Correspondence Theory implies Dualism

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The emergence of a mind from the processes of the brain doesn’t seem fundamentally different to me than the emergence of water from oxygen and hydrogen. It seems like you can use emergence to describe everything that exists as a combination of other parts. Is this a correct understanding or am I off?
Yeah. “Emergence” has some overloading to it, though. In one sense, we use the term as a “catch all”, similar to the way we use “random”. When we say some part of a process is “random” we are NOT really providing an explanation of what we have discovered; “random” is a negative term, principally, indicating our INability to discern purpose, pattern or plan in what we observe there.

Along the same lines, “emergence” is a term we use to connect high level phenomena with lower level phenomena. In the case of hydrogen and oxygen producing “wetness” of water, it turns out a lot has been discovered in terms of the fundamental physics that produce “wetness”, but for such a seemingly simple interaction – hydrogen + water – it’s remarkably complex and subtle.

We still call that an “emergent property”, even though we’ve managed to demystify a lot of that phenomenon (“wetness”). But when you look at the difficulty in that case, just making headway on “wetness”, the challenge of untangling the staggering complexities of an emergent property like consciousness is fairly bewildering. It isn’t just a single production; conscious is a cumulative result of lots of emergent features of nature.

In any case, the useful box around “emergence” I think is the idea of practical impenetrability of some phenomenon – we are unable to explain in any robust way how features A, B, and C at a lower level produce phenomenon X at a higher level – combined with the background understanding that X is natural “stuff” compositionally consistent with A, B, and C.

That differentiates it from superstition or magical answers, as it classifies those properties as “emergent” in a “to be figured out mechanically, someday” fashion. Like I said, with “wetness”, some good progress on that has already been made by modern physics (and people spending time looking at the problem). For something like “consciousness”, it appears to be entirely natural in composition and componentry, just extremely complex as a chained, recombinant set of emergent properties.
What do you say about the perception that our minds, even if we accept that they are products of emergence, can also act on the brain that produced them?
Fascinating, but not problematic, so far as I can see. This is what Doug Hofstadter (of Gödel, Escher, Bach fame) calls the “strange loop” dynamic; all sorts of unusual and interesting things proceed from self-interaction. If you point a video camera at a TV that is monitoring that same video camera’s output, you can see this principle at work; move the camera a bit and you get different kinds of “recursive kaleidoscope” effects, repeating and twisting toward a vanishing point, a kind of “incidental art” that (I find) always good for a few minutes’ fascination and intrigue.

Indeed, self-interaction is at the heart of many of our most amazing phenomena; Evolution is “self-interactive”, a kind of “strange loop” where gene’s interact with themselves to produce novel and innovative (and also lethally destructive) variations. The conscious mind can influence the brain – a seeming “magic trick”, often enough. The well known “placebo” effect, where medical patients are observed to heal more quickly and thoroughly if they simply believe they are receiving effective medicine (even though it may be jus sugar pills) is a good example of this – the “mental activity” has a controlling physiological effect that isn’t even liminal.
Is that perception necessarily a false one in this context? Or can the mind actually act on the brain within this view? Just curious what you make of that.
I think there is no doubt that the mind influences the brain. The mind is brain at work, and some of the “works of the mind” can have – must have – physiological effects on the brain. I mentioned placebos, which I think is a germane example here, but even more mundane things make that point clearly. I have twin 3 year old sons, who are both quite avid “wanna-be readers”. They make choices over and over each day now to engage and wrestle with the content of the many books on their shelf; this is not just a mental activity, it’s a brain activity, and one that works to shape and restructure their brains. Not only does (pre-)reading form all sorts of concepts and ideas they process from those expereiences, it actually produces neurological effects, changes in the biological structures of the brain.

And of course, those physiological changes produce downstream effects on the mind. And the cycle goes on…

-TS
 
Fascinating, but not problematic, so far as I can see. This is what Doug Hofstadter (of Gödel, Escher, Bach fame) calls the “strange loop” dynamic; all sorts of unusual and interesting things proceed from self-interaction. If you point a video camera at a TV that is monitoring that same video camera’s output, you can see this principle at work; move the camera a bit and you get different kinds of “recursive kaleidoscope” effects, repeating and twisting toward a vanishing point, a kind of “incidental art” that (I find) always good for a few minutes’ fascination and intrigue.

Indeed, self-interaction is at the heart of many of our most amazing phenomena; Evolution is “self-interactive”, a kind of “strange loop” where gene’s interact with themselves to produce novel and innovative (and also lethally destructive) variations. The conscious mind can influence the brain – a seeming “magic trick”, often enough. The well known “placebo” effect, where medical patients are observed to heal more quickly and thoroughly if they simply believe they are receiving effective medicine (even though it may be jus sugar pills) is a good example of this – the “mental activity” has a controlling physiological effect that isn’t even liminal.

I think there is no doubt that the mind influences the brain. The mind is brain at work, and some of the “works of the mind” can have – must have – physiological effects on the brain. I mentioned placebos, which I think is a germane example here, but even more mundane things make that point clearly. I have twin 3 year old sons, who are both quite avid “wanna-be readers”. They make choices over and over each day now to engage and wrestle with the content of the many books on their shelf; this is not just a mental activity, it’s a brain activity, and one that works to shape and restructure their brains. Not only does (pre-)reading form all sorts of concepts and ideas they process from those expereiences, it actually produces neurological effects, changes in the biological structures of the brain.

And of course, those physiological changes produce downstream effects on the mind. And the cycle goes on…

-TS
When you say the mind is brain at work, what exactly does that add to the definition of mind? Is it simply a function of the brain, like walking is a function of our legs?

And in reference to your sons, you say " this is not just a mental activity, it’s a brain activity"-aren’t they really the same thing? And if not, why is mental activity any different from brain activity?

It seems like you are looking at the mind as a sort of physical entity able to act on the meat that caused it to come into existence. Is that right? Because if it’s not a tangible thing, it would seem that in that case something non-physical is acting on something physical, which seems a bit supernatural. So am I missing some scientific knowledge explaining what physical properties the mind has as opposed to the brain? (and by physical I only mean something that has some sort of measurable properties, be they sub-atomic or otherwise) In other words,have thoughts been found to have any physical properties capable of causing physiological changes?
 
When you say the mind is brain at work, what exactly does that add to the definition of mind?
It connects it to the natural world, and distinguishes it conspicuously from mind-as-supernatural/immaterial. Similar to the way understanding “orbits” of satellites as natural – a function of mass, inertia, gravity, etc. vs gods pushing them around their heavenly track.
Is it simply a function of the brain, like walking is a function of our legs?
I don’t think “simply” applies to brain functioning as mind, but yes, mind is a descriptive concept for the actions of the brain in a similar way that walking is a descriptive concept concerning the movement of the legs and body.

This is an example I’ve used before, many times, and regularly invoke the question “does ‘walking’ exist?” People say of course it does, and I agree, but in what sense does it exist? Walking isn’t a “thing” in the discrete sense, right? It’s a descriptive concept for particular phenomena. “Mind” is similar, but for a much more complex phenomenon.
And in reference to your sons, you say " this is not just a mental activity, it’s a brain activity"-aren’t they really the same thing? And if not, why is mental activity any different from brain activity?
I was emphasizing the importance of monism here pedagogically. If we understand the mind-as-brain-activity in the sense of walking-as-activity-of-the-legs/body, we can comprehend the two way connection – thinking, as a physical activity, has physical consequences, and it’s not mysterious or magical, it’s physical natural. In a dualist paradigm, there’s this whole problem of how the immaterial mind affects the physical brain. More mystery and superstition must be invoked here, which is obviated by a monist view of mind/brain.
It seems like you are looking at the mind as a sort of physical entity able to act on the meat that caused it to come into existence. Is that right?
It is the "meat* that came into existence, but yes, I think you have a similar concept in mind to what I do, here.

That’s not really remarkable, though, considering my arm is in a similar position – a part of my body that can act on itself and other parts of the body.
Because if it’s not a tangible thing, it would seem that in that case something non-physical is acting on something physical, which seems a bit supernatural.
Yeah, that’s a problem, and an answer of the most weak-minded sort. The mind is the brain, just as “walking” is the legs, and “mind” and “walking” are concepts we find useful to describe particular patterns or actions by brain and body. Is “walking” non-physical? No, it’s a physical pattern in your brain and mine, as real as the chemical and electrical charges that it consists of. You can’t point to the atoms of the leg that make up the “walking”, because sometimes that body is at rest and there is no “walking” for that body. It’s just a description, and this description is totally physical, but located the brains of those giving and receiving the description.
So am I missing some scientific knowledge explaining what physical properties the mind has as opposed to the brain?
I can’t make that into a coherent question. What physical properties would you say “walking” has that the legs don’t? If you can answer that from me, I will know how to answer your question.
(and by physical I only mean something that has some sort of measurable properties, be they sub-atomic or otherwise) In other words,have thoughts been found to have any physical properties capable of causing physiological changes?
Sure, as I said, thoughts produce all sorts of physiological side effects. Thoughts about scary or horrifying subjects can release adrenaline, for example. Just thinking happy, positive thoughts can release endorphins, hormones that in turn combat stress. Some brain-states – thoughts, recalled memories, etc. – produce obsrvable and even dramatic physical changes in the body. Supernatural additions to this don’t help at all, as they don’t explain anything, and only introduce more questions that defy investigation and explanation.

-TS
 
It connects it to the natural world, and distinguishes it conspicuously from mind-as-supernatural/immaterial. Similar to the way understanding “orbits” of satellites as natural – a function of mass, inertia, gravity, etc. vs gods pushing them around their heavenly track.

I don’t think “simply” applies to brain functioning as mind, but yes, mind is a descriptive concept for the actions of the brain in a similar way that walking is a descriptive concept concerning the movement of the legs and body.

This is an example I’ve used before, many times, and regularly invoke the question “does ‘walking’ exist?” People say of course it does, and I agree, but in what sense does it exist? Walking isn’t a “thing” in the discrete sense, right? It’s a descriptive concept for particular phenomena. “Mind” is similar, but for a much more complex phenomenon.

I was emphasizing the importance of monism here pedagogically. If we understand the mind-as-brain-activity in the sense of walking-as-activity-of-the-legs/body, we can comprehend the two way connection – thinking, as a physical activity, has physical consequences, and it’s not mysterious or magical, it’s physical natural. In a dualist paradigm, there’s this whole problem of how the immaterial mind affects the physical brain. More mystery and superstition must be invoked here, which is obviated by a monist view of mind/brain.
Sorry if some of my questions were hard to follow. I won’t bother rephrasing them since I think you answered them anyway.

I was just looking to understand your position on the mind/brain relationship. So basically, thoughts can produce physiological changes because thoughts are only chemical reactions to outside stimuli. So it follows that such chemical processes should obviously be able to cause physical reactions.

And the only difference between walking as leg activity and thinking as brain activity is the type of pattern in our brain that corresponds to the action.

The “mind” is not a separate cohesive entity (even if only composed of electrical patterns or some other transient physical form) but an illusion of one that is produced by many, many different layers of reactions to other stimuli. Since we currently do not have the tools to understand exactly what consciousness, or mind, is in purely physical terms , we put the question on hold until science discovers the answer.

Hope I understood correctly. Thanks for responding.
 
Sorry if some of my questions were hard to follow. I won’t bother rephrasing them since I think you answered them anyway.
Well, I’m happy to try again to be more clear with what I said if it was not sufficient in response.
I was just looking to understand your position on the mind/brain relationship. So basically, thoughts can produce physiological changes because thoughts are only chemical reactions to outside stimuli. So it follows that such chemical processes should obviously be able to cause physical reactions.
It follows the kinds of patterns and dynamics we see in the rest of nature, yes.
And the only difference between walking as leg activity and thinking as brain activity is the type of pattern in our brain that corresponds to the action.
I’m nervous about committing to “the only difference”. I’m sure we could come up with a number of other differences. But yes, they are the same in terms of both being natural phenomena that we apply descriptive terms to for specific patterns or actions. Walking is not the legs, but a descriptive term for a particular kind of pattern of movement of the legs. Mind is not the brain, but a description of particular kinds of electro-chemical patterns that are generated by the brain.

Mental activity is fantastically complex compared to walking, but still they are both description of natural patterns of activity, as far we can tell.
The “mind” is not a separate cohesive entity (even if only composed of electrical patterns or some other transient physical form) but an illusion of one that is produced by many, many different layers of reactions to other stimuli.
It’s not an illusion any more than “walking” is an illusion. It’s not illusory at all, so far as I can see. It’s just descriptive in a way that is contingent upon particular patterns or behaviors of consitituent parts.

You won’t find “smile” on an anatomy chart of the human body. But a smile is perfectly real and non-deceptive as a phenomenon or a meaningful term. The actual configuration of muscles and skin etc. is perfectly real when the smile happens, and the concept in our minds that points at that physical effect is just as real as well. Mind works the same way, I suggest. Not an illusion, a description of particular patterns or behaviors of a system.
Since we currently do not have the tools to understand exactly what consciousness, or mind, is in purely physical terms , we put the question on hold until science discovers the answer.
Or better, we use that ignorance to drive our efforts to discovery. It’s frustrations like this that are the basic fuel for human knowledge building, science and the enterprise of discovery, and the questions that remain about cognition are doing that for us even as we speak. We are going through a kind of renaissance in neurophysiology and the science of cognition. It’s a very difficult topic, but great, exciting headway is being made right now!
Hope I understood correctly. Thanks for responding.
Nice conversing with you, thanks!

-TS
 
Mind is not the brain, but a description of particular kinds of electro-chemical patterns that are generated by the brain.
If the mind is a description it is simply a word. You probably mean the mind is no more than electro-chemical patterns that are generated by the brain.
It’s not an illusion any more than “walking” is an illusion. It’s not illusory at all, so far as I can see. It’s just descriptive in a way that is contingent upon particular patterns or behaviors of constituent parts.
It would seem that the description is generated by electro-chemical patterns…
You won’t find “smile” on an anatomy chart of the human body. But a smile is perfectly real and non-deceptive as a phenomenon or a meaningful term.
A smile expresses a feeling. How does a feeling emerge from electro-chemical patterns?
The actual configuration of muscles and skin etc. is perfectly real when the smile happens, and the concept in our minds that points at that physical effect is just as real as well. Mind works the same way, I suggest. Not an illusion, a description of particular patterns or behaviors of a system.
Is a concept yet another electro-chemical pattern? I fail to see how all this is not reductive materialism…
 
If the mind is a description it is simply a word. You probably mean the mind is no more than electro-chemical patterns that are generated by the brain.
How many times have I corrected you on “no more than electro-chemical patterns”? Too many to count now. It’s clearly use to invest time in discussing this with you. We can’t even disgree because you refuse to even bear in mind the points of disagreement.
It would seem that the description is generated by electro-chemical patterns…
Mental activity is physical activity in the brain. It’s not “generated by” it any more than water is “generated by” hydrogen and oxygen. It seems we’re doomed to kill yet more brain cells in the “reductive materialism” trope here, yet again, after so much time and thought invested in dispelling this misunderstanding you cling to.
A smile expresses a feeling. How does a feeling emerge from electro-chemical patterns?
A feeling is electro-chemical patterns. That’s what we mean by ‘pattern’, a particular configuration that is distinguished from others. When one reads a post that one interprets to be critical of superstitious are dearly beloved and deeply held, it can create brain-states that generate emotions that are made manifest in many other parts of the body. The “gut” is a key player in the emotions, and the neurotransmitters and neuroreceptors in your guy literally have you “feeling” – outisde your brain – the effects of these emotions, physical responses catalyzed by patterns in the brain.

Either that or some sort of magical immaterial what-it-is that supernatural controls your thoughts, and the gut.
Is a concept yet another electro-chemical pattern? I fail to see how all this is not reductive materialism…
Yes, fail is the word. It’s not hard to see the intransigence in this failure, given all the pages of back and forth just between us in past weeks, nevermind the innumerable sources of education on this stuff that are available elsewhere. If you’d like to “not fail” in this regard, the path is clear and available to you.

-TS
 
Mental activity is physical activity in the brain.
Thank you for clarifying your version of materialism which clearly reduces thoughts, feelings, decisions and presumably consciousness to electro-chemical patterns, a view which Schopenhauer described as “the philosophy of the subject who forgot take account of himself”!
 
Mental activity is physical activity in the brain.
Thank you for clarifying your version of materialism which clearly reduces thoughts, feelings, decisions and presumably consciousness to electro-chemical patterns, a view which Schopenhauer described as “the philosophy of the subject who forgot to take account of himself”!
 
Thank you for clarifying your version of materialism which clearly reduces thoughts, feelings, decisions and presumably consciousness to electro-chemical patterns, a view which Schopenhauer described as “the philosophy of the subject who forgot to take account of himself”!
It doesn’t though, and you’ve got abundant exposition from me as why that’s clearly not the case, here. The “self” doesn’t become any less meaningful, real, or valuable because it is reified through matter and energy. That is actually an accounting for the self, and materialism does this, in a way that your theism does not, and cannot. A materialist provides a model that accounts for the self in natural terms, phenomena that are empirically grounded. Your superstitions, by contrast, are no account at all, any more than “the gods must be bowling” accounts for thunder. Your “self”, in constrast to a materialist view, is an utter, impenetrable mystery, entirely magical.

-TS
 
Touchstone;6258444:
It doesn’t though, and you’ve got abundant exposition from me as why that’s clearly not the case, here. The “self” doesn’t become any less meaningful, real, or valuable because it is reified through matter and energy.
Even to refer to the self as “it” is to devalue “it”! (I’m not criticising you because it is common parlance).
The self (person) becomes less meaningful, real, or valuable if it is “reified” because he or she:
  1. no longer has a raison d’etre or objective purpose in life.
  2. is depersonalised as the result of being reduced to impersonal processes.
  3. is devalued by being seen as an accident in the history of the universe.4
  4. is relegated to the status of a product of events rather than an independent agent.
  5. lacks identity, unity, continuity and responsibility by ceasing to be an enduring entity and becoming what Hume described as “a bundle of perceptions”.
That is actually an accounting for the self, and materialism does this, in a way that your theism does not, and cannot.
The “accounting” amounts to an elimination of personhood.
A materialist provides a model that accounts for the self in natural terms, phenomena that are empirically grounded.
I have pointed out several times that we have direct, irrefutable experience of our thoughts, emotions, and decisions - which is grounded within ourselves, not in what we infer from what we perceive. Try as you might, you cannot escape from yourself as a conscious person in a private realm of your own, utterly distinct from that of anyone else. Why should your five senses be a more reliable guide to the nature of reality than your own thoughts and feelings? Your senses are useless if you cannot use your power of reason.
Your superstitions, by contrast, are no account at all, any more than “the gods must be bowling” accounts for thunder.
Your substitions account for absolutely nothing because the irrational, purposeless energy to which you ascribe everything not only remains unexplained but does not explain the most important aspects of life - truth, goodness, freedom, justice, beauty and love - which you are forced to reduce to “efficacious concepts”. And those efficacious concepts turn out to be no more than electro-chemical patterns which have mysteriously acquired the power of insight into themselves and other electro-chemical patterns… I use “no more than” advisedly because you not only derive our minds from them but you also **equate **all our thoughts and feelings with them.

By way of contrast all that we consider most precious is related to personal reality, the highest form of existence of which we have knowledge - and the only form of existence of which we have direct knowledge. Our most inspiring and valuable experiences are related to persons, not material objects. We’re concerned less with the physical dimensions of people than their spiritual and moral attributes.
Your “self”, in contrast to a materialist view, is an utter, impenetrable mystery, entirely magical.
Is matter not an utter, impenetrable mystery, entirely magical? In which respects is it more intelligible than your own mind? Would you use scientific analysis to choose a wife? How would you estimate the value of friendship and love? And what in your opinion are the most important things in life?
 
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