You have not provided a single citation saying that the state is bound to execute murders, besides, if that were the case, then it would not be permissible to oppose the death penalty for practical reasons, since one cannot fail to do that which is obligatory on the basis of prudential concerns.
I did not mean to suggest otherwise. I was addressing the the point I thought you were raising with your quote from Aquinas that executions were only allowed if necessary to enhance the common good. Since 2267 sees executions as acceptable only when necessary to protect society I didn’t want it to be assumed that 2267 says the same thing as Aquinas. The “common good” in his case would include retributive justice where 2267 does not.
Not exactly. I am addressing the doctrines behind the church’s position on capital punishment. The Magisterium gave their prudential opinion on the application of capital punishment in modern societies. Those really are two different things.
No, that’s not quite it either. What I said was that capital punishment is “a decree and a precept.” That said, I also acknowledged that it should be used “after due account is taken of extenuating circumstances, etc, etc”. I don’t recall taking part in a discussion about whether it would be advisable to use it or not.
Well, he and BXVI did oppose its use so they felt it was inadvisable to apply it. I will point out again that one of the last interventions was on behalf of Troy Davis, executed September 21, 2011. What is overlooked is that there was a second execution on that same day in Texas and no one was pleading for clemency in that case so it is fair to ask why this victim was overlooked. No one objects to clemency pleas for someone who might be innocent (a very weak claim in any event for Davis) but if capital punishment is wrong in every instance then the Texas case was the perfect opportunity to make that argument because the crime was truly heinous and there was no doubt whatever that the man was guilty. No one, however, took that approach.
I provided three, in posts #96 and #101, all from Doctors of the Church saying essentially that capital punishment is “a decree and a precept.”
No, there are allowable exceptions. Aquinas addressed this rather fully:Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death. (ST II-II 64,2)
Fair nough. However, two people’s opinions are not superior to the magesterium.
Except the teaching that you’re disagreeing with isn’t the that only those who are definitely guilty should be executed, but that only those who can’t be otherwise contained should be executed. Note also that Aquinas says “may” not “must”.
The statements of the Magisterium in 2267 are not doctrines, they are prudential judgments. The statements of the (three) Doctors of the Church I cited went to the doctrines the church taught.*Like the Pope, the bishops do not rule out capital punishment altogether, but they say that it is not justifiable as practiced in the United States today. In coming to this prudential conclusion, the magisterium is not changing the doctrine of the Church. *(Cardinal Dulles)
This is true. That teaching however, is prudential, not doctrinal. At least I hope that’s the case, otherwise it would represent a major doctrinal change which is not justifiable on the claim that it is a new development. It also would involve the repudiation of 2000 years of teaching about punishment.
Yes again, but I wasn’t citing him to affirm that point but to address the question you raised about whether there could be valid reasons for not executing someone who otherwise deserved that penalty.
Would human lives be defended from corrupted morals or bad ideas that came from an “unjust aggressor” if justice on any level is carried out? (Just exclude the death penalty for a minute.)
I don’t really understand your question; could you restate it and perhaps give an example? Here is Leo XIII’s opinion of justice in general:The law, nevertheless, is clear that for public prosperity it is to the interest of all that virtue - and justice especially, which is the mother of all virtues - should be practiced
Sorry.
I don’t understand that. If executions don’t enhance the common good, then wouldn’t they negatively affect the common good? An act such as capital punishment isn’t going to not have an impact on the common good.
Wow. Sorry for the wording. I’ve been tired all day. IOW, every act of capital punishment will affect the common good in some way, either positively or negatively.
Absolutely.
2267 completely ignores the concept of justice, that’s one of the major problems with it. This all goes back to the comments I made earlier about the concept of retribution. I think we are all agreed that there are four objectives of punishment. Dulles lists them as “rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, deterrence, and retribution” and the question is: which of these is primary? The answer is given in 2266: "**The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense." Given that Dulles didn’t list “redressing the disorder”, which of his objectives does this correspond to? In fact it corresponds to retribution … that is, retributive justice.
If executions negatively affect the common good they should not be used. I think this is the sense in which the last two popes have objected to its use. That is a complicated calculation and from what 2267 covers (defense) and omits (justice) it should be seen that not using it is problematic in that it has diminished our sense not only of what justice is but of it as a supreme virtue. Justice itself has been diminished.
Justice is not served by the misuse of Capital Punishment -
Well couldn’t one conclude that 2267 includes justice when it says, “only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor”? Wouldn’t the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor necessarily entail justice, when taking into account the moral and not just physical health of society?
The fact that the Papal States did it doesn’t mean it was a just and fair thing to do. Despite having the title ‘Papal State’ that does not mean that all that was committed by them was just and righteous. We could use that argument to build some justification for bringing back the Inquisition with all its methods. There are a great many acts that have been carried in our name throughout the course of the history of our Church that have ranged from being questionable to downright horrific.
No. Defending society is not at all the same as rendering justice.
No, this is not what justice means.
What does “redress the disorder” mean? Here is how the USCCB explained it in 1980:*The third justifying purpose for punishment is retribution or the restoration of the order of justice which has been violated by the action of the criminal. *
Nothing in 2267 accounts for what was just said in 2266. If retribution is the primary objective of punishment then how can the degree of punishment be determined by the defense of society, which is only a secondary objective?
Whether or not it was fair and just in each instance where it was used it was surely fair and just as a punishment. This is what the church has always taught. It is a position that has been well documented for at least 1600 years going back to Innocent I who said *"*Why should we condemn a practice that all hold to be permitted by God?"