Common ungrounded assumptions

[SentinelofTruth]

Hey, does it bother anyone else that some people make completely random and baseless assumptions during arguments that they just expect everyone not to question? For instance, the principle behind the interaction problem (things must be of the same nature to interact), aside from mysteriously never being raised against miracles (what’s with that?), is absolutely ungrounded. I have debated the interaction problem with multiple materialists on this thread, most of whom have raised this absurd and clearly ridiculous argument, and just kind of ignore when I refute the assumption.
Another example is the principle that “no effect can be greater than it’s cause”. I can’t remember how, but I’ve heard this used to argue for the existence of God.
Thoughts?

 

[polytropos]

For instance, the principle behind the interaction problem (things must be of the same nature to interact), aside from mysteriously never being raised against miracles (what’s with that?), is absolutely ungrounded. I have debated the interaction problem with multiple materialists on this thread, most of whom have raised this absurd and clearly ridiculous argument, and just kind of ignore when I refute the assumption.

There are a lot of things that are going on here, I think. Materialists would, I imagine, object to miracles because they do not believe in God. Most, I think, concede that if an omnipotent God were to exist, then that God would be able to perform miracles. They just don’t think that God exists, and they are probably thinking more about God’s supposed omnipotence rather than His immateriality.

In the case of a Cartesian res cogitans, again, most materialists do not believe in God. Besides the mind in question, the only other immaterial “substances” they might believe in are abstract objects, which do not have any causal efficacy.

That said, similar objections are sometimes raised against cosmological arguments (particularly when the cosmological argument is poorly stated). Bertrand Russell’s objection comes to mind - he said something to the effect of “We can’t assume that something outside the universe exists, since causality is undefined outside of the universe.” Similarly, a materialist might reply that we do not know of immaterial substances which can act, so why suppose that God can, if God is taken to be immaterial? The issue with such objections are that cosmological arguments tend to argue that there must be something causally efficacious to account for what is in the universe (whether because change needs to lead to an unmovable mover,or because the universe needs to have an explanation outside of itself). So the theist does not begin by assuming that it is possible that something outside of the material universe could be causally efficacious, but claims (by argument) that something must be.

In the case of God’s immateriality, it is not assumed either. That God must be Pure Act, or Subsistent Being Itself, is taken to be demonstrated by the argument, from which it follows that God could not change and must be immaterial. To claim that we don’t know whether immaterial things can act is beside the point, since the argument aims to demonstrate that something must be immaterial.

I suppose one could attempt to make a similar argument about a Cartesian res cogitans. Before any arguments are made, it is an open question whether immaterial substances can act on the physical, and if argument shows that there is an immaterial substance which acts on the physical, then the once-open question is now closed.

I think the main reason for the interaction problem is weirdness. Descartes took res cogitans to be unique in the world. The questions for a materialist become - Why is it there? Why does it only seem to be in our minds? What linked together our minds with our bodies? Why should I start believing in a unique sort of substance that I don’t see anywhere else? Most materialists, I think, would view it as a “gap” explanation, whether or not it is one.

Another example is the principle that “no effect can be greater than it’s cause”. I can’t remember how, but I’ve heard this used to argue for the existence of God.

One could argue for this, depending on how broadly “cause” is taken. A match lights a piece of firewood. The firewood is burning far more brightly than the match. But the match was not the only cause - it is actualizing a latent potential (to burn) in the firewood.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

There are a lot of things that are going on here, I think. Materialists would, I imagine, object to miracles because they do not believe in God. Most, I think, concede that if an omnipotent God were to exist, then that God would be able to perform miracles. They just don’t think that God exists, and they are probably thinking more about God’s supposed omnipotence rather than His immateriality.

In the case of a Cartesian res cogitans, again, most materialists do not believe in God. Besides the mind in question, the only other immaterial “substances” they might believe in are abstract objects, which do not have any causal efficacy.

Agreed, but if God is omnipotent I don’t see why he can’t create other things that have at least some of his power to remotely influence matter. The point was just that it is odd how most people consider this objection valid in the case of the mind but not in the case of God.

polytropos:

That said, similar objections are sometimes raised against cosmological arguments (particularly when the cosmological argument is poorly stated). Bertrand Russell’s objection comes to mind - he said something to the effect of “We can’t assume that something outside the universe exists, since causality is undefined outside of the universe.” Similarly, a materialist might reply that we do not know of immaterial substances which can act, so why suppose that God can, if God is taken to be immaterial? The issue with such objections are that cosmological arguments tend to argue that there must be something causally efficacious to account for what is in the universe (whether because change needs to lead to an unmovable mover,or because the universe needs to have an explanation outside of itself). So the theist does not begin by assuming that it is possible that something outside of the material universe could be causally efficacious, but claims (by argument) that something must be.

This brings another strange assumption to mind: that we have not directly experienced anything immaterial. People talk like the universe is something whose existence must be taken for granted because we have perceived it, but our experience of our own souls via introspection is just kind of ignored.

polytropos:

In the case of God’s immateriality, it is not assumed either. That God must be Pure Act, or Subsistent Being Itself, is taken to be demonstrated by the argument, from which it follows that God could not change and must be immaterial. To claim that we don’t know whether immaterial things can act is beside the point, since the argument aims to demonstrate that something must be immaterial.

How can we identify God with “being itself”? “Being” is just a concept. It’s not a substance, and I certainly don’t worship “existence itself”.

polytropos:

I think the main reason for the interaction problem is weirdness. Descartes took res cogitans to be unique in the world. The questions for a materialist become - Why is it there? Why does it only seem to be in our minds? What linked together our minds with our bodies? Why should I start believing in a unique sort of substance that I don’t see anywhere else? Most materialists, I think, would view it as a “gap” explanation, whether or not it is one.

The materialist’s big mistake is with the bold highlight here. As pointed out earlier, he has directly experienced his mind. It’s existence does not need to be proven. Also, since his introspection does not tell him that his mind has any property of space, mass, energy or such, we have strong grounds for assuming it to be immaterial.

polytropos:

One could argue for this, depending on how broadly “cause” is taken. A match lights a piece of firewood. The firewood is burning far more brightly than the match. But the match was not the only cause - it is actualizing a latent potential (to burn) in the firewood.

But how do we even measure the “magnitude” of an event? For a physical event, the question may be not unanswerable. But as far as concerns metaphysical events, there seems to be no objectively correct way to do this.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Another one I forgot to mention: the assumption that we can’t understand God. Everyone seems to believe this, but come to think of it, what quality of him can’t we understand?

 

[StrawberryJam]

Another one I forgot to mention: the assumption that we can’t understand God. Everyone seems to believe this, but come to think of it, what quality of him can’t we understand?

God’s strict focus on the middle east, and foreskins.

 

[Bahman]

Hey, does it bother anyone else that some people make completely random and baseless assumptions during arguments that they just expect everyone not to question? For instance, the principle behind the interaction problem (things must be of the same nature to interact),

My first question from you is why you assign different natures to body and self/soul. They have same nature but they are different. Simple, one nature problem solved.

aside from mysteriously never being raised against miracles (what’s with that?), is absolutely ungrounded.

There is not such a thing like miracle. Universe evolve based on laws of nature excluding our minds. God cannot intervene from timeless state.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

StrawberryJam:

God’s strict focus on the middle east, and foreskins.

That’s not a quality of God, it’s something he does.

Bahman:

My first question from you is why you assign different natures to body and self/soul. They have same nature but they are different. Simple, one nature problem solved.

We know about the body through sensory perception, according to which it has properties such as space, mass, and chemical properties. We know about the mind/soul through introspection, according to which it has properties like consciousness, free will, and such. Body and soul have not a single characteristic in common, therefore they are of different nature.

Bahman:

There is not such a thing like miracle. Universe evolve based on laws of nature excluding our minds. God cannot intervene from timeless state.

If God created the world, then he can certainly modify it.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Hey, does it bother anyone else that some people make completely random and baseless assumptions during arguments that they just expect everyone not to question? For instance, the principle behind the interaction problem (things must be of the same nature to interact), aside from mysteriously never being raised against miracles (what’s with that?), is absolutely ungrounded. I have debated the interaction problem with multiple materialists on this thread, most of whom have raised this absurd and clearly ridiculous argument, and just kind of ignore when I refute the assumption.
Another example is the principle that “no effect can be greater than it’s cause”. I can’t remember how, but I’ve heard this used to argue for the existence of God.
Thoughts?

Thomas Aquinas, all his works. Here are some of them. dhspriory.org/thomas/

Good luck.

Linus2nd

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Linusthe2nd:

Thomas Aquinas, all his works. Here are some of them. dhspriory.org/thomas/

Good luck.

I don’t plan on reading through that massive database. If you think something in it is relevant, just quote it.
And what do you mean by good luck?

 

[polytropos]

How can we identify God with “being itself”? “Being” is just a concept. It’s not a substance, and I certainly don’t worship “existence itself”.

Being is tough to define. I believe David Oderberg proceeds without defining it at all (and I imagine in doing so, he is following Aquinas, although I don’t know enough to say for sure). It is not just “existence,” if by existence one has the idea of the sum of “matter” that something has (since God, of course, is immaterial). It is not a substance (both substances and accidents are taken to be the “categories of being”), but it is not a concept either (it is not mind-dependent).

The transcendentals (goodness, truth, beauty) are defined by being convertible with being - although, that is a broad topic, and “convertible with” does not mean “identified with.” That basically means that the transcendentals are only conceptually distinguished from being. And to say that they are conceptually distinguished from being is not exactly to say that they are concept pure and simple - it just means that they are an aspect of, or another way of looking at, being. They are still objectively grounded in being.

To say God is Subsistent Being Itself is to say that His essence (real definition) is to exist. If you consider any aspect of creation, it does not exist by virtue of what it is. You can imagine, for instance, a human without knowing that the human exists, because there is something in the nature of humans which necessitates their existence. It is in God’s nature, however, to exist.

 

[polytropos]

Another one I forgot to mention: the assumption that we can’t understand God. Everyone seems to believe this, but come to think of it, what quality of him can’t we understand?

I would submit that we can evaluate some propositions about God, but we cannot “understand” God.

Given your philosophical bent, I imagine you might disagree. But the notion follows quite clearly from a broadly Aristotelian theory of knowledge. The world is learned about through perception and abstraction. We do not directly perceive God (we know him from his effects), so we can’t understand him in the way that we understand the rest of the world. Our (philosophical) knowledge of him must be knowledge that X (ie. God exists, God is omnipotent, God is immaterial). But that is not quite an understanding; what a purely actual being would be like is of course rather mysterious.

And then we can, of course, understand God through faith, but that knowledge is a gift.

 

[polytropos]

There is not such a thing like miracle. Universe evolve based on laws of nature excluding our minds. God cannot intervene from timeless state.

I’m not sure if this claim could be made, if one grants the classical theistic perspective that God is the first cause of each change in the world. This would imply that God is constantly active. The laws of nature are just the laws of natures, ie. abstractions generalizing the way that things in the world interact. So if God is constantly causally active in the world, a miracle is just an instance of God acting directly (ie. not just as a first cause) on the world - far from impossible.

 

[Portofino]

I’m not sure if this claim could be made, if one grants the classical theistic perspective that God is the first cause of each change in the world. This would imply that God is constantly active. The laws of nature are just the laws of natures, ie. abstractions generalizing the way that things in the world interact. So if God is constantly causally active in the world, a miracle is just an instance of God acting directly (ie. not just as a first cause) on the world - far from impossible.

Yes – if an omnipotent God existed and the laws of nature were considered the rules of the game, as determined by this God, there would be nothing against its effecting occasional (or frequent) exceptions to this rule.

In terms of human emotional response, this also implies that changing the rules – via the working of miracles – is no more inherently “amazing” or “extraordinary” than the establishment of the rules themselves. It is just a question of what one is used to; everything is a miracle in terms of being “amazing”, just some things happen with more frequency than others (said Voltaire, “the real miracle is not walking on water, but walking on solid ground”). He could have said that both are equally miraculous, in the ultimate sense. There is not a higher level of difficulty, one would presume, in terms of a God who determines the laws of the universe versus a God who also effects exceptions to those laws.

Of course, the question of whether a miracle – a changing of the rules of the game of physical reality – has actually occurred, is a separate matter. And it is also possible that the “rules of the game” of physical reality are not fully understood, so it is not so much a question of “bending the rules” so much as our not fully understanding the rules, to begin with (just as a telephone might appear to be miraculous, to someone who doesn’t understand its mechanism).

An omnipotent God could have effected the birth of Jesus through natural means – natural conception – and, in Christian terms, a mother that was tainted by sin, with the offspring (Jesus) being miraculously untainted by sin. One cannot say that such a thing would have been impossible. By those standards, things such as the Virgin Birth or the Immaculate Conception are not the way things had to be; they simply are (per the Christian) the way things happened, they way they were willed to happen. Other routes, conceivably, would have been possible, by the same standards as one affirms that “with an omnipotent God, all things are possible – including miracles.” The form of Jesus’ birth was not a necessity, it was a preference on the part of the creator (counter to those who argue, somewhat materialistically, that “a pure being such as Jesus could not have gestated in an impure womb” – others, subjectively, would be even more impressed by a pure being that gestated in an impure womb and maintained its purity; for them, that would be the “greater miracle”).

 

[polytropos]

Yes – if an omnipotent God existed and the laws of nature were considered the rules of the game, as determined by this God, there would be nothing against its effecting occasional (or frequent) exceptions to this rule.

My point was more that God does not create a Platonic realm of “laws of nature,” though they are often referred to in that sense, as though they are active and existing (which is part of the problem with regarding laws of nature as brute facts - but I digresss). They are abstracted, rather, from the interactions among what does exist. The force of an object due to gravity is not the activity of some abstract gravitational equation; it is a mathematical abstraction of the way objects act on each other. God’s acting directly on the world (a miracle) isn’t an exception to rules, because the rules don’t formally exist in the sense implied.

In terms of human emotional response, this also implies that changing the rules – via the working of miracles – is no more inherently “amazing” or “extraordinary” than the establishment of the rules themselves.

Hmmm, in practice, I don’t think those who experience miracles find them no more amazing or extraordinary than the ordinary.

It is just a question of what one is used to; everything is a miracle in terms of being “amazing”, just some things happen with more frequency than others (said Voltaire, “the real miracle is not walking on water, but walking on solid ground”). He could have said that both are equally miraculous, in the ultimate sense. There is not a higher level of difficulty, one would presume, in terms of a God who determines the laws of the universe versus a God who also effects exceptions to those laws.

I would mostly agree with this. Our sustained existence is a miracle, in a sense, made possible only through continuous gratuitous activity of God. To reason that existence and miracles are equally extraordinary is not to slight miracles but to elevate existence. As Edward Feser once said, “If you find yourself intellectually convinced that there is a divine Uncaused Cause who sustains the world and you in being at every instant, and don’t find this conclusion extremely strange and moving, something that leads you to a kind of reverence, then I daresay you haven’t understood it.”

 

[Bahman]

I’m not sure if this claim could be made, if one grants the classical theistic perspective that God is the first cause of each change in the world.

This definition has a conflict with timeless state as following:

1. One needs action to cause change
2. Timeless state is a state without change/time
3. Successive actions define a sequence/time in state of timeless so it is not allowed
4. So God cannot perform any action

This definition is against omniscience too

1. Omniscience is the capacity to know everything that there is to know.
2. God action would change the state of creation and so change state of knowledge
3. So God cannot perform any action

This would imply that God is constantly active.

God in state of timeless can only perform one action which was creation. After that it is causally separated from creation. Read previous argument. There is another argument for that that I can provide it if you wish.

The laws of nature are just the laws of natures, ie. abstractions generalizing the way that things in the world interact.

Law of nature are the abstraction of what happening in nature with a great precision. It is how nature acts on a specific situation but God wishes.

 

[Portofino]

The force of an object due to gravity is not the activity of some abstract gravitational equation; it is a mathematical abstraction of the way objects act on each other.

Hume would agree; there is no inherent logical necessity that there will be a sunrise tomorrow, just because there was a sunrise from time immemorial.

Likewise, according to that way of thinking, there is no inherent logical necessity that a human being is mortal. It’s simply that a human being, in fact, has proven to be mortal in all known cases thus far. Nor is there inherent logical necessity that sexual reproduction is necessary to produce offspring… Gee, this could be dangerous in rationalizing exceptions to assumed norms of human conduct (“it’s against nature to co-habit with those of one’s sex; two men or two women cannot make a baby!”; “yes, but – strictly speaking – you cannot tell me that two men cannot make a baby, merely that no baby has resulted thus far”). Anything is possible, in principle; just some things have never been observed thus far. Before Mary conceived, individuals would have insisted that a woman cannot make a baby without a husband or man in the picture.

would mostly agree with this. Our sustained existence is a miracle, in a sense, made possible only through continuous gratuitous activity of God. To reason that existence and miracles are equally extraordinary is not to slight miracles but to elevate existence. As Edward Feser once said, “If you find yourself intellectually convinced that there is a divine Uncaused Cause who sustains the world and you in being at every instant, and don’t find this conclusion extremely strange and moving, something that leads you to a kind of reverence, then I daresay you haven’t understood it.”

This, to me, leads me to view miraculous claims such as the resurrection or the virgin birth as being somewhat redundant. Waking up from sleep every morning is a resurrection; and every conception is no more or less miraculous than a “virgin birth” (or, for that matter, a case of “in vitro” fertilization ).

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

To say God is Subsistent Being Itself is to say that His essence (real definition) is to exist.

His definition isn’t “that which exists”.

polytropos:

I would submit that we can evaluate some propositions about God, but we cannot “understand” God.

ITT unless he has at least one quality that we can’t figure out, or can’t understand, then we can understand him.

Bahman:

This definition has a conflict with timeless state as following:

1. One needs action to cause change
2. Timeless state is a state without change/time
3. Successive actions define a sequence/time in state of timeless so it is not allowed
4. So God cannot perform any action

This definition is against omniscience too

1. Omniscience is the capacity to know everything that there is to know.
2. God action would change the state of creation and so change state of knowledge
3. So God cannot perform any action

God isn’t causally separate. Whereas finite beings have one set of mental states “turned
on” for each moment of the timeline, eternal beings have one set for each event, not just one for the whole timestream.
Also, if an omniscient God changed the world than he would know about his change, and so he would not lose his omniscience.

 

[Bahman]

First what was wrong with the first argument.

God isn’t causally separate.

God in state of timeless can only perform one action and then is causally separated from creation since the second action define a sequence of events, one follows another, in another word define time in state of timeless which is logically false.

Whereas finite beings have one set of mental states “turned
on” for each moment of the timeline, eternal beings have one set for each event, not just one for the whole timestream.

The whole streamline does not exist since we haven’t experienced them and haven’t made the according decisions.

Also, if an omniscient God changed the world than he would know about his change, and so he would not lose his omniscience.

Omniscience cannot change for a God in state of timeless.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bahman:

First what was wrong with the first argument.

This:

me:

God isn’t causally separate. Whereas finite beings have one set of mental states “turned
on” for each moment of the timeline, eternal beings have one set for each event, not just one for the whole timestream.

The point is that he can act in response to every event in the timestream, creating it wasn’t his only act.

Bahman:

The whole streamline does not exist since we haven’t experienced them and haven’t made the according decisions.

I didn’t say the whole thing existed.

Bahman:

Omniscience cannot change for a God in state of timeless.

But the change would be temporal. As stated earlier, he has one set of mental states for each event, so the change would just mean that his beliefs about reality outside of him would become different after the change.

 

[Bahman]

This:

What!?

The point is that he can act in response to every event in the timestream, creating it wasn’t his only act.

It seems that you didn’t read my argument carefully. God can only perform one action since sequences of actions define time in state of timeless.

I didn’t say the whole thing existed.

How future, in another word the whole timeline could exist without us having a chance to experience them and make according decisions?

But the change would be temporal.

Temporal change is not allowed in state of timeless.

As stated earlier, he has one set of mental states for each event, so the change would just mean that his beliefs about reality outside of him would become different after the change.

That I understood, but God is in state of timeless so it could never experience changes since changes means time.