Common fallacies in the proofs of God's existence

[awatkins69]

Metaphysics can have two ways. It may be congruent with physics, and in this case it is not relevant. Or it may contradict physics, in which case it is sheer speculation. There is an old saying: “shut up and calculate”. If it can be calculated, it is useful, even if its cannot be visualized.

I would completely disagree here. Quine, Lewis, etc. did metaphysics quite well. I’m familiar with your view, but I think it is antiquated. I’m not trying to be offensive by saying that. Metaphysics can explain things without contradicting physics.

I also went to your posted link, and by looking at the title, I got discouraged. I will explain why. It started by the concepts of “being and essence”. I simply do not accept this way of approach. I find it meaningless to talk about some abstract “essence”. Some philosophers talk about “necessary” and “contingent” existence, as a valid dichotomy. Some others talk about “abstract objects”, which “exist” independently from our concepts of them.

If you think it is meaningless to talk of essence, you will also find it meaningless to talk about definitions. If you find it meaningless to talk of being, then your own physicalist metaphysics is also meaningless. All metaphysics is concerned with explaining the nature of being.

I do not accept any of these approaches. I stand on a simple ground. Physical existence, which is objective, and conceptual existence as a reflection of of the physical existence. Conceptual existence can extend beyond that, and can incorporate other “things”, which only exist in our imagination, which do not have a physical counterpart. Physical existence is active, it changes, it effects other things. Conceptual existence is “inert”, the concept of 2 hydrogen molecules and the concept of one oxygen molecule will not combine into one water molecule. If you, or anyone else can start from this standpoint, and can reach a valid conclusion, which must be accepted on either physical or logical grounds, if you can substantiate that a non-physical, yet active way of existence is meaningful, then we can reach a great understanding. But, please, don’t bring up ancient philosophers, with their exotic vocabulary, which need a special dictionary to even understand the meaning of their terms. Use your own undertsanding, use your own words.

Now, If you have already determined that Aquinas is wrong because he is old, I definitely will not be able to help you. However, if you want to actually understand his argument, read through it. Most of the treatise is devoted to metaphysical foundation. If you think that we cannot do metaphysics **period **then it will not work (although I will remind you that you are basing your assumptions upon the metaphysics of physicalism). Klima provides modern analytic commentary and terminological explanation. If you have specific objections, let me know. And Vallicella is not ancient at all.

Again, have a good time. We’ll be happy to see you when you get back.

 

[awatkins69]

One more quick question. What do you think existence is? I don’t mean to ask what types of existence you think there actually are (as in p-existence or c-existence).

 

[R_Daneel]

One more quick question. What do you think existence is? I don’t mean to ask what types of existence you think there actually are (as in p-existence or c-existence).

Existence cannot be “defined” in the usual sense. To “define” something is to reduce it to something more fundamental, and there is nothing more fundamental than “existence”. It can be only defined tautologically. Something “exists” equals to something “is”. But that is not very informative. I am not sure what is the point of your question.

 

[R_Daneel]

I would completely disagree here. Quine, Lewis, etc. did metaphysics quite well. I’m familiar with your view, but I think it is antiquated. I’m not trying to be offensive by saying that. Metaphysics can explain things without contradicting physics.

Give me an example, please. If metaphysics does not contradict physics, then what use is it? What does the “metaphysical” explanation “add” to the physical explanation?

If you think it is meaningless to talk of essence, you will also find it meaningless to talk about definitions.

You misunderstood me, and it is probably my fault. I am saying that “essence” does not hang “in the air”. I don’t accept that there is some “essence” in the abstract sense - which is separate from existence and which is separate from the observer.

Let me try to explain. There is “something” - which is physical existence. We experience it in some fashion. We form a mental image of it. We consider some aspects of it as more important than others, based upon our value system, or based upon what we think is important. Every mental image is an abstraction, or a model forming. The “essence” is what we “think” is important. For a child the “essence” of nice red ball is that he can play with it, that its color is pleasing to eye, that its elasticity allows it to bump. For the merchant the “essence” is that it can be sold. Two different viewpoints, two different “essences”.

If you find it meaningless to talk of being, then your own physicalist metaphysics is also meaningless. All metaphysics is concerned with explaining the nature of being.

Yes, I consider metaphysics meaningless and irrelevant - in the sense that it is supposed to “explain” the nature of “things”. The only thing that matters (in philosophy) is epistemology. How do we gain information about something? What is the method to collect information? How to separate correct and incorrent deductions from the observations?

 

[awatkins69]

Hi R_Daneel. I’ll answer your questions, but I’m going to try to get the thread back on subject.

Now, let’s look back at your alleged fallacies. You say that we must prove that there is existence other than p or c-existence. However, the definition of existence you just gave in no way limits there being non-physical existence. If you want examples, that’s precisely what the theist is trying to provide in his arguments for God’s existence.

With regards to p and c-existence, I’d ask you to seriously consider how the intellect, supposedly not independent from matter, could harbor a potential infinite amount of concepts when no amount of matter can harbor a potential infinite amount of anything. I’d also consider how the mind can abstract perfect universals such as triangles, can conceive of perfect triangles, when there is not a single material instance of a perfect triangle. You’d also be very hard-pressed to find a philosopher these days who feels that qualia are examples of p or c-existence. This seems to be an example of existence other than p and c-existence. From what I read, most philosophers of mind (even naturalists like Searle, Kim, Chalmers, and Davidson) these days consider the mind to constitute non-physical existence.

With the fallacy of composition, it is only committed whenever someone argues that all members of a whole thing (A) possess property x, therefore, A possesses x. Nobody argues for the existence of God in this way. Cosmological arguments are applications of causal reasoning (which constitutes a whole other question), *not *reasoning about a category of things.

As for the “fallacy of the stolen concept”: I don’t think this is even a real fallacy. It’s hard for me to believe that after over 2000 years of logic, all of a sudden this brand new fallacy is going to be stumbled upon by, of all people, Ayn Rand. As I said before, I’ve never heard of this in a logic textbook ever. Even if I wanted to suppose it were something other than a “made up” fallacy, from what I read on wikipedia your application of it doesn’t seem to fit. Causality, existence, time, place, etc. are not in *any way *limited by logical necessity or definition to relations of p or c-existence.

As for everything else:
You’re doing metaphysics more than you think you are my friend. For instance, you propose that if we were to define existence it would be tautological, which is a serious ontological and metaphysical claim. Examples of areas of metaphysics which are not directly dealt with in physics include: free will/determinism, intentionality in mind, identity of objects, their continual identity through time and change, the nature of these objects and the nature of their possession of properties, necessity, causation, the nature of truth in itself, etc. Here are some specific examples of people doing metaphysics.

As for essences, if you have such sincere doubt about our ability to know essence, again, you would seem to have sincere doubt about our ability to know definitions of species of things. Essence and definition are practically interchangeable terms.

“For a child the “essence” of nice red ball is that he can play with it, that its color is pleasing to eye, that its elasticity allows it to bump.” That’s a huge statement to analyze. Firstly, we have to take the essence of one thing here, namely, the ball. “Nice” and “red” are qualitative accidents that are predicated of the ball. Now, indeed, the essence of a ball is something that is meant to be played with. I think you’re onto something here. The ball is something that can be sold, insofar as it is an object.

With regards to epistemology, given naturalism/physicalism, I’d have a sincere doubt as to the reliability of my cognitive faculties and my ability to attain truth about anything (including epistemology). You’re familiar with the evolutionary argument against naturalism. I’d also have sincere doubt as to my possession of free agency, and thus even more doubt as to whether I will learn anything or gain any truth.

I suppose we’re getting way off track by discussing essence, epistemology, and nature of metaphysics. If you’re interested in some interesting articles on this, I suggest some of these readings. This is just suggested reading for your own enjoyment. And I’d still be happy to send you WF Vallicella’s article if you’d so like.

Now, I’m going to let other people take off from what I leave, since this is all so time consuming! All the best in your endeavors.