Cooperation in Evil

[Ron_Conte]

I would say the object should be the first font. But that is just my opinion. That’s because when the object is already ascertained as intrinsically evil, the other two fonts do not matter anymore.

That is a good reason for placing the moral object first. There is more than one reasonable way to arrange and explain the truths of the faith.

 

[Ender]

In this case wanting an abortion and scheduling it and setting out to travel to the abortion provider would seem to certainly be evidence of an efficacious desire. Whatever happens after – whether a change of heart, or some other intervening event – that prevents the actual accomplishment of the abortion would not change the fact that the woman sinned in desiring one and willing it.

There is another point here that I am trying to get at. You said that if a woman decides to have an abortion, schedules it, and arranges to have it done she has committed a sin. I won’t dispute that but … what if she now has the abortion? Is that a second sin? If it is not then it wouldn’t seem to matter whether she actually consummates her intent - which doesn’t seem reasonable. That it is a second sin seems to be what Ron is saying (although his position isn’t entirely clear): *“Each of the acts you discuss is a separate sin, and not merely because the exterior act reveals the interior desire to sin.”

*Before we go any further, can we clarify this point? Is the intent one sin and the execution (or attempted execution) of the act a second sin?

Ender

 

[Ron_Conte]

Each and every knowingly chosen act must be moral under all three fonts; otherwise, the act is a sin.

So a woman who procures an abortion has likely committed several mortal sins pertaining to that abortion: making the decision to commit the act, planning to commit the act, going to the location in order to commit the act, committing the act.

Each and every act that have the same moral object has the same inherent moral meaning, regardless of whether or not the object is attained. So if she changes her mind at the last moment, and leaves the abortion clinic without an abortion, but if she still committed each of the above acts directed toward that end, then she still committed several mortal sins.

 

[Ender]

Receiving an evil-motivated donation does not complete the act of the sin on the part of the giver, for the simple reason that the sin has already been committed.

Ron Conte:

So a woman who procures an abortion has likely committed several mortal sins pertaining to that abortion: making the decision to commit the act, planning to commit the act, going to the location in order to commit the act, committing the act.

If we accept Ron’s explanation then we would have say that “receiving an evil-motivated donation” does not complete ***the ***act of sin because there are several sins involved but it does certainly complete ***an *act of sin, **specifically, committing the sinful act.Is this not so?

Ender

 

[Willy_Jose]

I suppose the principles are already clear at this point in the discussions. Please correct me if I’m wrong.

• With an evil-motivated donation there are essentially two parties involved: the giver and the receiver (or the donor and the donee). The sin/s on either end must be evaluated separately with respect to the three fonts.
• Harboring evil intention towards consummating an immoral act is a sin by itself. Once the evil intention is established by the originator, he may commit several sins in progression, each one geared towards actually committing the target immoral act.
• When the concluding attempt to commit the target immoral act is committed, the ultimate target sin takes place. The sin involved in this particular concluding act is completed. It does not matter if the concluding act was frustrated or not. In Ender’s example, if the donee refuses the donation, it is immaterial to the culpability of the donor in the sin of his concluding act (which may or may not have been successful). On the other hand if the donee accepts the donation, then we apply the three fonts to assess the morality of the donee’s action.

When we say a sin has been committed, we do not require a physical, tangible occurrence to take place. It may or may not materialize. Only for purposes of purely empirical observation, can we say that the act of receiving “completes the sin”. But then, that would be metaphorical.

 

[Ender]

I suppose the principles are already clear at this point in the discussions. Please correct me if I’m wrong.

• When the concluding attempt to commit the target immoral act is committed, the ultimate target sin takes place. The sin involved in this particular concluding act is completed. It does not matter if the concluding act was frustrated or not. In Ender’s example, if the donee refuses the donation, it is immaterial to the culpability of the donor in the sin of his concluding act (which may or may not have been successful). On the other hand if the donee accepts the donation, then we apply the three fonts to assess the morality of the donee’s action.

Well, I think we’re back where we started if you insist that the sin occurs when the intent is formed and nothing more happens when the sinful act is completed. Given that restriction, I’m not sure I see how it is possible for someone to cooperate in a sinful act. For example, if I drive you to an abortion clinic isn’t it clear that I am cooperating in your sin? Yet by your definition, the sin occurs whether or not I take you so how can I be cooperating in a sin that is already in the past? Do you acknowledge that I have sinned if I voluntarily drive someone to an abortion clinic?

It does matter whether or not the sin is consummated and if my cooperation facilitates that consummation then I am guilty of cooperating in it.

1868 *Sin is a personal act. Moreover, we have a responsibility for the sins committed by others when we cooperate in them: …

• by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an obligation to do so*;

Accepting the money in our example facilitates the donor’s sin, it certainly doesn’t hinder it, but if in fact the sin is committed when the intent is formed how would it even be possible to hinder someone? It is because we are (in most cases) not responsible for someone else’s intent; we can only hinder actions, not intentions.

Ender

 

[Willy_Jose]

Ender,
I will just annotate your comments with mine in [brackets].
/
Well, I think we’re back where we started [sigh] if you insist that the sin occurs when the intent is formed [yes] and nothing more happens when the sinful act is completed. [hold on, I didn’t say nothing more happens, my second bullet above clearly stated: *“Once the evil intention is established by the originator, he may commit several sins in progression…towards…the target immoral act”] Given that restriction, I’m not sure I see how it is possible for someone to cooperate in a sinful act. For example, if I drive you to an abortion clinic isn’t it clear that I am cooperating in your sin? Yet by your definition, [sorry, but it’s more like a misunderstanding on your part] the sin occurs whether or not I take you so how can I be cooperating in a sin that is already in the past? Do you acknowledge that I have sinned if I voluntarily drive someone to an abortion clinic? [Absolutely. In my http://forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5947097&postcount=31”]post#31, I said: “if you drove her to the abortion clinic (and you shared her intent with free will), you have committed a sin outright regardless of whether she decides to pursue the abortion or not,…”]

It does matter whether or not the sin is consummated and if my cooperation facilitates that consummation then I am guilty of cooperating in it. Not necessarily. Material cooperation, yes, but material cooperation is not always illicit. Let us track back the discussions very carefully. The actual attempt to sin is a sin by itself. To further illustrate, let us say in the actual attempt event that he hands you over the money, and when you move to receive it, a mighty wind from nowhere blows away the money to oblivion. No consummation, see? but the donor is already guilty of sin.]

1868 Sin is a personal act. Moreover, we have a responsibility for the sins committed by others when we cooperate in them: …

• by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an obligation to do so;

Sin is a personal act. This affirms that the donor and receiver has separate personal acts which must be evaluated separately]

Accepting the money in our example facilitates the donor’s sin, [yes, but it does not follow that the receiver is automatically guilty of sin. You still have to apply the three fonts to the receivers act]. it certainly doesn’t hinder it, [yes, this could fall under passive, mediate material cooperation, which is not necessarily a sin. Need to consider further circumstances] but if in fact the sin is committed when the intent is formed how would it even be possible to hinder someone? It is because we are (in most cases) not responsible for someone else’s intent; we can only hinder actions, not intentions.

[Perhaps you are talking of formal cooperation, which is always illicit. I’m not sure whether we are actually arguing this point. Material cooperation, on the other hand, is not necessarily illicit. The act of receiving a donation (even if you knew the evil intent of the giver) may theoretically fall under either formal cooperation or material cooperation. Try to review the principle for passive, mediate material cooperation which is not necessarily illicit. As I said, we may be in agreement actually.]
/
Peace!

 

[Verbum_Caro]

So a woman who procures an abortion has likely committed several mortal sins pertaining to that abortion: making the decision to commit the act, planning to commit the act, going to the location in order to commit the act, committing the act.

Interesting. Perhaps you can elaborate upon this theme?

One question that might come to mind is how this relates to the obligation to confess each mortal sin. Should women who have procurred an abortion confess deciding, planning, traveling, and procuring?

Thanks,
VC

 

[Ron_Conte]

Interesting. Perhaps you can elaborate upon this theme?

One question that might come to mind is how this relates to the obligation to confess each mortal sin. Should women who have procurred an abortion confess deciding, planning, traveling, and procuring?

First, some general comments:
There is a very disturbing trend among Catholics today, to only believe what is written in the Catechism, or only what is written in magisterial documents. Not only is learning directly from Tradition and Scripture deprecated or entirely set aside, but all theological knowledge, and reason itself, is treated as if it had nothing substantial to offer to the faithful. Unless there is a document saying exactly ‘this idea,’ in exactly ‘this wording,’ the person remains unconvinced. Of course, there are a number of magisterial documents that warn against this type of error, such as Fides et Ratio and Humani Generis (the sections on scholastic theology). But those Catholics who take this point of view, of relying only on what is explicitly stated in magisterial documents, usually have not read many magisterial documents. And even those they have read, they do not understand, because they reject all theological insight into those documents, taking instead an approach similar to the Protestant approach to Scripture, where no theological interpretation is said to be needed, and the text is said to mean nothing other than what it readily seems to mean to the casual reader. And so, if a truth on faith or morals is not explicitly stated in a document, they don’t accept it. So it is that many Catholics are unfamiliar with basic concepts in moral theology – because they treat all theology like so much chaff.

Now to the main point:
Each and every knowingly chosen act is either moral or immoral, so that an ‘act’ in terms of morality is not the whole sequence of events over many minutes, hours, and days leading up to and including a sin (e.g. bank robbery), but each knowing choice of the will, whether that results in an exterior act or not. An act is rooted in the human will, informed by the intellect. Each act of the will, each knowing choice, is either moral or immoral. And this truth is implicit in Veritatis Splendor, and has long been taught by moral theology.

Concerning Confession and the set of acts that are all related to one type of sin, it is not necessary to explicitly state each closely related sinful act; the confession of the entire set of sins is implied by the admission of that type of sin. For example, if a person robs a bank, there are obviously numerous gravely immoral acts involved, but the penitent, at a minimum, need only admit to robbing a bank, and to any different types of mortal sins, such as murder, that he also committed. In another example, if a man commits the sin of adultery, he need not list each and every adulterous sexual act; the admission of adultery, with some indication as to how long this affair continued for, is sufficient to imply the entire set of acts.

Similarly, if a person has a good confession, but forgot a particular actual mortal sin, that sin is forgiven; it is implied that the pentitent, in being sorrowful (especially with perfect contrition), is sorrowing over all sin, and not selectively over only certain ones. His repentance for all sin is implicit, and so the forgiveness extends over all sin.

But the same attitude that I began by describing, whereby nothing is believed unless it is explicitly stated in plain terms, this same attitude, when applied to confession, refuses to admit that anything can be implied and yet effective. This leads to the error of thinking that only those sins that are explicitly stated are forgiven.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

First, some general comments:
There is a very disturbing trend among Catholics today, to only believe what is written in the Catechism, or only what is written in magisterial documents. Not only is learning directly from Tradition and Scripture deprecated or entirely set aside, but all theological knowledge, and reason itself, is treated as if it had nothing substantial to offer to the faithful. Unless there is a document saying exactly ‘this idea,’ in exactly ‘this wording,’ the person remains unconvinced. Of course, there are a number of magisterial documents that warn against this type of error, such as Fides et Ratio and Humani Generis (the sections on scholastic theology). But those Catholics who take this point of view, of relying only on what is explicitly stated in magisterial documents, usually have not read many magisterial documents. And even those they have read, they do not understand, because they reject all theological insight into those documents, taking instead an approach similar to the Protestant approach to Scripture, where no theological interpretation is said to be needed, and the text is said to mean nothing other than what it readily seems to mean to the casual reader. And so, if a truth on faith or morals is not explicitly stated in a document, they don’t accept it. So it is that many Catholics are unfamiliar with basic concepts in moral theology – because they treat all theology like so much chaff.

Ron, you introductory remarks are all fine. You don’t mean to apply them to me do you? It would be a gross error to attribute the above to myself.

. . .if a man commits the sin of adultery, he need not list each and every adulterous sexual act; the admission of adultery, with some indication as to how long this affair continued for, is sufficient to imply the entire set of acts.

Here you are speaking of the principle that one may approximate the number of mortal sins if one cannot give a specific number. But this is entirely different from the mandate to confess in number according to one’s ability. If a married man fornicates with a woman once a week for three weeks, ought he not to confess to having committed adultery three times? In other words, if you* know* the number, ought you confess the number?

The above adultery example is different from what I was asking, which is assessing the actual number of mortal sins involved. In your example a woman commits a mortal sin by deciding to have an abortion, another mortal sin by scheduling it, another mortal sin traveling to the abortion mill, and another mortal sin by going through with it. Numerically, how many mortal sins are there? Can you explicate this?

Similarly, if a person has a good confession, but forgot a particular actual mortal sin, that sin is forgiven; it is implied that the pentitent, in being sorrowful (especially with perfect contrition), is sorrowing over all sin, and not selectively over only certain ones. His repentance for all sin is implicit, and so the forgiveness extends over all sin.

Most certainly.

But the same attitude that I began by describing, whereby nothing is believed unless it is explicitly stated in plain terms, this same attitude, when applied to confession, refuses to admit that anything can be implied and yet effective. This leads to the error of thinking that only those sins that are explicitly stated are forgiven.

Again, this seems to miss the point. There is no question that a sin may be forgiven even if not explicitly stated. But one ought to explicitly state in number and kind what one can, correct? This brings us to my question about the abortion - has the woman committed 4 mortal sins (deciding, scheduling, traveling, and procuring)? If she is aware of committing 4 mortal sins, should she confess each mortal sin?

My understanding was that you do not leave the confessional in a state of grace unless you confess and are repentant from each and every actual mortal sin. But if you are entirely repentant from all mortal sins, and simply can’t remember, or unintentionally omit some of them, you are still forgiven from all your mortal sins.

My question isn’t about not remembering or accidentally omitting, but rather about the actual number of sin that one ought to confess and be repentant of.

Thanks.
VC

 

[Ron_Conte]

If a married man fornicates with a woman once a week for three weeks, ought he not to confess to having committed adultery three times? In other words, if you* know* the number, ought you confess the number?

The above adultery example is different from what I was asking, which is assessing the actual number of mortal sins involved. In your example a woman commits a mortal sin by deciding to have an abortion, another mortal sin by scheduling it, another mortal sin traveling to the abortion mill, and another mortal sin by going through with it. Numerically, how many mortal sins are there? Can you explicate this?

But one ought to explicitly state in number and kind what one can, correct? This brings us to my question about the abortion - has the woman committed 4 mortal sins (deciding, scheduling, traveling, and procuring)? If she is aware of committing 4 mortal sins, should she confess each mortal sin?

My understanding was that you do not leave the confessional in a state of grace unless you confess and are repentant from each and every actual mortal sin. But if you are entirely repentant from all mortal sins, and simply can’t remember, or unintentionally omit some of them, you are still forgiven from all your mortal sins.

My question isn’t about not remembering or accidentally omitting, but rather about the actual number of sin that one ought to confess and be repentant of.

VC, I was speaking in general, not referring to you.

There are two types of repentance: contrition (‘perfect contrition’) and attrition (‘imperfect contrition’). Perfect contrition implies repentance from all sin. No one can have perfect contrition, i.e. out of love of God and neighbor, from one actual mortal sin and not another actual mortal sin. However, a person might have **imperfect **contrition from one actual mortal sin and not another.

In the above example, if a woman has committed 4 mortal sins (deciding, scheduling, traveling, and procuring) concerning an abortion, she need not say the number four, and she need not even describe the set of sins so that the priest can deduce that the sins were four in number. She need only confess the sin of abortion, the other closely related sins are implied.

A person can be saved by implied desire for Baptism; a person can be forgiven by implied desire for Confession (by perfect contrition without confession for non-Catholics). Similarly, a person is forgiven in the confessional even if he knows that a sin he confesses consisted of a certain number of actual mortal sins (all pertaining to the sin that he confesses), but he only confesses the set without saying the number.

It is too narrow and too literal an interpretation to require the number to be stated if known, and to say that otherwise the person is not forgiven. The admission of the sin that represents the set, e.g. abortion, or adultery, is sufficient. If the adultery continued for a long time, the person should say ‘for a long time’; he need not even attempt to determine the exact number. The teaching of Trent about confessing the number of actual mortal sins, if known, does not literally require a known number to be stated as a necessity for salvation. It is sufficient for salvation that the sin be confessed; if that sin includes a number of closely related acts, each of which is a mortal sin, the confession of these sins is implied.

This type of idea that I am expressing is not at all controversial among theologians. It is very common to interpret and apply Church teaching in a way that is reasonable and merciful. Canon Law, for example, is subject to this same type of reasonable interpretation and merciful application. For example, the sin of procuring an abortion includes excommunication, which cannot be lifted by any priest in confession. But theologians interpret that Law as limited to only those women who knew at the time of the abortion that the sin was also an excommunicable offense.

However, many Catholics have fallen into a certain type of over-simplification of the Catholic faith which is just like the Pharisaism that Jesus warned about. This approach is very common in Catholic discussion groups. Someone will cite a magisterial document, and then interpret it very literally and narrowly, and then conclude that this overly literal and narrow interpretation is the teaching of the Church. “It says it in this document, so it must be true!” Such is not the case. The written documents of the Magisterium must be understood and interpreted in the light of all the teachings of the Faith, and with true love, true faith, true hope, and not with a specious faith that merely adheres to the letter of the documents of the Church.

Example: Someone reads that “Outside the Church, there is no salvation.” This ought to be interpreted such that the Church includes all persons in a state of grace, even non-Christians. A narrow interpretation would be false and merciless.

Example: Council of Florence: “It [the holy Roman Church] firmly believes, professes and preaches that all those who are outside the catholic church, not only pagans but also Jews or heretics and schismatics, cannot share in eternal life and will go into the everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels, unless they are joined to the catholic church before the end of their lives” But this is to be interpreted such that all these persons can be saved if they are implicitly members of the Church, despite being formally outside the Church.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

VC, I was speaking in general, not referring to you.

Thank you Ron, I appreciate it.

I think I’ve led us a bit afield by bringing up the confession of sins. My interest was in the number of sins involved and not, necessarily, the directive to confess in number and kind. I will state, however, that I disagree with you in that I tend to think the directive to confess in number and kind is a bit more stringent then you seem to indicate. Emergency situations, lack of knowledge, forgetfulness, etc. can excuse from the obligation but I believe the basic obligation is clear. You mentioned Trent already, and to that we can add its codification in Can. 988 §1. “A member of the Christian faithful is obliged to confess in kind and number all grave sins committed after baptism and not yet remitted directly through the keys of the Church nor acknowledged in individual confession, of which the person has knowledge after diligent examination of conscience.” Again, I am not speaking of extraordinary circumstances, but rather what is normative – number and kind.

Actually, I thought my prior post similar to a post of yours on another thread (emphasis mine):
Ron Conte:

If you enter the confessional not in a state of grace, due to actual mortal sin,
you do not leave in a state of grace unless you confess and are repentant from each and every actual mortal sin, however,
if you are entirely repentant from all mortal sins,
but can’t remember, or unintentionally omit some of them,
you are still forgiven from all your mortal sins.

and therefore I didn’t anticipate a discussion on the obligation of “number and kind.” I inadvertently took us off track.

Leaving that aside, the real purpose of my query was regarding the actual number of sins. I’m curious about the concept that the woman who procures an abortion commits four numerically distinct mortal sins de facto. My training in moral theology leads me to think otherwise. My understanding of the issue is that when numbering sins, aside from species (each species is a distinct sin), the number of sins within the same species can be identified (among other ways) by complete acts of the will, not an act of the will which refers to another act of the will as a part to a whole.

The unity of the acts of the will I am speaking of is a moral unity and not a physical unity. If the person wills a component of a physical act for its own sake this could be an indicator of the components not being a moral unity, but sometimes if an act of the will can be referred to another act of the will as a part of whole then there aren’t two sins but rather one.* Also this moral unity can be disrupted by changing the will back and forth, the so called “moral interruption”.

As an illustration, my understanding is that an internal action of, say, deciding to murder someone and the external action of physically murdering someone are not two numerically distinct formal sins but rather one formal sin – the external act completes the external act. Though the external act does indeed add to the malice of the sin by completing it. And in some cases another sin may be generated as well, such as scandal.

Another illustration might be stabbing someone twice in succession in order to murder them. The stabbings normally would be a component of the sin of murder – one sin, not three. This could change, though, if the perpetrator willed to maim and then willed to murder. Those are two distinct moral acts. Or if the perpetrator stabs someone in order to kill, changes their mind, and then changes it back and stabs again in order to kill. This would be a classic case of a “moral interruption” as I understand it, and thus two sins.

So in the case of the woman who a)decides to get an abortion b)makes and appointment c)drives there and d)procures the abortion I am finding it difficult to identify 4 numerically distinct formal sins, unless there is a moral interruption or some other ancillary sins generated by each action (such as scandal).

It is quite possible that I am misunderstanding you, or that I am mistaken, or that we are mis-communicating. Perhaps it would be helpful if you could point out another source that might support your contention that there are 4 mortal sins in this case? Please note that I am not saying that unless you can point to another source to corroborate your position then your position is erroneous. I have noticed that recently you have been quite concerned about people demanding Church documents, Catechism passages, etc before assenting to a theological principle. What I am asking is if you can direct me towards any treatises on moral theology, writing of the Saints, etc that could support your position, and thus help me to understand it. As you know, good theology, while it can stand on its own, can often also adduce examples from Saint’s writings or other theological works.

Thank you for your time. I look forward to your response.
VC

*Please note that this can get a bit complicated, and I’ve simplified it (or perhaps over-simplified it). Each case is different. I would appreciate it if we could limit our discussion only to the case at hand:

a)deciding to get an abortion
b)scheduling it
c)traveling to it
d)submitting to it

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Ron,

I should note, too, that in this scenario there is certainly a possibility that each is a distinct sin because of the possibility of a significant lapse in time between each component. In that case, I would tend to view it as a moral interruption and distinct sins, if the end purpose had to be willed again or consented to.

I see now that I had been assuming that these four actions occurred in close proximity, although that isn’t explicit in our example, and it could go the other way - at least with deciding/scheduling/submitting. I think, though, in general traveling/submitting would be in close proximity and in common estimation comprise one moral choice of the will (“getting an abortion”). I think you would agree that the proximity in time between these four things might be important to the analysis.

I should also say that given the complexity of some cases in regard to numeric distinction of sins, the general principle you put forth above – that a penitent may confess what in normal estimation is the intended sin and this would include any other sins which may or may not comprise it – is one supported in moral theology and pastoral practice. I wasn’t looking at it from a pastoral or practical point of view, but was interested, rather, in the actual numerical distinction. That topic might be a bit complex for this venue (and probably is a bit deviation from the discussion here in this thread). Grisez, in fact, begs off these complexities in his moral theology text. Perhaps we should do likewise!

VC

 

[Ron_Conte]

I think I’ve led us a bit afield by bringing up the confession of sins. My interest was in the number of sins involved and not, necessarily, the directive to confess in number and kind. I will state, however, that I disagree with you in that I tend to think the directive to confess in number and kind is a bit more stringent then you seem to indicate. Emergency situations, lack of knowledge, forgetfulness, etc. can excuse from the obligation but I believe the basic obligation is clear. You mentioned Trent already, and to that we can add its codification in Can. 988 §1. “A member of the Christian faithful is obliged to confess in kind and number all grave sins committed after baptism and not yet remitted directly through the keys of the Church nor acknowledged in individual confession, of which the person has knowledge after diligent examination of conscience.” Again, I am not speaking of extraordinary circumstances, but rather what is normative – number and kind.

**Dogmas are subject to interpretation. **In the case of number of sins of the same kind, the part is indicated by the whole. The number of sins need only be confessed by part, so that a set of sins of the same type, if each one is an individual actual mortal sin, need only be confessed by referring to the set. I’m referring to the ordinary case, not exceptions such as being unable to remember, etc.

When we say that the consecrated wine is the Blood of Christ, we are referring to the whole, since the Eucharist is all of Jesus (body, blood, soul, Divinity), by the part.

Otherwise, the burden on the penitent would be a severe detriment to salvation.

[Matthew]
{23:4} For they bind up heavy and unbearable burdens, and they impose them on men’s shoulders. But they are not willing to move them with even a finger of their own.

Some theologians bind up heavy and unbearable burdens by their strict literal interpretation of dogmas and of Church law. We must not be like that. For example, Canon law give the penalty of automatic excommunication for any woman who procures a direct abortion. But theologians interpret this to refer only to women who knew of the penalty at the time of the act.

Baptism is absolutely necessary for salvation. But theologians have always interpreted this as including a non-formal baptism of desire, and they taught this prior to the magisterial teaching on the same point. The subsequent magisterial teaching (at Trent) confirms that this theological approach is valid. The Council of Florence taught:“all those who are outside the catholic church, not only pagans but also Jews or heretics and schismatics, cannot share in eternal life and will go into the everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels, unless they are joined to the catholic church before the end of their lives” But this is interpreted as referring to a joining at least implicitly, by attaining and retaining a state of grace.

Your interpretation is too literal and narrow on the question of number and kind.

In the example of the women who gets an abortion, I identified four sins, but was merely an illustrative example. She very likely committed many actual mortal sins related to the one abortion. She likely repeated knowing choices of the will many times with the same gravely immoral intention. Similarly with a man who commits adultery; there are a large number of distinct mortal sins involved in even a brief affair. Persons have never been required by the Tradition of the Church to confess the number of sins in the sense of literally each actual mortal sin; it has always been the practice of the Living Tradition to indicate a set of individual mortal sins in a more general way.

The Catholic Faith is not merely written documents. Both Tradition and Scripture are lived by the Church.

 

[Ron_Conte]

I should note, too, that in this scenario there is certainly a possibility that each is a distinct sin because of the possibility of a significant lapse in time between each component. In that case, I would tend to view it as a moral interruption and distinct sins, if the end purpose had to be willed again or consented to.

Each and every knowingly chosen immoral act is a sin.

It is absurd to claim that only one sin is committed merely because the acts are close to one another in time, and then to say that they are separate sins if an arbitrary amount of time separates them. This idea of the ‘principle of totality’ which joins several acts together as one act contradicts the most basic teachings of the Church on morality. It nullifies the idea that the three fonts determine the morality of each act. It nullifies the definition of sin as nothing else but a morally bad act.

You speak as if you were an expert on moral theology, discussing open questions, but from my point of view, you are badly misinformed and unwilling to accept correction or instruction. I’m not willing to continue to discuss theology with you, VC.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Your interpretation is too literal and narrow on the question of number and kind.

I don’t see how. I merely hold the plain obligation to confess in number and kind. The extent of the obligation, and how one numbers, and with what precision is a more complicated subject and involves individual cases.
Ron Conye:

She likely repeated knowing choices of the will many times with the same gravely immoral intention. .

That’s right Ron. But the choices of the will that concern us are the complete choices, not always the component parts. I questioned whether travelling to the abortion and getting the abortion were two numerically distinct formal sins. They might be, or they might not be. A clearer case might be choosing to walk across the room to assault someone. In most cases I would think this comprises one total object of the will. But even in such a case there *could *be two numerically distinct formal sins depending on the internal disposition of actor.

Are you familiar with the term “moral interruption”?
Ron Conte:

with a man who commits adultery; there are a large number of distinct mortal sins involved in even a brief affair. Persons have never been required by the Tradition of the Church to confess the number of sins in the sense of literally each actual mortal sin; it has always been the practice of the Living Tradition to indicate a set of individual mortal sins in a more general way.

You are correct in one sense. But I think you generalize in such a way as to obscure the plain and basic obligation – which is not unduly burdensome*. *Number means *something *Ron. A penitent can easily confess either the obvious or the approximate number of the same species. Thus a man who has a brief affair over two weeks which principally comprised three visits to his paramour (although each visit, and the times between visits, may comprise a various number of distinct sins) would seem to be skirting his obligation by confessing simply to adultery, and not adultery 3 times.

There is no obligation to scruple over number, or to investigate each sin in the detail that we have done (scheduling, traveling) etc. But there is an obligation to give the number that is plain by common estimation.

VC

 

[Ender]

You speak as if you were an expert on moral theology, discussing open questions, but from my point of view, you are badly misinformed and unwilling to accept correction or instruction. I’m not willing to continue to discuss theology with you, VC.

VC -

Join the club.

I would like your opinion on this situation:

A politician decides to make a donation to a charitable organization with the specific view of burnishing his public image, going so far as to arrange for media coverage of him handing the check to the president of the charity, who has been informed of his plans.

Inasmuch as the Catechism contains this specific example: On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving). (1753) it seems pretty clear that the politician’s act is a sin. It is my contention that accepting the donation in this situation constitutes formal cooperation in that sinful act, which is itself a sin.

How do you see it?

Ender

 

[Verbum_Caro]

It is absurd to claim that only one sin is committed merely because the acts are close to one another in time, and then to say that they are separate sins if an arbitrary amount of time separates them.

That I did not claim. You make a false characterization.
Ron Conte:

This idea of the ‘principle of totality’ which joins several acts together as one act contradicts the most basic teachings of the Church on morality.

I do not subscribe to the principle of totality (of which I am familiar, by the way, and which I too recognize an error).

You have** mistakenly** ascribed these things to me Ron.

I trust careful readers of this thread will see that these are false accusations.

VC