G
Gorgias
Guest
I think that, since you’ve offered a definition, we should stick to that definition in this thread. And yes, I have objections to your definition:That is subject of discussion. What is your definition? Do you have any objection to my definition?
So, your claim is that consciousness is a physical state. OK, then, prove it!I think I just need to show that consciousness is a physical state
This, unfortunately, doesn’t prove your claim.I think my definition is based on three facts: (1) There is a correlation between brain process and consciousness (scientific fact)
The “correlation between brain process and consciousness” doesn’t help you here, since all you’re saying is that when consciousness is presumed, certain brain processes can be measured, and when consciousness is not presumed, certain other brain processes can be measured. Can you see that these observations – while interesting – don’t prove your point? Among other problems here, there’s a certain ‘circular reasoning’ here (I’m not quite sure I want to call it “begging the question”, but that’s how it feels): since you presume consciousness, you note brain activity… and then say that this brain activity proves consciousness! That just doesn’t hold up to scrutiny.
Think of it this way: I could say “when I’m happy, certain facial muscles contract”
That’s an argument parallel to yours; there’s a correlation between an observed set of physical actions and a mental state… but there’s no way that we would even consider asserting that smiles and frowns cause those states!
So, for your claim to hold up, you’d have to show not only that the brain processes exist, but that they cause consciousness.
(And, of course, at that point, you’d have to explain why the processes give rise to what we call ‘consciousness’… but we’re not even close to being there, yet.)
Now… on to your second and third ‘proofs’!
Is ‘awareness’ your definition of consciousness, then?and (2) We are internally aware of options and (3) We are internally aware that we can decide.
Is ‘internal awareness’ distinct from some other kind of awareness?
Can you demonstrate that the brain processes cause ‘internal awareness’?
If so, then you’ve got a potential argument here. Otherwise, you just have a set of observations, along with a vague description of what those processes are, and no causal link between them. Without that… no definition; no proof.
Ahh, but “other states of matter” can be measured. Can you measure consciousness? (Or, rather, are you merely observing something that happens at a particular time, during which you presume consciousness is present?)Consciousness is just a state of matter like other states, solidity, wetness, etc.
After all, I can tell you how solid (i.e., ‘dense’) an object is and give you a value for its density in kg/L. I can measure how wet (i.e. how much water is present in a material) an object is, and give you a value for its wetness as a percentage of water. What kind of measure can you give for consciousness? If you can’t, then you can’t very well make a claim for consciousness as a physical state.
Look up the Wikipedia article on monism; it’ll help give you the background knowledge you’re lacking.Could you please tell us what are the options?