stop at X- there is no way we can stop until we reach X without a subsequent. In an infinite regress, that can’t happen- and therefore we cannot stop and must proceed to infinity along the number line. When you acknowledge that the infinite number line is in a singular moment, this means that there are infinite integers in a single moment. Since causes work on things, not abstract numbers, the corollary of this is that there are an infinite number of things (bodies) in a single moment if there is infinite causation in this moment.

If time is infinite, it doesn’t matter what point you choose to traverse from until reaching the present, you’ll still cross a finite amount of time between those two points.

Suppose that each ‘point’ on this number line is a given moment in time. Since there aren’t an infinite amount of causers existing at any given point (as there are some which won’t come to exist until other points etc.) then you cannot say that at each point there are an infinite number of things. And this despite the fact that the number line is infinite.
That is, you can continue leftwards forever without finding its end.

This only works in linear time. In a singular moment, the network of causes is immediate. An infinity of causes in a single moment necessitates an infinite number of things, just as an infinite number line on a piece of paper necessitates an infinite number of integers actually on that paper.

If you change this to say “the infinity of integers only appears over infinite time” you aren’t directly addressing the argument. Both Aristotle and Aquinas acknowledge explicitly that the world could be eternal according to this formula- Aristotle said it was in fact so. The problem with this, though, is that you are obligated to say that the infinite regress does not exist at a singular moment, only across time. If you admit this, the argument becomes relatively simple. Aquinas is not talking about linear causation across time- he is talking about vertical, hierarchical causation that relates everything to each other in that singular moment. In other words, Aquinas is asking: “in a given moment, how do causal relationships exist?” Since you admitted that the infinite regress cannot exist in a singular moment, this chain of causation is not infinite. Therefore, it has limits.

 

[Sarpedon]

I’m not sure what we’re talking about any longer. It doesn’t seem like Aquinas is concerned with single moments in either of his first ways.

Aquinas is definitely talking about singular moments. See Contra Gentiles 2, 38. A lot of people assume that the Summa is the entirety of Thomistic philosophy and his highest achievement. In reality, though, the Summa was intended as a basic intro course for his students, and it is therefore relatively abbreviated and simplified. A lot of his philosophical heft is in Contra Gentiles, De Ente et Essentia, and his commentaries on Aristotle.

Also, the arguments were Aristotle’s, but Aquinas adopts them and tinkers a bit with them, before going far beyond them. It that sense the argument really belongs to both of them.

Well, the original argument I proposed didn’t mention “things”:

1. If whatever moves is moved and God moves, then God is moved. 2. Whatever moves is moved. 3. God moves. 4. Therefore, God is moved.

I’ve constructed a Thomistic argument against the existence of God based on the motion principle in 1, before. It seems like, granting that God isn’t a thing, it can still be the case that God is moved…granting that ‘whatever’ [whether thing or action] moves is moved.

There are a couple of different ways to respond to this depending on how you define your terms. Aquinas identifies certain attributes that must belong to to the act of existence itself, among these an inability to change. It would seem to me that if existence itself could change, then that change has to be measured against something else, which isn’t existence- thus wrecking our idea of reality as being grounded in existence. It’s also problematic to think that there is anything aside from existence by which to measure change. Anyway, though, I would need a bit more context before addressing this.

I think I may have to bow out of this convo though. I’m spending too much time on the forums

Thanks for the engaging debate Sarpedon.

Thank you! This has been fascinating discussion. Nothing like an engaging philosophy discussion to break out of the boring summer doldrums.

 

[Sarpedon]

Levinas, I’ll return later today or tomorrow