Correspondence Theory implies Dualism

[Matthias123]

Correspondence theory is the position that truth is the conformity between a notion in the intellect and objective reality. If and only if a notion of our mind actually exists in objective reality,then is a notion called “true”. This is most evident when we visualize the universe without observers, as what would have been called “truth” would just things that are in* being*. So when we say “X is true” we are saying “X is in being”, therefore “truth” and “being” are synonymous. Now since being is immaterial by virtue of it being purely actual, a materialist mind cannot know being, as even though the immaterial could interact with the physical, the physical cannot interact with the immaterial, therefore we cannot know being via our senses. Therefore it is the case that we cannot know truth – if one does not know what truth is, one cannot know if something is true – therefore the knowledge of truth in correspondence theory implies dualism.

Thoughts?

 

[Magnanimity]

Correspondence theory is the position that truth is the conformity between a notion in the intellect and objective reality. If and only if a notion of our mind actually exists in objective reality,then is a notion called “true”. This is most evident when we visualize the universe without observers, as what would have been called “truth” would just things that are in* being*. So when we say “X is true” we are saying “X is in being”, therefore “truth” and “being” are synonymous. Now since being is immaterial by virtue of it being purely actual, a materialist mind cannot know being, as even though the immaterial could interact with the physical, the physical cannot interact with the immaterial, therefore we cannot know being via our senses. Therefore it is the case that we cannot know truth – if one does not know what truth is, one cannot know if something is true – therefore the knowledge of truth in correspondence theory implies dualism.

Thoughts?

OK, so I think there is a bit of equivocation going on with the word being. If on the definition you seem to allude to, of being as that which is “in act,” that is not what is normally meant when you state something which obtains-state a truth. Predicating something of an object is what is normally done when we say “X is Y.”

I think it’s the difference between using “is” as a pure copula, as in existence, and then using “is” as in predication, (identifying that which inheres in the subject, as in “Mary is tall.”)

More importantly perhaps is that you are correct in thInking there must be some immaterial aspect of all objects, which could unite with the mind, else there is the dualism you speak of. As far as I know, only the Aristotelian/Thomistic form/matter distinction of all objects in re provides a realistic solution to the problem of idealism/dualism.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Correspondence theory is the position that truth is the conformity between a notion in the intellect and objective reality. If and only if a notion of our mind actually exists in objective reality,then is a notion called “true”. This is most evident when we visualize the universe without observers, as what would have been called “truth” would just things that are in* being*. So when we say “X is true” we are saying “X is in being”, therefore “truth” and “being” are synonymous. Now since being is immaterial by virtue of it being purely actual, a materialist mind cannot know being, as even though the immaterial could interact with the physical, the physical cannot interact with the immaterial, therefore we cannot know being via our senses. Therefore it is the case that we cannot know truth – if one does not know what truth is, one cannot know if something is true – therefore the knowledge of truth in correspondence theory implies dualism.

Thoughts?

By “dualism” here I assume you mean dualism in philosophy of mind. I don’t think this line is going to work here - there are other arguments for the immateriality of an intellect. Your argument has the following problems:

“Truth” and “being” aren’t quite synonymous - “truth” is the correspondence of an intellect with something in being, the way you are using the term here. Of course, that correspondence is an ontological entity, a “being” itself - which then an intellect can correspond to again… More on this below.

Not all being is purely actual and immaterial. Material things have being.

Even so, if by “interact with” you mean “influence”, all that is necessary is for the immaterial to interact with the physical; then a materialist mind could know, in theory. In fact that happens when we program computers. Of course you will argue that computers are neither minds nor intellects; but you haven’t precisely defined these terms.

Finally, one can’t really “know” the correspondence theory of truth to be true. It’s a metaphysical assumption. If we claim to know the CTT is true, that is a correspondence between a notion in our intellect and a fact. But how do we know this correspondence exists? So again, it’s another correspondence, and yet another one, the “turtles all the way down” problem in epistemology.

 

[Shike]

Correspondence theory is the position that truth is the conformity between a notion in the intellect and objective reality. If and only if a notion of our mind actually exists in objective reality,then is a notion called “true”. This is most evident when we visualize the universe without observers, as what would have been called “truth” would just things that are in* being*. So when we say “X is true” we are saying “X is in being”, therefore “truth” and “being” are synonymous. Now since being is immaterial by virtue of it being purely actual, a materialist mind cannot know being, as even though the immaterial could interact with the physical, the physical cannot interact with the immaterial, therefore we cannot know being via our senses. Therefore it is the case that we cannot know truth – if one does not know what truth is, one cannot know if something is true – therefore the knowledge of truth in correspondence theory implies dualism.

Thoughts?

I agree with the previous poster and like the positive things he had to say about your argument.

When you say that being is purely actual, that tends to make me think of God… but there exist other “things” besides God, namely the other objective things you talk about when stating the correspondence theory. I don’t think that these other things would be purely actual, from what can be adduced by experience.

if one does not know what truth is, one cannot know if something is true

Taking this statement out of context (I’m hoping the context doesn’t affect it too much), I have to say this statement is wrong. I see this as equivalent to saying, ‘before you can know anything, you first need to know what truth is’. I find this false by experience; someone can know many things, and know that they know many things without having a working definition of what truth is. To use an exaggeration, not all of us are epistemologists. And if you are taking the word “know” as experiential, then I think you should say so (though such a definition would lead to an obvious statement; you have no experience of truth, therefore you cannot know if something is true… yes, in fact you know nothing!).

But if what you mean by your statement is only ~A → ~A, namely if one doesn’t know truth, then one doesn’t know truth, then it is fine… albeit a bit redundant. But this is a strained interpretation of what you’re trying to say methinks.

Look at me and how I just babble on and on; hopefully something I said helps.
peace,
Michael

 

[Shike]

Finally, one can’t really “know” the correspondence theory of truth to be true. It’s a metaphysical assumption. If we claim to know the CTT is true, that is a correspondence between a notion in our intellect and a fact. But how do we know this correspondence exists? So again, it’s another correspondence, and yet another one, the “turtles all the way down” problem in epistemology.

Deductively, no; but bring common experience into the argument and then you have a yes.

 

[punkforchrist]

Part of the difficulty in justifying a correspondence theory of truth (CTT) is that there is a bit of an equivocation between what truth is (metaphysics) and how we come to know truth (epistemology). Matthew, I assume you have the metaphysical aspect in mind, correct?

CTT is indeed the “common-sense” view of truth, and it is certainly one I agree with. Another way of making the inference of dualism from correspondence is to stress the abstract nature of truth. Abstract objects don’t stand in causal relations, and the mind only comes to know something external to itself if there is a causal relationship between the two. This would imply that our minds are incapble of knowing truth, which is absurd. So instead, we might postulate that truth is not independent of the mind.

Now, if the union of all true propositions is itself an abstract object, then this union must likewise be the concept of a mind. But, only an omniscient mind could know all true propositions. From this it follows that an omniscient mind exists, and given that each physical entity has limitations, this omniscient mind is arguably immaterial. If this argument is correct, then correspondence (or more specifically, the reality of abstract objects) does imply dualism.

Still, more argumentation would be needed to infer that human minds in particular are immaterial.

 

[James_S_Saint]

If you **declare **that a certain marble is the color “purnewble”, is it at all possible that it isn’t that color to you?

All truth begins with declaration, not observation.

 

[Shike]

If you **declare **that a certain marble is the color “purnewble”, is it at all possible that it isn’t that color to you?

All truth begins with declaration, not observation.

So say you! ( I hope you get the joke)

 

[James_S_Saint]

So say you! ( I hope you get the joke)

I SO declareth!!

 

[Magnanimity]

If you **declare **that a certain marble is the color “purnewble”, is it at all possible that it isn’t that color to you?

All truth begins with declaration, not observation.

An example from color, eh? I cannot resist… Suppose you state something more basic than that about the marble. Let’s say that you assert that it is colorful, by which you mean you perceive that it is a certain color (whatever that color is). Are you not stating a truth based on your observation in that instance?

 

[James_S_Saint]

An example from color, eh? I cannot resist… Suppose you state something more basic than that about the marble. Let’s say that you assert that it is colorful, by which you mean you perceive that it is a certain color (whatever that color is). Are you not stating a truth based on your observation in that instance?

Not until I **Declare **what “colorful” means to ME.

A mind cannot sense anything until it **declares **that something is a sensory (name removed by moderator)ut. Once declared, truth begins as categories of sensing are declared. Associations for sensory analysis are declared. Relevance is declared and dictates what is to be declared as sensed verse ignored.

The entire structure of all knowledge or epistemology is founded on declaration. As the correspondence concept declares, when what is sensed matches what has been declared, then we call what has been declared to be something real and relevant, thus worth keeping as knowledge. Concepts that have no relevant worth, declared or not, are not of concern and thus are rationally left behind and forgotten.

 

[Magnanimity]

James, I thought you were trying to skeptical of the CTT by using color as a means. I’m really not sure what you’re getting at in your reply to me, however, so I can’t really engage you, I don’t think. So, I bow out now.

 

[James_S_Saint]

James, I thought you were trying to skeptical of the CTT by using color as a means. I’m really not sure what you’re getting at in your reply to me, however, so I can’t really engage you, I don’t think. So, I bow out now.

Well, “if you can’t dazzle them with brilliance…”

What I am saying is that AFTER declaration, the CTT applies and clears up all of the inherent questions.

 

[Magnanimity]

James,

Let me try this and see if we get anywhere. What do you think of the Thomistic epistemic position, which can be summed up like this: “There is nothing in the mind, which was not previously in the senses, except the mind itself.”

 

[James_S_Saint]

James,

Let me try this and see if we get anywhere. What do you think of the Thomistic epistemic position, which can be summed up like this: “There is nothing in the mind, which was not previously in the senses, except the mind itself.”

I would have to stretch to make that into a true statement. Thomas didn’t have the advantage of being able to actually construct a thinking mind from scratch so as to see how obvious many things are once you actually try to put a thinking mind together.

The human mind begins long before the human knows to question its own methods. It begins before birth. The DNA establishes relevance and categories for sensory information and many of those declarations I was talking about. The conscious mind arises long after the very sophisticated mind has already been functioning without external consciousness.

The conscious mind begins as the result of the subconscious mind getting overloaded and needing to “look outside” and assess what is elsewhere to help. That is why a doctor used to spank a baby, to get them to wake up to the world, open their eyes, and breath/interact.

The conscious mind does begin with a blank slate as far as cognitive knowledge, unfortunately. It literally has no idea of even why it exists. The emotional/subconscious urges guide it with relevance indicators as well as they were able.

The concepts of association for space and time are prewired along with many more complex concerns associated with serious danger, like falling, excessive heat, hunger, and so on.

An infant born into a vacuum of information would still “know” of timing, spatial associations, harmony needs, beauty, hunger, threat and hope, and many others. So no, I don’t think I could go along with the connotations of thinking that the mind had nothing in it before senses put it there.

 

[punkforchrist]

James S Saint:

An infant born into a vacuum of information would still “know” of timing, spatial associations, harmony needs, beauty, hunger, threat and hope, and many others. So no, I don’t think I could go along with the connotations of thinking that the mind had nothing in it before senses put it there.

I realize that Thomas is often referred to as an empiricist of sorts, but he would actually agree that we have some kind of a priori knowledge. Granted, this isn’t the kind of knowledge that Descartes, or even Kant, envisaged, but it does involve a mind previously constructed in such a way as to produce knowledge of external things. So, this isn’t quite like Locke’s tabula rasa.

 

[Leela]

Correspondence theory is the position that truth is the conformity between a notion in the intellect and objective reality. If and only if a notion of our mind actually exists in objective reality,then is a notion called “true”. This is most evident when we visualize the universe without observers, as what would have been called “truth” would just things that are in* being*. So when we say “X is true” we are saying “X is in being”, therefore “truth” and “being” are synonymous. Now since being is immaterial by virtue of it being purely actual, a materialist mind cannot know being, as even though the immaterial could interact with the physical, the physical cannot interact with the immaterial, therefore we cannot know being via our senses. Therefore it is the case that we cannot know truth – if one does not know what truth is, one cannot know if something is true – therefore the knowledge of truth in correspondence theory implies dualism.

Thoughts?

A fundamental flaw in the correspondence theory of truth (and all theories of truth as far as I know) is that it doesn’t help in any way in determining which statements are true or help us generate new true statements, which is the only reason I could think of for wanting to develop a theory of truth to begin with. So why would I ever need to agree or disagree with the correspondence theory of truth or any other theory of truth or concern myself with these ideas about materialism and being?

Best,
Leela

 

[Shike]

A fundamental flaw in the correspondence theory of truth (and all theories of truth as far as I know) is that it doesn’t help in any way in determining which statements are true or help us generate new true statements, which is the only reason I could think of for wanting to develop a theory of truth to begin with. So why would I ever need to agree or disagree with the correspondence theory of truth or any other theory of truth or concern myself with these ideas about materialism and being?

Best,
Leela

Because there’s more to the world than just your pursuance of utility. Why not knowledge just for the sake of knowing?

Notice how you didn’t actually engage his argument, therefore not helping him out at all.

 

[Leela]

Because there’s more to the world than just your pursuance of utility. Why not knowledge just for the sake of knowing?

Notice how you didn’t actually engage his argument, therefore not helping him out at all.

I’m all for knowledge for the sake of knowing. My point is that such theories of truth don’t help you know anything.

As for engaging his argument, I started by questioning the utility of his definition: “Correspondence theory is the position that truth is the conformity between a notion in the intellect and objective reality. If and only if a notion of our mind actually exists in objective reality,then is a notion called “true”.”

I just think this is all just empty. What is this correspondence between the objective reality and a notion supposed to be like? How could we ever directly compare a notion to reality to see if it is in the proper relation? Without answering such questions, it is meaningless to say that truth is correspondence with reality. All it says is that “correspondence with reality” and “truth” are interchangeable terms, but one doesn’t shed any light on the other. This theory doesn’t tell us how to decide if a statement is true which sounds like an important minimal requirement for a theory of truth.

Best,
Leela

 

[punkforchrist]

Leela:

A fundamental flaw in the correspondence theory of truth (and all theories of truth as far as I know) is that it doesn’t help in any way in determining which statements are true or help us generate new true statements, which is the only reason I could think of for wanting to develop a theory of truth to begin with. So why would I ever need to agree or disagree with the correspondence theory of truth or any other theory of truth or concern myself with these ideas about materialism and being?

What you’re referring to is epistemology - how we come to know truth. The issue of what truth is involves metaphysics. There is truth (correspondence) on the one hand, and there is our knowledge of that correspondence on the other. One needn’t have a fully developed epistemology in order to defend a correspondence of truth.

It would be helpful if we define correspondence. My favorite summation comes from Aristotle: “To say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true; to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false.”

For example, then, the proposition, “it is true that the cat is on the mat,” is true if and only if the cat is on the mat. We often take the truth of this theory of truth (pardon the redundancy) for granted, but you would be amazed how many people, especially philosophers, reject or undermine this. P.F. Strawson wrote a lengthy reply to J.L. Austin’s defense of correspondence.

Materialism comes into play whenever we consider the fact that propositions are abstract objects - they are not extended in space, but they are meaningful nonetheless. Whereas the cat and the mat are physical, concrete objects, the proposition that states a relation between the two is itself not material. Based on this, and on the argument that abstract objects are necessarily concepts of a mind, we can infer a model of dualism. See my first post on this thread for more on that.