Connections between morality and epistemology?

[fakename]

I have a few questions on the nature of the connection between morality and epistemology:

(1) Does one have to have certain, true, belief justified by premises immediate to the definition of the question at hand that is backed by self-evident axioms in order to act morally?

(2) Can one be certain or must one always be in a state of doubt? If the latter is true, then would it not follow that one is always certain of one’s doubt? But the world is so complex that it would seem impossible to not always qualify or doubt one’s ideas.

(3) If moral knowledge is practical knowledge, and practical knowledge admits of some doubtfulness, then does one have moral knowledge and doubts about it at the same time? How are the two reconciliable?

(4) Can the mind be trusted to remember and record facts important for a moral use? To argue that it can’t means to contradict oneself, IMO, and to say that the mind is made up of varying and ambiguous gray spots is to make a black-and-white claim about something which is supposed to be all gray. Yet again, one cannot deny that in your daily life you do misremember a lot and that in principle, it is possible that one could have misremembered something.

Perhaps in all these problems also, there is a difference between how the mind records and the truth or false of what it records. For instance, it may be that one cannot doubt that the mind records things, but one could doubt whether the mind recorded them truthfully or not.

Any help?

 

[jonathan_hili]

Good questions!

It’s late here, so many answers will be sadly short and probably vague, but here it goes.

(1) Does one have to have certain, true, belief justified by premises immediate to the definition of the question at hand that is backed by self-evident axioms in order to act morally?

I wouldn’t think so, since one could act morally even if one were not aware of it. However, if you mean, must one have JTB to know one is acting morally, I would say “yes”.

Can you give an example of what you mean to flesh out the question a little?

(2) Can one be certain or must one always be in a state of doubt? If the latter is true, then would it not follow that one is always certain of one’s doubt? But the world is so complex that it would seem impossible to not always qualify or doubt one’s ideas.

This is more about epistemology than morality. One can certainly be certain about some things, such as logical axioms, one’s own existence, etc. However, we can also have moral certitude about all sorts of things, even if these certainties can be doubted, such as, “I am the child in that photo” or “the sun will rise tomorrow”. And, as you said, if you doubt, you are certain of your doubt or else you face an infinite regress, in which case you can be certain of having doubts.

Is it impossible to not always qualify or doubt one’s ideas? I don’t think so, but it depends on one’s ideas. Some, for instance, my idea of my own existence, can’t be doubted - I can say, “I doubt my own existence” but once I realise what my own existence is, I recognise that it cannot logically be doubted. Similarly, logical statements like 1+1=2 or the law of non-contradiction can’t be genuinely doubted. I think if people do claim that they are doubting these, they are either (i) confused about what these things mean, (ii) confused about what doubt is, or (iii) trying to keep a straight face will dousing their trousers.

(3) If moral knowledge is practical knowledge, and practical knowledge admits of some doubtfulness, then does one have moral knowledge and doubts about it at the same time? How are the two reconciliable?

Who said moral knowledge was solely practical knowledge? Sure, it has practical implications but it goes beyond practical knowledge. As Kant described it, moral knowledge is practical reason, which means it is reasoned thought which applies to practice.

(4) Can the mind be trusted to remember and record facts important for a moral use? To argue that it can’t means to contradict oneself, IMO, and to say that the mind is made up of varying and ambiguous gray spots is to make a black-and-white claim about something which is supposed to be all gray. Yet again, one cannot deny that in your daily life you do misremember a lot and that in principle, it is possible that one could have misremembered something.

What kind of facts did you have in mind?

 

[fakename]

Good questions!

It’s late here, so many answers will be sadly short and probably vague, but here it goes.

I wouldn’t think so, since one could act morally even if one were not aware of it. However, if you mean, must one have JTB to know one is acting morally, I would say “yes”.

Can you give an example of what you mean to flesh out the question a little?

This is more about epistemology than morality. One can certainly be certain about some things, such as logical axioms, one’s own existence, etc. However, we can also have moral certitude about all sorts of things, even if these certainties can be doubted, such as, “I am the child in that photo” or “the sun will rise tomorrow”. And, as you said, if you doubt, you are certain of your doubt or else you face an infinite regress, in which case you can be certain of having doubts.

Is it impossible to not always qualify or doubt one’s ideas? I don’t think so, but it depends on one’s ideas. Some, for instance, my idea of my own existence, can’t be doubted - I can say, “I doubt my own existence” but once I realise what my own existence is, I recognise that it cannot logically be doubted. Similarly, logical statements like 1+1=2 or the law of non-contradiction can’t be genuinely doubted. I think if people do claim that they are doubting these, they are either (i) confused about what these things mean, (ii) confused about what doubt is, or (iii) trying to keep a straight face will dousing their trousers.

Who said moral knowledge was solely practical knowledge? Sure, it has practical implications but it goes beyond practical knowledge. As Kant described it, moral knowledge is practical reason, which means it is reasoned thought which applies to practice.

What kind of facts did you have in mind?

(1) Morality requires prudence and prudence is just the careful weighing of ideas and concrete realities to gain the good end which you seek. Morality then, requires that we know what we are doing and knowledge requires JTB. That’s as concrete as the question will admit.

(2) I agree. Again though, let me expand on the complex world. One can say for instance, that death is just the heart stopping. But if someone were to examine someone being shot, and the blood running forth, that person might believe that death was caused by the blood running out. Yet both explanations are true and are so, due to the complexity of the world while it is essentially the heart’s function that determines life. So whereas one has the more abstract theory (that death is determined by the heart) the other has a more practical reason (that death is determined by the amount of blood). Therefore both can doubt their conclusions since their conclusions, although arrived at through similar processes of reasoning and observation, lead to different explanations. As such, either of them can say “we don’t have the full truth” but especially the latter one, since he doesn’t have the essential reason nor is it likely that he knows he does not have it.

(3) I mean moral knowledge is the application of principles of concrete situations.

(4) For instance, if I remember seeing a color, I could be just be remembering seeing those colors that present themselves in the imagination or those that exist when one’s eyelids close, or that it was a color present only in a TV show I was watching. So I never really “saw” the color I remember since this color was not extramental. So in this case, I am not remembering so much as I am misremembering. But to even say that is to remember misremembering and to again regain confidence in memory.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I have a few questions on the nature of the connection between morality and epistemology:

(1) Does one have to have certain, true, belief justified by premises immediate to the definition of the question at hand that is backed by self-evident axioms in order to act morally?

(2) Can one be certain or must one always be in a state of doubt? If the latter is true, then would it not follow that one is always certain of one’s doubt? But the world is so complex that it would seem impossible to not always qualify or doubt one’s ideas.

(3) If moral knowledge is practical knowledge, and practical knowledge admits of some doubtfulness, then does one have moral knowledge and doubts about it at the same time? How are the two reconciliable?

(4) Can the mind be trusted to remember and record facts important for a moral use? To argue that it can’t means to contradict oneself, IMO, and to say that the mind is made up of varying and ambiguous gray spots is to make a black-and-white claim about something which is supposed to be all gray. Yet again, one cannot deny that in your daily life you do misremember a lot and that in principle, it is possible that one could have misremembered something.

Perhaps in all these problems also, there is a difference between how the mind records and the truth or false of what it records. For instance, it may be that one cannot doubt that the mind records things, but one could doubt whether the mind recorded them truthfully or not.

Any help?

Catechism of the Catholic Church, Part 3, Sec 1, ch 1, arts. 3-8 deals with human actions and morality; Part 3, Sec 2, ch1, arts 1-10 deals with the commandments.

Also, see the Summa Theologiae, Part 2, Ques. 6-30, deals with Human Acts and Morality in general.

Also, here is a discussion on Morality in the Catholic Encyclopedia :
newadvent.org/cathen/10559a.htm

As far as epistemology per se see the Summa Theologiae, Part 1, ques 75-89, on how man knows what he knows is true.

You will naturally say that is a lot of reading and study. Indeed it is, but you have asked a lot of questions and many of them require careful attention. It would be impossible to treat them meaningfully in the " sound bites " available. So you need to put out the effort to study the material yourself. Linus2nd

 

[wittgenstein]

One cannot get an “ought” from an " is" (Hume). That is why something beyond logic (God) is necessary for morality to be meaningful.

 

[jonathan_hili]

(1) Morality requires prudence and prudence is just the careful weighing of ideas and concrete realities to gain the good end which you seek. Morality then, requires that we know what we are doing and knowledge requires JTB. That’s as concrete as the question will admit.

Sure, I agree. However, this is then a point about knowing one is acting morally, not about acting morally. One can be moral without being aware of it.

(2) I agree. Again though, let me expand on the complex world. One can say for instance, that death is just the heart stopping. But if someone were to examine someone being shot, and the blood running forth, that person might believe that death was caused by the blood running out. Yet both explanations are true and are so, due to the complexity of the world while it is essentially the heart’s function that determines life. So whereas one has the more abstract theory (that death is determined by the heart) the other has a more practical reason (that death is determined by the amount of blood). Therefore both can doubt their conclusions since their conclusions, although arrived at through similar processes of reasoning and observation, lead to different explanations. As such, either of them can say “we don’t have the full truth” but especially the latter one, since he doesn’t have the essential reason nor is it likely that he knows he does not have it.

Hmmm I guess so, however, in this example it isn’t so much that there are two answers but that it is one answer with two parts: the heart needs to beat to pump blood, and blood needs a pumping heart to circulate through the body. Both are necessary but not sufficient for life.

(3) I mean moral knowledge is the application of principles of concrete situations.

You mean, “moral knowledge is the application of principles to concrete situations”? Again, I don’t think this is necessarily the case. For instance, I have moral knowledge that it is always wrong to kill an innocent human being. Yet I have never applied this to any concrete situation (i.e. this or that particular human being) nor have I observed it applied. However, I agree that moral judgements require information from specific concrete situations (facts).

(4) For instance, if I remember seeing a color, I could be just be remembering seeing those colors that present themselves in the imagination or those that exist when one’s eyelids close, or that it was a color present only in a TV show I was watching. So I never really “saw” the color I remember since this color was not extramental. So in this case, I am not remembering so much as I am misremembering. But to even say that is to remember misremembering and to again regain confidence in memory.

I guess the position I would take is to prima facie trust our senses and memory unless there is reason not too. I don’t think it helps to be doubting at the outset, especially since that very doubt is based somehow on sense perception and memory, cause you’ll end up in an ugly hole that way.

 

[fakename]

Sure, I agree. However, this is then a point about knowing one is acting morally, not about acting morally. One can be moral without being aware of it.

Hmmm I guess so, however, in this example it isn’t so much that there are two answers but that it is one answer with two parts: the heart needs to beat to pump blood, and blood needs a pumping heart to circulate through the body. Both are necessary but not sufficient for life.

You mean, “moral knowledge is the application of principles to concrete situations”? Again, I don’t think this is necessarily the case. For instance, I have moral knowledge that it is always wrong to kill an innocent human being. Yet I have never applied this to any concrete situation (i.e. this or that particular human being) nor have I observed it applied. However, I agree that moral judgements require information from specific concrete situations (facts).

I guess the position I would take is to prima facie trust our senses and memory unless there is reason not too. I don’t think it helps to be doubting at the outset, especially since that very doubt is based somehow on sense perception and memory, cause you’ll end up in an ugly hole that way.

On the circulation problem, I don’t think that my example was entirely good so I’ll use another one which makes my point more striking. We know that a tornado is caused by the different densities of air. But yet, scientists say that a butterfly flapping its wings can cause a hurricane many miles away. If that is true then somehow although there is one answer (that ultimately a hurricane is caused (materially) by the air swirling around) there are many ways for air to swirl (differences in temp, or a butterfly effect). The person who knows the material cause abstracts from these many ways and so has a more universal and therefore more scientific reason than those who have the less universal accounts. Those who follow one explanation may consider themselves to be very wise and yet both accounts are true however one is more fundamental and the other more superficial. So in a world of complex events, you will have more than one true explanation for a thing and so you can always say “I doubt I have the whole truth”. Further some explanations are less useful than others so that if one had the more abstract explanation in the example above, you would also have the less operationally meaningful one; if someone asked you to predict tornadoes from the idea that swirling air causes them, you would be in a worse position than the person who recognizes temp. differences as a cause. So even having the truth is no guarantee for practical living. And morality is a part of practical living. So here it seems prudence is to no avail. Yet prudence is everything and even this conclusion must be considered to no avail if the world is so complex.

 

[jonathan_hili]

On the circulation problem, I don’t think that my example was entirely good so I’ll use another one which makes my point more striking. We know that a tornado is caused by the different densities of air. But yet, scientists say that a butterfly flapping its wings can cause a hurricane many miles away. If that is true then somehow although there is one answer (that ultimately a hurricane is caused (materially) by the air swirling around) there are many ways for air to swirl (differences in temp, or a butterfly effect). The person who knows the material cause abstracts from these many ways and so has a more universal and therefore more scientific reason than those who have the less universal accounts. Those who follow one explanation may consider themselves to be very wise and yet both accounts are true however one is more fundamental and the other more superficial. So in a world of complex events, you will have more than one true explanation for a thing and so you can always say “I doubt I have the whole truth”. Further some explanations are less useful than others so that if one had the more abstract explanation in the example above, you would also have the less operationally meaningful one; if someone asked you to predict tornadoes from the idea that swirling air causes them, you would be in a worse position than the person who recognizes temp. differences as a cause. So even having the truth is no guarantee for practical living. And morality is a part of practical living. So here it seems prudence is to no avail. Yet prudence is everything and even this conclusion must be considered to no avail if the world is so complex.

Absolutely, truth is a very deep thing. While some truths can be uttered easily, others - as you rightly point out, especially when trying to articulate the truth about reality, persons, etc. - are multi-layered and complex, I don’t disagree with you there.

But is morality like that? I think it may be on the level of facts, that is, have I got the facts right? Take abortion. We are not 100% sure if and when the unborn human being gains the status of a person (mainly because we don’t fully understand personhood itself). There are deep layers of truth with regards to this issue. Perhaps future discoveries will make things clearer, perhaps not. Nevertheless, the moral truth of “it is always wrong to kill an innocent person” is straightforward and not complex at all. The facts involved in the moral decision might be, the moral itself is not.

 

[fakename]

Absolutely, truth is a very deep thing. While some truths can be uttered easily, others - as you rightly point out, especially when trying to articulate the truth about reality, persons, etc. - are multi-layered and complex, I don’t disagree with you there.

But is morality like that? I think it may be on the level of facts, that is, have I got the facts right? Take abortion. We are not 100% sure if and when the unborn human being gains the status of a person (mainly because we don’t fully understand personhood itself). There are deep layers of truth with regards to this issue. Perhaps future discoveries will make things clearer, perhaps not. Nevertheless, the moral truth of “it is always wrong to kill an innocent person” is straightforward and not complex at all. The facts involved in the moral decision might be, the moral itself is not.

That is what I mean, the facts involved in moral decisions are complex. However there is no morality in actuality which is not a moral decision. And so how can we be really good when those decisions are always fluctuating.

Another example: What if, for instance, the only star in the universe was the sun or the only human was a single man -wouldn’t we mistake all the accidental properties of a single man to be expressive of the nature of all men? This is mere sophistry and yet, due to our limited experience it seems like the sagest wisdom. So how do we know when we are sophists or when we are philosophers? Or what if we said that we understood humans because we understood shapes and humans are shapes? Is this also, not a sophistical “understanding” of humans? We would always mistake the accidental for the essential and this is not where knowledge lies. Then imagine if we were to create a whole anthropology or science of man based on accidents like hair cuts or skin color. The attempt at increasing our knowledge would be a failure from the get-go. Likewise imagine acting by such “knowledge”; our moral and intellectual acts would have no value since we do not know anything except in the most indirect and inessential ways. So our acts would be guided by a prudence which had no real, essential principles to apply but mere aping of such principles.

 

[jonathan_hili]

That is what I mean, the facts involved in moral decisions are complex. However there is no morality in actuality which is not a moral decision. And so how can we be really good when those decisions are always fluctuating.

Well, we can know moral values and truths irrespective of putting them into or observing them in acts of practical reasoning, but I take what you’re saying. There is no one who is really good but God alone!

Another example: What if, for instance, the only star in the universe was the sun or the only human was a single man -wouldn’t we mistake all the accidental properties of a single man to be expressive of the nature of all men?

Well, I suppose if the entire population of a set is 1, then that 1 would define the set. Therefore, if there was only one single human, his properties (even if accidental) would be expressive of the nature of all men. They only stop being so or can be shown to not be so, with counter examples.

However, even this might not be true, because accidentals change by their very nature. A man who is 5’8" today, was not this tall twenty years ago; a woman with dark hair, might have had fair hair when she was born or might loose her hair when she is older.

This is mere sophistry and yet, due to our limited experience it seems like the sagest wisdom. So how do we know when we are sophists or when we are philosophers? Or what if we said that we understood humans because we understood shapes and humans are shapes? Is this also, not a sophistical “understanding” of humans? We would always mistake the accidental for the essential and this is not where knowledge lies. Then imagine if we were to create a whole anthropology or science of man based on accidents like hair cuts or skin color. The attempt at increasing our knowledge would be a failure from the get-go. Likewise imagine acting by such “knowledge”; our moral and intellectual acts would have no value since we do not know anything except in the most indirect and inessential ways. So our acts would be guided by a prudence which had no real, essential principles to apply but mere aping of such principles.

I’ve a real problem with this because it’s mostly based on an argument from ignorance: because x (that is, the fact that we might be wrong about a certain claim to knowledge) is possible, therefore we should believe x. But that’s not how we make rational judgements. We do so based on probability and how reasonable something seems to be. Unless good evidence to the contrary exists, I don’t see why we shouldn’t take for granted what we do take for granted.

 

[fakename]

I’ve a real problem with this because it’s mostly based on an argument from ignorance: because x (that is, the fact that we might be wrong about a certain claim to knowledge) is possible, therefore we should believe x. But that’s not how we make rational judgements. We do so based on probability and how reasonable something seems to be. Unless good evidence to the contrary exists, I don’t see why we shouldn’t take for granted what we do take for granted.

Then do you think that it is true, that people are not expected to be perfectly and demonstrably certain about everything because that would be impossible? And yet, wouldn’t it be contradictory to state that “there is some statement which we know we cannot know”? Perhaps not if we believe that Socrates really knew that he didn’t know. I suppose one could say that “I am certain that this is probably true”. Do you agree?

To what extent does the theory of Probablism have to do with this question I wonder?

I’m also curious as to your opinion, if you have one, on the Godel Impossibility Theorem. How does this connect with our problem and does it meaningfully connect with epistemology at all, since it seems to be a mathematical theorem and numbers have no generic relation to knowledge?

 

[jonathan_hili]

Then do you think that it is true, that people are not expected to be perfectly and demonstrably certain about everything because that would be impossible? And yet, wouldn’t it be contradictory to state that “there is some statement which we know we cannot know”? Perhaps not if we believe that Socrates really knew that he didn’t know. I suppose one could say that “I am certain that this is probably true”. Do you agree?

To what extent does the theory of Probablism have to do with this question I wonder?

I’m also curious as to your opinion, if you have one, on the Godel Impossibility Theorem. How does this connect with our problem and does it meaningfully connect with epistemology at all, since it seems to be a mathematical theorem and numbers have no generic relation to knowledge?

Well, people can have a “moral certainty” in their judgements, and this is often based on probability.

It’s not contradictory to say: “There is some statement which we know we cannot know”, unless you add: “and we know what this statement is”.

What’s the Godel Impossibility Theorem?

 

[Linux]

For instance, I have moral knowledge that it is always wrong to kill an innocent human being.

How do you know that it is always wrong to kill an innocent human being?

 

[jonathan_hili]

How do you know that it is always wrong to kill an innocent human being?

The simple answer would be that once one recognises the dignity of a person, and then what innocence is and means, one intuits that to kill an innocent person is always wrong. How precisely one comes to that conclusion I’m not all that clear about and haven’t thought that much about. Nevertheless, one doesn’t need to know how one knows something to know that one does know something.