Cooperation in Evil

[Areopagite]

When we are determining how and to what degree one can cooperate in evil, what constitutes the “evil” in those moral theological questions? Does the “evil” refer to an objectively evil action or does it refer to an action that is evil because it fails the 3 font principle?

I know (correct me if I’m wrong) that remote material cooperation in evil is acceptable. But all other kind of cooperation in evil is not. However, can we cooperate in “evil” if the “evil” action is actually objectively good but accompanied by an evil intent (of the person doing the action, which we are cooperating in) and/or by the circumstance?

If no one knows what I’m talking about, that’s okay. It’s kind of obscure. Nonetheless, I’ve scoured every book of moral theology I’ve laid my hands on, and none of them seem to address this question. I’m dying to know the answer here.

 

[Willy_Jose]

Hi,
Let me try to answer.

The Catechism provides us a good reference point.
/
1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together.
An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).

The *object of the choice *can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.

1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
/
So, it appears that a morally good act requires not only the moral goodness of the object (the action), but also the moral goodness of the the intention and the circumstances. Conversely an act is evil if it is not morally good as to the object, the intention, and the circumstances --taken together. If an act is not morally good in any of the three, then it constitutes an evil act. For the secondary question, you can cooperate with
a good act done by a person who has an evil intent, as long as you do not share his evil intent. In this case, the former is an evil act, while your action is not.

As to the principles of material cooperation, I have come across a good explanation within the document “Moral Reflections on Vaccines Prepared From Cells Derived From Human Foetuses” released by the Vatican Pontifical Academy for Life. (see pages 5 to 9).

Yes, passive remote material cooperation is not necessarily illicit, but it is pertinent to seriously assess the possibility of scandal (CCC 2284). Hope this is helpful.

-WillyJ
randomthoughtsmusings.blogspot.com/

 

[Reuben_J]

I can only guess.

Well, unlike the Robin Hood story, in Chritsianity it is wrong to do that. No matter how good is the intention but if the means is evil it is not right.

Did I get you right?

 

[Ron_Conte]

When we are determining how and to what degree one can cooperate in evil, what constitutes the “evil” in those moral theological questions? Does the “evil” refer to an objectively evil action or does it refer to an action that is evil because it fails the 3 font principle?

Cooperation with evil refers to any situation in which one person is sinning, and a second person is choosing whether or not to commit a related act (but not the same sinful act).

The evil in ‘cooperation with evil’ refers to any sin (moral evil), including actual sin and merely objective sin. The three fonts determine whether or not any act is a sin. So sin and ‘evil under the three fonts’ is the same.

I know (correct me if I’m wrong) that remote material cooperation in evil is acceptable. But all other kind of cooperation in evil is not. However, can we cooperate in “evil” if the “evil” action is actually objectively good but accompanied by an evil intent (of the person doing the action, which we are cooperating in) and/or by the circumstance?

explicit formal cooperation with another person’s sin – immoral
implicit formal cooperation with another person’s sin – immoral
immediate material cooperation with another person’s sin – immoral

mediate material cooperation with another person’s sin – may or may not be a sin depending on the good and bad consequences (third) of the second person’s chosen act. Remoteness is a way to refer to the moral weight of the good and bad consequences. It is a matter of degree. Remote mediate material cooperation with a very serious sin could still be immoral, if there were no weighty good consequences that outweighed the bad consequences of the cooperative act.

If no one knows what I’m talking about, that’s okay. It’s kind of obscure. Nonetheless, I’ve scoured every book of moral theology I’ve laid my hands on, and none of them seem to address this question. I’m dying to know the answer here.

I’m working on a new book of moral theology. Expected date of competion is March of 2010.

 

[thistle]

Cooperation with evil refers to any situation in which one person is sinning, and a second person is choosing whether or not to commit a related act (but not the same sinful act).

The evil in ‘cooperation with evil’ refers to any sin (moral evil), including actual sin and merely objective sin. The three fonts determine whether or not any act is a sin. So sin and ‘evil under the three fonts’ is the same.

explicit formal cooperation with another person’s sin – immoral
implicit formal cooperation with another person’s sin – immoral
immediate material cooperation with another person’s sin – immoral

mediate material cooperation with another person’s sin – may or may not be a sin depending on the good and bad consequences (third) of the second person’s chosen act. Remoteness is a way to refer to the moral weight of the good and bad consequences. It is a matter of degree. Remote mediate material cooperation with a very serious sin could still be immoral, if there were no weighty good consequences that outweighed the bad consequences of the cooperative act.

I’m working on a new book of moral theology. Expected date of competion is March of 2010.

Ron,

How would this work in the following scenario?

We know that girls in a bar stripping and lap dancing are committing grave sins. That being the case shouldn’t every priest and lay Catholic in the vincinity of such strip bars be there every day telling the girls to stop what they are doing. If not, isn’t that cooperation in their sins?

 

[Ron_Conte]

Ron,

How would this work in the following scenario?

We know that girls in a bar stripping and lap dancing are committing grave sins. That being the case shouldn’t every priest and lay Catholic in the vincinity of such strip bars be there every day telling the girls to stop what they are doing. If not, isn’t that cooperation in their sins?

When someone sins by cooperation with evil, i.e. by cooperation with the sin of another person, this cooperation is a sin only because one or more of the three fonts of morality are bad. So sinning by cooperation with evil falls under the same basic principles of morality as all other acts. The category of cooperation with evil is simply an application of the three fonts of morality to a particular class of acts, those in which the act of one person is related, in some way and to some extent, to the sin of another person.

It is possible to sin by omission. There are positive precepts which require us to act rather than to refrain from acting. Therefore, it is possible for someone to sin by cooperation with the sin of another person, as a sin of omission, rather than commission.

If a positive precept requires us to act, and we sin by omitting that morally required act, it is a sin of omission. If the required act is also related to another person’s sin, so that the omission assists that person in continuing to sin, then the sin of omission would also fall under cooperation with evil.

Examples: (1) One person makes a false accusation against another person. A third person knows that the accusation is false, but remains silent. The person who remains silent is cooperating with the false accusation by committing a sin of omission. (2) A police officer knows that a fellow officer is committing serious crimes, but he does not report it. His sin of omission allows the sin of the other officer to continue; he is cooperating with the other person’s sin by his own sin of omission.

In the example that you gave of a strip club, whether or not the persons who live in the area are obligated to act against the sins that occur there depends on the circumstances. Positive precepts bind always but not in each instance; they are generally binding, but are carried out only at particular times in particular ways, in accord with prudential judgment. So the individual would have to evaluate whether or not he had a moral obligation to speak out, or to act in some other way, in that particular set of circumstances, in order to oppose the sins of that business. Only if an individual, in his particular circumstances, had the moral obligation to act would he sin by omission in not acting; in such a case, this sin would also be a type of cooperation with the sins being committed there.

 

[StrawberryJam]

Thank you Ron,

You gave me a much better understanding on the principals of weighing these things out.

 

[thistle]

When someone sins by cooperation with evil, i.e. by cooperation with the sin of another person, this cooperation is a sin only because one or more of the three fonts of morality are bad. So sinning by cooperation with evil falls under the same basic principles of morality as all other acts. The category of cooperation with evil is simply an application of the three fonts of morality to a particular class of acts, those in which the act of one person is related, in some way and to some extent, to the sin of another person.

It is possible to sin by omission. There are positive precepts which require us to act rather than to refrain from acting. Therefore, it is possible for someone to sin by cooperation with the sin of another person, as a sin of omission, rather than commission.

If a positive precept requires us to act, and we sin by omitting that morally required act, it is a sin of omission. If the required act is also related to another person’s sin, so that the omission assists that person in continuing to sin, then the sin of omission would also fall under cooperation with evil.

Examples: (1) One person makes a false accusation against another person. A third person knows that the accusation is false, but remains silent. The person who remains silent is cooperating with the false accusation by committing a sin of omission. (2) A police officer knows that a fellow officer is committing serious crimes, but he does not report it. His sin of omission allows the sin of the other officer to continue; he is cooperating with the other person’s sin by his own sin of omission.

In the example that you gave of a strip club, whether or not the persons who live in the area are obligated to act against the sins that occur there depends on the circumstances. Positive precepts bind always but not in each instance; they are generally binding, but are carried out only at particular times in particular ways, in accord with prudential judgment. So the individual would have to evaluate whether or not he had a moral obligation to speak out, or to act in some other way, in that particular set of circumstances, in order to oppose the sins of that business. Only if an individual, in his particular circumstances, had the moral obligation to act would he sin by omission in not acting; in such a case, this sin would also be a type of cooperation with the sins being committed there.

We know that immoral acts are being committed in the strip clubs (that is the actual purpose of a strip club) so are we (including priests) not morally obligated to go there and try to persuade the girls to stop doing what they are doing. Are we not cooperating in their sin by closing our eyes to it and doing nothing?

 

[StrawberryJam]

I would think that is like being in a situation of temptation for a priest to go to minister to women who work at strip clubs. Isnt that putting yourself in the “near occasion of sin” if you have a weakness when around scantily clad beautiful women?

 

[Ender]

However, can we cooperate in “evil” if the “evil” action is actually objectively good but accompanied by an evil intent (of the person doing the action, which we are cooperating in) and/or by the circumstance?

An objectively good act done with an evil intent is a sin; the fact that the act is objectively good does not change that so your cooperation is controlled by the fact that this particular act is sinful, not that it is objectively good. The Catechism gives an example of such an act: *“On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).” (1753)

*If you were a charity and someone offered a large donation but confided in you that it was being done to create a positive political image I believe you would be obliged to reject the offer, otherwise you would be materially cooperating in an evil act. Objective goodness does not alter your obligation not to cooperate with an evil act.

Ender

 

[Ron_Conte]

However, can we cooperate in “evil” if the “evil” action is actually objectively good but accompanied by an evil intent (of the person doing the action, which we are cooperating in) and/or by the circumstance?

The morality of each and every knowingly chosen act is determined solely by the three fonts of morality. If an act is good under all three fonts, then you may act. The concept of cooperation with evil is merely an application of the three fonts to a particular set of acts, those in which the chosen act is related to the sinful act of another person.

If the other person sins only by intent, you may cooperate with their act which has a good moral object (the act itself is good) and in which the good consequences outweigh any bad consequences. But you may not share their sinful intention. If your cooperative act has the consequence of encouraging their sinful intention, then this is a bad consequence to be weighed in the third font of your act.

If the person sins only because the bad consequences outweigh the good, you must ascertain that your act has more good consequences than bad (and that the other two fonts of your act are also good).

The sin of passive scandal is also weighed in the third font of morality of your act. Active scandal is when you sin, and your sin influences others toward sin. So active scandal is a sin by definition. Passive scandal is when your act is a good act with good intention, but one of the bad consequences is influencing others toward sin (perhaps because they misunderstand your action).

 

[Ender]

If the other person sins only by intent, you may cooperate with their act which has a good moral object (the act itself is good) and in which the good consequences outweigh any bad consequences.

Are you saying that one may cooperate in an immoral act so long as (a) it is not intrinsically evil and (b) it has beneficial consequences? In the example I gave earlier, a charity accepting a donation from someone who gives solely to create a positive political image, would be materially cooperating in an immoral act - which is immoral. I will also point out that while good consequences may mitigate one’s responsibility for an immoral act, the consequences of themselves cannot change the moral nature of the act … or are you arguing from the principle of double effect?

If the person sins only because the bad consequences outweigh the good, you must ascertain that your act has more good consequences than bad (and that the other two fonts of your act are also good).

Bad consequences cannot make an act immoral any more than can good consequences make an act moral. One can judge the morality of the act without knowing the effects the act will have.

Ender

 

[Willy_Jose]

Ender:
If you were a charity and someone offered a large donation but confided in you that it was being done to create a positive political image I believe you would be obliged to reject the offer, otherwise you would be materially cooperating in an evil act. Objective goodness does not alter your obligation not to cooperate with an evil act.

This reminds me of Mother Terese who reportedly quipped, “I know where the money has been and I know where it’s going.”. I am not about to pass judgment on whether this is a particular case of material cooperation, because it sounds like a very complex case of the application of double-effect and the possibility of scandal. Has the Church definitively ruled in these particular case as may be universally applied? I am not aware, although the moral theology framework has been laid out, as explained by Ron Conte above. As in many cases, particular circumstances are unique, and when you have seen one - you have seen one. I think when a particularly difficult instance involves proportionate reasons and potential scandal, it is best to consult the local bishop.
/

 

[Ron_Conte]

Bad consequences cannot make an act immoral any more than can good consequences make an act moral. One can judge the morality of the act without knowing the effects the act will have.

Your claim that consequences do not affect the morality of the act contradicts the definitive teaching of the Church on ethics in Veritatis Splendor, and in the Catechism and the Compendium of the Catechism. The sources or fonts of morality are three:

1. intention
2. moral object
3. circumstances

Catechism of the Catholic Church: “The morality of human acts depends on: - the object chosen; - the end in view or the intention; - the circumstances of the action. The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the ‘sources,’ or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.”

Compendium of the Catechism: “The morality of human acts depends on three sources: the object chosen, either a true or apparent good; the intention of the subject who acts, that is, the purpose for which the subject performs the act; and the circumstances of the act, which include its consequences.”

Pope John Paul II: “These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed ‘intrinsically evil’ (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very [2] object, and quite apart from the ulterior [1] intentions of the one acting and the [3] circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that ‘there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object’.”

 

[Ron_Conte]

Ender,

You have badly misunderstood the teaching of the Church on ethics. You are making patently false statements on ethics, one after another, without presenting any basis for your claims.

The doctrine of ‘cooperation with evil’ has long been understood and taught in Catholic moral theology. If you need a primer on the topic, here are some resources:

newadvent.org/cathen/01100a.htm

ascensionhealth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82rinciples-of-formal-and-material-cooperation&Itemid=171

consciencelaws.org/Examining-Conscience-Ethical/Ethical02.html

formal cooperation is mentioned by Cardinal Ratzinger here:
priestsforlife.org/magisterium/bishops/04-07ratzingerommunion.htm

both formal and material cooperation are mentioned by the CDF here:
vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-unions_en.html

formal cooperation is also mentioned in the Catechism, in the section on abortion.

Are you saying that one may cooperate in an immoral act so long as (a) it is not intrinsically evil and (b) it has beneficial consequences? In the example I gave earlier, a charity accepting a donation from someone who gives solely to create a positive political image, would be materially cooperating in an immoral act - which is immoral.

formal cooperation in the sin of another person is a sin
material cooperation is sometimes a sin, and sometimes not a sin.

Your assessment of your own example is not correct.
If a charitable organization is offered a donation from someone who has bad intent (to create a positive political image), the other person is sinning, but we must evaluate each of our own acts based on the three fonts as they apply to each of our acts (not other acts by other persons)

1. the intention of the person accepting the donation is to use the money to help in the charitable work, so the intention is good. The bad intention of another person does not affect the morality of another act by a different person.
2. the act itself with its moral object, accepting a donation to charity, is moral. Even the moral object of the other person, the person who is sinning by intention, is a good moral object; each font is independent of the other fonts.
3. the circumstances must be weighed, and the act can only be done if the good consequences outweigh the bad. The act of accepting the donation might have some bad consequences, related to the bad intent of the person giving the money, such as some passive scandal to persons who might misunderstand and think that the charity is supporting that candidate. But if the totality of the good consequences for all persons affected by the act are greater than the bad consequences, then the third font is moral.

I will also point out that while good consequences may mitigate one’s responsibility for an immoral act, the consequences of themselves cannot change the moral nature of the act … or are you arguing from the principle of double effect?

Again, you are making patently false claims without presenting any basis.

There are three fonts of morality. All three fonts must be good for an act to be moral. So if a good act (good moral object) is done with good intention, the act is nevertheless immoral if the bad consequences outweigh the good. The consequences and intention cannot make an act with an evil moral object good, because all three fonts must be good for an act to be moral. But if the first two fonts are good, the morality of the act is determined by the consequences.

The principle of double effect is merely a proper application of the three fonts. When the first two fonts are good, and there is a good and bad effect in the consequences, then the act is moral if the good outweighs the bad, and immoral if the bad outweighs the good.

 

[Ron_Conte]

I think when a particularly difficult instance involves proportionate reasons and potential scandal, it is best to consult the local bishop.
/

There are over one billion Catholics in the world, and only a few thousand Bishops. It is not possible for every Catholic to ‘consult the local bishop’ on every difficult question of ethics that might arise. Instead, each Catholic should learn the moral teachings of the Church, so that he can understand the basic principles of ethics and how to apply them.

 

[Ender]

Your claim that consequences do not affect the morality of the act contradicts the definitive teaching of the Church on ethics in Veritatis Splendor, and in the Catechism and the Compendium of the Catechism.
The sources or fonts of morality are three:

1. intention
2. moral object
3. circumstances

Catechism of the Catholic Church: “The morality of human acts depends on: - the object chosen; - the end in view or the intention; - the circumstances of the action. The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the ‘sources,’ or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.”

You need to read a little more carefully. As I said, circumstances do not change the moral nature of the act. Had you read the Catechism a little further you would have encountered this:

1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.

Ender

 

[Ron_Conte]

You need to read a little more carefully. As I said, circumstances do not change the moral nature of the act. Had you read the Catechism a little further you would have encountered this:

1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.

Ender

You have misunderstood a number of points.

An act that is in itself evil is immoral under the second font (moral object). Intention and circumstances cannot change an intrinsically evil act to make it good. However, if the act is in itself good, intention or circumstances can make the act immoral. A good act done with good intent is a sin if the bad consequences outweigh the good consequences.

Also, the statement that you cite from the Catechism is true, but you have misapplied it. You gave this example:

In the example I gave earlier, a charity accepting a donation from someone who gives solely to create a positive political image, would be materially cooperating in an immoral act - which is immoral. I will also point out that while good consequences may mitigate one’s responsibility for an immoral act, the consequences of themselves cannot change the moral nature of the act … or are you arguing from the principle of double effect?

So the first act is:

1. intention to create a positive political image - a sinful intention, so the first font is bad
2. the act itself, donating to a charity, has a good moral object, so the second font is god.
3. consequences: there was not enough information in your example, but since it is hypothetical, let’s say that the good consequences of the donation outweigh the bad consequences.

The second act, that of accepting the donation, is a distinct act. If all three fonts are good, then the act is moral. The immorality of the first act, which is only immoral by intention and is not in itself evil (a phrase used only when the moral object is bad), does not affect the intention or moral object of the second act. It is absurd to claim that because the first act is immoral, that the circumstances of the second act have no effect on the morality of the second act.

Also, the Magisterium does NOT teach that all material cooperation with an immoral act is immoral. Material cooperation may or may not be moral, depending on the three fonts. If there is no explicit or formal cooperation, and the first two fonts are good (intention and moral object), then the cooperating act is moral if the good consequences outweigh any bad consequences (including scandal), and immoral if the bad consequences outweigh the good.

 

[Ender]

You have badly misunderstood the teaching of the Church on ethics. You are making patently false statements on ethics, one after another, without presenting any basis for your claims.

I’m willing to debate that point.

formal cooperation in the sin of another person is a sin
material cooperation is sometimes a sin, and sometimes not a sin.

Your assessment of your own example is not correct. If a charitable organization is offered a donation from someone who has bad intent (to create a positive political image), the other person is sinning, but we must evaluate each of our own acts based on the three fonts as they apply to each of our acts (not other acts by other persons)

I did misspeak in saying that accepting the donation was material cooperation, which was sinful; I meant to say that accepting the donation was formal cooperation, which, as you note above, is always sinful.

1. the circumstances must be weighed, and the act can only be done if the good consequences outweigh the bad. The act of accepting the donation might have some bad consequences, related to the bad intent of the person giving the money, such as some passive scandal to persons who might misunderstand and think that the charity is supporting that candidate. But if the totality of the good consequences for all persons affected by the act are greater than the bad consequences, then the third font is moral.

It is often difficult or even impossible to know what the consequences of an act will be but the morality of the act is determined when we commit it; it will not become good or bad later on as the consequences become known. Anticipating certain consequences of our acts goes to intent, which does determine the morality of the act; the actual consequences may mitigate our responsibility but they do not alter the morality of the act already committed.

There are three fonts of morality. All three fonts must be good for an act to be moral. So if a good act (good moral object) is done with good intention, the act is nevertheless immoral if the bad consequences outweigh the good. The consequences and intention cannot make an act with an evil moral object good, because all three fonts must be good for an act to be moral. But if the first two fonts are good, the morality of the act is determined by the consequences.

Your last statement is incorrect, as section 1754 makes clear.

Ender

 

[Ender]

The principle of double effect is merely a proper application of the three fonts. When the first two fonts are good, and there is a good and bad effect in the consequences, then the act is moral if the good outweighs the bad, and immoral if the bad outweighs the good.

No, there is more to it than that. The principle of double effect has four conditions that must be satisfied for the act to be moral.

1. The action to be performed must be morally good in itself or at least morally neutral.
2. The good effect must not come about as a result of the evil effect but must come directly from the action itself.
3. The good must be willed and the evil merely allowed or tolerated.
4. The good effect must be at least equivalent in importance to the evil effect. In other words, there must be a sufficient reason for permitting the evil effect to occur.

The first condition repeats the requirements of the second font of morality: the action may not be intrinsically evil. The fourth condition clarifies the claim you’ve been making about consequences; the second and third conditions are specific to the principle of double effect.

Ender