Condoms, STDs, and abstinence

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…Which means it is Ron Conte’s **personal opinion **that any act which deprives the sexual act of its procreative meaning is intrinsically evil, and so, always gravely immoral. However, this is in direct contradiction with this passage from Humanae Vitae which makes it clear that there are acts which deprive the sexual act of its procreative meaning while still remaining moral.
In general, moral principles as taught by the Church are “general”, whereas all action we take is “specific”. It is the job of prudential judgement to mediate the two. Conte is providing his prudential judgement on the matter, which absent a specific formal Church teaching is the best any of us can do.
I am only pointing this out seeing as Ron Conte and his theology has been brought up earlier in this thread as though he were a respected theologian in line with Church teaching. He is not.
Conte also participated in the thread and unfortunately excited prematurely. I referenced him because he has written on-point arguments, linked to Church teaching, not because he is acclaimed in any sense. By the way, has he been officially sanctioned?
His teachings are extremely dangerous because he mixes a very large amount of sound Catholic moral theology and logic with a sprinkling of false premises. The false premises lead to erroneous conclusions, however, because so much of what he says is true and he follows a very logical form of argument it is very easy for the average lay person reading his writings to be mislead by the truth and logic that does exist in his writings and so to become convinced that his erroneous conclusions must be true. The most dangerous falsehoods are those that are mixed in with truth.
On the positive side, he does provide reasoning against the Church-taught principles. Notwithstanding that, I don’t agree with everything he writes either, but his conclusions are not universally bad.

PS: I will come back with more on the specific topic of the thread a bit later.
 
I want to go way back in the thread to clear up what seems to be a misunderstanding. HPV and herpes are not the same thing. HPV does not require a lifetime of medication.
 
thewanderer and Rau,

It’s been interesting following your discussion. But in the end Conte’s argument is not that hard to critique. While he may or may not be properly applying the three fonts of morality, the fundamental issue with his argument, and the reason his conclusions are wrong, is that he has incorrectly defined contraception.

Here is a meaning I think we can take as correct: catholicculture.org/culture/library/dictionary/index.cfm?id=32788
Deliberate interference with marital intercourse in order to prevent conception.
An act is only an act of contraception when done “in order to prevent conception”. When an act is done for another reason (eg to treat a medical condition) and there is an unintended secondary effect of infertility/sterility, it is not an act of contraception.

This is the perfectly encapsulated in Humae Vitae, as people have noted:

“the Church does not consider at all illicit the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable impediment to procreation should result there from—provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever” (HV 15).

Conte would have us believe that anything that resulted in “a foreseeable impediment to procreation” is an act of contraception. This is simply incorrect and, as you have both noted, contradicted by direct and clear Church teaching.
 
…While [Conte] may or may not be properly applying the three fonts of morality, the fundamental issue with his argument, and the reason his conclusions are wrong, is that he has incorrectly defined contraception.
Without expressing a view (just now) on the rights or wrong’s of Conte’s argument, you are quite right to say that the outcome hangs on whether there is actually an act of contraception occurring. “Infertile” sex happening, even when the free choice of the participants is involved, is not a prima facie case that contraception occurred (as is obvious to all I hope). We will need to look closely at the Act(s) done and compare them with contraception.
 
…An act is only an act of contraception when done “in order to prevent conception”.
This form of expression is problematic because it suggests the Intentions bear on the moral object.
This is the perfectly encapsulated in Humanae Vitae, as people have noted:
“the Church does not consider at all illicit the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable impediment to procreation should result there from—provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever” (HV 15).
Conte would have us believe that anything that resulted in “a foreseeable impediment to procreation” is an act of contraception.
He hasn’t said that actually. For example, he views the Pope’s statement that you quoted as endorsing something major such as a hysterectomy, and he concurs that there is no wrong done by the affected woman later engaging in sexual relations. I did ask him whether he had a basis for such a limited interpretation of the Pope’s phrase “the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases” and he did not answer.

In his Blog, Conte tries to explain that the Pope’s statement means the reverse of what others read it to mean. But his argument seems to be quite circular.

The thought passed through my mind that maybe Conte thinks the Pope has expressed this paragraph in HV very poorly, perhaps even erroneously, but Conte’s loyalty to the Magisterium compels him to interpret it as he believes it ought to be.
 
I don’t wish to get into discecting moral objects, becasue it can get tricky. In short, intention plays into both the object chosen, in that it is the intended end, and the broader reasons for acting (the second source of morality).
This form of expression is problematic because it suggests the Intentions bear on the moral object.
They do.

Shooting a gun is morally neutral. There may be many good reasons to shoot guns.

Shooting a gun in order to (unlawfully) kill someone is murder.

The intented end is central to the moral object.
 
He hasn’t said that actually. For example, he views the Pope’s statement that you quoted as endorsing something major such as a hysterectomy, and he concurs that there is no wrong done by the affected woman later engaging in sexual relations. I did ask him whether he had a basis for such a limited interpretation of the Pope’s phrase “the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases” and he did not answer.
Yes, his inconsistency is a great problem too.

But as above, the greatest issue is with his definition of contraception to begin with. There is little point analysing his arguments after this fundamental error in his premises.
 
I don’t wish to get into discecting moral objects, becasue it can get tricky. In short, intention plays into both the object chosen, in that it is the intended end, and the broader reasons for acting (the second source of morality).

They do.

Shooting a gun is morally neutral. There may be many good reasons to shoot guns.

Shooting a gun in order to (unlawfully) kill someone is murder.

The intented end is central to the moral object.
Let’s agree not to get into it then. Suffice it to say than the language becomes a great barrier to meaningful discussion if used loosely. What you say “works” when the Act is thought of from an “observers” perspective, but that is not the perspective of moral theology.
 
What you say “works” when the Act is thought of from an “observers” perspective, but that is not the perspective of moral theology.
I have no idea what you are implying here, nor where you think I have erred.

If you want greater precision, here is what the catechism says about the moral object:
1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.
Please note these points:

“the will deliberately directs itself”

“the act of the will”

The moral object is not merely what is seemingly done, but what the actor willed (aka deliberate, intended).

Thus, contraception is not merely an act that makes sex infertile, but an act in which the infertility is willed (aka deliberate, intended).
 
The moral object is not merely what is seemingly done, but what the actor -]willed (aka deliberate, intended)/-] deliberately chooses.
If expressed with my amendment, I certainly agree. The prior text addressing intentions is I think, potentially, unclear.
Thus, contraception is not merely an act that makes sex infertile, but an act in which the infertility is willed (aka deliberate, intended).
Contraception is not an act of sex that is infertile - that we would both agree on.

The question is whether deliberately choosing an act that makes sex infertile is wrong? This goes to the heart of whether marital relations where one choose to wear a condom is contraception, even if avoidance of conception was not the Intention. Is choosing to exclude conception = contraception? Or what about if the couple choose to masturbate each other, rather than engage in coitus, because the husband’s sperm irritates the wife’s body (I believe such is a real condition.)

An alternative line of thinking is to invoke double-effect…

Footnote:

I’m not aware of any circumstance where the Church has advised that marital relations wearing a condom, or where the husband finishes other than in the wife, is moral.

There seems to be an analogy here with the process of supplying a sperm sample for medical testing. Stimulating oneself in order to produce the sample is regarded as immoral, notwithstanding that the “Intention” giving rise to the act is the good of a medical test, rather than self-pleasuring. [There is an establish method for a married man - the perforated condom - but what does the single man do…though I suppose in the case of a single man, the issue should not arise…]
 
If expressed with my amendment, I certainly agree. The prior text addressing intentions is I think, potentially, unclear.
I believe it is clearer if we stick with the term “willed”. That is the term in the catechism.

Using a term such as “deliberately chooses” may lead to confusion when we are taking about intended and unintended consequences of any act (sorry, impossible really to avoid the term “intended”).

I may “deliberately choose” to do something that has both a good and a bad outcome (if principles of double effect are met).

I may not “will” the bad outcome.
The question is whether deliberately choosing an act that makes sex infertile is wrong?
This question is definitively answered in Hunmae Vitae (noting the above regarding “willed” vs “deliberately choosing”).
This goes to the heart of whether marital relations where one choose to wear a condom is contraception, even if avoidance of conception was not the Intention. Is choosing to exclude conception = contraception? Or what about if the couple choose to masturbate each other, rather than engage in coitus, because the husband’s sperm irritates the wife’s body (I believe such is a real condition.)
These are more complex cases (than say using the pill as a medical treatment) and I am happy to leave them to the debate of skilled moral theologians.

The opinion of some theologians I hold in high regard is that some insemenation is required for a marital act, and thus any sex that excludes any insemenation is not a moral use of our sexual faculties. I’m not saying this is definitive, but it is an interesting point with regard to these very complex issues.
 
I expressed the question of immediate interest in a prior post poorly. The following is more on-point:

“Is it always wrong to engage in a marital act while simultaneously taking steps which render the act infertile”?

This is intended to analyse the condom wearing scenario (motivated by infection control, say), not taking pills for medical purposes or marital relations after a hysterectomy.
 
I expressed the question of immediate interest in a prior post poorly. The following is more on-point:

“Is it always wrong to engage in a marital act while simultaneously taking steps which render the act infertile”?

This is intended to analyse the condom wearing scenario (motivated by infection control, say), not taking pills for medical purposes or marital relations after a hysterectomy.
Fair enough. As above, I’m happy to leave such debates to skilled moral theologians, who are collectively working through them. I merely joined the thread to point out Conte’s errors, which I think are now covered.

And if you are trying to work through these difficult issues, I’d stay clear of Conte’s teachings as any sort of basis to explore them.
 
Fair enough. As above, I’m happy to leave such debates to skilled moral theologians, who are collectively working through them. I merely joined the thread to point out Conte’s errors, which I think are now covered.

And if you are trying to work through these difficult issues, I’d stay clear of Conte’s teachings as any sort of basis to explore them.
No worries. Could you tell me the HV para you ere referring to? Is it the same as the one you quoted before?
 
No worries. Could you tell me the HV para you ere referring to? Is it the same as the one you quoted before?
Yes. And I meant definitive with regard to using the Pill for medical reasons. Applying it to the situations you describe is above my pay grade.
 
Yes. And I meant definitive with regard to using the Pill for medical reasons. Applying it to the situations you describe is above my pay grade.
Yes, and after consideration, I agree that taking a medication (that impedes fertility) to treat a medical illness, when that is a prudent course, and with no intention to impede conception, and subsequently having marital relations, is not “contraception” as the Church means it. Now, it is true that the marital relations will not be fertile, but in this regard, this is not morally different to when infertility results from other causes such as:
  • menopause;
  • hysterectomy;
  • low sperm count;
  • wife’s natural cycles.
Conjugal relations under these circumstances are in fact conjugal, and they are not “inapt” for generation of life - they are simply ineffective.

What About Using Condoms to Prevent STD Transmission?

A well-known theologian, Fr. Martin Rhonheimer wrote an article in 2004 stating:
…a married man who is HIV infected and uses condoms to protect his wife from infection is not acting to render procreation impossible, but to prevent infection. If conception is prevented, this will be an—unintentional—side effect and will not therefore shape the moral meaning of the act as a contraceptive act.

The above frames the issue of condoms and HIV in relation to the question of what constitutes a contraceptive act. The suggestion is that if it is not contraceptive, it is not wrong. A number of theologians have pointed out however that framing the question as being about contraception fails to come to grips with the underlying moral issue, which, in fact, is not about avoiding conception. They point out the the question needs to be addressed in relation to the nature of the conjugal act and chastity.

Traditional teaching holds that sexual acts must be conjugal to be good., hence if the use of a condom prevents the sexual act from being truly conjugal, then the very choice to use a condom is in itself morally evil. Rhonheimer tries to get round this by arguing that the Church’s teaching that “each and every” sexual act between spouses must by “Open” to procreation should be understood to mean “intentional” openness, rather than “physical” openness. Otherwise he says, that the natural fertility, medical treatments and the like would also invalidate sexual intimacies of the spouses, since they too would lack physical openness.

Rhonheimer errs in that he he argues that the use of a condom as such is a pre-moral or merely “natural” description of an event, and not yet the description of a moral act. It is analogous therefore to the statement “a man was killed.” His conclusion then is inevitable: it is not until the intention (e.g., use of a condom to prevent conception, or use of a condom to prevent transmission of HIV/AIDS) is known that any moral evaluation at all can be made. But this is not right (according to Catholic moral theology) - the choice to use a condom constitutes a moral object.

Numerous Church documents teach that each and every conjugal act must be open to new life. Each must be of a kind that can consummate a marriage, making the husband and wife “one flesh”. Canon Law (1061) says consummation requires a conjugal act “per se apt for the generation of children”, and explains that this per se aptness is what makes the spouses one flesh. In other words, even though the question of condoms and HIV/AIDS does not turn on whether the act is an act of contraception (i.e., whether it possesses the intentionality of preventing conception), whether or not the sexual act is a “kind of behavior” that is “apt for generation” is nevertheless crucial in determining whether it is a conjugal act. Certain acts having nothing to do with contraception, such as sodomy or mutual masturbation, are also immoral (unchaste) on the basis of a similar inaptness.

It is not actual conception that renders the spouses one flesh. What is necessary is that the sexual act be the appropriate kind of behaviour, it must be such as to permit the sort of mutual communication in which the husband communicates his “flesh” and the woman receives it, regardless of whether other factors such as age, or sterility prevent this communication from being fruitful in particular cases.

The “non-contraceptive” use of condoms is a failure with respect to aptness for generation. It likewise cannot communicate the husband’s substance to the wife in the way that is pertinent to a conjugal act, even when no contraceptive intent is present. Thus, freely adopting (and therefore intending) such acts as the object of choice implies the pursuit of sexual pleasure without the communication objectively necessary for conjugal love.

Such acts are therefore distinct from the sexual union of infertile spouses, whether that infertility results from natural causes (such as menopause), hormone therapy, hysterectomy, low sperm count, or the wife’s natural cycles. Infertile spouses can become one flesh in their sexual relations because the communication of bodies does occur in their sexual intimacy, although the normal fruit of this communication is not possible. Conjugal relations under these circumstances are not “inapt” for generation; they are simply ineffective.

Source: communio-icr.com/articles/view/conjugal-love-condoms-and-hiv-aids
Much of the above text borrows directly from the above source and is reproduced here for the ease of study by readers. I recommend reading the source for a fuller picture.
 
Thanks Rau. This is saying, in a more indepth way, much the same as what I was meaning earlier:

“The opinion of some theologians I hold in high regard is that some insemenation is required for a marital act, and thus any sex that excludes any insemenation is not a moral use of our sexual faculties.”

But I also note there are other theologians who see it differently. We can say this is an issue currently being worked through at a very high theological level.
 
Thanks Rau. This is saying, in a more indepth way, much the same as what I was meaning earlier:

“The opinion of some theologians I hold in high regard is that some insemenation is required for a marital act, and thus any sex that excludes any insemenation is not a moral use of our sexual faculties.”

But I also note there are other theologians who see it differently. We can say this is an issue currently being worked through at a very high theological level.
Of interest is that the sin of contraception is defined to require a particular intention, but even absent that intention, such an act is intrinsically evil for other reasons as set out above.

The article above also exposes Conte’s error in deeming marital relations in the context of hormone therapy to be contraception, or indeed to be immoral in any way.
 
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