Continuity of philosophy from scholastics to moderns

[Quatsch]

I am new to the philosophy board, but this caught my attention while reading Chesterton’s biography of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Chesterton seems to make the claim that the continuity of philosophy from the ancients (e.g. Plato, Aristotle, etc.) to the moderns was snapped somewhere along the line around the time of the Renaissance.

The quote in question:

From: gkc.org.uk/gkc/books/aquinas.html (emphasis mine)

The great intellectual tradition that comes down to us from Pythagoras and Plato was never interrupted or lost through such trifles as the sack of Rome, the triumph of Attila or all the barbarian invasions of the Dark Ages.** It was only lost after the introduction of printing, the discovery of America, the founding of the Royal Society and all the enlightenment of the Renaissance and the modern world. It was there, if anywhere, that there was lost or impatiently snapped the long thin delicate thread that had descended from distant antiquity; the thread of that unusual human hobby; the habit of thinking. This is proved by the fact that the printed books of this later period largely had to wait for the eighteenth century, or the end of the seventeenth century, to find even the names of the new philosophers; who were at the best a new kind of philosopher**. But the decline of the Empire, the Dark Ages and the early Middle Ages, though too much tempted to neglect what was opposed to Platonic philosophy, had never neglected philosophy. In that sense St. Thomas, like most other very original men, has a long and clear pedigree. He himself is constantly referring back to the authorities from St. Augustine to St. Anselm, and from St. Anselm to St. Albert, and even when he differs, he also defers.

He doesn’t name names of the “new philosophers” who he says were “at the best a new kind of philosopher,” seeming to imply that at the worst they aren’t really philosophers at all, but I am curious to what you who are schooled in the history of philosophy have to say about this passage.

 

[Shike]

I am new to the philosophy board, but this caught my attention while reading Chesterton’s biography of St. Thomas Aquinas.

I think Chesterton is pointing to the onset of modern philosophy. Exactly what makes modern philosophy “modern” may be numerous but here are a few: rejection of immanent final causality and the rejection and/or neglect of tradition.

The latter is particularly important because by neglecting the development of the history of philosophy, old mistakes were made new and judged as insights instead of errors. At least, very big and important errors were made. I’m sure there are many benefits that modern philosophy has brought to the table as well.

The Last Superstition by Edward Feser gives a very brief but useful summary of an important line in the history of philosophy that was “snapped” during the enlightenment and the scientific revolution.

What struck me the most however, was reading both Aquinas and Descartes, and seeing how the latter drones on and on like a story whereas the former is concise and to the point with rigorous argumentation. Or perhaps 19th century German philosophy, such as Schopenhauer (shudder).

 

[Quatsch]

I think Chesterton is pointing to the onset of modern philosophy. Exactly what makes modern philosophy “modern” may be numerous but here are a few: rejection of immanent final causality and the rejection and/or neglect of tradition.

The latter is particularly important because by neglecting the development of the history of philosophy, old mistakes were made new and judged as insights instead of errors. At least, very big and important errors were made. I’m sure there are many benefits that modern philosophy has brought to the table as well.

The Last Superstition by Edward Feser gives a very brief but useful summary of an important line in the history of philosophy that was “snapped” during the enlightenment and the scientific revolution.

What struck me the most however, was reading both Aquinas and Descartes, and seeing how the latter drones on and on like a story whereas the former is concise and to the point with rigorous argumentation. Or perhaps 19th century German philosophy, such as Schopenhauer (shudder).

That is a biting observation. I wish I knew more about philosophy, but do you have an example or two of old mistakes that were judged as insights instead of errors the second time around? The way you phrase it is very Chestertonesque, and it reminds me of what he said a couple pages prior to the first quote I posted:

http://www.gkc.org.uk/gkc/books/aquinas.html:

When the moderns, drawing the blackest curtain of obscurantism that ever obscured history, decided that nothing mattered much before the Renaissance and the Reformation,** they instantly began their modern career by falling into a big blunder. It was the blunder about Platonism.** They found, hanging about the courts of the swaggering princes of the sixteenth century (which was as far back in history as they were allowed to go) certain anti-clerical artists and scholars who said they were bored with Aristotle and were supposed to be secretly indulging in Plato. **The moderns, utterly ignorant of the whole story of the medievals, instantly fell into the trap. They assumed that Aristotle was some crabbed antiquity and tyranny from the black back of the Dark Ages, and that Plato was an entirely new Pagan pleasure never yet tasted by Christian men. **Father Knox has shown in what a startling state of innocence is the mind of Mr. H. L. Mencken, for instance, upon this point. In fact, of course, the story is exactly the other way round. If anything, it was Platonism that was the old orthodoxy. It was Aristotelianism that was the very modern revolution. And the leader of that modern revolution was the man who is the subject of this book.

The Last Superstition looks like it could be interesting. I would like to take some time and learn more about philosophy, specifically St. Thomas’s.

On another note, I found another recent thread here: forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=591146 that talks about the bias against scholasticism.

:tiphat:

 

[Areopagite]

Without thinking too much about it, the lack of continuity with previous philosophers in modern philosophy started out with the very first modern philosopher, namely Descartes, whose express goal was to demolish everything he had previously heard or thought and then rebuild everything with a new completely new foundation. (it’s in the first chapter or two of his Meditations on First Philosophy and characterizes his entire approach)

This, above all else, is what defines modern philosophy … that is, not taking into account what has previously been said but trying to start something entirely new. Honestly, is there any other defining characteristic of modern philosophy? The answer is no.

No two modern philosophers are alike, even regarding the bare essentials. And they seem to take pride in that. That is, they are proud that they have massively conflicting and irreconcilable views of the truth … sometimes explicitly dismissing the existence of the truth altogether just for good measure.

Even Descartes’ Cogito Ergo Sum, his unvanquisable premise, was vanquished in short order by David Hume, who said we can’t know the self exists … only that a bundle of sensations exist (that is, we know that “sensing” is going on, but we don’t know if there is anything existing that is doing the “sensing”).

But I don’t know. Does this answer you question? I’m not sure if it does.

 

[Shike]

That is a biting observation. I wish I knew more about philosophy, but do you have an example or two of old mistakes that were judged as insights instead of errors the second time around?

• Perhaps one of the biggest mistakes is the rejection of final causality as understood by Aristotle. Feser’s book unravels many problems in modern and contemporary philosophy from the rejection of final causality.
• This is probably one of the outcomes due to the rejection of final causality, but when I think of modern philosophy I think, ‘great, we get to argue again and again about universals and come to ridiculous conclusions like nominalism’. Indeed, I have had some pretty difficult discussions on this sub-forum because someone or other implicitly rejects essences, leading to assumptions in epistemology that are really conversation stoppers.

The Last Superstition looks like it could be interesting. I would like to take some time and learn more about philosophy, specifically St. Thomas’s.

It is very interesting; read it twice! And with regards to Aquinas, there is a lot of confusion out there concerning his 5 ways. Feser also has a beginner’s guide to Aquinas that helps bring someone up to speed with many modern objections, both silly and serious.

As for myself, after picking up some of the philosophical tools and terminology that Aristotle uses, I was able to read and sort of comprehend, at least enough not to get discouraged, the first 100 pages in The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas by Pegis, which is pretty much straight from the beginning of the Summa Theologica in order. Patience and perseverance is rewarded.

 

[Quatsch]

Without thinking too much about it, the lack of continuity with previous philosophers in modern philosophy started out with the very first modern philosopher, namely Descartes, whose express goal was to demolish everything he had previously heard or thought and then rebuild everything with a new completely new foundation. (it’s in the first chapter or two of his Meditations on First Philosophy and characterizes his entire approach)

This, above all else, is what defines modern philosophy … that is, not taking into account what has previously been said but trying to start something entirely new. Honestly, is there any other defining characteristic of modern philosophy? The answer is no.

No two modern philosophers are alike, even regarding the bare essentials. And they seem to take pride in that. That is, they are proud that they have massively conflicting and irreconcilable views of the truth … sometimes explicitly dismissing the existence of the truth altogether just for good measure.

Even Descartes’ Cogito Ergo Sum, his unvanquisable premise, was vanquished in short order by David Hume, who said we can’t know the self exists … only that a bundle of sensations exist (that is, we know that “sensing” is going on, but we don’t know if there is anything existing that is doing the “sensing”).

But I don’t know. Does this answer you question? I’m not sure if it does.

Thanks, that does help.

Chesterton mentions the “moderns” but doesn’t name any names. Your statement about the modern philosophers taking pride in their differences is interesting. I wish I knew more so that I could actually have a discussion about it, but thanks for your (name removed by moderator)ut.

 

[KevJohn]

Without thinking too much about it, the lack of continuity with previous philosophers in modern philosophy started out with the very first modern philosopher, namely Descartes, whose express goal was to demolish everything he had previously heard or thought and then rebuild everything with a new completely new foundation. (it’s in the first chapter or two of his Meditations on First Philosophy and characterizes his entire approach)

This, above all else, is what defines modern philosophy … that is, not taking into account what has previously been said but trying to start something entirely new. Honestly, is there any other defining characteristic of modern philosophy? The answer is no.

No two modern philosophers are alike, even regarding the bare essentials. And they seem to take pride in that. That is, they are proud that they have massively conflicting and irreconcilable views of the truth … sometimes explicitly dismissing the existence of the truth altogether just for good measure.

Even Descartes’ Cogito Ergo Sum, his unvanquisable premise, was vanquished in short order by David Hume, who said we can’t know the self exists … only that a bundle of sensations exist (that is, we know that “sensing” is going on, but we don’t know if there is anything existing that is doing the “sensing”).

But I don’t know. Does this answer you question? I’m not sure if it does.

Etienne Gilson makes a good case for what Chesterton refers to as beginning with Michel de Montaigne, whom he claims is the sceptic whom Descartes is responding to. (in GIlson’s The Unity of Philosophical Experience)

 

[levinas12]

This, above all else, is what defines modern philosophy … that is, not taking into account what has previously been said but trying to start something entirely new. Honestly, is there any other defining characteristic of modern philosophy? The answer is no.

Even Descartes’ Cogito Ergo Sum, his unvanquisable premise, was vanquished in short order by David Hume, who said we can’t know the self exists … only that a bundle of sensations exist (that is, we know that “sensing” is going on, but we don’t know if there is anything existing that is doing the “sensing”).

There may be more continuity between Descartes and previous philosophy than you might think. For example, Descartes takes from the tradition a notion of being as a substance (i.e., as a something in the world, a res). Both res cogitans and res extensa have a “thingly” being.

But the person is not a thing; the person is a relation. This is what gets covered over in modern philosophy.

And the person is a peculiar relation because each of us is a singularity (outside of genus/species). There is no genus/species for Bob or Sally as persons.

Yes, Bob and Sally share a human nature which is the same in both of them. And human nature is defined in terms of genus (animal) and specific difference (rational).

However, Bob the person is radically other than Sally the person. Nature answers to what they are; person answers to who they are. And who they are is totally unique and unrepeatable. A person is not simply an instantiation; “person” is not a sortal noun.

And, Aristotelian matter cannot be the source of personhood. Because the individuality of the person is different than the individuality of non-personal beings.

This strange being of persons is eclipsed in modern philosophy. That is why Hume could dissolve the self into a bundle of sensations. Even Kant failed to understand correctly the relationality of person (the unity of apperception is still too monadic).

This was the unhappy condition of philosophy until Kierkegaard first launched his protest against the Hegelian absorption of person into the Absolute Spirit. And Dostoevsky (and others) invented “existentialist” literature.

This protest on behalf on the "person"continued in the writings of Heidegger, Marcel, Sartre - down to John Paul II. Of course, there were major differences here. But the theme of person was now explicit.

 

[Perplexity]

I remember when I was in seminary, a philosophy Prof told us philosophy died after Aquinas. We all believed him. Then, I got into contemporary non-Thomistic philosophy (usually just known as philosophy). I couldn’t disagree more with my Prof now. We’ve seen such an incredible influx of development in so many areas, philosophy is anything but stagnate. The debates over anti-realism with Putnam, McDowell, Rorty, etc. Have never been so acute. Entirely new arguments for and against God have been constructed. Analyses of causation are mathematically precise. Etc. Ad infintum. (Pardon random capitalizations, bloody phone has a mind of its own )