Cooperation in Evil

[Ender]

An act that is in itself evil is immoral under the second font (moral object). Intention and circumstances cannot change an intrinsically evil act to make it good. However, if the act is in itself good, intention or circumstances can make the act immoral. A good act done with good intent is a sin if the bad consequences outweigh the good consequences.

We seem to be disagreeing over the meaning of words. The consequences are secondary elements of a moral act and of themselves cannot change its moral quality. That doesn’t seem all that complicated a concept. If I can anticipate both good and bad consequences then I have to satisfy the conditions I specified for the principle of double effect. This is where the relative weight of the (anticipated) consequences comes into play. If, however, I anticipate minimal harmful consequences but my action turns out to have catastrophic results, that does not make my action immoral.

The second act, that of accepting the donation, is a distinct act. If all three fonts are good, then the act is moral.

We agree: the first act is immoral. The second act is immoral because it is formal cooperation with an immoral act which, as you stated earlier, is immoral.

Also, the Magisterium does NOT teach that all material cooperation with an immoral act is immoral. Material cooperation may or may not be moral, depending on the three fonts.

Material cooperation is moral or not depending on its proximity to the immoral act itself and whether there is a proportionate reason.

If there is no explicit or formal cooperation, and the first two fonts are good (intention and moral object), then the cooperating act is moral if the good consequences outweigh any bad consequences (including scandal), and immoral if the bad consequences outweigh the good.

This ignores proximity: just how much does your action facilitate the sinful action. Proximate cooperation is usually immoral regardless of the results while remote cooperation is usually not immoral. If I drive someone to an abortion clinic, my cooperation is proximate and immoral; if I drive a city bus that stops at the clinic then my cooperation is remote and moral.

Ender

 

[Ron_Conte]

I did misspeak in saying that accepting the donation was material cooperation, which was sinful; I meant to say that accepting the donation was formal cooperation, which, as you note above, is always sinful.

Accepting a donation from someone who donates with bad intention is not formal cooperation. See the links with explanations on formal cooperation in my post above. Formal cooperation pertains to the chosen act itself, with its moral object, not to the intent. Explicit cooperation is cooperation by having the same sinful intent. Formal cooperation refers to the moral object. If someone donates to charity with bad intent, the moral object of the act is good, so cooperation with that act cannot be formal cooperation. It could be explicit cooperation if the person accepting the donation also had the same sinful intent as the donor. It cannot be formal cooperation with evil because the donor’s act does not have an evil moral object; it is not the type of act that is wrong in itself.

The person accepting a donation generally would not know the intent of the donor, but formal cooperation is always a sin. So you are in effect claiming that all charitable organizations are sinning whenever anyone donates to them with bad intent. And what if someone donates to a parish or diocese with bad intent? Your position implies that the Church sins by accepting such donations!! You have badly misunderstood Catholic teaching on ethics.

It is often difficult or even impossible to know what the consequences of an act will be but the morality of the act is determined when we commit it; it will not become good or bad later on as the consequences become known. Anticipating certain consequences of our acts goes to intent, which does determine the morality of the act; the actual consequences may mitigate our responsibility but they do not alter the morality of the act already committed.

The consequences are good or bad based on the reasonably anticipated outcome, not based on the actual outcome. See Veritatis Splendor.

Your last statement is incorrect, as section 1754 makes clear.

Your denial of the role of consequences in determining the morality of an act is a serious doctrinal error. You have badly misunderstood CCC 1754. See Veritatis Splendor.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Ender,

I’m not going to reply to the remainder of your comments above, nor to any more of your posts for the following reasons:

Your claims concerning formal cooperation contradict magisterial teaching, sound moral theology, and reason. You have misunderstood the meaning and application of the three fonts of morality. You have misunderstood the brief passages from the Catechism that you cited. You are unwilling to accept correction. And you lead others into these same errors by repeatedly posting false and erroneous claims on matters of morality.

Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II’s encyclical on ethics, plainly states the role of consequences in morality; you are openly contradicting the definitive teaching of the Magisterium in that papal document.

 

[Willy_Jose]

There are over one billion Catholics in the world, and only a few thousand Bishops. It is not possible for every Catholic to ‘consult the local bishop’ on every difficult question of ethics that might arise. Instead, each Catholic should learn the moral teachings of the Church, so that he can understand the basic principles of ethics and how to apply them.

And for every individual question of sin in general, but of course.

The consultation must be applied however, in cases where a single decision on a difficult question of ethics will amount to an impact of a large scale nature. Take the famous and controversial case of the Caritas entering into partnership with Celticare in the Archdiocese of Boston. The local ordinary Cardinal O’Malley weighed in after a lengthy controversy and consultation. Such kind of difficult decisions must not be left to individual consciences, not to mention where there is ample opportunity and time for consultation.

This would be quite particular in the case of health care policies and similar instances where there would be wide scale implications. As a further example, the USCCB bishops directives for “Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services” provides a reference point in section #71.

"#71 "The possibility of scandal must be considered when applying the principles governing cooperation.Cooperation, which in all other respects is morally licit, may need to be refused because of the scandal that might be caused. Scandal can sometimes be avoided by an appropriate explanation of what is in fact being done at the health care facility under Catholic auspices. The diocesan bishop has final responsibility for assessing and addressing issues of scandal, considering not only the circumstances in his local diocese but also the regional and national implications of his decision.”
/

 

[Areopagite]

**If the other person sins only by intent, you may cooperate with their act which has a good moral object (the act itself is good) and in which the good consequences outweigh any bad consequences. **But you may not share their sinful intention. If your cooperative act has the consequence of encouraging their sinful intention, then this is a bad consequence to be weighed in the third font of your act.

If the person sins only because the bad consequences outweigh the good, you must ascertain that your act has more good consequences than bad (and that the other two fonts of your act are also good).

The sin of passive scandal is also weighed in the third font of morality of your act. Active scandal is when you sin, and your sin influences others toward sin. So active scandal is a sin by definition. Passive scandal is when your act is a good act with good intention, but one of the bad consequences is influencing others toward sin (perhaps because they misunderstand your action).

Sweet. This answers my question. Thank you very much, Ron Conte. This makes a lot of sense.

I’m working on a new book of moral theology. Expected date of competion is March of 2010.

Awesome! Let me know when it comes out.

 

[Ender]

Accepting a donation from someone who donates with bad intention is not formal cooperation.

“Formal cooperation is that in which the cooperator wills the evil, either by an explicit act of the will or by actually sharing in the evil act itself.” A donation, given with a bad intent is a sin and the sin is committed when the donation is made. Receiving the donation (when the bad intent is known) completes the sin on the part of the giver; if the donation had not been received the sin would not have been committed. Partaking in the act is formal cooperation.

See the links with explanations on formal cooperation in my post above.

It would be helpful if you were more explicit with your references. “See Veritatis Splendor” is not all that useful.

The person accepting a donation generally would not know the intent of the donor, but formal cooperation is always a sin. So you are in effect claiming that all charitable organizations are sinning whenever anyone donates to them with bad intent. And what if someone donates to a parish or diocese with bad intent? Your position implies that the Church sins by accepting such donations!! You have badly misunderstood Catholic teaching on ethics.

Actually, when I gave this example, I specified that the charity knew of the immoral intent which is the significant point. There is obviously no sin in accepting donations where the intent is unknown.

Your denial of the role of consequences in determining the morality of an act is a serious doctrinal error. You have badly misunderstood CCC 1754. See Veritatis Splendor.

Why don’t you explain what I have misunderstood? “The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act.” That seems pretty clear: the circumstances (and consequences) are of less importance than the intent and the object chosen in determining the moral quality of an act. In what way do they affect the act? “They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts … They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility”. Can they change the moral quality of an act?* "Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts "*

If I have so badly misunderstood 1754 it should be simple for you to explain what part of the section I got wrong.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Your claims concerning formal cooperation contradict magisterial teaching, sound moral theology, and reason. You have misunderstood the meaning and application of the three fonts of morality. You have misunderstood the brief passages from the Catechism that you cited. You are unwilling to accept correction. And you lead others into these same errors by repeatedly posting false and erroneous claims on matters of morality.

Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II’s encyclical on ethics, plainly states the role of consequences in morality; you are openly contradicting the definitive teaching of the Magisterium in that papal document.

You have made no effort to engage my arguments nor offered any correction; your responses have been nothing more than “You’re wrong” which is not all that compelling. My comments on cooperation with evil (but not the example) and the principle of double effect are from “Catholicism & Ethics” which has both an Impramatur and Nihil Obstat. I would be interested in knowing if you are able to arrange those for your book.

Ender

 

[Willy_Jose]

Ender,

Allow me to take off from Ron Conte’s stated principles. I happen to agree with them. Sadly he left off exasperated with you, and so I guess you played an active, direct, material role to make him culpable of passive, mediate, material cooperation. (just kidding, ok?) .

You say: “A donation, given with a bad intent is a sin and the sin is committed when the donation is made.”

Yes, it is a sin on the part of the giver, because of the first font (evil intention).

You continue: *“Receiving the donation (when the bad intent is known) completes the sin on the part of the giver;…if the donation had not been received the sin would not have been committed. Partaking in the act is formal cooperation.”
*
Oops, not so fast. Maybe yes and maybe no, which means not necessarily. You are leaving out two crucial considerations.

1. Does the receiver share the bad intention of the giver; and
2. What are the circumstances entailed with receiving the donation.

I guess #1 is pretty much straightforward, as formal material cooperation is always evil.
It is item #2 which needs some careful evaluation and discernment. In this item, another 2 more crucial considerations come in to play.

a) pressure (ex: matters of grave importance and emergency)
b) scandal

One these two items you will have to apply the double-effect principle (you are familiar with the 4 conditions).
Let us read your own post on this carefully again (postcount#20) before proceeding with the following example…

So, let us say as an example of item #a (pressure), someone’s life is in immediate danger and you need the donation pronto to save the life of
that person. No, there’s no time to look for another donor. If the donor gives you money to aggrandize himself (vainglory, and you knew it), you may justify your receiving the donation as a morally good act, as long as the 4 conditions of double-effect are not violated. No, this example is not a violation of justifying evil with good results, because the very act of **receiving the donation **(the object) is not intrinsically evil, even if you are aware of the evil intent of the giver. An important thing to keep in mind is that you may be aware of the donor’s intention of aggrandizement, yet you do not share his intention of aggrandizement even if you receive the donation. That is not outright evil. I hope you are following so far.

In addition, item #b (scandal) must be taken into account. Think of the possible effects of influencing others to commit sin, (which you never intended to do in the first place - an unintended consequence) as a result of accepting the donation. If this concern is sufficiently compelling enough, you should reject the donation, otherwise it would constitute a sinful act. As I mentioned before, in some particularly big-ticket complex situations, the advise of the local ordinary is recommended to be solicited when scandal is concerned.

Hope it helps.

 

[Willy_Jose]

Oh by the way,

“Receiving the donation (when the bad intent is known) completes the sin on the part of the giver;”

Nope…
As the donor actively attempts to donate with an evil intention, that is already a sin outright, whether or not the donation is consummated. We are talking of two distinct objects here: giving a donation and receiving a donation.

Remember He said to the effect that - when you as much as look at a woman with lust, you have already committed adultery in your heart. Receiving an evil-motivated donation does not complete the act of the sin on the part of the giver, for the simple reason that the sin has already been committed.

 

[Ender]

Oh by the way,

“Receiving the donation (when the bad intent is known) completes the sin on the part of the giver;”

Nope…
As the donor actively attempts to donate with an evil intention, that is already a sin outright, whether or not the donation is consummated. We are talking of two distinct objects here: giving a donation and receiving a donation.

Remember He said to the effect that - when you as much as look at a woman with lust, you have already committed adultery in your heart. Receiving an evil-motivated donation does not complete the act of the sin on the part of the giver, for the simple reason that the sin has already been committed.

This objection had occurred to me as well but I decided that it was inadequate to explain the situation. Assume that a young woman decides to have an abortion. According to the theory you present, the sin is already committed at that point … so where would be the sin in my driving her to the abortion clinic? Further, suppose when she reaches the clinic something persuades her to change her mind and not have the abortion - again, by your rules she has still committed the sin of abortion so we would be left with the situation where the woman has sinned even though she has committed no sinful act while I have not sinned even though voluntarily driving her to the clinic is in fact a sinful act whether she has the abortion or not.

I understand the point you made but it is too narrow to be applicable in all situations. I recognize that the desire to sin is sinful even though the act is thwarted because the opportunity doesn’t allow its consummation, but there is more than just this involved as I think my example shows.

Thank you for being willing to continue this discussion.

Ender

 

[Willy_Jose]

This objection had occurred to me as well but I decided that it was inadequate to explain the situation. Assume that a young woman decides to have an abortion. According to the theory you present, the sin is already committed at that point … so where would be the sin in my driving her to the abortion clinic? Further, suppose when she reaches the clinic something persuades her to change her mind and not have the abortion - again, by your rules she has still committed the sin of abortion so we would be left with the situation where the woman has sinned even though she has committed no sinful act while I have not sinned even though voluntarily driving her to the clinic is in fact a sinful act whether she has the abortion or not.

I understand the point you made but it is too narrow to be applicable in all situations. I recognize that the desire to sin is sinful even though the act is thwarted because the opportunity doesn’t allow its consummation, but there is more than just this involved as I think my example shows.

Thank you for being willing to continue this discussion.

Ender

First, I think we can agree that circumstances come into play.

Speaking of abortion however, circumstances are not applicable as it is a grave sin that belongs to what we consider as intrinsic evil. (like murder, contraceptives, adultery…).
These types of sins are outright evil (intrinsically evil).

With my example, if you drove her to the abortion clinic (and you shared her intent with free will), you have committed a sin outright regardless of whether she decides to pursue the abortion or not, for whatever reason. This is formal material cooperation on your part - by driving her to the abortion clinic. This is similar to what I was trying to demonstrate earlier.

Now if she changes her mind and does not proceed with the abortion, then we must get to the reason why. If she had an inner conversion, then we don’t say she committed a sin. She was just tempted and was able to discern and correct her error in time.
Now let us say her reason was just trivial, like she did not have the money to pay for the abortion procedure although she wanted to. No abortion materialized, but she has already sinned in her heart.

Yes, I agree that arbitrary assumptions will appear too narrow to be applicable in all situations. Circumstances are likely to vary in each case.

Thanks.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Now if she changes her mind and does not proceed with the abortion, then we must get to the reason why. If she had an inner conversion, then we don’t say she committed a sin. She was just tempted and was able to discern and correct her error in time.

Willy,

Although I am taking things a bit farther afield then the subject of this thread, I think a clarification is in order here. I don’t think a change of heart in this instance would mean that no sin was committed. Sin is committed if there is an efficacious desire to sin – i.e., a desire which includes within it the intention to accomplish what has been resolved.

In this case wanting an abortion and scheduling it and setting out to travel to the abortion provider would seem to certainly be evidence of an efficacious desire. Whatever happens after – whether a change of heart, or some other intervening event – that prevents the actual accomplishment of the abortion would not change the fact that the woman sinned in desiring one and willing it.

VC

 

[Willy_Jose]

Willy,

Sin is committed if there is an efficacious desire to sin – i.e., a desire which includes within it the intention to accomplish what has been resolved.

VC

Hmm, I will agree. I guess that just reinforces my major point that the target deed need not be committed in order for sin to take place, once the evil intention has been established beforehand.

Once a resolve to commit sin is done, there is already the occasion of sin. What happens thereafter doesn’t change that fact. I hope I said it right.

Thanks.

 

[Ron_Conte]

You are both considering sin in the first font, intention. And yes, any immoral intention is a sin; there need not be an exterior deed. An interior act can be a sin just as an exterior act can be a sin.

However, you are not considering the second font, moral object. If someone commits an act that is inherently directed at an evil moral object, such as murder (or specifically, abortion), the act need not attain its moral object (the death of the innocent person) in order to be a sin under the second font. Any act that is ordered toward an evil end (the moral object) is intrinsically evil, and always immoral, even if that end happens not to be attained.

Each of the acts you discuss is a separate sin, and not merely because the exterior act reveals the interior desire to sin.

Also, I think that you many be confusing the intended end, the purpose or motive for the chosen act, with the act itself.

An interior decision to procure an abortion is a sin because the act (interior decision) is inherently ordered toward the death of the innocent. So it is the chosen act that is intrinsically evil and gravely immoral. If the intended end of that act were to save the life of the mother, then that intended end would be good, but the intended means of direct abortion would still be gravely immoral.

The exterior act of scheduling an abortion is a sin for the same reason, mainly because of the second font, although the intention to use an intrinsically evil means to even a good end would not be a moral intention.

And it is the same with various other acts. Each of the acts that has this same moral object of killing the innocent prenatal is intrinsically evil under the second font (moral object of the chosen act) regardless of intention or circumstances.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

You are both considering sin in the first font, intention.

Ron if you mean me, I believe you misapprehend or I communicated poorly.

I was pointing out that an an efficacious desire to sin – i.e., a desire which includes within it the resolve to obtain the desire – is a sin.

In the example given the proximate end was an abortion, which is an intrinsically evil act, so an efficacious desire for that act (without any consideration of the other two fonts) would be a sin.

In other cases, whether or not a efficacious desire for an act constitutes a sin would involve an analysis of the the other two fonts.

In other words, I wasn’t speaking of the font of intention in my post, I was speaking solely of the movement of the will towards the proximate end.
VC

 

[Ron_Conte]

So you were considering the interior act of resolving to obtain an abortion, which has as its moral object the abortion (even though, at that point in time, it is only an interior act), making the interior act a sin under the second font. Good, that is what I was saying also.

I should add the point that an interior act without the resolve to commit the exterior act (should it be possible or opportune) can still be a sin. For example, fantasizing about becoming a famous baseball player, without any intention to pursue such a goal, can still be a sin if the interior act is selfish in any way.

But suppose that the person wills to commit the exterior act, but would never do so, not because it is immoral, but because of various circumstances (timidity, possible harm to reputation, etc.). Such an interior act still has the same moral object as the exterior act that is desired, and so the second font is still immoral.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Yes,

Elementary and basic in traditional Catholic moral theology.

VC

PS. Unrelated note: Do you find that the enumeration of the fonts have various orders? I don’t think they are static. I find that the current fashion is the label the object as the first font, the intention as the second, the circumstances the third.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Yes,

Elementary and basic in traditional Catholic moral theology.

VC

PS. Unrelated note: Do you find that the enumeration of the fonts have various orders? I don’t think they are static. I find that the current fashion is the label the object as the first font, the intention as the second, the circumstances the third.

You posted while I was adding to (editing) my post above.

I answer that question on the numbering and order of the fonts in my forthcoming book. St. Thomas uses the order: object, circumstances, intention. The Catechism uses the order: object, intention, circumstances. Veritatis Splendor does not use a particular order. Other sources have various orders, sometimes numbering the fonts and sometimes not.

I use the order: [1] intention, [2] object, [3] circumstances for particular reasons, to be brief, because the natural relation of the three fonts is such that intention is logically and usually chronologically first, so that the second font proceeds from the first, and the third font proceeds from the first and second. A person chooses the act based on the intended end. The consequences result from the intention and the chosen act.

I also see an analogy between the three fonts and the Trinity, in terms of procession, so that is why I use this particular order. However, no particular order or numbering is necessary to the truths that are expressed by the three fonts of morality.

 

[Willy_Jose]

I would say the object should be the first font. But that is just my opinion.
That’s because when the object is already ascertained as intrinsically evil, the other two fonts do not matter anymore.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Thanks Ron. I thought so.

VC