Connection between free will and a known future?

[inocente]

In any case, accepting that you didn’t attempt an argument then, what is NOW your argument that God “knowing” necessarily entails some causal connection to what is known by him?

The discussion seems to have got a bit sidetracked.

The issue with omniscience is simply that no one can ever rebel against God’s knowledge, and therefore we have no free will.

According to the doctrine of omniscience, Judas had to betray Jesus, he had no choice. He could have wished with all his heart not to betray Jesus but he had to, because otherwise he would have proved God’s knowledge wrong.

We are puppets dancing to whichever tune God’s knowledge plays, so we might as well do whatever we feel like, because if we can’t do other that what God knows we will do, why bother worrying about it.

Or to put it more technically, omniscience is duff.

 

[JamesATyler]

The discussion seems to have got a bit sidetracked.

The issue with omniscience is simply that no one can ever rebel against God’s knowledge, and therefore we have no free will.

According to the doctrine of omniscience, Judas had to betray Jesus, he had no choice. He could have wished with all his heart not to betray Jesus but he had to, because otherwise he would have proved God’s knowledge wrong.

We are puppets dancing to whichever tune God’s knowledge plays, so we might as well do whatever we feel like, because if we can’t do other that what God knows we will do, why bother worrying about it.

Or to put it more technically, omniscience is duff.

Yeah…not. You are not trying to rebel against God’s knowledge, you are trying to rebel against yourself. It isn’t God’s knowledge that is the problem, it is your own will. The theme is Man vs Self not Man vs God. Good try though.

 

[inocente]

Yeah…not. You are not trying to rebel against God’s knowledge, you are trying to rebel against yourself. It isn’t God’s knowledge that is the problem, it is your own will. The theme is Man vs Self not Man vs God. Good try though.

Yikes that’s dangerous.

Why did you go to the school and shoot 40 kids? Because God knew I would, and I did not want to rebel.

 

[JamesATyler]

Yikes that’s dangerous.

Why did you go to the school and shoot 40 kids? Because God knew I would, and I did not want to rebel.

That’s what you say.

 

[Peter_Plato]

God’s want was larger and backed by the power to make it manifest. Peter still wanted. God still wanted.

My daughter wants ice cream for dinner, I want her to have a healthy meal. Guess what’s on the plate?

The fact that you put a healthy meal on the plate does not entail your daughter will choose to eat it. Your claim was that Peter acted to betray Jesus. That would have been Peter’s choice, not Jesus’. Just as, ultimately, your daughter still has a choice - to act with or against your placing the meal in front of her. It will still be HER choice, in the end, NOT yours, even if she were to capitulate. Peter’s choice, NOT that of Jesus; that is why he felt remorse. Which would not make sense on your newly minted account.

That was, in fact, the position YOU previously argued in the other thread - that whatever act an agent finally chooses to do, it will always come down to competing wants on THEIR part. Some “want” acting in Peter made him act. His act could NOT, according to you in the other thread, have been the result of anything but a want in him.

You still need to work this contradiction out in your own mind.

 

[belorg]

If God knows that revealing X will lead to ~X (as the skeptic must assume for the sake of argument), then on any traditional account of omnipotence, God cannot and would not reveal X.

I beg your pardon? What about the traditional account of omnipotence (or rather omniscience) by which God sees the future as if it were the present. What does God see ‘as the present’ in that situation?

That is one interpretation. The situation on the whole looks vacuous, and requires instantiating God in a particular instance of time in a way that seems inconsistent with God’s nature. To put it differently, the experimental setup is impossible.

Because, contrary to at least one traditional view on God’s omnipotence, God does not see the futer as if it were the present.

That said, humans are naturally free. That does not mean humans are always free to do whatever; circumstantial limitations are consistent with a free nature. Catholics believe, for instance, that once we experience the beatific vision in heaven, we have no freedom to turn from God and sin. The angels, who accepted or rejected God with full knowledge, did so freely and eternally in a single act. It doesn’t seem obvious to me that the creature would be allowed to tempt his Lord.

Yet, the Free Will Defense claims that, because God values free will so much, He allows a tremendous amount of evil.

 

[Peter_Plato]

The discussion seems to have got a bit sidetracked.

The issue with omniscience is simply that no one can ever rebel against God’s knowledge, and therefore we have no free will.

This is an ill-conceived understanding of the issue.

Our free will does not stand in contention or opposition to God’s knowledge. It is concupiscence that makes us think that God is our enemy. In fact, to put it simply, God IS our free will. Our will IS free to the extent that we will what God does for us. His will for us is the embodiment of perfect free will for ourselves, anything else detracts from our own freedom and makes us less free and more compelled by the forces around us.

This was the view of people like Augustine, Boethius and Jesus himself.

To the Jews who had believed him, Jesus said, “If you hold to my teaching, you are really my disciples. Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.”

They answered him, “We are Abraham’s descendants and have never been slaves of anyone. How can you say that we shall be set free?”

Jesus replied, “Very truly I tell you, **everyone who sins is a slave to sin. Now a slave has no permanent place in the family, but a son belongs to it forever. So if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed. **I know that you are Abraham’s descendants. Yet you are looking for a way to kill me, because you have no room for my word. I am telling you what I have seen in the Father’s presence, and you are doing what you have heard from your father. ” (John 8:31-38)

According to the doctrine of omniscience, Judas had to betray Jesus, he had no choice. He could have wished with all his heart not to betray Jesus but he had to, because otherwise he would have proved God’s knowledge wrong.

This doesn’t follow. God knows what Judas would do BECAUSE Judas was going to do it, Judas did NOT do what he did BECAUSE God knew it. You have the causal connection backwards, which is fallacious thinking (retrospective determinism) on your part.

We are puppets dancing to whichever tune God’s knowledge plays, so we might as well do whatever we feel like, because if we can’t do other that what God knows we will do, why bother worrying about it.

That point entirely misconceives who and what God is. Furthermore, it is you arguing that “we can’t do other than what God knows” in a deterministic sense, so it is you arguing that we are puppets.

In any case, how could we do “whatever we feel like” if we are puppets?

My view is that we have made ourselves puppets and God seeks to set us free from the strings that we are entirely content to tie ourselves up with because freedom, in the true sense of taking ultimate responsibility for our actions, is a frightening proposition we would sooner find any reason to avoid than take on.

We are responsible because we are free and we are free precisely because God makes us autonomous agents and is continually using his knowledge to “cut the strings” that we keep retying. A sure sign of this is our compulsion to keep tracing the blame back to God being responsible for what we do, ad tedium.

Or to put it more technically, omniscience is duff.

Sure, and Einstein’s general theory of relativity appears to be “duff” to a slug that doesn’t understand it.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I beg your pardon? What about the traditional account of omnipotence (or rather omniscience) by which God sees the future as if it were the present. What does God see ‘as the present’ in that situation?

God does NOT see the future “as if it were the present.” That expression of the account makes the assumption that God is a temporal being with insight into the future, which isn’t what the account states.

All things are present to God, there is no “as if” involved.

You would also benefit, perhaps, from this article on Eternity, Awareness and Action

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

The fact that you put a healthy meal on the plate does not entail your daughter will choose to eat it. Your claim was that Peter acted to betray Jesus. That would have been Peter’s choice, not Jesus’. Just as, ultimately, your daughter still has a choice - to act with or against your placing the meal in front of her. It will still be HER choice, in the end, NOT yours, even if she were to capitulate. Peter’s choice, NOT that of Jesus; that is why he felt remorse. Which would not make sense on your newly minted account.

That was, in fact, the position YOU previously argued in the other thread - that whatever act an agent finally chooses to do, it will always come down to competing wants on THEIR part. Some “want” acting in Peter made him act. His act could NOT, according to you in the other thread, have been the result of anything but a want in him.

You still need to work this contradiction out in your own mind.

You are taking the meal analogy farther than I did. I was speaking to what goes on the plate. Taken to the extreme if she refuses to eat where it can damage her health I as a parent could force feelings on her. I have the power to do so. She could still not want it. I having more power can force my want.

Peter felt remorse because he didn’t live up to his view of himself as defender and loyal servant. But what if he dd? He most likely would have been killed and not done his work for the early church. God’s will/want was done, it superceeded Peter’s desire and idea of being a loyal servant. God said no, I have other plans. We are driven by want, we don’t always get it.

What’s the old saw? Want to hear god laugh? tell him your plans.

 

[belorg]

God does NOT see the future “as if it were the present.” That expression of the account makes the assumption that God is a temporal being with insight into the future, which isn’t what the account states.

All things are present to God, there is no “as if” involved.

OK, I’ll go by your semantics if you like
So, what I will do tomorrow is present to God, ad so is what my grandson will do on 13 April 2099, even though at my present I don’t even have a grandson yet? And still this grandson has free will, and, beacsue everything is present to God, He can tell my grandson what he will do in 2099, and because my gandson supposedly has libertarian free will, he can do whatever he wants, including the opposite of what God told him he would do.

 

[Peter_Plato]

OK, I’ll go by your semantics if you like
So, what I will do tomorrow is present to God, ad so is what my grandson will do on 13 April 2099, even though at my present I don’t even have a grandson yet? And still this grandson has free will, and, beacsue everything is present to God, He can tell my grandson what he will do in 2099, and because my gandson supposedly has libertarian free will, he can do whatever he wants, including the opposite of what God told him he would do.

The contradiction is that God wouldn’t and couldn’t (given omniscience) tell your grandson what he hypothetically would do if that is inconsistent with the choice that your grandson finally makes. In other words, your grandson couldn’t do opposite of what he chooses to do precisely because he finally chose to do it. God knows what your grandson FINALLY chooses to do. There is no other “if” involved.

It is like posing the issue as one of: Could my grandson freely and finally choose to do opposite of what my grandson freely and finally chooses to do?

It is a nonsensical question to begin with. It is on par with: Could a triangle have four sides if a triangle could have four sides? It is a meaningless question based upon a meaningless hypothetical.

 

[polytropos]

I beg your pardon? What about the traditional account of omnipotence (or rather omniscience) by which God sees the future as if it were the present. What does God see ‘as the present’ in that situation?

Because, contrary to at least one traditional view on God’s omnipotence, God does not see the futer as if it were the present.

God “sees” the future as the present in the sense that He is present to all times. God isn’t sitting in 2013 predicting what’s going to happen next year with perfect accuracy. God is present to both times.

So the question “What does God see ‘as the present’ in that situation?” is unintelligible. There is no time which God sees “as the present,” nor any “situation” which God is “in.”

Yet, the Free Will Defense claims that, because God values free will so much, He allows a tremendous amount of evil.

I’m not advocating the Free Will Defense.

 

[polytropos]

I beg your pardon? What about the traditional account of omnipotence (or rather omniscience) by which God sees the future as if it were the present. What does God see ‘as the present’ in that situation?

Also, perhaps I’m missing something, but I don’t see how this engages the resolution I gave.

Suppose that the proposed experiment is coherent (which is doubtful). The skeptic asks God to predict what number he will write on a sheet of paper. My point is that if God knows that His predicting X will lead to the skeptic doing ~X, then it is just logically impossible for God to state his prediction, and so not predicting is neither a slight to his omniscience nor his omnipotence.

 

[inocente]

That’s what you say.

That’s a terrific counter argument bro, you should nominate it for the Most Awesome Counter Argument of the Year Award.

 

[belorg]

The contradiction is that God wouldn’t and couldn’t (given omniscience) tell your grandson what he hypothetically would do if that is inconsistent with the choice that your grandson finally makes. In other words, your grandson couldn’t do opposite of what he chooses to do precisely because he finally chose to do it. God knows what your grandson FINALLY chooses to do. There is no other “if” involved.

If God is eternally present, then the FINAL choice of my grandson is etenally present to Him to. Also the final choice in the case God tells him what this final choice is going to be.
But if my grandson truly has free will, it must be possible for him to do otherwise.
Your problem is that you jump between factual knowldge and hypothetical knowledge. if God has factual knowledge of the future, then the future is and has always been an immutable truth. But is that’s the case, there is no libretarian free will anywhere.
The problem disapperas of course if God has hypothetical knowlegde of the future. But then even bigger problems arise.

It is like posing the issue as one of: Could my grandson freely and finally choose to do opposite of what my grandson freely and finally chooses to do?

On a libertarian account: yes he could. Of course he won’t do opposite of what he will do, but that’s another matter. Up to the moment of the actual choice, it is possible for him to choose A or B.

 

[belorg]

God “sees” the future as the present in the sense that He is present to all times. God isn’t sitting in 2013 predicting what’s going to happen next year with perfect accuracy. God is present to both times.

Sure, so He can tell my grandson what he will do in 2013 since both times are present to Him and he is present to both times.

 

[belorg]

Also, perhaps I’m missing something, but I don’t see how this engages the resolution I gave.

Suppose that the proposed experiment is coherent (which is doubtful). The skeptic asks God to predict what number he will write on a sheet of paper. My point is that if God knows that His predicting X will lead to the skeptic doing ~X, then it is just logically impossible for God to state his prediction, and so not predicting is neither a slight to his omniscience nor his omnipotence.

Because God cannot know the outcome of libertarian free choices? I have no problem acknowledging this, you know, but it goes against most traditional accounts of omniscient. If you have another one, you are of course welcome to it.

 

[polytropos]

Sure, so He can tell my grandson what he will do in 2013 since both times are present to Him and he is present to both times.

He can, provided that He also knows that revealing what your grandson will do will not lead your grandson to act differently.

But His telling your grandson what he will do does not violate his freedom, since it is not God who is making your grandson act as he will act. Your grandson acts as he chooses to act because God actualizes his free will. The fact that it might be consistent for God to reveal to your grandson what he mean that God’s revealing causes your grandson to act in a certain way.

 

[polytropos]

Because God cannot know the outcome of libertarian free choices? I have no problem acknowledging this, you know, but it goes against most traditional accounts of omniscient. If you have another one, you are of course welcome to it.

Can you clarify what part of my post you are referring to? Which part goes against libertarian free choices?

 

[belorg]

He can, provided that He also knows that revealing what your grandson will do will not lead your grandson to act differently.

So, the ‘time’ at which my grandson acts differently is not present to God? Why not?

But His telling your grandson what he will do does not violate his freedom, since it is not God who is making your grandson act as he will act. Your grandson acts as he chooses to act because God actualizes his free will. The fact that it might be consistent for God to reveal to your grandson what he mean that God’s revealing causes your grandson to act in a certain way.

I think a few words are missing in your text here, polytropos. I think I knwo what you mean here, but I am not quite sure.