Condoms, STDs, and abstinence

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Ron,

Your last two posts - which include many excellent quotes - are completely beside the point.

Your error is in mistaking the moral object itself. The links above from Fr Serpa and Michelle Arnold sufficiently outline the correct analysis in this case. As does the “vague” commentary from the American Bishops.

While this may never convince you Ron, it is more than adequate for anyone else who happens to read this thread.

And so, I think that will do.
 
I ask Ron how he can know the moral object of an act to swallow a pill, or the moral object of a man aiming and shooting a gun at another, without knowing what is in the mind of the actor. He does not answer. [The fact is, he cannot know.] I point out that his reasoning assumes the very fact in debate - he does not respond.
The idea that one cannot know the moral object, without knowing the mind of the person who acts, is an idea that has been explicitly rejected by Pope Saint John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor. “For this reason — we repeat — the opinion must be rejected as erroneous which maintains that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behavior or specific acts, without taking into account the intention for which the choice was made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned.” (VS 82)

How can we know the moral object? The object is the end, in terms of morality, toward which the knowingly chosen act is inherently ordered. The human person deliberately chooses the concrete act – e.g. aiming and shooting a gun at an innocent person – he knows the type of act that he is choosing. But we need not know why he does so, his purpose or intention, in order to condemn that type of act (murder, contraception, abortion, theft).

Your position, Rau, separates the bodily dimensions of the concrete act from its inherent moral meaning (“moral species”). JP2 writes: “A doctrine which dissociates the moral act from the bodily dimensions of its exercise is contrary to the teaching of Scripture and Tradition.” (VS 49)

Each concrete act, in each particular case, has a moral nature (also called its species or genus) – the type of act in terms of morality. And that moral nature is determined by the end toward which the act is ordered, in and of itself, independent of the intention or purpose of the person who acts. The claim that we cannot know the moral object without knowing the mind of the agent is contrary to the teaching of Veritatis Splendor. It is a serious error in moral theology.

A woman takes a pill that acts as a contraceptive and at times as an abortive drug, and she chooses to have sex while on that pill. This type of deliberate act cannot be reduced to merely “taking a pill”. The pill acts as an abortifacient contraceptive if she chooses to have sex. Her physical actions are not devoid of moral meaning, absent a contraceptive intent or an abortive intent. The concrete act itself of taking this particular type of pill, while sexually active, has an inherent moral meaning – it is ordered toward contraceptive and abortive ends.
You ask him how he can disregard the principal of double effect. He does not answer. By not responding to points such as this, I conclude that Ron does not want to entertain any challenge or interrogation of his reasoning or his understanding.
The principle of double effect ALWAYS includes the condition that the act have only good in the moral object, i.e. that the act not be intrinsically evil. It turns the principle of double effect upside-down to omit that condition, and then use the rest of the principle to claim that the act is not intrinsically evil.

People say: “its an unintended side effect.” Well, the intention is in the first font, and the effects of the act are in the third font (circumstances). The assertion that a result is an unintended side effect does not reveal the moral object, and does not reveal if the act is intrinsically evil. An intrinsically evil act can have a bad effect that is unintended.

Also, an act can have more than one moral object. Natural marital relations open to life has three moral objects: the marital, unitive, and procreative meanings. Marital relations with contraception is still marital and unitive, but the deprivation of the procreative meaning by the use of contraception makes the act intrinsically evil. Two good moral objects and one bad moral object makes the act nevertheless intrinsically evil.

On the claim of “not responding” – at some point, I will have to discontinue participating in this thread. These types of debates tend to be endless. But since I have replied more than a few times, I have in fact responded. I believe I have addressed all the major points of the opposing argument.
 
Ron, I can’t remember if you addressed this earlier in the thread, but is your example one where the pill taken causes *either *sterility or miscarriage… or are you addressing only those pills that cause miscarriage for the sake of making this particular point?
 
I believe I have addressed all the major points of the opposing argument.
Except for the main point Ron, and the point on which your whole logic falls down, and turns into circular reasoning and begging the question.

The point that you have incorrectly defined contraception to begin with.

As explained previously:
thewanderer and Rau,

It’s been interesting following your discussion. But in the end Conte’s argument is not that hard to critique. While he may or may not be properly applying the three fonts of morality, the fundamental issue with his argument, and the reason his conclusions are wrong, is that he has incorrectly defined contraception.

Here is a meaning I think we can take as correct: catholicculture.org/culture/library/dictionary/index.cfm?id=32788
Deliberate interference with marital intercourse in order to prevent conception.
The correct analysis of this situation is explained here:

forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=4618

forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=30815

It is also clear in the explanation of the American Bishops; Bishops who have authroity to teach their flock and thus the faithful can be assured that they make no error in following their teaching.
 
The idea that one cannot know the moral object, without knowing the mind of the person who acts, is an idea that has been explicitly rejected by Pope Saint John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor. “For this reason — we repeat — the opinion must be rejected as erroneous which maintains that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behavior or specific acts, without taking into account the intention for which the choice was made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned.” (VS 82)
This is to misunderstand the Pope and the nature of the moral object. By this statement the Pope refers to the motivation for an act not altering changing its moral object. The unpreparedness of the woman to be pregnant (weak heart, etc.) is not a justification for contraception. We know contraception is wrong, and we know the why does not change that. We all agree on this.
How can we know the moral object? The object is the end, in terms of morality, toward which the knowingly chosen act is inherently ordered. The human person deliberately chooses the concrete act – e.g. aiming and shooting a gun at an -]innocent /-]person – he knows the type of act that he is choosing. But we need not know why he does so, his purpose or intention, in order to condemn that type of act (murder, contraception, abortion, theft).
Herein lies the nub of the issue. What is the moral object, and what is an unfortunate consequence? A man raises a gun, aims at another man, and shoots. The 2nd man dies. What I have described it not an act for which a moral object can be determined. The act does not rise to the level of a moral act - and it can only do so by knowing “SOMETHING” about what is in the mind of the first man. In fact, whether or not the 2nd man was innocent is not relevant, only what the first man believed, and the will underpinning his response. Yes - you said it yourself - the first man knows what he does - is it murder?, is it self-defence? - but we as observers do not necessarily know. The “concrete act” is not merely the set of events that one can view as an observer, or watch on a video.

If we were in an operating room and saw a surgeon administer potassium chloride to induce cardiac cessation, we could not know simply by observing the physical act whether the surgeon was doing this to put the patient on a heart–lung machine and thus bypass coronary vessels, or to stop the heart permanently to procure organs and bring about the patient’s death. But the surgeon knows. What is in his mind makes clear the moral nature of the act.
Each concrete act, in each particular case, has a moral nature (also called its species or genus) – the type of act in terms of morality. And that moral nature is determined by the end toward which the act is ordered, in and of itself, independent of the intention or purpose of the person who acts. The claim that we cannot know the moral object without knowing the mind of the agent is contrary to the teaching of Veritatis Splendor. It is a serious error in moral theology.
A woman takes a pill that acts as a contraceptive and at times as an abortive drug, and she chooses to have sex while on that pill. This type of deliberate act cannot be reduced to merely “taking a pill”. The pill acts as an abortifacient contraceptive if she chooses to have sex. Her physical actions are not devoid of moral meaning, absent a contraceptive intent or an abortive intent. The concrete act itself of taking this particular type of pill, while sexually active, has an inherent moral meaning – it is ordered toward contraceptive and abortive ends.
Nor can taking medicine to treat a condition be reduced to an act of contraception. If it can, then the young woman who chooses a hysterectomy when medically advised, but with the full intention of continuing sexual relations, falls equally foul of your reasoning. Having sex while one is sterile is not an evil act - it is evil when one engineered that outcome. That is the meaning of “contraception”. Taking medication to treat a medical condition, just like having a hysterectomy, does not “propose…to render procreation impossible” (HV 14) - it may have that side-effect.
People say: “its an unintended side effect.” Well, the intention is in the first font, and the effects of the act are in the third font (circumstances). The assertion that a result is an unintended side effect does not reveal the moral object, and does not reveal if the act is intrinsically evil. An intrinsically evil act can have a bad effect that is unintended.
Correct, however this does not support your case that taking medicine to treat a medical condition has an evil moral object.

A matter you have not responded to is how it can be that the US Bishops disagree with you, and what efforts you have made to correct them. Are you able to share any communication exchanged with them on the subject?
 
A matter you have not responded to is how it can be that the US Bishops disagree with you, and what efforts you have made to correct them. Are you able to share any communication exchanged with them on the subject?
It is quite a severe exaggeration to say “The US Bishops disagree with you” on the basis of a vague statement on a Website FAQ. You yourself pointed out [page 5 of this thread] that the statement is vague and does not say whether the woman continues having marital relations or not, while using the pill. This statement on the USCCB website was not put to a vote before all the US Bishops, and it probably was not written by even a single Bishop. No one considers a website FAQ to be an act of the magisterium requiring religious assent or theological assent.

I can tell you that it is not a matter of dispute among moral theologians that the traditional position is that an intrinsically evil act is wrong by its nature, apart from what is in the mind of the person who acts. Acts have their own inherent morality, just as Saint Thomas taught. And JP2 asserted this traditional idea in moral theology as an act of the magisterium in Veritatis Splendor. The CCC also teaches the same idea.

There are some moralists like Fr. Martin Rhonheimer who challenge this traditional view. But even they acknowledge that their position differs from what has long been the traditional understanding of intrinsic evil.

It is a fact that your position on the moral object is contrary to the traditional understanding of intrinsic evil in Catholic moral theology. You can argue about how this understanding should be applied to particular cases (such as the use of the pill for a medical purpose). When ethicists agree on the basic principles, they sometimes still disagree on specific situations. But the claim that you cannot know that an act is intrinsically evil without knowing the mind of the agent is contrary to the traditional view in moral theology and the current teaching of the magisterium.

The traditional view is that acts have a morality, in and of themselves, called the moral species or moral nature of the act. And this inherent moral meaning to the act does not depend on the intention or purpose for which the agent chose the action. It does not depend on knowing the mind of the agent. The only sense in which intention applies to the second font is that the agent intentionally (deliberately) chooses a concrete act. But in choosing any particular action or behavior, he necessarily also chooses, at least implicitly, its nature and its object.

Perhaps we should start a new thread focusing on the act and its object, apart from any specific application of these ideas.
 
It is quite a severe exaggeration to say “The US Bishops disagree with you” on the basis of a vague statement on a Website FAQ. You yourself pointed out [page 5 of this thread] that the statement is vague and does not say whether the woman continues having marital relations or not, while using the pill. This statement on the USCCB website was not put to a vote before all the US Bishops, and it probably was not written by even a single Bishop. No one considers a website FAQ to be an act of the magisterium requiring religious assent or theological assent.
Ron, on your website, you have prominently criticized CAF apologists and their stated opinions for, in your opinion, teaching error. Those opinions are certainly not acts of the Magisterium, and come with less moral authority, and less audience, than the US Bishops’ website. How then can you be so circumspect about a statement that purports to have the authority of the U.S. Bishops and teaches, or at the very least, appears to teach (what you consider) error? Is it worth a letter to the Bishops?
 
I can tell you that it is not a matter of dispute among moral theologians that the traditional position is that an intrinsically evil act is wrong by its nature, apart from what is in the mind of the person who acts. Acts have their own inherent morality, just as Saint Thomas taught. And JP2 asserted this traditional idea in moral theology as an act of the magisterium in Veritatis Splendor. The CCC also teaches the same idea.
No one is disputing this Ron. To keep restating this is to talk past everyone else in this thread.

The issue is that you have incorrectly identified the moral object as an act of contraception; your definition of contraception is incorrect, as explained above.

The American bishops and CAF apologists have provided the correct analysis and if you disagree you should take it up with them, as Rau has asked you about. If you think the bishops are teaching error, you really should follow it up with them. Please do so and let us know their response.
 
No one is disputing this Ron. To keep restating this is to talk past everyone else in this thread.

The issue is that you have incorrectly identified the moral object as an act of contraception; your definition of contraception is incorrect, as explained above.

The American bishops and CAF apologists have provided the correct analysis and if you disagree you should take it up with them, as Rau has asked you about. If you think the bishops are teaching error, you really should follow it up with them. Please do so and let us know their response.
Ron sees it as a person chooses an action that will cause a subsequent marital act to be made sterile. He then says that why said course was chosen does not change the nature of the act.

However, if this is sufficient analysis of the situation, then it must be the case that a hysterectomy represents an equivalent scenario. The only difference in the 2 scenarios is the possible exigency or seriousness of the circumstances, yet those cannot change the moral object. After a hysterectomy, a woman may choose to refrain from sexual relations, just as after a pill.

If Ron is correct, how can self-defence be distinguished from murder without knowing the mind of the actor?

I recall Jimmy Akin wrote a piece some time ago that explained (hotly disputed by Ron, I should point out) that intrinsically evil acts typically incorporate a degree of “intention” or “circumstance” in their definition. Thus Jimmy says, the Intentions and Circumstances referred to in the explanation of the 3 fonts are those over and above anything that MAY be intrinsic to the act. We all agree one cannot contracept for any reason. But the physical acts one performs are only contraception if they “propose to render a sexual act infertile”. Such is not proposed with a hysterctomy, nor with medication. This supports my assertion that mere observations of an act, “sterile” descriptions of an event, may be insufficient to determine the moral object.

If the Church had intended Ron’s interpretation, it would have outlawed sexual relations in conjunction any act which “by its nature” has the effect of rendering sex infertile. But no, it has said that result must be “proposed”, must be intended.

Of course, if Ron writes to the U.S. Bishops and succeeds in having the relevant FAQ rewritten to accord with his view, I will withdraw my remarks here and accept their instruction.
 
Contraception includes any actions which are in themselves, that is, by their nature and condition, directed to a contraceptive end.

The use of abortifacient contraception while sexually active eventually results in the death of an innocent prenatal. Over the course of many marriages and years, many prenatals are killed by abortifacients in this way. Couples who deliberately choose to use abortifacient contraception and at the same time deliberately choose to remain sexually active are morally responsible for those deaths.

Intrinsically evil acts are irremediably evil. They are immoral in and of themselves, by their very nature. Intrinsically evil acts are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person by any intention or motive. When acts are in themselves sins, doing them for good motives does not make these acts no longer intrinsically evil.
 
Ron, you post is a statement of your views, but is otherwise, “non-responsive” to your interlocutors. That is the difference between a Blog and a Forum. But, I respond to your points:
Contraception includes any actions which are in themselves, that is, by their a nature and condition, directed to a contraceptive end.
The act of adopting therapeutic means to treat a medical condition, and the act of seeking to prevent a pregnancy are not the same moral act, even when the same pill is swallowed. Were they the same moral act, then those having a hysterectomy ought feel the same obligation to reject sexual relations as a person taking medication which by its nature has the effect of causing sterility.
The use of abortifacient contraception while sexually active eventually results in the death of an innocent prenatal. Over the course of many marriages and years, many prenatals are killed by abortifacients in this way. Couples who deliberately choose to use abortifacient contraception and at the same time deliberately choose to remain sexually active are morally responsible for those deaths.
The threat of harm to a baby from certain medications is a just reason to avoid sex, or avoid the medicine, in my view, but is unrelated to what is, and what is not, contraception. [Forgive me, but this point comes across sounding like a secondary (and off the topic) reason to bolster what is a weak primary argument…]
Intrinsically evil acts are irremediably evil. They are immoral in and of themselves, by their very nature. Intrinsically evil acts are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person by any intention or motive. When acts are in themselves sins, doing them for good motives does not make these acts no longer intrinsically evil.
We are all agreed on this; though it is not the matter in debate.
 
Contraception includes any actions which are in themselves, that is, by their nature and condition, directed to a contraceptive end.
But when you say ‘contraceptive end’, it sounds like you are defining sterility when we know that the evilness of contraception is defined by willed sterility. It’s like you are saying that murder includes any actions which are in themselves, that is, by their nature and condition, directed to a murderous end. It’s a kind of tautology. Murder is not defined as the death of a person by another’s hand … its evilness is in the fact that murder is the *willed *death of a person by another’s hand. It doesn’t include deaths which happen when the action willed was medical or defensive.

Pope StJPII in VS is addressing the argument that if someone has good intentions that that can change the willed death of another or the willed sterilization, into a morally good object. For example, I’m going to kill this person to protect myself or I’m going to sterilise myself because it will be harmful to me to get pregnant. The willed end, the moral object, can’t be altered by any good intention.

I think when you say ‘contraception’ you are forgetting that the willed end, that is, the desire to be sterile to avoid conception, has to be present, not just the unintended consequence of sterility. That ‘willed’ aspect defines the morality of the act.
 
Ron, I can’t remember if you addressed this earlier in the thread, but is your example one where the pill taken causes *either *sterility or miscarriage… or are you addressing only those pills that cause miscarriage for the sake of making this particular point?
He declares the act of taking medication which causes sterility to be an act of contraception. It seems to me that the abortifacient aspect is tangential. Sex while sterile is not sinful. Sex under enhanced risk of miscarriage is a separate question.
 
Contraception includes any actions which are in themselves, that is, by their nature and condition, directed to a contraceptive end.
This is circular and meaningless.

Please see the definition offered above, as well as LoningSoul’s good explanation. This issue is at the very heart of your errors.

And please respond to Rau’s repeated question regarding your inconsistent classification of medically advised hysterectomies as acceptable vs medically advised hormonal treatments as unnacceptable.
 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: “Any cooperation whatsoever, institutionally-approved or tolerated, in actions which are in themselves (that is, by their nature and condition) ordered toward a contraceptive end, as well as any that impede the natural result of the sexual act allowing it to be subjected to deliberate sterilization, is absolutely forbidden.” (Reply of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on Sterilization in Catholic Hospitals, Quaecumque Sterilizatio, March 13, 1975, AAS 68 (1976) 738-740; DOCUMENTA 25)
 
I’m going to start a new thread (under moral theology), for anyone who is interested, to discuss the moral object and intention. What makes an act intrinsically evil? Is the object willed directly, regardless of the physical action, or are some acts in themselves sins?

I’m not going to reply further in this thread.
 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: “Any cooperation whatsoever, institutionally-approved or tolerated, in actions which are in themselves (that is, by their nature and condition) ordered toward a contraceptive end, as well as any that impede the natural result of the sexual act allowing it to be subjected to deliberate sterilization, is absolutely forbidden.” (Reply of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on Sterilization in Catholic Hospitals, Quaecumque Sterilizatio, March 13, 1975, AAS 68 (1976) 738-740; DOCUMENTA 25)
By my reading, neither treating a medical comdition with a drug, nor medically advised surgery, fall under that description.
 
By my reading, neither treating a medical comdition with a drug, nor medically advised surgery, fall under that description.
“as well as any that impede the natural result of the sexual act allowing it to be subjected to deliberate sterilization, is absolutely forbidden”

That is right since the word ‘deliberate’ specifies the willed end being sterilisation rather than the* unwilled* consequence of another willed end such as medical treatment.
 
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