Common ungrounded assumptions

[polytropos]

Hume would agree; there is no inherent logical necessity that there will be a sunrise tomorrow, just because there was a sunrise from time immemorial.

Likewise, according to that way of thinking, there is no inherent logical necessity that a human being is mortal. It’s simply that a human being, in fact, has proven to be mortal in all known cases thus far. Nor is there inherent logical necessity that sexual reproduction is necessary to produce offspring… Gee, this could be dangerous in rationalizing exceptions to assumed norms of human conduct (“it’s against nature to co-habit with those of one’s sex; two men or two women cannot make a baby!”; “yes, but – strictly speaking – you cannot tell me that two men cannot make a baby, merely that no baby has resulted thus far”). Anything is possible, in principle; just some things have never been observed thus far. Before Mary conceived, individuals would have insisted that a woman cannot make a baby without a husband or man in the picture.

This is not what I am talking about. The abstracted laws of nature are still the laws of natures. They do still generalize how substances with given natures interact. The point is not that cause and effect are decoupled; the point is that laws of natures are descriptions of certain causes, while a miracle is accountable to God.

I also would dispute that consistent conceivability (ie. not inherently logically impossible) implies real possibility. There are “natural necessities” that we don’t know about but can’t be violated. For instance, if a few thousand years ago, you said, “A ruby could be made of diamond,” the proposition would have been empty and vacuous. Even though, a few thousand years ago, we did not know that rubies are made of red corundum, they were, and it was necessary to what they were. So even though, at the time, it seems logically consistent to say that they could, conceivably, be made of diamond, it was false, and any statement claiming as much was meaningless. (Likewise, Hume’s claim that an object might exist without a cause because it is “imaginable” is vacuous.)

I am not saying, then, that there is no legitimate way to appeal to the laws of nature. I am saying that they do not exist on their own, and are actually generalizations consequent on the activity of repeatable but individual forms (like “human being,” or “ruby”). “Anything is possible, in principle” does not follow; that two men could have a baby is, I would say, something we could judge as false given human nature.

 

[polytropos]

His definition isn’t “that which exists”.

To say that His essence is to exist is not to say he is “that which exists,” ie. that everything that exists is God (there would be problems with this, owing to the fact that “existence” must be taken analogically). It is to say that God is defined by the fact that He exists, ie. that He exists necessarily, that He must exist and could not not exist.

ITT unless he has at least one quality that we can’t figure out, or can’t understand, then we can understand him.

I imagine you are not trying to be precise. But note that you said “unless he has at least one quality that we can’t figure out, or can’t understand, then we can understand him.” You are stipulating that we understand God by understanding His qualities; but then how do we know that we understand His qualities? You would face an additional problem in that Catholics hold God to be metaphysically simple, so God’s qualities are not separate from or parts of Him, so that leaves empty the notion of understanding God by understanding His properties…

And in any case, I would submit that we do not understand God’s divine simplicity, omniscience, or omnipotence simply because we can generate a list of such properties, even if we have philosophical justification for them.

 

[polytropos]

I am not saying, then, that there is no legitimate way to appeal to the laws of nature. I am saying that they do not exist on their own, and are actually generalizations consequent on the activity of repeatable but individual forms (like “human being,” or “ruby”). “Anything is possible, in principle” does not follow; that two men could have a baby is, I would say, something we could judge as false given human nature.

I want to add that what I’m advocating is much more like Chesterton’s fairyland than a empiricist epistemological swamp.

 

[Portofino]

I also would dispute that consistent conceivability (ie. not inherently logically impossible) implies real possibility.

I would agree, but I thought we also were talking about God and the existence of the miraculous. If God is real and the possibility of a miracle is a reality, then it is possible for a ruby to be made out of a diamond, or for a human female to conceive while remaining celibate; or for water to become wine, or to rise from the dead after having been dead for three days.

I’m no Hume expert but I believe he would agree with your point above, notwithstanding his acknowledgement that many things are possible conceptually; based on this agreement, however, Hume also rejected the possibility of miracles. But insofar as one accepts the possibility of miracles, I think, then all things really are possible, not only conceptually but in reality (“with God, all things are possible”).

Anything is possible, in principle" does not follow; that two men could have a baby is, I would say, something we could judge as false given human nature.

Here again, this is something that many who agree with you would use as a basis for rejecting Biblical accounts of the miraculous.

 

[polytropos]

I would agree, but I thought we also were talking about God and the existence of the miraculous. If God is real and the possibility of a miracle is a reality, then it is possible for a ruby to be made out of a diamond, or for a human female to conceive while remaining celibate; or for water to become wine, or to rise from the dead after having been dead for three days.

Actually, God cannot make a ruby made out of diamond. Rubies are made of corundum; that which is made out of carbon rather than corundum is not a ruby. Omnipotence does not entail that God can create things with contradictory natures (like a dog that is also a cat - it is just incoherent).

That real impossibility is of a different kind than the alleged impossibility of miracles. Miracles are not cases where natures are contradictory. Water turning into wine is not a case of something being both wine and water (which is really impossible); it is a case of one substance becoming another (so God could change a ruby into a diamond, but could not make a ruby be made out of diamond). It may be impossible, owing to the nature of humans, for someone to spontaneously conceive while celibate; but the immaculate conception was not spontaneous or uncaused (it would seem that it would just be an instance of creation ex nihilo, since a woman’s body is naturally inclined to pregnancy, whereas two men having a baby would contradict the nature of men). Likewise with rising from the dead.

I’m no Hume expert but I believe he would agree with your point above, notwithstanding his acknowledgement that many things are possible conceptually; based on this agreement, however, Hume also rejected the possibility of miracles. But insofar as one accepts the possibility of miracles, I think, then all things really are possible, not only conceptually but in reality (“with God, all things are possible”).

Well, many have noted that Hume’s account of causality was inconsistent with his position on miracles. But Hume did argue that one could hold that things can exist without a cause because it can be “imagined,” and imaginability is even weaker than conceivability.

But as I’ve said, accepting miracles does not entail that all imaginable things are impossible, since some imaginable things are incoherent based on the natures of things (like ruby made out of diamond).

Here again, this is something that many who agree with you would use as a basis for rejecting Biblical accounts of the miraculous.

I do not think the account I’ve given can be used to reject miracles; it would be a non-sequitur. I have argued that miracles are instances of God acting directly, and that the laws of nature are the laws of natures. This is consistent with both moderate realism about real essences and the possibility of miracles (for the laws of nature are generalizations about how created things interact, while miracles are instances of God directly acting). In neither case can things occur which contradict the natures of thing (whether making a ruby out of diamond, or possibly an event with no cause.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

And in any case, I would submit that we do not understand God’s divine simplicity, omniscience, or omnipotence simply because we can generate a list of such properties, even if we have philosophical justification for them.

Omniscience just means knowing all things. We can understand that just fine. We can even conceive of it. Likewise for omnipotence and simplicity.

Bahman:

It seems that you didn’t read my argument carefully. God can only perform one action since sequences of actions define time in state of timeless.

You just reasserted your conclusion. You have not responded to my thesis.

Bahman:

How future, in another word the whole timeline could exist without us having a chance to experience them and make according decisions?

Are you asking how there could be a future in a world with no free will?

Bahman:

Temporal change is not allowed in state of timeless.

The timestream is parallel to God, not perpendicular, so all of his interventions occur at the same time.

Bahman:

That I understood, but God is in state of timeless so it could never experience changes since changes means time.

God doesn’t “experience” changes. He knows about what happens through his necessary omniscience, but it’s not really an experience.

 

[polytropos]

Omniscience just means knowing all things. We can understand that just fine. We can even conceive of it. Likewise for omnipotence and simplicity.

I am going to disagree. Defining is not the same as understanding. I have no idea what a purely actual, metaphysically simple being is like; how could I? I just know that that is how God is.

I’d also say that the necessarily analogical interpretation of qualities like omniscience makes it doubtful that we can truly understand what it means for God to be omniscient. We know that God knows all and that God is timeless and unchanging. We have knowledge, so we know what it is like to have knowledge; but our knowledge is different in that 1) we must obtain it through processes of reasoning and 2) we gain (and lose) it over time. So again, we can affirm certain propositions about God, and we can speculate as to what His knowledge is like based on our knowledge and how we know Him to differ from us; but that is not the same thing as understanding or conceivability.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

I am going to disagree. Defining is not the same as understanding. I have no idea what a purely actual, metaphysically simple being is like; how could I? I just know that that is how God is.

But the concept is conceivable.

polytropos:

I’d also say that the necessarily analogical interpretation of qualities like omniscience makes it doubtful that we can truly understand what it means for God to be omniscient.

What “analogical interpretation” are you talking about?

polytropos:

but our knowledge is different in that 1) we must obtain it through processes of reasoning and 2) we gain (and lose) it over time. So again, we can affirm certain propositions about God, and we can speculate as to what His knowledge is like based on our knowledge and how we know Him to differ from us; but that is not the same thing as understanding or conceivability.

The first point here is not entire true. We don’t learn everything from reasoning. Consider your knowledge that reason is reliable. Did you come to that through logical argument?
Also just because we can gain and lose knowledge does not make a substantial difference. I mean, do you think we’ll still work that way in eternity?

 

[polytropos]

But the concept is conceivable.

What do you mean by conceivable?

What “analogical interpretation” are you talking about?

Roughly what I meant by saying that God’s omniscience is not exactly like ours. Two predications are “univocal” if they mean the same thing and “analogical” if they bear incomplete similarity in meaning (and “equivocal” if they have no similarity in meaning). Our knowledge is like God’s, but not totally like God’s.

The first point here is not entire true. We don’t learn everything from reasoning.

The first point does not need to be entirely true. We acquire much of our knowledge through perception and reasoning, while God would not need to. (That said, it is tough to say how we learn our first principles. Skeptics might have to come up with some justification for trusting their reasons/senses, but most people do not even think about it, probably because we have a “reality commitment.” If our senses do not return the world relatively accurately, then any attempt at truth would be futile.)

Also just because we can gain and lose knowledge does not make a substantial difference. I mean, do you think we’ll still work that way in eternity?

Humans naturally acquire knowledge through the senses. Our bodies need to be resurrected for a reason.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

What do you mean by conceivable?

Imaginable.

Roughly what I meant by saying that God’s omniscience is not exactly like ours. Two predications are “univocal” if they mean the same thing and “analogical” if they bear incomplete similarity in meaning (and “equivocal” if they have no similarity in meaning). Our knowledge is like God’s, but not totally like God’s.

The only difference is that he knows thing we don’t, and that he knows them with complete certainty. Aside from that, there is no real difference between our knowledge and his.

The first point does not need to be entirely true. We acquire much of our knowledge through perception and reasoning, while God would not need to. (That said, it is tough to say how we learn our first principles. Skeptics might have to come up with some justification for trusting their reasons/senses, but most people do not even think about it, probably because we have a “reality commitment.” If our senses do not return the world relatively accurately, then any attempt at truth would be futile.)

Our senses would not need to return the world accurately, unless we wish to theorize about the world. But for philosophical purposes, all that is needed is the utility of reason.

Humans naturally acquire knowledge through the senses. Our bodies need to be resurrected for a reason.

So you don’t think God will give us complete knowledge at the end of time? Also, how can we learn things without time?

 

[polytropos]

Imaginable.
…
Our senses would not need to return the world accurately, unless we wish to theorize about the world. But for philosophical purposes, all that is needed is the utility of reason.

I doubt you could really conceive or imagine what it is like to be outside of time and be omniscient. “Imaginability” tends to imply the ability to conjure up mental images (although you may not mean that); what would make you think that God’s knowledge, then, could be imagined by temporally limited beings like ourselves? I see no reason to suppose that God’s knowledge need be mediated by “mental images” of any sort. He certainly does not “experience” His knowledge as we do, since that implies change.

This is somewhat related to the point I made in post #21 (second paragraph), that conceivability does not imply real possibility. Speaking of which, I submit that as a “common ungrounded assumption.” In this case, the argument is: real possibility must be grounded in the real natures of things, rather than the consistency of names and definitions, but we have not directly interacted with God in a way that would allow us to understand His nature in a way sufficient to say that we can say that we can “conceive” or “imagine” what it is like to be Him.

So you don’t think God will give us complete knowledge at the end of time? Also, how can we learn things without time?

This is beside the point. As I pointed out,

And then we can, of course, understand God through faith, but that knowledge is a gift.

Knowledge given to us after death would be similar, of course. But the point here is that by our own powers (of imagining, or conceiving, or reason) we do not understand God’s nature. We can affirm true propositions about it, but the way we obtain knowledge in this life and without the help of God limits what we can know.

Late in his life, Thomas Aquinas had a vision of God, after which he said that everything he had previously wrote “seems like straw to me.” Human reason is powerful, but does not compare to what God can give.

 

[Bahman]

You just reasserted your conclusion.

Nah, the argument is as simple as that. If you wish I can open it:

1. Timeless state is a state that no change can occur in it
2. Consecutive actions defines a sequence/change
3. Summing 1 and 2 means that God in state of timeless can only perform one action which was creation and performing second action define a sequence/change in state of timeless

You have not responded to my thesis.

What was that?

Are you asking how there could be a future in a world with no free will?

No, I am asking how there could be any future accepting free will.

The timestream is parallel to God, not perpendicular, so all of his interventions occur at the same time.

That is logically impossible, accepting that God does not know our decisions.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

He certainly does not “experience” His knowledge as we do, since that implies change.

The only way we directly experience our knowledge is through introspection. God certainly has that.

polytropos:

but we have not directly interacted with God in a way that would allow us to understand His nature in a way sufficient to say that we can say that we can “conceive” or “imagine” what it is like to be Him.

You also haven’t directly interacted with Luke Skywalker, but you can at least vaguely conceive of being him.

polytropos:

Knowledge given to us after death would be similar, of course. But the point here is that by our own powers (of imagining, or conceiving, or reason) we do not understand God’s nature. We can affirm true propositions about it, but the way we obtain knowledge in this life and without the help of God limits what we can know.

Late in his life, Thomas Aquinas had a vision of God, after which he said that everything he had previously wrote “seems like straw to me.” Human reason is powerful, but does not compare to what God can give.

Agreed that we cannot know everything, but the superiority of God to reason is really irrelevant. With regard to affirming propositions, if we know all of God’s essential characteristics, then we count as understanding Him.

Bahman:

Nah, the argument is as simple as that. If you wish I can open it:

1. Timeless state is a state that no change can occur in it
2. Consecutive actions defines a sequence/change
3. Summing 1 and 2 means that God in state of timeless can only perform one action which was creation and performing second action define a sequence/change in state of timeless

The actions are only consecutive within the timestream. In eternity, the timestream is parallel to God, so he can make all of his interventions simultaneously, but to different parts of time.

What was that?

I seem to have forgotten.

No, I am asking how there could be any future accepting free will.

The future doesn’t pre-exist.

That is logically impossible, accepting that God does not know our decisions.

Why?

 

[Bahman]

Why?

Because the future and now does depend on our decisions so God cannot perform any action at the moment which require a knowledge of our decisions. Example God wishes to move object X from Y and put it on Z. This object is available to us so we could move the object as well which means Gods action is conditioned whether we move object or not.

 

[polytropos]

The only way we directly experience our knowledge is through introspection. God certainly has that.

I disagree that introspection is the only way we directly experience our knowledge, but that is beside the point. Insofar as introspection is a process (as we would say it is for us), God would not need it, because he does not need to obtain knowledge (as that would imply that He is in time, lacks knowledge, can change, etc.).

You also haven’t directly interacted with Luke Skywalker, but you can at least vaguely conceive of being him.

My conceiving of what it is like to be Luke Skywalker is based on my knowledge (through direct experience) of what it is like to be human, since Luke Skywalker is human.

This reminds me of Thomas Nagel’s article on philosophy of mind, What Is It Like to Be A Bat?. I admittedly have not read it - but the idea I am trying to get across is that, despite the fact that we have been made in God’s image, there are substantive differences between us and Him. I don’t know what it would be like to echolocate (I can kind of imagine it, but I am likely wrong as to how a bat experiences it). I don’t know what it would be like to know everything eternally, without having to learn it, without having my knowledge mediated by perception, or introspection, or anything.

Agreed that we cannot know everything, but the superiority of God to reason is really irrelevant. With regard to affirming propositions, if we know all of God’s essential characteristics, then we count as understanding Him.

The point I was making that Thomas Aquinas, of all people, had certainly spent a good deal of time contemplating God’s divine attributes. But when He had a spiritual vision of God, He realized that his derivation of the attributes etc. were not an understanding of God.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bahman:

Because the future and now does depend on our decisions so God cannot perform any action at the moment which require a knowledge of our decisions. Example God wishes to move object X from Y and put it on Z. This object is available to us so we could move the object as well which means Gods action is conditioned whether we move object or not.

I agree; God’s decisions are not made in light of our future decisions. But I’m not sure what the last sentence is saying.

polytropos:

My conceiving of what it is like to be Luke Skywalker is based on my knowledge (through direct experience) of what it is like to be human, since Luke Skywalker is human.

And what it is like to be God will have at least some things in common with what it is like to be human. First, he has free will, so there’s that similarity. We also know he can’t experience such things as ignorance (so he can’t wonder anything, a dissimilarity), shame (cause he never does anything wrong)… etc. While we can perhaps not fully imagine what it would be like to have such mental states, we can understand that God experiences them, and there is nothing incoherent about it.

 

[StrawberryJam]

God’s strict focus on the middle east, and foreskins.

I’m missing something here if someone is going to shrug this one off.
Please explain.

 

[HardRockGTR]

Hey, does it bother anyone else that some people make completely random and baseless assumptions during arguments that they just expect everyone not to question?

This is called foundationalism; basic beliefs are to be taken without justification as their beliefs are self-justified. This philosophy has been challenged by *anti-*foundationalists such as Nietzsche.

That said, I never understood why God’s omnibenevolence is taken for granted and just accepted without argument.

 

[polytropos]

That said, I never understood why God’s omnibenevolence is taken for granted and just accepted without argument.

Do you have any major Catholic philosophers/theologians in mind when you claim that God’s omnibenevolence is taken for granted and accepted without argument?

 

[HardRockGTR]

Do you have any major Catholic philosophers/theologians in mind when you claim that God’s omnibenevolence is taken for granted and accepted without argument?

As far as what I’ve read since I began getting really interested in religion and theology in general, I have not once read anything by Catholic (or Christian) philosophers or theologians that didn’t immediately assume God is omnibenevolent.

Perhaps negative theologians, but decidedly, I am not familiar with Negative Theology.