Correspondence Theory implies Dualism

[Leela]

What you’re referring to is epistemology - how we come to know truth. The issue of what truth is involves metaphysics. There is truth (correspondence) on the one hand, and there is our knowledge of that correspondence on the other. One needn’t have a fully developed epistemology in order to defend a correspondence of truth.

Truth is indeed an epistemological concern. Since knowledge is justified true belief, it is important to know the meaning of the word true. To say that truth is agreement with reality or correspondence may be thought of as a metaphysical assertion if we are to take the claim to mean something about the nature or essence of truth. I don’t think of truth as the sort of thing that has an essence.

It would be helpful if we define correspondence. My favorite summation comes from Aristotle: “To say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true; to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false.”

For example, then, the proposition, “it is true that the cat is on the mat,” is true if and only if the cat is on the mat. We often take the truth of this theory of truth (pardon the redundancy) for granted, but you would be amazed how many people, especially philosophers, reject or undermine this. P.F. Strawson wrote a lengthy reply to J.L. Austin’s defense of correspondence.

Listen, punk! The examples you give here to describe the correspondence theory of truth are generally used to criticize the idea that we need theories of truth and that the correspondence theory functions as a theory at all. We know all we need to now about truth by considering how the word true is used in such “cat is on the mat” sentences. We don’t need to think of truth as having a metaphysical essence to deploy the concept confidently in sentences.

Materialism comes into play whenever we consider the fact that propositions are abstract objects - they are not extended in space, but they are meaningful nonetheless. Whereas the cat and the mat are physical, concrete objects, the proposition that states a relation between the two is itself not material. Based on this, and on the argument that abstract objects are necessarily concepts of a mind, we can infer a model of dualism. See my first post on this thread for more on that.

I have no problem with the assertion that assertions are real and have truth-value. I have no problem with the assertion that the relationship between an assertion and another assertion or person or object is real. I don’t see where dualistic thinking comes in unless you see important metaphysical distinctions between ideas and rocks and trees–that rocks and trees are real in a different way than ideas are real or that one sort is “more real” than the other.

 

[Shike]

Truth is indeed an epistemological concern.

He never said it wasn’t.

We don’t need to think of truth as having a metaphysical essence to deploy the concept confidently in sentences.

And I think, to put words in his mouth, punk would agree. But again, that is still an epistemological concern.

I don’t see where dualistic thinking comes in unless you see important metaphysical distinctions between ideas and rocks and trees–that rocks and trees are real in a different way than ideas are real or that one sort is “more real” than the other.

This is an important point. In other words, is it possible to account for ideas and trees by appealing to one substance? And if so, is it possible to account for ideas and trees by a monistic or dualistic substance?

peace,
Michael

 

[Touchstone]

It would be helpful if we define correspondence. My favorite summation comes from Aristotle: “To say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true; to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false.”

Isn’t that just Aristotle, AGAIN, just giving license to his intuitions and casual notions, over some objective criterion? By his measure you offer here, correspondence can be (and often is, in my experience) just whatever people would like it represent.

I suggest that correspondence, to have any meaning that is effective – that is, any meaning that provides an objective filter for “corresponds” as opposed to “does not correspond” – needs grounding in objective analysis. A statement corresponds to reality insofar as the objective (group-based, methodologically oriented toward disinterested and skeptical outside verification) review of the statement confirms the observation and sense of others (as well as any relevant instrumentation that can be brought to bear – say, thermometers regarding statements about temperature, etc.).

This is a substantive, useful definition that makes Aristotle’s definition just fluff, the stuff of “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin” philosophy that rightly get mocked as self-indulgent distractions.

For example, then, the proposition, “it is true that the cat is on the mat,” is true if and only if the cat is on the mat. We often take the truth of this theory of truth (pardon the redundancy) for granted, but you would be amazed how many people, especially philosophers, reject or undermine this. P.F. Strawson wrote a lengthy reply to J.L. Austin’s defense of correspondence.

This is a subtle and profound question, though, and the mighty-minded Aristotle and many other great philosophers – men in love with their superstitions in spite of their reasoning faculties – weaseled out of a real commitment to the epistemic problems in a statement like “the cat is on the mat”.

To say “if and only if the cat is one the mat” begs the only question that’s meaningful here. How is that established? Because you, I, or Aristotle thinks it is? No. But perhaps if all three of us are in the room and agree in reporting via our senses that we see a cat and it does indeed appear to be lying on a mat. Here, we have correspondence across multiple minds, and this is the key to correspondence theory – the consilience of observation from different vantage points. This is also the principle that renders supernaturalism and superstition problematic, by the way, and provides solid epistemic grounding for materialism.

Materialism comes into play whenever we consider the fact that propositions are abstract objects - they are not extended in space, but they are meaningful nonetheless. Whereas the cat and the mat are physical, concrete objects, the proposition that states a relation between the two is itself not material.

That is not the case, or more precisely, I do not believe that to be the case and you do not have any grounds for supposing it to be the case. The proposition “the cat is on the mat” is just as physical and just as physically actual as any cat that may be on a mat. It’s a state of your brain, and is just as dependent on electrons and energy and space/time as the cat to be real and meaningful. Admittedly, a concept is not “furry” and not something you can pick up and place on a mat, but that does not mean that what is taking place in your brain is not physically extant, any less than said cat. The propositions you are contemplating are just as materially real as any cat or mat, I say.

Or, less agressively, we have no basis for saying they aren’t just as real, if we want to be more generously agnostic on the issue. Saying “the relation between th two is not material” is wholly unwarranted, like saying atoms aren’t real because you can’t see them – your thoughts aren’t any more “supernatural” than atoms, just because they are locked away in a brain you can’t “see into”, or touch, etc.

Based on this, and on the argument that abstract objects are necessarily concepts of a mind, we can infer a model of dualism. See my first post on this thread for more on that.

This is my dualism as an inference fails. The idea that mind and thoughts and concepts are immaterial, supernatural is primitive superstition at work.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

Correspondence theory is the position that truth is the conformity between a notion in the intellect and objective reality. If and only if a notion of our mind actually exists in objective reality,then is a notion called “true”. This is most evident when we visualize the universe without observers, as what would have been called “truth” would just things that are in* being*. So when we say “X is true” we are saying “X is in being”, therefore “truth” and “being” are synonymous. Now since being is immaterial by virtue of it being purely actual, a materialist mind cannot know being, as even though the immaterial could interact with the physical, the physical cannot interact with the immaterial, therefore we cannot know being via our senses. Therefore it is the case that we cannot know truth – if one does not know what truth is, one cannot know if something is true – therefore the knowledge of truth in correspondence theory implies dualism.

Thoughts?

First, even as you’ve stated it, this doesn’t imply dualism, but rather nihilism – knowledge of the truth is a meaningless statement according to your argument here. At best, nihilism obtains from this, as stated.

Second, happily, the semantic here are highly problematic, and correspondence theory can be salvaged by getting some clarity on the terms used here. We are not doomed to nihilism (or dualism).

It’s apparent that you have confused the statement (“X is true”) with the referent of the statement, a kind of map-is-not-the-territory error. As I pointed out to punkforchrist, a concept of statement is itself perfectly real and actual on the materialist view – a phsyical state-of-brain, but while the statement “the cat is on the mat” has a real instantiation in the mind as electro-chemical patterns of brain, the statement is NOT the cat, or the mat. It is, rather, a physical state that represents symbols and semantics ABOUT a putative cat on a mat.

The statement is not the object of the statement.

“X exists” is NOT “X”.

Third, the reason correspondence theory is embraced and value is NOT because we have some a priori justification for it, logically, but rather because it’s the inescapable heuristic we develop as infants onward in dealing with the world around us. We are physically wired to process external stimuli as “true” – we have correspondence theory baked right into the physiology of brains. What is “true” as a concept is that which corresponds (to some degree) to what our senses and experiences tell us.

We should no more wonder what the justification for this commitment is than we should wonder what our justification is for having a heart, blood and a circulation system. These are biological questions, not philosophical fancies.

This works on a basic level for the individual as just an individual, but man as a biological machine is prone to errors and mistakes in mapping out the correspondence. In connecting with other minds, through language and social interaction, we can significantly enhance the quality and depth of our “correspondences”, as subjecting our own “truth maps” to the critique and analysis of others against their own can (and often does) reveal errors and mistakes in our map.

If 85% of people polled believe they are “better than average” drivers, for example. This is mathematically problematic, but just understanding this doesn’t say anything specific about one’s own driving skills. I may believe I’m an excellent driver, and suppose this maps nicely with my observations, but I, as a human, am prone to all sorts of problems in that mapping process because of my passions, vanities and all manner of psychological and emotional conflicts.

If I subject my statement “I am an above average driver” to friends, peers, and others who are familiar with my driving, I may well receive a verdict back from the group that I am in fact a below average driver, evidence suggesting my “map” is incorrect, and that perhaps my vanity has inclined me to a pleasing view of reality that does not correspond with a more objective map than my own.

-TS

 

[Shike]

Isn’t that just Aristotle, AGAIN, just giving license to his intuitions and casual notions, over some objective criterion? By his measure you offer here, correspondence can be (and often is, in my experience) just whatever people would like it represent.

I suggest that correspondence, to have any meaning that is effective – that is, any meaning that provides an objective filter for “corresponds” as opposed to “does not correspond” – needs grounding in objective analysis. A statement corresponds to reality insofar as the objective (group-based, methodologically oriented toward disinterested and skeptical outside verification) review of the statement confirms the observation and sense of others (as well as any relevant instrumentation that can be brought to bear – say, thermometers regarding statements about temperature, etc.).

This is a substantive, useful definition that makes Aristotle’s definition just fluff, the stuff of “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin” philosophy that rightly get mocked as self-indulgent distractions.

Excuse my lack of understanding, but isn’t your “definition” more of a method than an actual definition? Aristotle might very well have agreed with you, but it seems he only put down a “what” instead of a “how”.

And is this correct → Is Aristotle’s “what” really a self-indulgent distraction and unpractical (moreover, why does something have to be practical to be true?)? However, it seems to me that his definition is very practical. It tells me that if I know something, or more correctly know that I know something, then there exists an external objective reality ontologically apart from my mind and senses.

peace,
Michael

 

[tonyrey]

It’s apparent that you have confused the statement (“X is true”) with the referent of the statement, a kind of map-is-not-the-territory error. As I pointed out to punkforchrist, a concept of statement is itself perfectly real and actual on the materialist view – a physical state-of-brain, but while the statement “the cat is on the mat” has a real instantiation in the mind as electro-chemical patterns of brain, the statement is NOT the cat, or the mat. It is, rather, a physical state that **represents **symbols and semantics ABOUT a putative cat on a mat.

Precisely how does one physical state **represent **another physical state? And what guarantee is there that this representation (whatever it may be) is a source of information? In fact what constitutes information according to the materialist?

 

[Leela]

This is an important point. In other words, is it possible to account for ideas and trees by appealing to one substance? And if so, is it possible to account for ideas and trees by a monistic or dualistic substance?

I don’t see how postulating either a single substance or two or more substances that the properties of rocks, trees, and ideas are supposed to adhere to helps account for rocks, trees, and ideas.

 

[Touchstone]

Excuse my lack of understanding, but isn’t your “definition” more of a method than an actual definition? Aristotle might very well have agreed with you, but it seems he only put down a “what” instead of a “how”.

I’m sure Aristotle and I would have agreed on what he said. It’s not a matter of disagreement, but rather a matter of his answer being so agreeable as to be fatuous, empty. It’s just not a statement that advances anything, or brings clarity, distinctions or rigor to the thinking process. The whole question is not “saying what the thing is, versus is not”, that just represents a colossal beg to the key question: what does "saying what a thing is entail? How is that distinguished from saying what a thing is not?

We’d agree, but Aristotle just doesn’t venture into the key territory to be explored here. It’s not just the quote above – Aristotle scrupulously avoided that question, he was the empiricist compared to Plato!

And is this correct → Is Aristotle’s “what” really a self-indulgent distraction and unpractical (moreover, why does something have to be practical to be true?)? However, it seems to me that his definition is very practical. It tells me that if I know something, or more correctly know that I know something, then there exists an external objective reality ontologically apart from my mind and senses.

I think I understand you, and intuitively I agree, but that’s the whole rub – such intuitions are weak, dubious, facile in the face of empirical testing and discovery. Our empirical analysis militates against just this intuition, and renders it so problematic that such a conviction is no more “knowledge” in any disciplined sense then saying “The next spin will land on red” at the roulette table. You could very well be right, and it will land on red, but it ain’t knowledge. It’s just conviction and chance, near random chance.

The message of the objective, extramental reality around us is that our intuitions are worth taking counsel of, but they are not knowledge, and they are very often the source of error and anti-knowledge, just as they are often borne out to be consistent with knowledge (if not knowledge themselves).

peace,
Michael

Peace to you as well,

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

Precisely how does one physical state **represent **another physical state? And what guarantee is there that this representation (whatever it may be) is a source of information? In fact what constitutes information according to the materialist?

It’s an isomorphism. A map. In human brains, it is made of neurons and axons and synapses, in fantastically huge arrays interconnected in stupendously complex patterns. But if you draw a map, say a crude drawing of the floorplan of your home, it is isomorphic to the structure of your home (from the top down, looking at the vertical walls) to the extent your drawing skills obtain.

In that case, the physical state could be grooves in the sand which you made with a stick to draw the floor plan of your home. It has meaning, because it is isomorphic; it corresponds to the plan of your house to some significant degree, where comprehending one leads to comprehension and understanding of the other, to the point (perhaps) where one is recognizable from familiarizing oneself with the other.

That’s what meaning is – isomorphism and symbolic representation. The brain does it one way, but there are innumerable ways to effect isomorphisms – the light arriving from a far away star is a kind of crude (but enormously useful) isomorphism to the chemical make up of the star – via spectroscopy we can “read the map” of the light for the star and understand something significant about its makeup. The light has meaning in that way, as an isomorphism to its source.

-TS

*EditedToAdd: Sorry forgot to answer your last question. Information has many different meanings, which is one reason it’s such a source of confusion, and sadly, too often, deception and obfuscation by the intelligent design apologists and other forms of creationism. But here’s a rigorous and useful definition for our purposes here:

Information is the reduction in uncertainty. Given a phase space, a set of probabilities of what could occur, information is anything that narrows down the actual from the outermost scope of probabilities to the specific configuration and selection of elements from that phase space. So, if you have a deck of cards, randomly shuffled, every card dealt to you face up yields information to you, except the last one, which you can deduce outright. Each in turn reduces your uncertainty about what might be to a narrower version of what is.*

 

[tonyrey]

It’s an isomorphism. A map. In human brains, it is made of neurons and axons and synapses, in fantastically huge arrays interconnected in stupendously complex patterns. But if you draw a map, say a crude drawing of the floorplan of your home, it is isomorphic to the structure of your home (from the top down, looking at the vertical walls) to the extent your drawing skills obtain.

So it is an entirely deterministic system. We play no part in the emergence of isomorphisms. In fact “we” are “stupendously complex patterns” of atomic particles which have no insight into, and no control over, events…

In that case, the physical state could be grooves in the sand which you made with a stick to draw the floor plan of your home. It has meaning, because it is isomorphic; it corresponds to the plan of your house to some significant degree, where comprehending one leads to **comprehension **and understanding of the other, to the point (perhaps) where **one **is recognizable from familiarizing **oneself **with the other.

All the highlighted words refer to nothing in a world composed of nothing more than material objects!

That’s what meaning is – isomorphism and **symbolic **representation. The brain does it one way, but there are innumerable ways to effect isomorphisms – the light arriving from a far away star is a kind of crude (but enormously useful) isomorphism to the chemical make up of the star – via spectroscopy we can “read the map” of the light for the star and **understand **something **significant **about its makeup. The light has meaning in that way, as an isomorphism to its source.

You are conjuring up “meaning” from nowhere in your atomic system. Atomic particles do not understand or grasp meaning; they just move in accordance with the laws of physics.

EditedToAdd: Sorry forgot to answer your last question. Information has many different meanings, which is one reason it’s such a source of confusion, and sadly, too often, **deception **and **obfuscation **by the intelligent design apologists and other forms of creationism. But here’s a rigorous and useful definition for our purposes here:

Information is the reduction in uncertainty. Given a phase space, a set of probabilities of what could occur, information is anything that narrows down the actual from the outermost scope of probabilities to the specific configuration and selection of elements from that phase space. So, if you have a deck of cards, randomly shuffled, every card dealt to you face up yields information to you, except the last one, which you can **deduce **outright. Each in turn reduces your uncertainty about what might be to a narrower version of what is.

It seems miraculous that atomic particles are capable of all this intangible activity! I think you are living in a totally different world from that inhabited by the vast majority of human beings… It is worth repeating that intangibles do not exist in your scheme of material things.

 

[punkforchrist]

Truth is indeed an epistemological concern. Since knowledge is justified true belief, it is important to know the meaning of the word true. To say that truth is agreement with reality or correspondence may be thought of as a metaphysical assertion if we are to take the claim to mean something about the nature or essence of truth. I don’t think of truth as the sort of thing that has an essence.

I agree that truth involves epistemology, especially once we introduce how we are capable of knowing truth. But, that is a different matter than saying what truth is. I share your hesitation of attaching the word “essence” to truth, since essences are typically applied to concrete objects, and truth is abstract. In any case, though, this isn’t an objection to correspondence, but to treating truth like any concrete object.

Listen, punk!

I’m also open to “do you feel lucky? Well do ya’, punk?”

The examples you give here to describe the correspondence theory of truth are generally used to criticize the idea that we need theories of truth and that the correspondence theory functions as a theory at all. We know all we need to now about truth by considering how the word true is used in such “cat is on the mat” sentences. We don’t need to think of truth as having a metaphysical essence to deploy the concept confidently in sentences.

I think you’ve misunderstood my point. I’m not talking about essences. I would only reserve “essences” to concrete objects, whether they are material or immaterial. Truth can be likened to numbers and sets, which neither stand in causal relations nor are extended in space.

I have no problem with the assertion that assertions are real and have truth-value. I have no problem with the assertion that the relationship between an assertion and another assertion or person or object is real. I don’t see where dualistic thinking comes in unless you see important metaphysical distinctions between ideas and rocks and trees–that rocks and trees are real in a different way than ideas are real or that one sort is “more real” than the other.

You have left out an important premise. It’s not that correspondence per se implies dualism, but rather that correspondence in conjunction with conceptualism implies dualism. Once we establish that the union of all true propositions is itself an abstract object that must be grounded in a mind, it follows necessarily that a mind exists which knows all true propositions (i.e. an omniscient mind).

 

[punkforchrist]

Isn’t that just Aristotle, AGAIN, just giving license to his intuitions and casual notions, over some objective criterion? By his measure you offer here, correspondence can be (and often is, in my experience) just whatever people would like it represent.

No, I think it’s Aristotle reflecting on an issue that is commonsensical to most people, but something that a number of philosophers have decided to make controversial. Are you saying that “X is true if and only if X” is just intuition and nothing more?

I suggest that correspondence, to have any meaning that is effective – that is, any meaning that provides an objective filter for “corresponds” as opposed to “does not correspond” – needs grounding in objective analysis.

As do I.

A statement corresponds to reality insofar as the objective (group-based, methodologically oriented toward disinterested and skeptical outside verification) review of the statement confirms the observation and sense of others (as well as any relevant instrumentation that can be brought to bear – say, thermometers regarding statements about temperature, etc.).

You’re talking about epistemology (how we know truth), but our concern is over what truth is.

This is a substantive, useful definition that makes Aristotle’s definition just fluff, the stuff of “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin” philosophy that rightly get mocked as self-indulgent distractions.

That’s a rather disanalogous comparison, I think. Why can’t I say that, “empiricism is just fluff”?

This is a subtle and profound question, though, and the mighty-minded Aristotle and many other great philosophers – men in love with their superstitions in spite of their reasoning faculties – weaseled out of a real commitment to the epistemic problems in a statement like “the cat is on the mat”.

Correspondence has nothing to do with the superstitions of Aristotle’s time - the Greek gods and astrology, etc. If correspondence is false, then what is truth?

To say “if and only if the cat is one the mat” begs the only question that’s meaningful here. How is that established? Because you, I, or Aristotle thinks it is? No. But perhaps if all three of us are in the room and agree in reporting via our senses that we see a cat and it does indeed appear to be lying on a mat. Here, we have correspondence across multiple minds, and this is the key to correspondence theory – the consilience of observation from different vantage points. This is also the principle that renders supernaturalism and superstition problematic, by the way, and provides solid epistemic grounding for materialism.

Again, this is epistemology. I have no problem with saying that we can know things by observation, and neither would Aristotle.

Correspondence can be established in any number of ways. Some have argued by intuition, which I would maintain is actually reasonable barring any defeaters, but others would appeal to transcendental arguments and, more appealing to an empiricist, the economical advantages of correspondence versus redundancy theories, et al. Just calling this superstition without any elaboration doesn’t at all suffice.

That is not the case, or more precisely, I do not believe that to be the case and you do not have any grounds for supposing it to be the case. The proposition “the cat is on the mat” is just as physical and just as physically actual as any cat that may be on a mat. It’s a state of your brain, and is just as dependent on electrons and energy and space/time as the cat to be real and meaningful. Admittedly, a concept is not “furry” and not something you can pick up and place on a mat, but that does not mean that what is taking place in your brain is not physically extant, any less than said cat. The propositions you are contemplating are just as materially real as any cat or mat, I say.

Even granting that concepts are physically real in the human brain, we still have to deal with how the union of all true propositions is grounded. It cannot be the concept of just any mind, since you and I exist contingently. Only an omniscient mind could know all true propositions, so you’re materialistic alternative has left out an extremely important premise of the argument.

Or, less agressively, we have no basis for saying they aren’t just as real, if we want to be more generously agnostic on the issue. Saying “the relation between th two is not material” is wholly unwarranted, like saying atoms aren’t real because you can’t see them – your thoughts aren’t any more “supernatural” than atoms, just because they are locked away in a brain you can’t “see into”, or touch, etc.

I take it your position, then, is a reductive materialism?

This is my dualism as an inference fails. The idea that mind and thoughts and concepts are immaterial, supernatural is primitive superstition at work.

Immateriality isn’t synonymous with supernatural. If that were the case, then Russell and Quine would have been supernaturalists when, in fact, they were ardent naturalists.

 

[Touchstone]

So it is an entirely deterministic system. We play no part in the emergence of isomorphisms. In fact “we” are “stupendously complex patterns” of atomic particles which have no insight into, and no control over, events…
All the highlighted words refer to nothing in a world composed of nothing more than material objects!

That cast the world in kind of Laplacian mode, which is not my understanding at all, or a supportable one in light of science. Randomness and stochastic/probabilistic features of natural processes obtain at the lowest, fundamental levels of reality, which makes for a kind of evolving “dance”, the interaction of deterministic law and non-deterministic probabilities.

But yes, the evidence conspicuously does NOT suggest any think like the “cosmic free will” superstitions that Christians and many other theist embrace. It’s not a falsifiable idea, so there’s no way in principle to ever discredit such a notion even if it’s fals, but that said, what we do have in front of us does not support the magical thinking many apply to the subject of free will.

You are conjuring up “meaning” from nowhere in your atomic system. Atomic particles do not understand or grasp meaning; they just move in accordance with the laws of physics.

[Insert lecture about emergence and levels of description here]

It seems miraculous that atomic particles are capable of all this intangible activity! I think you are living in a totally different world from that inhabited by the vast majority of human beings… It is worth repeating that intangibles do not exist in your scheme of material things.

Well, it depends on what you mean by intangible. You can’t “touch” magnetic force, and in that sense it’s “intangible” and yet perfectly real and actual. But intangible can also be applied to the wholly imaginary, and in that case, you’re right, I do not think wholly imaginary things exist apart from the imagination (hence the name “imaginary”).

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

No, I think it’s Aristotle reflecting on an issue that is commonsensical to most people, but something that a number of philosophers have decided to make controversial. Are you saying that “X is true if and only if X” is just intuition and nothing more?

Well, we can say it’s at least intuition. But we don’t know, a priori, in any rigorous sense of “know” if it’s more than that, until we take counsel of our experience. For the most part, for example, the physical world around us embodies something very close to the idea of the law of identity. But that would be something we learn via observation, not something we can somehow just realize as knowledge a priori. It’s an intuition, no doubt, but intuitions aren’t knowledge, ipso facto.

As do I.

Cool. d’accord!

You’re talking about epistemology (how we know truth), but our concern is over what truth is.

I understand, but my point is that that is a distinction without a difference. There’s no way to answer “what is truth” apart from offering an epistemology. To answer the question IS to make profound epistemic claims. This is, interestingly another kind of dualism at work, which goes back to Plato, and probably back further; that truth is something we assess and define apart from epistemology. A lesson available to us that Plato did not have, and to a great extent, many who came far later did not have (cf. Aquinas) is that this dualism is badly mistaken. A definition of truth is an epistemology, and vice versa, inextricably. The method is the definition.

That’s a rather disanalogous comparison, I think. Why can’t I say that, “empiricism is just fluff”?

Because I will pull out a cigarette ligher and invite you to hold your hand in the flame for as long as you can. The folly and falsehood and pretense of such a retort is made manifest, vividly, if you should choose to stand by such a retort. It is falsifiable by your own involuntary actions in the most visceral way. Empiricism is not a crystal ball, or an infalible method, but it’s a heuristic humans are not at liberty to dismiss as fluff.

Correspondence has nothing to do with the superstitions of Aristotle’s time - the Greek gods and astrology, etc. If correspondence is false, then what is truth?

No idea. If correspondence doesn’t work, I think solipsism unto nihilism is the only path left. My comments on Aristotle were not aimed at the superstitions of the time, but at the overarching idea that the intuition itself is somehow magical, authoritative in some sense, unassailable. That problem has endured right into this thread, though all those Greek animist ideas may be gone.

Again, this is epistemology. I have no problem with saying that we can know things by observation, and neither would Aristotle.

I understand, but my criticism of Aristotle goes far deeper than that, and rejects the idea that “know” has any meaning outside of that method. Do you think Aristotle would accept such empiricist claims. I think not! He was more an empiricist than Plato (which isn’t saying much), but he was no skeptic of the intuition in the way a modern disciplined thinker is.

Correspondence can be established in any number of ways. Some have argued by intuition, which I would maintain is actually reasonable barring any defeaters, but others would appeal to transcendental arguments and, more appealing to an empiricist, the economical advantages of correspondence versus redundancy theories, et al. Just calling this superstition without any elaboration doesn’t at all suffice.

Words mean whatever we want them to mean, so one can call anything one wishes “correspondence”. But transcendental appeals are not grounded in the concepts that ground empiricism, and even if you call it “correspondence”, it’s word play, as you are not grounding an epistemology then in meaning derived from isomorphisms. The concept that that “correspondence” refers to, which is what is substantive here, is violated by such an appeal to transcendental arguments. The only value in calling that “correspondence” would be an “apologetic” value.

Even granting that concepts are physically real in the human brain, we still have to deal with how the union of all true propositions is grounded. It cannot be the concept of just any mind, since you and I exist contingently. Only an omniscient mind could know all true propositions, so you’re materialistic alternative has left out an extremely important premise of the argument.

Whys is that an important? I don’t see that as a predicate or premise for anything I’m arguing, here.

I take it your position, then, is a reductive materialism?

No. If you look back at the now numerous exchanges I’ve had with tonyrey, you will see, over and over, my attempts to get tonyrey out of the ‘reductive materialism’ box for me. I think that’s the only alternative he is able or willing to consider to his own, which explains in part why he feels passionate about his current beliefs – they aren’t tested in very strong ways, and just fight against strawmen. But look those up for a whole lot of narrative from me on that. I’m a materialist, but one who affirms the strong theoretical and empirical basis for emergence and holistic features of material reality. Hydrogen isn’t wet, and neither is oxygen, as I keep reminding tonyrey. How does that happen and water is “wet”?

The mind is a fantastically more complex example of the same thing: emergence and highly complex, dynamic systems. It’s all material, and it’s not magic, but, as Clarke observed, often has an appearance of magic, because it’s simply far beyond what we can apprehend and process at the moment. That is the distinct pattern we discover through science and rigorous thinking about the world around us.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

punkforchrist:

Immateriality isn’t synonymous with supernatural. If that were the case, then Russell and Quine would have been supernaturalists when, in fact, they were ardent naturalists.

That’s a fair point. I think the case for immateriality-but-real fails, and fails badly. But it does have a dignity that supernaturalism does not.

-TS

 

[tonyrey]

So it is an entirely deterministic system. We play no part in the emergence of isomorphisms. In fact “we” are “stupendously complex patterns” of atomic particles which have no insight into, and no control over, events.

But yes, the evidence conspicuously does NOT suggest any thing like the “cosmic free will” superstitions that Christians and many other theist embrace.

There is certainly no evidence to suggest the superstition that inanimate matter is the supreme reality which has the unbelievable power to produce consciousness, rationality, free will and purposeful activity though fortuitous combinations of atomic particles…

It’s not a falsifiable idea, so there’s no way in principle to ever discredit such a notion even if it’s false, but that said, what we do have in front of us does not support the magical thinking many apply to the subject of free will.

Materialism not falsifiable and the rejection of free will is at odds with the presumption of responsibility in every legal system throughout the world and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It is also self-refuting because it entails total scepticism. If we cannot choose what to think we have no guarantee that our thoughts correspond to the facts.

[Insert lecture about emergence and levels of description here]

Your one-liner does nothing to explain how insight and meaning have emerged from irrational processes. Levels of description presuppose insight and meaning…

It seems miraculous that atomic particles are capable of all this intangible activity! I think you are living in a totally different world from that inhabited by the vast majority of human beings… It is worth repeating that intangibles do not exist in your scheme of material things.

Well, it depends on what you mean by intangible. You can’t “touch” magnetic force, and in that sense it’s “intangible” and yet perfectly real and actual.

Its effects are also observable and measurable…

But intangible can also be applied to the wholly imaginary, and in that case, you’re right, I do not think wholly imaginary things exist apart from the imagination (hence the name “imaginary”).

A platitude…

 

[Leela]

You have left out an important premise. It’s not that correspondence per se implies dualism, but rather that correspondence in conjunction with conceptualism implies dualism. Once we establish that the union of all true propositions is itself an abstract object that must be grounded in a mind, it follows necessarily that a mind exists which knows all true propositions (i.e. an omniscient mind).

I’m not at all convinced that “the union of all true propositions is itself an abstract object that must be grounded in a mind.” Why can’t these true propistions be scattered one per mind in the universe? Why can’t some of these propositions be unknown or not as of yet invented/discovered?

Also, since we are talking about it the notion, the-union-of-all-true-propositions is a concept that both of our minds are using without knowing what all the true propositions are.

 

[Touchstone]

There is certainly no evidence to suggest the superstition that inanimate matter is the supreme reality which has the unbelievable power to produce consciousness, rationality, free will and purposeful activity though fortuitous combinations of atomic particles…

I don’t think ‘evidence’ is a meaningful term as you’ve used it there. There is no ‘supreme’ to be had in evidence, “supreme” is a notion that negates the meaning of evidence. So you’re right there is no such evidence, but it’s not an interesting statement any more than noting that there’s no evidence that a circle is a square. We have no such evidence, but there’s no reason to think that’s even worth worrying about.

Do you suppose “supreme reality” is discoverable by evidence? That’s a mistake, demonstrably. For any reality you suppose “supreme” as demonstrated by some consilience of evidence, you can ALWAYS posit a “more supreme” layer of reality that simply isn’t discoverable that way, and which lies beyond the evidence.

Materialism not falsifiable and the rejection of free will is at odds with the presumption of responsibility in every legal system throughout the world and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It is also self-refuting because it entails total scepticism. If we cannot choose what to think we have no guarantee that our thoughts correspond to the facts.

That may be, but I don’t see how that would attach here. I’m an advocate for free will in the compatibilist rendering, and fully support and promote agency and individual responsibility under the law and as part of our social contracts and civic culture. Free will is not the problem, nor materialism. It’s magical thinking that accepts facile and simplistic answers on those questions that is at issue here.

As you know from my pointing it out over and over, my epistemology promotes and supports real knowledge through reasonable skepticism. It’s the farthest thing from total skepticism, solipsism and nihilism. It’s why you an get on a 250,000 lb airplane and fly safely coast to coast in 5 hours. That doesn’t get produced from solipsism.

What’s happening here is basically just ignorance and/or intransigence. The false dichotomies come fast and hard – either supersitious religious credulity, or else reductive materialism. Either magical cosmic free will, else Laplacian hard determinism.

These are not the exhaustive options available, and they are not even the quality options available. And yet, the discourse is routinely cast in this polar thinking paradigm. It’s as if emergence, for example, is rejected outright, not on the merits, but precisely because it’s not a bogus straw man that simplistic reductivism would be as a contender against theistic credulity. If not God, then man cannot possibly be moral or ethical, etc. Bleah. That’s just really, really weak and self-serving as a way to think about these questions.

Your one-liner does nothing to explain how insight and meaning have emerged from irrational processes. Levels of description presuppose insight and meaning…

No, but you have a pages and pages now of exposition on this very topic from me to refer back to, threads where I’ve been responding to you directly on this. It’s like you just can’t be bothered to read or understand what I’ve already written on this. You don’t have to accept it, but I do expect you would be cognizant of it. As it is, even the one liner seems a waste of time, as you are again putting your worldview in the ring with a kind of clownish caricature of materialism, and keeping the ideas and arguments that do have some teeth out of the picture – see your return to “materialism == reductionism” trope here, again.

I’m happy to engage and exchange on this, but at this point, it seems you just do not want to address what’s being said in response, but rather cling to your strawmen. That’s your choice, but it’s a waste of time for me to think and type this stuff out, if so.

Its effects are also observable and measurable…

Yes. That’s the basis for the distinction I was making. “Intangible” doesn’t make something unreal or imaginary. Being wholly imaginary does.

-TS

 

[tonyrey]

There is certainly no evidence to suggest the superstition that inanimate matter is the supreme reality which has the unbelievable power to produce consciousness, rationality, free will and purposeful activity though fortuitous combinations of atomic particles…

I am using “supreme” in the sense of “the most powerful and fundamental” - which is clearly attributed to matter if one is a materialist.

Do you suppose “supreme reality” is discoverable by evidence? That’s a mistake, demonstrably. For any reality you suppose “supreme” as demonstrated by some consilience of evidence, you can ALWAYS posit a “more supreme” layer of reality that simply isn’t discoverable that way, and which lies beyond the evidence.

You can but an infinite regress is generally regarded as unsatisfactory. The fact that you opt for materialism demonstrates that you believe there is evidence in its favour…

Materialism not falsifiable and the rejection of free will is at odds with the presumption of responsibility in every legal system throughout the world and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It is also self-refuting because it entails total scepticism.
That may be, but I don’t see how that would attach here. I’m an advocate for free will in the compatibilist rendering, and fully support and promote agency and individual responsibility under the law and as part of our social contracts and civic culture.?

The use of the phrase “compatibilist rendering” does nothing to clarify how determinism is compatible with free will. Precisely how can that which is determined possibly be capable of self-determinism?

If we cannot choose what to think we have no guarantee that our thoughts correspond to the facts.

As you know from my pointing it out over and over, my epistemology promotes and supports real knowledge through reasonable skepticism. It’s the farthest thing from total skepticism, solipsism and nihilism. It’s why you can get on a 250,000 lb airplane and fly safely coast to coast in 5 hours. That doesn’t get produced from solipsism.
You have not explained how your epistemology is rational if we cannot choose what to think. I am ignoring your tirade which does precisely nothing to advance the discussion…

Neither you nor anyone else has explained how:

1. Purposeful activity has emerged from purposeless processes.
2. Insight has emerged from processes which lack insight.
3. Self-control has emerged from that which lack self-control…

There can be no intermediate stages. A molecular structure cannot be semi-purposeful, semi-insightful or semi-independent. If you think it can I shall be very interested to know how…

Its effects are also observable and measurable…

Yes. That’s the basis for the distinction I was making. “Intangible” doesn’t make something unreal or imaginary. Being wholly imaginary does.

Indeed. Intangibles like insight, meaning, free will and purpose are intangible but not observable and measurable. Do you imagine they are imaginary? If so you don’t need the “compatibilist rendering”…

 

[tonyrey]

There is certainly no evidence to suggest the superstition that inanimate matter is the supreme reality which has the unbelievable power to produce consciousness, rationality, free will and purposeful activity though fortuitous combinations of atomic particles…

I am using “supreme” in the sense of “the most powerful and fundamental” - which is clearly attributed to matter if one is a materialist.

Do you suppose “supreme reality” is discoverable by evidence? That’s a mistake, demonstrably. For any reality you suppose “supreme” as demonstrated by some consilience of evidence, you can ALWAYS posit a “more supreme” layer of reality that simply isn’t discoverable that way, and which lies beyond the evidence.

You can but an infinite regress is generally regarded as unsatisfactory. The fact that you opt for materialism demonstrates that you believe there is evidence in its favour…

Materialism not falsifiable and the rejection of free will is at odds with the presumption of responsibility in every legal system throughout the world and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It is also self-refuting because it entails total scepticism.

That may be, but I don’t see how that would attach here. I’m an advocate for free will in the compatibilist rendering, and fully support and promote agency and individual responsibility under the law and as part of our social contracts and civic culture.?

The use of the phrase “compatibilist rendering” does nothing to clarify how determinism is compatible with free will. Precisely how can that which is determined possibly be capable of self-determinism?

If we cannot choose what to think we have no guarantee that our thoughts correspond to the facts.

As you know from my pointing it out over and over, my epistemology promotes and supports real knowledge through reasonable skepticism. It’s the farthest thing from total skepticism, solipsism and nihilism. It’s why you can get on a 250,000 lb airplane and fly safely coast to coast in 5 hours. That doesn’t get produced from solipsism.

You have not explained how your epistemology is rational if we cannot choose what to think.

Neither you nor anyone else has explained how:

1. Purposeful activity has emerged from purposeless processes.
2. Insight has emerged from processes which lack insight.
3. Self-control has emerged from that which lack self-control…

There can be no intermediate stages. A molecular structure cannot be semi-purposeful, semi-insightful or semi-independent. If you think it can I shall be very interested to know how… How did the first living organisms acquire the urge to survive?

Its effects are also observable and measurable…

Yes. That’s the basis for the distinction I was making. “Intangible” doesn’t make something unreal or imaginary. Being wholly imaginary does.

Indeed. Intangibles like insight, meaning, free will and purpose are intangible but not observable and measurable. Do you imagine they are imaginary? If so you don’t need the “compatibilist rendering”…