Changelss God and fate

[Bahman]

Here I am trying to challenge the doctrine of changeless God arguing that one of its consequence is the existence of fate. The argument is very simple:

P1) God is changeless
C1) This means that God’s knowledge is not subject to change
P2) God’s knowledge is necessary for act creation
P3) Creation has a content which is basically the knowledge of each act each individual performs
C2) From P2 and P3 we can deduce that the knowledge of content of creation is necessary
C3) From C1 and C2 we can deduce that each individual has a fate

Please note that I am not arguing that God’s knowledge negate free will but instead arguing that it defines a fate for each individual, fatalism.

 

[balto]

Here I am trying to challenge the doctrine of changeless God arguing that one of its consequence is the existence of fate. The argument is very simple:

P1) God is changeless
C1) This means that God’s knowledge is not subject to change
P2) God’s knowledge is necessary for act creation
P3) Creation has a content which is basically the knowledge of each act each individual performs
C2) From P2 and P3 we can deduce that the knowledge of content of creation is necessary
C3) From C1 and C2 we can deduce that each individual has a fate

Please note that I am not arguing that God’s knowledge negate free will but instead arguing that it defines a fate for each individual, fatalism.

C2 is invalid. The knowledge of creation is not necessary. There’s nothing in creation that forces God to create it. I suspect that what you are really trying to get at is that if something happens, then God cannot fail to know it. We don’t have knowledge of God’s essence, only knowledge of creation so we have to argue from creation upwards. But if p happens freely, it only happens freely because God knows it happens freely. You would have to argue that God’s knowledge of p is necessary to establish fatalism but all classical theistic accounts of omniscience deny that God’s knowledge of creation is necessary.

 

[Bahman]

C2 is invalid.

C2 is valid. Knowledge is required for any action.

The knowledge of creation is not necessary.

Are you serious?

There’s nothing in creation that forces God to create it.

Changeless God has no other option. God by definition is a being with ability to create and this ability has to become actual since God is in the state of timeless.

I suspect that what you are really trying to get at is that if something happens, then God cannot fail to know it.

My argument is very clear.

We don’t have knowledge of God’s essence, only knowledge of creation so we have to argue from creation upwards.

We can assume so and come downward and see if things are consistent.

But if p happens freely, it only happens freely because God knows it happens freely.

Which means that God cannot know how p happens because it is free. How God could then distinguish that p happens freely if God knows it?

You would have to argue that God’s knowledge of p is necessary to establish fatalism but all classical theistic accounts of omniscience deny that God’s knowledge of creation is necessary.

I don’t understand what you are trying to say here.

 

[Trekker47]

Changeless God has no other option. God by definition is a being with ability to create and this ability has to become actual since God is in the state of timeless.

Well to be fair, God by definition has the ability to turn my computer into a newt, but that doesn’t mean that ability has to become actual.

Seriously though, just because God is outside of time and therefore can see our future as if it were the present to Him, doesn’t mean it was ‘fated’ to happen, we still caused whatever our future is to be, by free will.

 

[balto]

C2 is valid. Knowledge is required for any action.

That is not what C2 says. C2 says that knowledge of creation is necessary, which it isn’t.

Are you serious?

Uh, yes I am serious. What about creation necessitates God’s knowledge? God’s knowledge of creation is only necessary assuming He decides to create it. That would be like saying “supposing I decide to sit, it is necessary that I sit” and then erroneously concluding that therefore it is absolutely necessary that I sit and I could not have done otherwise. If you want to argue that “knowledge of creation” is necessary, then you would have to establish that this universe is logically necessary, which it isn’t.

Changeless God has no other option. God by definition is a being with ability to create and this ability has to become actual since God is in the state of timeless.

Why does this ability have to be actual? There is nothing in this or any universe that makes it necessary that God create it.

We can assume so and come downward and see if things are consistent.

No, you cannot assume you know God’s essence. You are assuming that God knowing a contingent thing as contingent somehow makes it necessary, which as I’ve pointed out several times already does not follow.

Which means that God cannot know how p happens because it is free. How God could then distinguish that p happens freely if God knows it?

God does know how p happens. It happens freely. You keep assuming a priori that free will is impossible.

I don’t understand what you are trying to say here.

As another poster once pointed out on these forums, all omniscience claims is that it is necessary that Gods knows that (if p, then q). The skeptic is trying to prove that q is necessary, which would establish fatalism, from this omniscience claim. So she tries to use the fact that p at least happens contingently to establish that God necessarily knows it. But omniscience does not claim that God necessarily knows p, only that God necessarily knows that (if p, then q). The omniscience claim is still consistent with ~p, hence fatalism cannot be established.

Credit: polytropos in forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=882283

 

[Bahman]

That is not what C2 says. C2 says that knowledge of creation is necessary, which it isn’t.

I see. I am sorry that was what I meant.

Uh, yes I am serious. What about creation necessitates God’s knowledge? God’s knowledge of creation is only necessary assuming He decides to create it. That would be like saying “supposing I decide to sit, it is necessary that I sit” and then erroneously concluding that therefore it is absolutely necessary that I sit and I could not have done otherwise. If you want to argue that “knowledge of creation” is necessary, then you would have to establish that this universe is logically necessary, which it isn’t.

Hence C2 is correct. That is all that we are looking for. Creation does exist hence the decision is made.

Why does this ability have to be actual? There is nothing in this or any universe that makes it necessary that God create it.

There is a decision to be made, the decision being whether to create or do not create. So there was a potentiality in the situation. Otherwise we are talking about a God who you believe where God existence, Gods knowledge and God’s only act are same.

No, you cannot assume you know God’s essence. You are assuming that God knowing a contingent thing as contingent somehow makes it necessary, which as I’ve pointed out several times already does not follow.

I think it should be clear by now. Please read the previous comment.

God does know how p happens. It happens freely. You keep assuming a priori that free will is impossible.

I didn’t say so. I did only say that God knows the act of each individual hence future is fixed. I am looking to see if we can agree on this point that future is fixed since God knows it.

As another poster once pointed out on these forums, all omniscience claims is that it is necessary that Gods knows that (if p, then q). The skeptic is trying to prove that q is necessary, which would establish fatalism, from this omniscience claim. So she tries to use the fact that p at least happens contingently to establish that God necessarily knows it. But omniscience does not claim that God necessarily knows p, only that God necessarily knows that (if p, then q). The omniscience claim is still consistent with ~p, hence fatalism cannot be established.

Credit: polytropos in forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=882283

I don’t mean that. I totally understand what you said. All I am saying is that future is fixed. We are free to act but our life is tide to future which is one. Basically the content of creation is fixed hence we have a fate. Was it possible to have another fate? Yes. It was all up to God to create another one! It sounds strange but that is your scenario, the very definition of your God.

 

[balto]

Hence C2 is correct. That is all that we are looking for. Creation does exist hence the decision is made.

Okay, if you modify C2 to say “From P2 and P3 we can deduce that the knowledge of content of creation is necessary supposing God decides to create a universe” then you can keep it. But then C3 does not follow. God creates a universe with free agents. God knows what they do because He is eternally present to them. But nothing necessitates their specific decisions. You are assuming that God cannot create anything other than necessary causes and effects.

There is a decision to be made, the decision being whether to create or do not create. So there was a potentiality in the situation. Otherwise we are talking about a God who you believe where God existence, Gods knowledge and God’s only act are same.

There is no potentiality. God has the active power to create all logically possible universes or none at all. The “decision” to create is eternally actual: God did not deliberate and decide to create one day. That would contradict divine simplicity.

I didn’t say so. I did only say that God knows the act of each individual hence future is fixed. I am looking to see if we can agree on this point that future is fixed since God knows it.

I think what we can agree upon is that there is a fact of the matter that I do X in the future, but I am saying that X is free and you are denying it. I don’t know how else to get this point across that God’s knowing my doing X in the future does not make it unfree. You seem to be assuming that God’s simultaneity is transitive, i.e. that if God is present to t1 and t2, then by the transitive property t1 and t2 are present to each other, which is obviously false. Hence the fact that I do X at t2 is not true at t1 even if God eternally knows that (X is true at t2).

I don’t mean that. I totally understand what you said. All I am saying is that future is fixed. We are free to act but our life is tide to future which is one. Basically the content of creation is fixed hence we have a fate. Was it possible to have another fate? Yes. It was all up to God to create another one! It sounds strange but that is your scenario, the very definition of your God.

Well sure, since God is the ultimate cause of all being, if I do X at t2, He could have created a world where I did Y at t2, since such a world is logically possible so God can create it, but it still would not change the fact that I freely did either X or Y at t2. The reason I do X at t2 is precisely because God sustains my free ability to do X.

Aquinas sometimes says that God causes everything to happen in the way that He desires that they happen (i.e. either necessarily, contingently, or freely). You keep assuming that He can only create necessary states of affairs.

 

[Bahman]

Well sure, since God is the ultimate cause of all being, if I do X at t2, He could have created a world where I did Y at t2, since such a world is logically possible so God can create it, but it still would not change the fact that I freely did either X or Y at t2. The reason I do X at t2 is precisely because God sustains my free ability to do X.

Aquinas sometimes says that God causes everything to happen in the way that He desires that they happen (i.e. either necessarily, contingently, or freely). You keep assuming that He can only create necessary states of affairs.

So you agree that we have a fate namely our free action must coincide exactly with what God knows. You also accept the very fact that God could create another universe that you would do completely different things there. You can resolve the problem with assuming the very strange concept of foreknowledge but you cannot escape the very fact that you have a fate here which could be different in another universe. That doesn’t sound illogical to you? If not, assume that you are in a creation with hell as your final destiny. You could however be in another creation with heaven as your final destiny. You are the very same person and act freely in both creation yet having different destiny. That doesn’t sound illogical to you? How do you define divine justice when everything was decided for you with the very act of creation?

 

[balto]

So you agree that we have a fate namely our free action must coincide exactly with what God knows. You also accept the very fact that God could create another universe that you would do completely different things there.

Yes, that is correct.

You can resolve the problem with assuming the very strange concept of foreknowledge but you cannot escape the very fact that you have a fate here which could be different in another universe.

“Foreknowledge” is your word, not mine. I would not call it foreknowledge because it elicits the mistaken concept of God as being some sort of temporal being. He doesn’t “foreknow” anything because everything is present to Him.

That doesn’t sound illogical to you?

No it doesn’t. If my doing X is free, then my not doing X is really possible. If it is really possible then God could have created a universe where I freely do not do X. You keep assuming that my doing X is logically necessary which it is not.

If not, assume that you are in a creation with hell as your final destiny.

I would like to believe that’s not the case but okay, let’s assume that.

You could however be in another creation with heaven as your final destiny.

This needs to be qualified. It would not be the case that there is a second universe where I am in Heaven and in this universe I am in Hell. That would entail a contradiction. All it means is that it is logically possible for me to have freely chosen Heaven.

You are the very same person and act freely in both creation yet having different destiny.

That is precisely what the phrase “act freely” means: it is not logically necessary so yes it is really possible for me to choose Heaven or Hell. Let’s say I do ultimately end up in Hell, but right now I am not in Hell. Therefore, the proposition “Balto is in Hell” is not true right now, although after death it is. From God’s perspective, He knows that “after dying Balto goes to Hell”. Since it is not true now, I am not necessarily going to Hell right now, so I am still free, and my ending up in Hell was still freely chosen. Arguing that “well you’re still going to Hell right now” is not necessarily true. It is only true if I am indeed choosing to go to Hell right now.

How do you define divine justice when everything was decided for you with the very act of creation?

It isn’t decided for me as I indicated above.

 

[Bahman]

Yes, that is correct.

That is sounds good.

“Foreknowledge” is your word, not mine. I would not call it foreknowledge because it elicits the mistaken concept of God as being some sort of temporal being. He doesn’t “foreknow” anything because everything is present to Him.

Well, lets say that God guess. But always guess correct!

No it doesn’t. If my doing X is free, then my not doing X is really possible. If it is really possible then God could have created a universe where I freely do not do X. You keep assuming that my doing X is logically necessary which it is not.

Cool. Then lets continue.

I would like to believe that’s not the case but okay, let’s assume that.

I just say lets assume.

This needs to be qualified. It would not be the case that there is a second universe where I am in Heaven and in this universe I am in Hell. That would entail a contradiction. All it means is that it is logically possible for me to have freely chosen Heaven.

I didn’t say both. I did say either or.

That is precisely what the phrase “act freely” means: it is not logically necessary so yes it is really possible for me to choose Heaven or Hell. Let’s say I do ultimately end up in Hell, but right now I am not in Hell. Therefore, the proposition “Balto is in Hell” is not true right now, although after death it is. From God’s perspective, He knows that “after dying Balto goes to Hell”. Since it is not true now, I am not necessarily going to Hell right now, so I am still free, and my ending up in Hell was still freely chosen. Arguing that “well you’re still going to Hell right now” is not necessarily true. It is only true if I am indeed choosing to go to Hell right now.

That was no where I wanted to take you. You accept that you go to hell in universe A and can go heaven in universe B. Your choices are of course free but you could not choose the universe, that is in fact God’s decision. Do you have a fate? Doesn’t this seems illogical?

It isn’t decided for me as I indicated above.

It is decide by the very act of creation. You cannot choose the creation. You are embedded within and have a fate.

 

[rinnie]

So you agree that we have a fate namely our free action must coincide exactly with what God knows. You also accept the very fact that God could create another universe that you would do completely different things there. You can resolve the problem with assuming the very strange concept of foreknowledge but you cannot escape the very fact that you have a fate here which could be different in another universe. That doesn’t sound illogical to you? If not, assume that you are in a creation with hell as your final destiny. You could however be in another creation with heaven as your final destiny. You are the very same person and act freely in both creation yet having different destiny. That doesn’t sound illogical to you? How do you define divine justice when everything was decided for you with the very act of creation?

Not really, especially where you fate can be hell or heaven, depending on the choices you choose to make, and how important hell and heaven are to you, and what you are willing to sacrifice and give up to get there.

I do not see where anything was decided for you. You make your own decisions God only knows where your decisions in life leads you, and how you choose to stay at that point in life or change yourself and situation in life.

He know at this moment when I am going to die, where, and if I will enter heaven or hell.

Just because I don’t have that knowledge right now, has nothing to do with where I will end up. Only that I know where I want to end up, and how I will pray for his grace to help me out.

 

[Bahman]

Not really, especially where you fate can be hell or heaven, depending on the choices you choose to make, and how important hell and heaven are to you, and what you are willing to sacrifice and give up to get there.

I do not see where anything was decided for you. You make your own decisions God only knows where your decisions in life leads you, and how you choose to stay at that point in life or change yourself and situation in life.

He know at this moment when I am going to die, where, and if I will enter heaven or hell.

Just because I don’t have that knowledge right now, has nothing to do with where I will end up. Only that I know where I want to end up, and how I will pray for his grace to help me out.

It is not about us knowing future. It is about very fact whether future exist or not. Each individual is attach to his/her very fate at the time of creation. It is very simple to understand this: It was up to God to create the creation wherein each individual has a very specific fate, for example in one universe everybody goes to Hell and in the second one everybody goes to heaven. We are free but we have fate.

 

[rinnie]

It is not about us knowing future. It is about very fact whether future exist or not. Each individual is attach to his/her very fate at the time of creation. It is very simple to understand this: It was up to God to create the creation wherein each individual has a very specific fate, for example in one universe everybody goes to Hell and in the second one everybody goes to heaven. We are free but we have fate.

Okay then there is fate, but no free will. Thank goodness God did not decide our fate for us, he put it into our hands.

The only Fate God decided for us was this, he knew when he was putting us in this world, and when he was taking us out. Not where he was taking us out to.

So actually it depends on how you define fate. If your fate is to die on this day, and live on this day, its in the hands of God, and yes our fate for physical life is in his hands, our fate for Eternal Life is in our hands.

 

[Bahman]

Okay then there is fate, but no free will. Thank goodness God did not decide our fate for us, he put it into our hands.

The only Fate God decided for us was this, he knew when he was putting us in this world, and when he was taking us out. Not where he was taking us out to.

So actually it depends on how you define fate. If your fate is to die on this day, and live on this day, its in the hands of God, and yes our fate for physical life is in his hands, our fate for Eternal Life is in our hands.

You need to focus on two questions: 1) Was God able to create another universe? Yes or no? 2) Was the knowledge of creation was necessary before the very act of creation? Yes or no.

 

[balto]

Well, lets say that God guess. But always guess correct!

But there’s no need for God to “guess.” He knows by being present to everything.

I just say lets assume.

Next time you are going to be the one hypothetically going to Hell . Beelzebub is hypothetically jabbing me with his pitchfork and it is hypothetically very uncomfortable :/. And he’s been doing it all day and seems to have no intention of stopping…

I didn’t say both. I did say either or.

I know, I am just making sure the readers are on the same page.

That was no where I wanted to take you. You accept that you go to hell in universe A and can go heaven in universe B. Your choices are of course free but you could not choose the universe, that is in fact God’s decision. Do you have a fate? Doesn’t this seems illogical?

I think you are misunderstanding the notion of possible worlds, which is probably why Thomists are hesitant to rely on possible world semantics. It is not the case there are these possible worlds and God selects one of them, such that first there is [God] and then there is [God, universe]. God doesn’t even technically “decide” to create anything since He doesn’t consider options, reason to conclusions, and change His will. To speak of “possible worlds” is simply to say that it was not absolutely necessary that God create what is actual in this universe. Now the question is does God’s causing my free nature determine the act of my will…

It is decide by the very act of creation. You cannot choose the creation. You are embedded within and have a fate.

No, it is not decided by creation nor choosing between worlds, as I said above. Now you are getting into nitty gritty, purely-conceptual metaphysical theses. Does God determine my will? In a certain sense, yes, but this needs qualification. Does God determine the act of my will? No, the nature of my will is such that I determine the content of my will. But God does determine my will in the sense that He determines my will to be a determining thing. God’s creation of my will is the principle by which I determine my act.

The reason why people have so many difficulties is that they are assuming that God’s will and my will are two co-ordinated causes, i.e. they are on an equal par metaphysically-speaking, so the only way to affirm the freedom of one is to deny the freedom of the other. But thinking that way is misguided. God’s causation is primary and mine is secondary, so they are sub-ordinated causes. God’s primary causation makes it to be the case that my will is a self-determining thing, and my will determines itself to a particular act.

How does this square with divine omniscience? The error you are making is assuming that God’s contingent knowledge of my free act is ontologically prior to His knowledge of my willing it. If that were the case, then yes my actions would no longer be free. But God knows my action through my will, i.e. He knows it precisely as my free act and not an act that I happen to perform.

You assume the ontological priority goes like this: God’s knowledge → my act → my will
I assume it goes like this: God’s knowledge → my will → my act. He knows my act through my free will and not my free will through my act.

 

[balto]

By the way, thank you for asking me that question because it forced me to re-read part of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange’s Predestination which I read a couple of months ago. Didn’t understand a lot of what he was saying, but the book contained a couple of appendixes and the third appendix, written by a “sound Thomist” is absolutely brilliant. Seriously, anybody who is interested should buy the book just to read that one ten page appendix.

Actually, I was curious and you don’t even have to buy the book. Look what I found in the Internet archives: archive.org/stream/Garrigou-LagrangeEnglish/Predestination%20-%20Garrigou-Lagrange,%20Reginald,%20O.P__djvu.txt

Search for “Appendix III” (very near the bottom). Right after that is the subheading “A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS ON DIVINE MOTION”. Anybody interested in this topic should give it a read.

 

[Bahman]

But there’s no need for God to “guess.” He knows by being present to everything.

That is at best very ambiguous. How God could be so close to my mind and be different from me at the same time? So God is able to guess at the very moment that I make my mind.

Next time you are going to be the one hypothetically going to Hell . Beelzebub is hypothetically jabbing me with his pitchfork and it is hypothetically very uncomfortable :/. And he’s been doing it all day and seems to have no intention of stopping…

Cool.

I know, I am just making sure the readers are on the same page.

Cool.

I think you are misunderstanding the notion of possible worlds, which is probably why Thomists are hesitant to rely on possible world semantics. It is not the case there are these possible worlds and God selects one of them, such that first there is [God] and then there is [God, universe]. God doesn’t even technically “decide” to create anything since He doesn’t consider options, reason to conclusions, and change His will. To speak of “possible worlds” is simply to say that it was not absolutely necessary that God create what is actual in this universe. Now the question is does God’s causing my free nature determine the act of my will…

No, hold on. I am not interested at this part. What I am interested is the very act of creation. God by definition is someone who create rather than sustainer. I am interested to know what was the content of creation?

No, it is not decided by creation nor choosing between worlds, as I said above. Now you are getting into nitty gritty, purely-conceptual metaphysical theses. Does God determine my will? In a certain sense, yes, but this needs qualification. Does God determine the act of my will? No, the nature of my will is such that I determine the content of my will. But God does determine my will in the sense that He determines my will to be a determining thing. God’s creation of my will is the principle by which I determine my act.

So you are trying to elaborate on concept of motion which I am not interested.

The reason why people have so many difficulties is that they are assuming that God’s will and my will are two co-ordinated causes, i.e. they are on an equal par metaphysically-speaking, so the only way to affirm the freedom of one is to deny the freedom of the other. But thinking that way is misguided. God’s causation is primary and mine is secondary, so they are sub-ordinated causes. God’s primary causation makes it to be the case that my will is a self-determining thing, and my will determines itself to a particular act.

Again you are emphasizing on concept of motion. I am interested at the concept of creation.

How does this square with divine omniscience? The error you are making is assuming that God’s contingent knowledge of my free act is ontologically prior to His knowledge of my willing it. If that were the case, then yes my actions would no longer be free. But God knows my action through my will, i.e. He knows it precisely as my free act and not an act that I happen to perform.

You assume the ontological priority goes like this: God’s knowledge → my act → my will
I assume it goes like this: God’s knowledge → my will → my act. He knows my act through my free will and not my free will through my act.

Well. I am interested at the very concept of creation rather that keeping things in motion. But anyhow you are calamining that God does not know future!?

 

[rinnie]

You need to focus on two questions: 1) Was God able to create another universe? Yes or no? 2) Was the knowledge of creation was necessary before the very act of creation? Yes or no.

Question number one, Yes God is able and was able to create another universe. If he did, it was not revealed to us. So we have no knowledge of this happening.

I don’t understand the next question.

If you are questioning the knowledge of God, it is so above your level of understanding you could never understand it.

 

[balto]

That is at best very ambiguous. How God could be so close to my mind and be different from me at the same time? So God is able to guess at the very moment that I make my mind.

Is there any reason He cannot be? I am not a necessary being so it stands to reason that if I exist then God as the source of being is present to me. There is no need to guess. God knows my act as my free act. You are assuming that the only logical possibilities are that God and creatures are two distinct realities, which erroneously assumes that God is an item in the created order, or that occasionalism is true, i.e. that everything is really God.

No, hold on. I am not interested at this part. What I am interested is the very act of creation. God by definition is someone who create rather than sustainer. I am interested to know what was the content of creation?

The “content of creation” is everything that actually exists that is not God. This includes free agents and their self-determined acts.

So you are trying to elaborate on concept of motion which I am not interested.

But yet you claim to be interested in God’s creative act. God moves by creating so it is relevant.

Well. I am interested at the very concept of creation rather that keeping things in motion. But anyhow you are calamining that God does not know future!?

We’ve been over this already. God knows the future by being present to it. But there is nothing about God knowing the future that makes the future real right now unless you assume that God’s knowledge of my future acts are ontologically prior to Him knowing my future free willing of my acts. “Keeping things in motion” is what it means for God to create. It’s not the case that God creates and then keeps it in motion. God creating my free will is precisely to “keep it in motion” as a self-determining thing.

 

[balto]

I don’t understand the next question.

If you are questioning the knowledge of God, it is so above your level of understanding you could never understand it.

The reason you cannot respond to it is because the question assumes that “God’s knowledge of creation before creation” is a meaningful concept, which it isn’t. The implicit assumption in Bahman’s question is that possible worlds are things that are “spread out” before God in the act of creation and God chooses between them. But that is false. God’s knowledge of the actual world just is His act of creating it. The error is in thinking that to say that “Balto knows X” and “God knows X” uses the word “know” univocally. In reality the way that God knows X is only analogous to the way Balto knows X due to the distinction between primary and secondary causation.