Catholicism and Circular Reasoning: Take Two

[Perplexity]

You ignored my point. Premise 1 is false, because a Catholic does not presuppose the authority of the RCC universally for all revelation. The Catholic personally accepts the revelation of God in the person of Jesus, who therefore has divine authority, and from that the authority of the RCC in all other matters.

Luke: I’m not claiming a Catholic’s beliefs about the RCC’s relation to the Deposit of Faith are the only beliefs s/he has on the matter. So, sure, they can accept it through the person of Jesus etc. Your objection is the most common objection I’ve run into in presenting the argument, so in the second post of the thread I responded to it.

Your point that “the Catholic personally accepts the revelation of God in the person of Jesus, who therefore has divine authority, and from that the authority of the RCC in all other matters” is not opposed to premise 1; since premise 1 merely says that because a Catholic believes the RCC is responsible for producing [albeit instrumentally], protecting and proliferating the Deposit of Faith, and that the RCC had(s) the authority to do so, the Catholic must presuppose these beliefs [not just these] in identifying anything as a member of the Deposit of Faith.

 

[Luke_K]

Luke: I’m not claiming a Catholic’s beliefs about the RCC’s relation to the Deposit of Faith are the only beliefs s/he has on the matter. So, sure, they can accept it through the person of Jesus etc. Your objection is the most common objection I’ve run into in presenting the argument, so in the second post of the thread I responded to it.

Your point that “the Catholic personally accepts the revelation of God in the person of Jesus, who therefore has divine authority, and from that the authority of the RCC in all other matters” is not opposed to premise 1; since premise 1 merely says that because a Catholic believes the RCC is responsible for producing [albeit instrumentally], protecting and proliferating the Deposit of Faith, and that the RCC had(s) the authority to do so, the Catholic must presuppose these beliefs [not just these] in identifying anything as a member of the Deposit of Faith.

Either I’m not understanding you, or you’re not understanding Catholicism. I don’t presuppose Catholicism’s hold on the deposit of faith out of faith in Catholicism. I hold it on my faith in Jesus. That is not circular.

 

[steve_b]

It comes in two parts:

Argument 1:

(1) If the Catholic appeals to God’s revelation, then s/he presupposes the authority of the Catholic Church. [Premise]

(2) If the Catholic presupposes the authority of the Catholic Church, then s/he presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God. [Premise]

(3) Therefore, if the Catholic appeals to God’s revelation, then s/he presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God. [From (2), (3) Modus Ponens]

Argument 2:

(1’) Only if the Catholic appeals to God’s revelation can s/he show that the papacy is a truth revealed by God.

(2’) If the Catholic appeals to God’s revelation, then s/he presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God.

(3’) Therefore, only if the Catholic presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God can s/he show that the papacy is a truth revealed by God. [From (1), (2) by Modus Ponens]

taking this in sections

Argument 1:
(1) If the Catholic appeals to God’s revelation, then s/he presupposes the authority of the Catholic Church. [Premise]
true, assuming by God’s revelation, you mean scripture. St Augustine said something close to that.

“For my part, I should not believe the gospel except moved by the authority of the Catholic Church. So when those on whose authority I have consented to believe in the gospel tell me not to believe in Manicheus, how can I but consent?” Augustine, Epistle of Manichaeus 5,6 (A.D. 397).
(2) If the Catholic presupposes the authority of the Catholic Church, then s/he presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God. [Premise]
This is likewise logical and true, and moving in a straight line, not bending to start forming a circle.
(3’) Therefore, only if the Catholic presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God can s/he show that the papacy is a truth revealed by God. [From (1), (2) by Modus Ponens*
since 1 & 2 are true then so is #3 (giving latitude to the terms you used)

 

[davidv]

davidv: I’ve addressed most of this in the second post of the thread, I should’ve included that post in the first

By producing, if you notice, I say “[albeit instrumentally]” as in a secondary cause; but, the “producing…” part isn’t necessary for the argument. We could replace it with a phrase like “the Deposit of Faith was entrusted to the Catholic Church” in the words of Dei Verbum, and the Catechism etc. So, I most definitely do not mean the RCC created revelation.

I’ve also addressed the objection that the authority of the Church being presupposed in premise 1 isn’t dependent on the papacy.

If you note, I said no bishop would have ordinary jurisdiction or infallibility unless the papacy is a truth revealed by God. As Lumen Gentium, n. 21 [and Mystici Corporis, etc.] teaches, a bishop can only licitly exercise his authority if he has received the right to do so from the pope.

Since the authority which the Catholic presupposes is necessarily licit, then s/he must believe those bishops received this from the pope. But, if the papacy isn’t a truth revealed by God, then bishops don’t have licity. Therefore, the Catholic presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God when s/he presupposes the authority of the Catholic Church.

The authority of a bishop comes from the bishop(s) who ordained him, not the Pope, through the laying on of hands. Jesus invested each apostle with the authority needed to spread the “Good News”, not just to Peter (the first Pope). IOW, the Pope is not like a corporate CEO or Chairman of the Board.

Looks like you have created a strawman.

 

[Perplexity]

Since begging the question isn’t irrational, I don’t see how you can make the leap to the claim that it prevents us from making a rational argument.

warpspeed: That makes me wonder how you understand ‘irrational.’ Begging the question occurs when the conclusion of an argument is presupposed by, at least, one of the premises intended to demonstrate that conclusion. The reason begging the question is considered to be a fallacy is because an argument which begs the question is claiming the premises demonstrate the conclusion when don’t actually do that. They just assume the conclusion has been demonstrated.

Let’s entertain an example of begging the question to see if you think someone who accepts the conclusion, despite it’s fallacious nature, is still rational:

I know that God exists because the bible says so, and it’s reliable. I know the bible is reliable because God inspired it.

^ is that a rational argument?

 

[Perplexity]

The authority of a bishop comes from the bishop(s) who ordained him, not the Pope, through the laying on of hands. Jesus invested each apostle with the authority needed to spread the “Good News”, not just to Peter (the first Pope). IOW, the Pope is not like a corporate CEO or Chairman of the Board.

Looks like you have created a strawman.

David: I’m not sure what I’ve said that has led you to this conclusion. I whole heartedly agree with you.

According to Vatican I, Sess. 4, ch. 3, “This power of the supreme pontiff by no means detracts from that ordinary and immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction, by which bishops, who have succeeded to the place of the apostles by appointment of the holy Spirit, tend and govern individually the particular flocks which have been assigned to them.”

The bishops receive the power of the episcopacy through ordination; but, not the right to exercise that power.

Lumen Gentium, n. 21, “But Episcopal consecration, together with the office of sanctifying, also confers the office of teaching and of governing, which, however, of its very nature, can be exercised only in hierarchical communion with the head and the members of the college.”

So, all I’m claiming is what Lumen Gentium teaches…

 

[davidv]

David: I’m not sure what I’ve said that has led you to this conclusion. I whole heartedly agree with you.

According to Vatican I, Sess. 4, ch. 3, “This power of the supreme pontiff by no means detracts from that ordinary and immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction, by which bishops, who have succeeded to the place of the apostles by appointment of the holy Spirit, tend and govern individually the particular flocks which have been assigned to them.”

The bishops receive the power of the episcopacy through ordination; but, not the right to exercise that power.

Lumen Gentium, n. 21, “But Episcopal consecration, together with the office of sanctifying, also confers the office of teaching and of governing, which, however, of its very nature, can be exercised only in hierarchical communion with the head and the members of the college.”

So, all I’m claiming is what Lumen Gentium teaches…

Therefore there is no circularity in demonstrating the Church’s authority, nor the legitimacy of the the papacy.

 

[Perplexity]

Therefore there is no circularity in demonstrating the Church’s authority, nor the legitimacy of the the papacy.

(1) If the Catholic appeals to God’s revelation, then s/he presupposes the authority of the Catholic Church. [Premise]

The authority which is being presupposed is that which the Catholic believes has preserved the Deposit of Faith. Who did that? The bishops and the pope, through local and ecumenical councils. Therefore every bishop, whose authority the Catholic presupposes here, has the right to exercise that power because they received it from the pope. But, the pope wouldn’t be able to confer such a right unless ‘the papacy is a fact revealed by God.’ So, it follows necessarily that in presupposing this authority, the Catholic presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God.

This is just a premise of the first argument. I make no claims here about circularity. Circularity is the conclusion of the 2nd argument.

 

[tonyrey]

tonyrey: The way you’re using ‘logical’ and ‘coherence’ is very strange to me. Propositions are either true or false. They’re true only if their truth-conditions are met. Offering a cogent alternative to how the Church arose is not a truth-condition of any of my premises. Therefore, the offering of such an explanation doesn’t imply whether the premises’ truth-conditions are met, and is therefore irrelevant to whether they’re true or false.

It is not a truth-condition of any of your premises because your premises are restricted to one part of the picture. Your argument may be coherent within its limited domain but not correspond to reality as a whole. Since the teaching of Christ and the origin of the Church are overlooked in your argument it has no existential significance.

The whole of science consists of circular reasoning because it cannot justify the premises on which it is based…

.

 

[JDaniel]

It comes in two parts:

Argument 1:

(1) If the Catholic appeals to God’s revelation, then s/he presupposes the authority of the Catholic Church. [Premise]

Perplexed:

Not so. This premise limits the ways in which a Catholic can believe in Revelation to the “authority of the Catholic Church” ONLY. Although it tries to avoid this by the use of the preposition, “if,” it is confirmed in premise 2 ff. Furthermore, it leaves out of the proposition the other very powerful supposition: that the history that we read is not false. By this, I mean the history of the data from the time period, which includes the history from the Biblical library. If some or all of the history of the data from the time period is false, then we have the perpetuation of perhaps the largest conspiracy fraud in history. Your limitation tries to make it possible to believe that we can and (very well may) have all been duped.

(2) If the Catholic presupposes the authority of the Catholic Church, then s/he presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God. [Premise]

This premise can stand alone, based on my reply to Premise 1. If the Catholic believes that he has not been duped, then it is reasonable to believe that the revelation of the conversation in the Garden actually took place in the manner, and with the intention that is normally acceptable to most people, and the Catholic Church.

(3) Therefore, if the Catholic appeals to God’s revelation, then s/he presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God.

True, but not by your limitation.

Argument 2:

(1’) Only if the Catholic appeals to God’s revelation can s/he show that the papacy is a truth revealed by God.

Again, you are constraining the appeal to “revelation” ONLY, when it also must suppose “true history.” So, this premise is incorrect. If the appeal is to a non-factical, then both history and revelation are false. (This does not necessarily falsify all of the data from the time period, just the events in the Garden. The problem with this is that the identical facts in Matthew are written (told to us) in the books by the same name from other non-Catholic compilers.)

(2’) If the Catholic appeals to God’s revelation, then s/he presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God.

True, based on my reply above.

(3’) Therefore, only if the Catholic presupposes that the papacy is a truth revealed by God can s/he show that the papacy is a truth revealed by God.

Not true, by virtue of the fact that the limitation is an artificial and inappropriate constraint, and thus a red herring.

God bless,
jd

 

[warpspeedpetey]

warpspeed:…

Premise1 Your argument uses logic.
Premise2 Logic is based on the Law of Identity, A=A
Premise3 The Law of Identity, A=A is circular
Premise4 Circularity makes arguments irrational (this is your baby here)
Conclusion1 Therefore your attempted refutation is irrational
Conclusion2 You will not like this fact very much. lol

You are using what you an argument that is itself reliant on a circularity to prove that all arguments with circular features are invalid. Your argument amounts to a self refuting statement, and hence it is a logical contradiction and therefore invalid.

The point being that mere circularity does not make an argument false. Nor make the proposal of such an argument irrational. If it did, Mathematics, other schools of logic, and even the dictionary would be unintelligible, because they all rely on some circularity in some way.

 

[Perplexity]

JDaniel: Thanks for your response.

I take your main contention with premise one to be the following:

“This premise limits the ways in which a Catholic can believe in Revelation to the “authority of the Catholic Church” ONLY.”

I’ve clarified my understanding of premise 1 numerous times throughout the thread as this objection seems to reoccur.

Premise 1 merely states that because this person is a Catholic, s/he believes that the Deposit of Faith was entrusted to the RCC, and this same Church has preserved, protected and proliferated this Deposit. That is, without the Church, there would be nothing to which the Deposit was entrusted to etc. That’s it. That’s all Premise 1 is about. These are the beliefs a Roman Catholic holds to, and presupposes when appealing to said Deposit.

Premise 1 isn’t concerned with what brought this person to this belief. Premise 1 doesn’t mind whether the Catholic believes these things because of x, y or z. The only thing that matters is that the person is in fact a Catholic, and therefore does hold these beliefs.

I’d rather stay away from getting into whether the RCC has the best claim to the early Church history. It’s not relevant to the argument and would take the conversation far afield. But, it certainly is an interesting topic.

Thanks again for your reply.

 

[Perplexity]

Premise1 Your argument uses logic.
Premise2 Logic is based on the Law of Identity, A=A
Premise3 The Law of Identity, A=A is circular
Premise4 Circularity makes arguments irrational (this is your baby here)
Conclusion1 Therefore your attempted refutation is irrational
Conclusion2 You will not like this fact very much. lol

You are using what you an argument that is itself reliant on a circularity to prove that all arguments with circular features are invalid. Your argument amounts to a self refuting statement, and hence it is a logical contradiction and therefore invalid.

The point being that mere circularity does not make an argument false. Nor make the proposal of such an argument irrational. If it did, Mathematics, other schools of logic, and even the dictionary would be unintelligible, because they all rely on some circularity in some way.

warpspeed: This certainly is an interesting response, thanks.

The most important question which should be answered is whether you accept the conclusions of the arguments. If not, then you must reject one of the premises. The implications these arguments have about the rationality of Catholicism isn’t essential to the arguments themselves.

Having said that, I’d like to note a few things about your response on ‘begging the question.’

The argument you provide above (with the Law of Identity etc.) doesn’t actually beg the question, ironically. Nor does it seem to be an ‘argument’ as various logics would classify one (propositional logic, predicate logic, syllogistic logic) etc.

Regardless, I believe I see your point. Namely, that if I’m arguing that all begging the question is irrational, then this argument itself begs the question and is irrational.

Rather than lose sight of the goal of this thread, I’ll just grant your point. It’s not important to whether these arguments succeed. I can explain why I think these arguments are so devastating once we’ve come to some agreement on the arguments.

 

[Perplexity]

I’ve committed quite an embarrassing error folks. I’d like to apologize and correct it. It doesn’t effect the arguments themselves nor the dialogue we’ve had so far; but, despite its inconsequential nature, it’s still rather embarrassing My arguments are NOT Modus Ponens. I have no idea why I was saying they were. My article, from which I copied these arguments from, has these as Hypothetical Syllogisms. This is another valid logical form, just like Modus Tollens, or Modus Ponendo Tollens, etc. So, again nothing essential changes, I’ve just made a silly mistake. I’ll change the original post accordingly to avoid confusion.

Modus Ponens =

(1) If P is true then Q is true.
(2) P is true.
(3) Therefore, Q is true.

Hypothetical Syllogism =

(1) If P is true then Q is true.
(2) If Q is true then R is true.
(3) Therefore, if P is true then R is true.

 

[Perplexity]

So, it seems to me like these arguments are logically valid and, for a Catholic, their premises will be accepted as true.

Throughout the discussion so far, almost all the objections have been to the first premise of the first argument.

I think I’ve adequately replied to them. Premise 1 merely describes a fact about Catholic epistemology. The objections presented misunderstood premise 1, and that’s totally understandable. As I said from the get go, these words and their constructions can be ambiguous, and misunderstanding is near inevitable. However, it seems to me like we’re generally on the same page now.

So, what is the verdict? Do you accept the conclusions to these arguments, or do you have objections to their premises?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…
The most important question which should be answered is whether you accept the conclusions of the arguments. If not, then you must reject one of the premises…Regardless, I believe I see your point. Namely, that if I’m arguing that all begging the question is irrational, then this argument itself begs the question and is irrational…

Because the argument is self refuting it is a logical contradiction. That should be all the refutation necessary once an agreement is reached on that point. If necessary I can return to the premise’ at a later time, but I see more fundamental errors in the argument. Namely, the logically contradictory nature of the argument.

 

[Perplexity]

Because the argument is self refuting it is a logical contradiction. That should be all the refutation necessary once an agreement is reached on that point. If necessary I can return to the premise’ at a later time, but I see more fundamental errors in the argument. Namely, the logically contradictory nature of the argument.

warpspeedpetey:

I’m beginning to detect blurring in reasoning here. Perhaps the best way to proceed is a black and white question and answer format. What do you say?

Do you agree that the two arguments I advanced in the first post of this thread are logically valid, each taking the form, Hypothetical Syllogism?

Do you agree that each of the premises of these arguments is true? If not, which premise of which argument do you reject, and why?

This way we can get straight to the core of any disagreements.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…
Do you agree that each of the premises of these arguments is true?..

I am not willing to talk about premise’ now because I see an error prior to them, there is a logical contradiction that must be dealt with before any discussion of the premise’ would matter. I am not sure that I am conveying the gravity of the situation, I am pointing out that you cannot use standard forms of logic to make that argument without logical contradiction. Your argument depends on a circularity to refute a circularity which means it refutes itself. There is nowhere else to go with the argument from there. We could talk about the premise’ all day long, but as long as that giant logical contradiction sits there we would be wasting our time. I understand your eagerness to test your hard work, but I think you might be “missing the forest for the trees”. In that you are wanting to discuss the parts of the argument to test them, while ignoring the forest fire of a logical contradiction burning it down, so to speak. From my viewpoint your argument is dead because of the contradiction. You can accept the obvious contradiction and bail on that argument, you can deny its a contradiction and we can talk that out, or you could do the irrational, and accept the validity of a logical contradiction. Now if you can get out from under the contradiction I will be happy to attack the premise’. But not until then.

 

[steve_b]

So, it seems to me like these arguments are logically valid and, for a Catholic, their premises will be accepted as true.

Throughout the discussion so far, almost all the objections have been to the first premise of the first argument.

I think I’ve adequately replied to them. Premise 1 merely describes a fact about Catholic epistemology. The objections presented misunderstood premise 1, and that’s totally understandable. As I said from the get go, these words and their constructions can be ambiguous, and misunderstanding is near inevitable. However, it seems to me like we’re generally on the same page now.

So, what is the verdict? Do you accept the conclusions to these arguments, or do you have objections to their premises?

I gave your terms some latitude/wiggle room
forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=8106257&postcount=43

 

[Perplexity]

warpspeedpetey: Alright, I’m up for the challenge. I’ve carefully worded the following rebuttal to ensure clarity and rigor.

I’ve gone over each of your posts [3] in which you’ve described the objection; here is what I’ve gathered:

Your Objection:

In post #51 you stated that, “You are using what you an argument that is itself reliant on a circularity to prove that all arguments with circular features are invalid.”

In post #56 you say that my argument[s?] is “logically contradictory in nature.”

In your last post, #58, you say, “Your argument depends on a circularity to refute a circularity which means it refutes itself.”

Response:

I. If I’m understanding correctly, you’re objecting to the two arguments I initially advanced in the beginning of this thread, not to my position on the irrationality of begging the question (a subject my arguments are silent on). I infer this because in your last post you say you’re unwilling to talk about the premises of the argument until we address the alleged logical problem of the argument first. The premises which we were talking about were those of the two arguments I initially proposed. This point is utterly fundamental, which leads me to my next point.

II. Your objection seems to be that these two arguments are attempting to attack circularity, but rely on circularity in order to do so: they’re self-refuting.

Before getting into whether these arguments actually do rely on circularity, it’s imperative to note that they’re not attacking circularity.

Their conclusions only seek to show that if a Catholic does X, then the Catholic does Y. i.e., that Catholics must beg the question if they do (x). They say nothing about whether circularity is bad, or irrational, or renders the argument invalid.

So, regardless of whether my arguments do rely on circularity, your objection has already been refuted; since, it’s false that my “argument depends on a circularity to refute a circularity.”

III. Do my arguments rely on circularity? They would do so only if one or more of their premises presupposed their respective conclusion. As, I think, anyone can see neither argument’s premises presuppose their conclusions. If you disagree, would you mind explaining how which premise of which argument presupposes the conclusion?

I think this suffices. Thanks again for your response.