Checkmate in 2 moves

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MindOverMatter2

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  1. An absolute privation of reality cannot exist. (Thanks to “TheTrueCentrist” and also “J Daniel” for reminding me of the word “privation”)
  2. Therefore a Necessary-Reality must absolutely exist without fail; thus transcending all potential states or contingent realities in virtue of being ontologically necessary.
🤓
 
Checkmate in 1 move! >>>

“In God we live, move and have our being”.

How else? In the middle of nothing? Sparks in the Dark? :confused:
 
Darn it! I thought you were really talking about chess! I was hoping for a chance to use the Pirc-Robasch Defense.😦
 
Of course an absolute privation of reality couldn’t exist…otherwise it would be an absolute privation of reality. This doesn’t mean it wasn’t possible for there to have been nothing, it just means nothing cannot be something…which is tautologous.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_nihilism

Cf. amazon.com/Could-there-have-been-Nothing/dp/0230573630/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1322818221&sr=8-1 for an excellent discussion of this.

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Interestingly, metaphysical nihilism is employed as an argument for atheism: if there is a possible world in which no concreta exist, then there is a possible world in which God doesn’t exist. Since if something exists necessarily it exists in all possible worlds, then if God doesn’t exist in a possible world, he necessarily doesn’t exist. So, the topic of whether there is a possible world without concreta is extremely important for atheism v. theism.
 
MindOverMatter2 said:
  1. An absolute privation of reality cannot exist. (Thanks to “TheTrueCentrist” and also “J Daniel” for reminding me of the word “privation”)
  2. Therefore a Necessary-Reality must absolutely exist without fail; thus transcending all potential states or contingent realities in virtue of being ontologically necessary.
🤓
Click to expand...
Where is god?
 
Perplexity said:
Of course an absolute privation of reality couldn’t exist…otherwise it would be an absolute privation of reality. This doesn’t mean it wasn’t possible for there to have been nothing, it just means nothing cannot be something…which is tautologous.
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Nothing by definition is a privation.
 
Perplexity said:
Of course an absolute privation of reality couldn’t exist…otherwise it would be an absolute privation of reality. This doesn’t mean it wasn’t possible for there to have been nothing, it just means nothing cannot be something…which is tautologous.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_nihilism

Cf. amazon.com/Could-there-have-been-Nothing/dp/0230573630/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1322818221&sr=8-1 for an excellent discussion of this.

edit

Interestingly, metaphysical nihilism is employed as an argument for atheism: if there is a possible world in which no concreta exist, then there is a possible world in which God doesn’t exist. Since if something exists necessarily it exists in all possible worlds, then if God doesn’t exist in a possible world, he necessarily doesn’t exist. So, the topic of whether there is a possible world without concreta is extremely important for atheism v. theism.
Click to expand...
That is a perfect example of a pure contradiction. How is it possible for there to be an " existing world where nothing exists?" That is nothing more than a silly mental exercise. But, it does show the lengths to which some atheist ‘thinkers’ will go! (And, I use that term in its widest possible iteration.)

God bless,
jd
 
JDaniel said:
That is a perfect example of a pure contradiction. How is it possible for there to be an " existing world where nothing exists?" That is nothing more than a silly mental exercise. But, it does show the lengths to which some atheist ‘thinkers’ will go! (And, I use that term in its widest possible iteration.)

God bless,
jd
Click to expand...
🍿
 
JDaniel said:
That is a perfect example of a pure contradiction. How is it possible for there to be an " existing world where nothing exists?" That is nothing more than a silly mental exercise. But, it does show the lengths to which some atheist ‘thinkers’ will go! (And, I use that term in its widest possible iteration.)

God bless,
jd
Click to expand...
hmm, I’m not sure what you mean by ‘world.’ Are you familiar with possible worlds semantics?

“A possible word is, intuitively speaking, a way the world could have been other than the way it is. Possible worlds are used to explain the truth conditions of modal claims. Thus, “necessarily p” is true if and only if p is true at every possible world, and “possibly p” is true if and only if p is true at some possible world. Although the need for introducing possible worlds in order to explain the truth conditions of modal expressions is widely agreed upon, there is a vast disagreement regarding the exact nature of possible worlds. Modal realists believe that possible worlds are actual places, of the same sort as the actual world, whereas modal actualists believe that possible worlds are (usually abstract) bits of the actual world, such as maximal states of affairs.” Cook, Roy T.* A Dictionary of Philosophical Logic*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009. p. - 224.

Cf. amazon.com/Plurality-Worlds-David-K-Lewis/dp/0631224262/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1322852444&sr=8-1 for a classic exposition and defense of the view that possible worlds are just as real as our own.

I’m following the modal actualist line of thought expressed in the Gale and Pruss cosmological argument:

“A possible world is a maximal, compossible conjunction of abstract propositions. It is maximal in that, for every proposition p, either p is a conjunct in this conjunction or its negation, not-p, is, and it is compossible in that it is conceptually or logically possible that all of the conjuncts be true together.”

Concrete objects (concreta pl.) are things which are at least one of the following: spatial, temporal, or causal. The modal realism of the ilk of David Lewis says possible worlds are concreta. So, for him, metaphysical nihilism is impossible.

Abstract objects (abstracta pl.) have none of the above properties. Things like numbers and their relations are abstracta. Most philosophers regard propositions as such, also. Propositions are what sentences express. Thus, ‘snow is white’ and ‘schnee ist weiss’ both exemplify the same proposition.

So, on the view I’m advocating, it makes perfect sense to say in some possible world there is nothing, or no concrete objects at least. It just means there is a proposition containing no reference to any concrete objects.

I recommend Pruss book on possible worlds: he’s a Catholic philosopher btw 😉
 
Perplexity said:
hmm, I’m not sure what you mean by ‘world.’ Are you familiar with possible worlds semantics?
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Perplexity:

Yes I am. That’s why I consider much, but not all, of modal logic ridiculous. It likes to have us postulate the unpostulatable. “Possible worlds” should mean “possible worlds,” not “impossible worlds.” Does that make sense?

IOW, regardless of the (presupposed) intent, the rule of non-contradiction ever continues to hold. For example, postulation: “a married bachelor exists.” Or, “a cat alive and dead.” I refuse to consider such comic book stuff that passes for some sort of “logic.”

God bless,
jd
 
JDaniel said:
Perplexity:

Yes I am. That’s why I consider much, but not all, of modal logic ridiculous. It likes to have us postulate the unpostulatable. “Possible worlds” should mean “possible worlds,” not “impossible worlds.” Does that make sense?

IOW, regardless of the (presupposed) intent, the rule of non-contradiction ever continues to hold. For example, postulation: “a married bachelor exists.” Or, “a cat alive and dead.” I refuse to consider such comic book stuff that passes for some sort of “logic.”

God bless,
jd
Click to expand...
🍿
 
JDaniel said:
Perplexity:

Yes I am. That’s why I consider much, but not all, of modal logic ridiculous. It likes to have us postulate the unpostulatable. “Possible worlds” should mean “possible worlds,” not “impossible worlds.” Does that make sense?

IOW, regardless of the (presupposed) intent, the rule of non-contradiction ever continues to hold. For example, postulation: “a married bachelor exists.” Or, “a cat alive and dead.” I refuse to consider such comic book stuff that passes for some sort of “logic.”

God bless,
jd
Click to expand...
I agree that much of modal logic is ridiculous (though perhaps for other reasons). I don’t think that effects what I said. Your original reply, “How is it possible for there to be an " existing world where nothing exists?”" only works if we believe possible worlds are concreta (a position most consider magick). I’m advocating an ersatzistic view of possible worlds. On my view, we don’t have to believe that unicorns, leprechauns, or teams of opera singing, flying pigs are real. Your view does though. Note, these things aren’t actual, but on the view you’re advocating, actuality is indexical. i.e., saying this world is actual just means you belong to it. The world inhabited by transformers is actual for them, but not for us.
 
To elaborate a lil more, because possible worlds are things which occupy space, endure time, and experience causal interactions, then the things within those worlds also occupy space, endure time…etc.

So, when I close my eyes and envisage a world of teenage mutant ninja turtles riding atop miniature Godzillas, whilst playing pokemon on their gameboys, apparently, I’m epistemically accessing a concrete possible world, inhabited by real entites as I’ve just described.

If this at all sounds crazy to you, then your initial reply to me should be abandoned. If you view possible worlds as abstracta, like propositions or states of affairs, then your grappling with metaphysical nihilism has only just begun.
 
Perplexity said:
I agree that much of modal logic is ridiculous (though perhaps for other reasons). I don’t think that effects what I said. Your original reply, “How is it possible for there to be an " existing world where nothing exists?”" only works if we believe possible worlds are concreta (a position most consider magick).
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Not so. It works when no one alters the definitions of words so that they become non-sensical.

There exists (at least) two levels of impossibility. There is perceptual impossibility. On this level, an unmarried bachelor may exist. For example, a man who is married and lives in another part of the world, travels to a distant part of the world and passes himself off as a bachelor. That is the most modest level.

OTOH, there is hyper-impossibility. On this level the real existence of something that is self-contradictory is impossible. For example, the existence of the non-existent. There is no relationship where such would pertain. To radically mis-define the words in the proposition will not make this type of impossibility possible - ever.
I’m advocating an ersatzistic view of possible worlds. On my view, we don’t have to believe that unicorns, leprechauns, or teams of opera singing, flying pigs are real. Your view does though. Note, these things aren’t actual, but on the view you’re advocating, actuality is indexical. i.e., saying this world is actual just means you belong to it. The world inhabited by transformers is actual for them, but not for us.
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Not so. I’m advocating the use of logic within a framework of common sense, and vice versa. That which is hyper-impossible will remain impossible regardless of how the proposer modifies the words of the proposal to make what is a purely fictional conclusion seem plausible.

God bless,
jd
 
Perplexity said:
To elaborate a lil more, because possible worlds are things which occupy space, endure time, and experience causal interactions, then the things within those worlds also occupy space, endure time…etc.

So, when I close my eyes and envisage a world of teenage mutant ninja turtles riding atop miniature Godzillas, whilst playing pokemon on their gameboys, apparently, I’m epistemically accessing a concrete possible world, inhabited by real entites as I’ve just described.

If this at all sounds crazy to you, then your initial reply to me should be abandoned. If you view possible worlds as abstracta, like propositions or states of affairs, then your grappling with metaphysical nihilism has only just begun.
Click to expand...
Not so. Abstraction should be carefully defined so as not to include non-sense in its definition. There are three levels of abstraction: the physical level, the mathematical level, and the metaphysical level.

On the physical level, the intellect, operating upon the data presented to it by the various senses and dematerializing such data in order to make things intelligible, leaves aside what is called individual sensible matter but retains, in abstracted form, what is termed common or universal sensible matter. - slightly paraphrased from Commentary on the Physics, Bk. 1, les. 1, 2.

On the mathematical level, in the framework of immateriality, the mathematician as scientist leaves aside all sensible matter and retains in the abstracted result universal intelligible matter. - slightly paraphrased from the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 85, a. 1, reply 2.

On the metaphysical level, the metaphysician leaves out of account not only sensible matter but even intelligible matter. Hence, metaphysics relinquishes from its considerations any reference to matter at all. - slightly paraphrased from Summa Theologiae, q. 85, a. 1, reply 2.

In each of the above definitions, St. Thomas presupposes that the abstractor will refrain from juxtaposing arbitrary determinants from multiple things onto one thing in such a way as to render said thing a hyper-impossibility.

One can easily imagine all kinds of other worlds. But, one cannot imagine one both existing and not-existing simultaneously. I invite people to try it. If someone responds to this that they can, I have a stretcher right over here for them, and can call an ambulance to take them back to where ever they escaped from.

God bless,
jd
 
Perplexity said:
To elaborate a lil more, because possible worlds are things which occupy space, endure time, and experience causal interactions, then the things within those worlds also occupy space, endure time…etc.

So, when I close my eyes and envisage a world of teenage mutant ninja turtles riding atop miniature Godzillas, whilst playing pokemon on their gameboys, apparently, I’m epistemically accessing a concrete possible world, inhabited by real entites as I’ve just described.

If this at all sounds crazy to you, then your initial reply to me should be abandoned. If you view possible worlds as abstracta, like propositions or states of affairs, then your grappling with metaphysical nihilism has only just begun.
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Its one thing that say that there is a possible world in which pokemon exists. There is nothing contradictory about a pokemon’s existence; at least nothing immediately evident.

Its a completely different thing entirely to say that a non-existent world exists. This is the same level of contradiction exhibited in the statement that a square is a triangle. You cannot say that the opposite of existence “exists”, is real. Its meaningless. However you could say that there is a world where nothing physical exists (no space, time, and energy), since it is not evident that their non-existence would entail the existence of nothing; it would merely entail the existence of nothing physical.
 
I prefer plain English.

There could not have been a “time” when absolutely nothing existed, or there still would be nothing.

There must have been something that existed necessarily, or else, again, there would still be nothing…
But this can’t be matter or anything in the universe that we can measure scientifically since all these things change and therefore cannot exist necessarily.

Therefore, the necessary thing existed “before” the universe which it created.
We will now hear all kinds of wordy nonsense from Perplexity.
🍿
 
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