Cognitive neuroscience and the soul

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So are you saying that human persons are “naturally” immortal, i.e., that no supernatural intervention is necessary to keep us going after death?
The Catholic teaching on this is that the rational soul is *naturally *incorruptible. This is because it is a simple non-composite substance (cannot be destroyed by division) and a spiritual substance (intrinsically independent from matter). If the rational soul is not susceptible to division or material change the only way it can be destroyed is if God reduces it to nothingness by withdrawing its act of existence (i.e. its being). As Aquinas explains in his Second Way, God keeps all creatures in existence through per se chains of being. This means that God keeps us going both before and after death, and our immortality is not an intervention but rather a continuation. There is a heresy called Annihilationism whose proponents claim that God does (at some point) withdraw being from the souls of the damned.
 
The Catholic teaching on this is that the rational soul is *naturally *incorruptible.
This may be a bit too Platonic and not enough Aristotelian.

What about the need for the phantasm for the exercise of human rationality?

Also, it should be noted that the human rational soul is not ontologically separable from the sensitive and vegetative powers. It includes these powers.

I grant you that there is an immateriality involved in human consciousness. This is brought out in Husserl’s notion of the “transcendental ego”, the basis for intentionality.

But Husserl also talks about “passive genesis” - which is analogous in some respects to the phantasm in Aristotle. Our consciousness is distinguished from neuronal activity (this is why intentionality cannot be reduced to nervous excitations) but, at the same time, our consciousness is naturally dependent on biological processes.

Unless you believe that, after death, we are naturally elevated to angelic status, it’s hard to maintain the natural immortality of the human person.
 
our consciousness is naturally dependent on biological processes
You have to be clear about what you mean by dependent. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that there is a hylomorphic dependency between mind and body, and he also admits that the mind is dependent upon the body for sensation and its contingent knowledge. However I think it is going too far to claim that there is an ontological dependency, i.e. that the body causes the mind in some fashion. I have come across such “emergent” theories before and they certainly conflict with the Summa.

I agree that Aristotlean-type phantasms would be impossible without the body, however I see no reason why all mental commerce must be in this currency. Whether we become angels or not is anybody’s guess (in Matthew we get a clue when Christ says “For in the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married; but shall be as the angels of God in heaven”) however I see no reason why the method that God uses to communicate with an angel could not also be employed between Him and a human soul, or between two human souls.

I do not quite get what you mean by “natural” in this context. Could you please explain how the term “natural immortality” differs from “supernatural immortality” or perhaps “unnatural immortality”?
 
Originally Posted by grannymh forums.catholic-questions.org/images/buttons_khaki/viewpost.gif
I do not believe that Aristotle is the expert on the spiritual soul as directly created by God.
So are you saying that human persons are “naturally” immortal, i.e., that no supernatural intervention is necessary to keep us going after death?
I am saying that when faced with a choice between Aristotle and Catholic teaching, I believe that the Catholic Church is the expert.

Post 21 has an answer to your question.
 
You have to be clear about what you mean by dependent. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that there is a hylomorphic dependency between mind and body, and he also admits that the mind is dependent upon the body for sensation and its contingent knowledge. However I think it is going too far to claim that there is an ontological dependency, i.e. that the body causes the mind in some fashion. I have come across such “emergent” theories before and they certainly conflict with the Summa.

I agree that Aristotlean-type phantasms would be impossible without the body, however I see no reason why all mental commerce must be in this currency. Whether we become angels or not is anybody’s guess (in Matthew we get a clue when Christ says “For in the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married; but shall be as the angels of God in heaven”) however I see no reason why the method that God uses to communicate with an angel could not also be employed between Him and a human soul, or between two human souls.

I do not quite get what you mean by “natural” in this context. Could you please explain how the term “natural immortality” differs from “supernatural immortality” or perhaps “unnatural immortality”?
Emphasis mine.

Because I respect the ban on evolution discussion, I will simply add in support of Catholic teaching that some “emergent” theories can be considered part of an anatomical material epiphenomenon and thus they clearly conflict with Catholic doctrines regarding the Spiritual Soul.
 
You have to be clear about what you mean by dependent. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that there is a hylomorphic dependency between mind and body, and he also admits that the mind is dependent upon the body for sensation and its contingent knowledge. However I think it is going too far to claim that there is an ontological dependency, i.e. that the body causes the mind in some fashion. I have come across such “emergent” theories before and they certainly conflict with the Summa.

I do not quite get what you mean by “natural” in this context. Could you please explain how the term “natural immortality” differs from “supernatural immortality” or perhaps “unnatural immortality”?
In Aristotle, the “ontological” components of any being are form and matter. Form equates to physis or nature, the principle of operations. For a living material being, the form or nature is psyche (the Aristotelian soul).

The human being has a specific type of nature or psyche or soul, one which is responsible for the vegetative, sensitive and rational powers. Please note that this nature is not the same as the individual human person; the nature is “shareable” and the same for all human beings; the person is “not shareable” and is different for each human being. Sometimes, people confuse Aristotelian “soul” or nature with the Christian sense of “soul”. The latter equates to the individual human person.

Aristotle is not a Cartesian dualist; the human being is not an accidental union of two separate “things” (res extensa, res cogitans). Human psyche, as the form or nature of the human being, cannot exist separately from the living human body - a nature cannot exist separately from the entity of which it is the nature. How can the principle of operations exist separately from the operations themselves (and their organs)?

Furthermore, for Aristotle, it is not possible to separate a part of a nature, from the rest of the nature. So you can’t separate the rational part of the human form, from the rest of the human form (vegetative, sensitive). This inseparability is an ontological necessity (pace Descartes).

This ontological necessity is neatly illustrated by Aristotelian epistemology. Human thinking requires a phantasm; and the phantasm requires a living human body.

What I mean by “supernatural” are activities which “go beyond” nature, e.g., the maintenance of human thinking without the phantasms (without the body).

More to the point, it is not natural for us to behave like angels.
 
What I mean by “supernatural” are activities which “go beyond” nature, e.g., the maintenance of human thinking without the phantasms (without the body).
Thanks for the clarification!
 
Thanks for the clarification!
Just imagine if the rational part of the human form could naturally continue on after death, without the other powers of the human form (vegetative, sensitive).

You would really have a new nature here. Not human. Not angelic. Something else. A free-floating res cogitans.

Again, I’m speaking in terms of natures. Not from a supernatural perspective.

I believe that God can maintain the individual human person apart from his/her body. But this would be done outside the necessities imposed by form or nature.

Such a person wpuld be able to somehow perceive what’s happening on earth, and what’s happening in the afterlife. And would retain memories of what did happen on earth. But this would not be a “natural” state. There would continue to be a “longing” for the body. Otherwise the Resurrection of the Body would be unnecessary.
 
I believe that God created everything we know, but He also created everything we don’t understand yet. There was one point where we didn’t know about or understand DNA, but it still existed. Therefore, it is quite possible that there are many other scientific facts of life (and death) that we don’t and may never understand. I am currently studying neuropsychology, but I still hold my beliefs close to my heart. I can’t look at an autistic child and believe that they weren’t put here for a reason. If you think you may be interested in studying this topic, check out my website, neuropsychologyprograms.com, to find out more about the different programs offered.
 
You make many excellent points, and have omitted many others that could be made in support of your considerations. Nonetheless, neuroscience is not the solid, well-established hard science that its practitioners would have you believe.

I’m not an expert in the field but have written a few computer programs in support of neuroscience research which gave the scientist who paid me for them an undeserved reputation. I’ve studied the field well enough to write a book which included a neurosurgery section that impressed several surgeons. And I’ve had conversations with one serious neurological researcher whose previous publications support my theories about the brain/soul interface.

Neuroscience is a field that is in as much flux as astronomy. Today’s textbooks will be obsolete in three years. Let’s see where the changes take us before concluding that they have excluded “soul” from their theories. After all, these folks have yet to explain Wilder Penfield’s consciousness experiments from 1947. Consciousness itself remains a mystery.

It is really impossible to discuss soul in the context of neuroscience, because soul is defined to be a spirit, an entity which cannot have any interaction with the physical.

One of my projects is to provide a more precise definition of soul (and a new name, beon, to go with it), which is consistent with all aspects of physics (and concomitantly at odds with religious beliefs).

This revised understanding of soul, the “beon” concept, is entirely consistent with the real evidence of neuroscience. It is similarly in alignment with evidence from psychology.

By way of simple examples, it makes sense of two phenomena which conventional science explains poorly:
  1. Handedness (specific hand preference) in human beings.
  2. The Sperry-Gazzoniga split-brain experiments.
There are others.

IMO you are wise to be thinking of these ideas. I don’t recommend discarding your beliefs on account of neuroscience theories just yet. Reading, thinking, and questioning seems a fair course of action. .
I have come to look at these sorts of questions recently because of a serious blow dealt to my thinking by two conclusions regarding personality. Surprisingly, this has made me turn to the idea of a ‘soul’ sympathetically: 1) seriously doubting the reality of free will; 2) doubting the existence of a self that is not constituted by experiences or a self that is singular, indivisible and constant.

So I am curious to hear how neuroscience sheds light on the existence of this ‘beon’ or soul, if you can elaborate. Given that (as you say) consciousness remains a mystery, how is it that a surely minor problem in comparison, like handedness, can provide us with key evidence that indicates there is this soul?

I find it easy to reconcile all of the OP’s points with materialistic biological explanations, and so to remove the soul as anything other than the name we give to the recognition that a person is a person. I cannot see the soul conceptually surviving as a real existent thing, and believe that the hylemorphic dualism concept is word-play or a category error telling us that a tree exists as the combination of tree-ness plus constituent leaves/trunk/roots.
 
There is pretty good evidence that people’s personalities and memories are very much linked with their brain structures. Traumatic brain injury patients can undergo loss of mental function and changes in personality and/or temperament.

This all points to mental function, emotion, and personality being inseparable from brain cells, tissues, and structures in a very physical way. I would dare posit that identity is dependent on our brains.

I think given neuroscience’s establishment of identity and personality in the brain, the notion that when we die, we’re going to see and meet all the people we loved in our lives is not a given. Maybe in the “mirror” soul or “screen play” or “maturing soul” we could remember things of our life, but it seems to me that God is so far beyond anything humans can comprehend or perceive with our physical senses that I’m not sure we’ll ever answer what happens when we die.
When we speak of memories, personality structures, attachments, we are speaking of information, yes?

I know of nothing in theology or neuroscience or personal experience that dictates that information can only be stored in one location.

In point of fact, everyone reading these words has proof right in front of them. You are reading this on a computer or other electronic device which stores information (memory), which was entered by a human operator, you or another. But you still retain much of that same information within your own consciousness.

Neuroscience itself points towards this direction with the holographic (non-localized) theory of memory storage within the brain.

To stretch an analogy, your physical body could be considered your computer. You operate it, you make the choices of what gets entered and what you want the computer to do. You can store information on the computer. Your brain is perhaps the processor, your personal Pentium chip, that sends the information throughout the hardware of the computer and directs the components based on your will.

Crush the computer’s processor chip, and the computer ceases to function. The memory (or memories) stored within the computer may be lost if the memory chips are destroyed, or get old and cease to function effectively. Pull the plug on the CPU so no power goes to the computer, and it “dies.” The computer can be damaged or infected with a virus that causes it to behave erratically or uncharacteristically, or which can make it unable to access memory. This can be frustrating to the computer’s operator, but does not affect the personality of the operator, or the ability to access parallel memories stored within the mind (soul) of the computer’s operator.

The entire computer can cease to exist, yet the owner of the computer still exists. The memories and lessons learned from his or her life and the attachments and loves remain, even if possibly not as complete as the information stored in the memory chips. He or she will retain what is needful.

The computer itself cannot function without the operator.

This seems quite clear to me.

There may be a need, based on our design as a hylemorphic unity, for the physical body to have its own separate storage for memories, knowledge, and emotions. What our body does affects the mind (one of the reasons Catholics pray with our whole bodies - we stand, we kneel, we sit, we press our hands together, and also one of the reasons why sex “matters” to our immortal soul, for good or bad), just as what our mind does affects the body (our blood pressure rises, our bodies become sexually excited, our pulse slows - all depending on what thoughts we are having), and the body physically “learns” from its stored memories - we learn things in different ways based on what physical state our body is in at the time we learn those things. Lessons learned in a hyperadrenalized state are more easily accessed when in a hyperadrenalized state, which is a teaching mode frequently utilized in military and police training (and in a negative mode, can be responsible for PTSD). Lessons learned in a relaxed and tranquil state will be most easily accessed in a relaxed and tranquil state. Lessons learned in a state of religious exaltation will be brought forward again when in state of mind. Neuroscience has shown that specific regions of the brain become active when operating in these mental states, just as specific hardware within my computer becomes activated when I send it a command to perform a specific function. It is possible, even likely, that our physical bodies, including the brain, may need to have ready access to physically-stored memories and feelings to do its day-to-day job of processing information, responding to stimuli, and making decisions.

It would seem likely that there is a continuous feedback loop between our physical bodies and our souls, with each interacting with the other. We are not spiritual jockeys riding a meat puppet, after all, but a unity of the two, which is why our true nature will be realized at the end of time with the reunification of body and soul.
 
Arizona Mike, do you have a reading list one could use to explore the topics listed in your post? Very interesting!
 
Arizona Mike, do you have a reading list one could use to explore the topics listed in your post? Very interesting!
While awaiting Arizona Mike’s reply let me give you some information from past posts of mine. I just left them as they are. They are below.
 
If one were to open the cranium and look at the brain of a perceiving, remembering, thinking patient, they would not see a single thing going through that patient’s mind–not an image, feeling, thought, or sense of self. In fact with mirrors I could look at my own brain and yet would see none of its conscious content.
From outside the conscious mind of another there is no direct access to the inside experienced content by observing the brain.

A search of one’s mind will never give a direct experience of one’s own brain cells or their electro-chemical processes and multi-level networking.
From the inside by observing my own consciousness there is no direct access to the observable brain and its neural electro-chemical processes.

No matter how detailed our correlation of conscious mental acts with brain structure and function may be, there is still an “explanatory gap” between brain activity observed from the outside and the content of consciousness as experienced from the inside.
How do objective, publically-observable neuronal events or the brain as a whole produce/become inner, first-person conscious mental experience(s)? In other words, how does what happens in the brain become what happens in your mind? No one is even close to figuring out how to cross that bridge scientifically.

Scientists:
•Joaquin M. Fuster, MD, PhD, a neurological researcher writes in his Cortex and Mind. (Oxford University Press, 2003)
“There are evident correlations between the brain and the mind. In the domains of scientific empiricism, however, where causality reigns supreme, correlation is Cinderella. Yet correlation is the only logical relationship we can substantiate empirically between the brain and the mind. . . . correlation is all we need for upholding the indissoluble unity of cortex and mind.” (p. viii)
•Larry R. Squire, et al., Fundamental Neuroscience, 3rd ed., 2008.
They discuss how “Brain scientists are exploiting a number of empirical approaches to shed light on the neural basis of consciousness.” (pp. 1223ff) As of 2008, neuroscientists “are shedding light on . . .”
•Christoph Koch, The Quest for Consciousness, 2004.
Francis Crick himself (a avowed materialist and atheist) writes in the preface: "Consciousness is the major unsolved problem in biology. . . . there is no present consensus on the general nature of the solution.” (p. xiii) We “will need the labors of many scientists . .” (xiv) Koch, a neuroscientist at Caltech, himself says of his efforts “I argue for a research program whose supreme aim is to discover neuronal correlates of consciousness.” (underlining mine)
•Michael S. Gazzaniga, ed., The Cognitive Neurosciences III. 3rd. ed. (Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press, 2004).
“As the science of consciousness advances, such definitions [Searle’s] will need to be refined and expressed in more fundamental neuronal terms. Until the problem is understood much better, though, a more formal definition of consciousness is likely to be either misleading or overly restrictive, or both. If this seems evasive, try defining a gene.” (p. 1107)

Further relevant data is provided by research into neuroplasticity, a term for the phenomena that conscious choices can alter brain structure and function. This shows a bi-directional causality in the relationship between brain and mind. That is, not only can one affect conscious experience and functioning by changes in the brain, one can also affect brain structure and functioning by conscious changes in activity. Researchers today are investigating the “bidirectional interaction between cultural experience and the brain” and “the neurosciences have identified mechanisms of neural plasticity from the molecular to the systems level.”(1) Numerous studies “demonstrate the surprising degree to which brain processes are malleably shaped by cultural tools and practices.”(2)

For example, studies show that adults who choose to learn Braille show changes in brain structure over those who do not.(3) Changes in brain structure are also seen in musicians proficient in stringed instruments relative to which fingers are used the most.(4) Additionally a study was performed on brain changes taking place in Buddhist monks during meditation–changes which sustain in long-term practitioners over time.(5)

The conviction that the mind as we know it is the soul (immaterial life principle, form of the body) in operation squares perfectly with all of the information and doesn’t in the least harm the legitimate aims and methods of neurological research even its goal to reach a complete scientific account of brain activity in its correlation with mental acts.

Another source of data is the immaterial nature of the intellectual acts of concept formation and reflection.

(1) Elizabeth A. Reynolds Losin, et al., “Culture and neuroscience: additive or synergistic.” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 5 (June/September 2010): 148-58.
(2) Shinobu Kitayama, et al., “Cultural neuroscience of the self: understanding the social grounding of the brain.” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 5 (June/September 2010): 111-29.
(3) Alvaro Pascual-Leone, et al., “Plasticity of the sensorimotor cortex representation of the reading finger in Braille readers” Brain 116 (February 1993):39-52. see summary discussion in Christopher Ariel Shaw, Jill McEachern, eds., Toward a Theory of Neuroplasticity. Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis, 2001., pp 71-3.
(4) Thomas Elbert, et al., “Increased Cortical Representation of the Fingers of the Left Hand in String Players” Science 270 (13 October 1995): 305-307.
(5) Lutz, et al., “Long-term mediators self-induce high-amplitude gamma synchrony during mental practice” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 101 (November 16, 2004): 16369-16373.
 
Michael W. Eysenck, Principles of Cognitive Psychology, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis Inc., 2001) p. 6-7.
Why is causality [between localized brain area and a particular cognitive function] so hard to demonstrate?
“What are the limitations of the cognitive neuropsychological approach? First, it is assumed that the cognitive performance of brain damaged patients provides direct evidence of the impact of brain damage on previously normal cognitive systems. However some brain damaged patients may have had somewhat unusual cognitive systems prior to brain damage. In addition, some impact of brain damage on cognitive functioning may be camouflaged because patient’s develop compensatory strategies to help them cope with their brain damage.

Second, the whole cognitive neuropsychological approach is very complex, because there are very often large differences among individuals having broadly similar brain damage. As Banich (1997, p. 55) pointed out, such individuals ‘typically vary widely in age, socioeconomic status and educational background. Prior to brain damage, these individuals may have had diverse life experiences. Afterward, their life experience vary widely too, depending on the type of rehabilitation they receive, their attitudes toward therapy and recovery and their social support network.’

Third, the modular approach may exaggerate the extent to which cognitive functions are localized within the brain (Farah, 1994). As Banich (1997, p. 52) noted: ‘the brain is comprised of about 50 million interconnected neurons. Therefore, even complex cognitive functions for which a modular description seems apt rely on a number of interconnected brain regions or systems.’

[p. 7] Fourth, the study of brain damaged patients can lead to underestimates of the brain areas involved in performing any given cognitive function. The lesion method generally only permits identification of those brain areas of crucial importance to a cognitive function, but not those that may be partially involved.

Fifth, study of brain damaged patients can lead to overestimates of the areas of the brain directly involved in certain aspects of cognitive functioning. This can happen when the brain damaged region contains axons known as fibers of passage, which connect the brain areas crucially involved in performing a certain cognitive function.” (italics in original)
 
I do not deny mapping efforts and results (as they are actually characterized by researchers and not in popularized versions) as should be obvious from what I have said in multiple ways in our conversation and in response to your #2) above. I hope you don’t deny neuroplasticity.

However one must distinguish popularizations and news reports from the technical and precisely formulated statements of researchers to see what really is overwhelming evidence and what is not.

On the subject of modularity I also recommend that you read Joaquín M. Fuster, MD, PhD, Cortex and Mind. (Oxford University Press, 2003). He is a prominent neurological researcher. To your description he notes that the modular paradigm correlates for patterns of sensation but it is “inadequate to clarify the central substrates of perception and memory.” “It is becoming increasingly evident that cognitive information transcends any of the traditional subdivisions of the cortex by structural and functional criteria (e.g., column, cytoarchitectonic area, thalamic projection, or receptive field).” (p., ix) He goes on to note: “The result of that encounter between unproven assumption [modularity] and partial evidence [from sensation] is the notion that there is a cortical region, or module, for every cognitive function. This notion has caused endless confusion. It is a serious impediment to the study of the brain mechanisms of cognition.” (x) “No cognitive function has a fully dedicated cortical area or network.” (56) He proposes and has found some success in a far more complicated multilevel network model as he reports in his book.

Its [prefrontal cortex] boundaries have been traced in various ways, depending on the methodology and criteria of definition. Yet, whatever the demarcation there are hardly any grounds for a priori regarding this part of the cerebral cortex as a structural entity with a unitary function. On morphological grounds alone, the anatomical complexity of the prefrontal cortex, especially in higher animals, makes its functional homogeneity implausible. Indeed, the behavioral study of animals with selective lesions of this cortex have ruled out such homogeneity. Furthermore, a unitary role for the prefrontal cortex is also inconsistent with clinical findings in patients with injuries to this part of the brain. Yet at some level, as we shall see, there is a synergy if not unity in prefrontal functions.
The precise nature of the apparently multiple functions of the prefrontal cortex is still to some extent unclear . . .
The prefrontal cortex is also connect to many other cerebral structures.
[Joaquín M. Fuster, *The Prefrontal Cortex. 4th ed. Boston: Elsevier Ltd., 2008, pp. 1, 2)

Given this and the actual data, your generalization about frontal lobotomies is off the mark. The effects of the procedure are various in the extreme. Although victims (aka patients) can become vegetative, there are other effects as well including uninhibited behavior, restlessness, cessation of certain severe psychotic symptoms w/o loss of personality. Sense of self and self-initiated conscious functioning is not always lost as in the famous case of Howard Dully who had a transorbital lobotomy by Walter Freeman (one of his “ice pick” lobotomies) at the age of 12. He has written a book on it.
 
I do not deny mapping efforts and results (as they are actually characterized by researchers and not in popularized versions) as should be obvious from what I have said in multiple ways in our conversation and in response to your #2) above. I hope you don’t deny neuroplasticity.
I am trying to catch up with this thread since “conscious mental acts” and brain mapping are very important for successful awake brain surgery. Were you including the issue of free will in the neuroscience research you cited?

Regarding brain mapping efforts during awake brain surgery, I have, in hand, the research paper “Movement Intention After Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans”, Michel Desmurget, et al, and supporting material. This research was published in Science, May 8, 2009. This was originally seen as “proof” that free will does not reside in a spiritual soul but instead is a function of the material brain. Long range, this paper could be seen as a refutation of the spiritual soul.

From a very brief CAF discussion, I observed that this paper’s valid examination of the dramatic method of using a bipolar electrode on the exposed brain of a surgery patient could be used as a demonstration of flaws in mind/brain, rational soul/decomposing anatomy research.

Please note that this acceptable method of brain mapping has resulted in huge benefits for people who have extremely difficult cases of brain tumors, etc. Natural science is a gift from God which has and will continue to provide major benefits for society.

My apology, but I have not read all you posts; yet, I wonder if you have seen a pattern in your particular areas of interest which would point to general, unavoidable flaws in neuroscience and the soul type research.
 

Regarding brain mapping efforts during awake brain surgery, I have, in hand, the research paper “Movement Intention After Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans”, Michel Desmurget, et al, and supporting material. This research was published in Science, May 8, 2009. This was originally seen as “proof” that free will does not reside in a spiritual soul but instead is a function of the material brain. Long range, this paper could be seen as a refutation of the spiritual soul.
This fact by itself enormously multiplies my admiration for God’s design.
I don’t have a problem to accept that my ‘spiritual soul’ is temporarily completely built out of real matter.
I still believe that God knows every single particle in the universe and its movement through the time from the begging till the end.
That’s how God knows every single process in my mind, every single thought, that’s how He knows my heart.
When the time comes He will transform/move my soul to different ‘spiritual’ dimensions. That’s unbelievably amazing. 🙂
 
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