Cosmological Argument

[Tyrion]

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

There are only 3 problems with this proposition.

1. 
   *]This is a metaphysical assumption, which is akin to the “no one has ever seen a black swan, therefore black swans do not exist” . Such unsubstantiated assumptions are dime a dozen.
   *]This is a physical assumption, which has not been substantiated. The Big Bang theory never stated that it was the beginning of the Universe, it merely stated that it was the beginning of the current form of the universe. Our physics cannot say anything about the internal state of the singularity.
   *]Since the two prerequisites are unsubstantiated assumptions, the corollary is unsubstantiated as well. There is only one more problem, the fallacy of composition. Since the universe is not an object, but a set of objects, it is a fallacy to try to generalize from the particular to the whole.
   
   Apart from these “minor” errors, the cosmological “argument” is airtight. But why worry? There are hundreds of proofs of God’s existence… enumerated here: godlessgeeks.com/LINKS/GodProof.htm

 

[hicetnunc]

Hi, hicetnunc

I really would enjoy finally discussing this.Most of the time, people just ignore this.
I(s true that this is basically Wes Morriston’s argument, but I made it independently of him.
Regardless who made it, I think it is pretty water tight.
But maybe, before I reply, you should ‘tease this distinction out more’. That way you can make sure I completely understand the distiction so that I can avoid attacking straw men.

Thanks for that belorg. Let me begin to try the tease…

By way of a run-up to that, I want to point out that I am ambivalent myself about the Kalam argument. My ‘jury is out’ on it, so to speak, so I’m grateful for your probing the argument with me. Maybe I should start by outlining my own difficulties with the argument. I have a suspicion that it rests on a deist assumption about the nature of God. It will probably come as no surprise to you that I do in fact believe in God, but not on account of any argument of this kind. In fact, I have never met anyone who believed because of an argument drawn from logic. If God exists, and he is a God of love, then the only way to encounter him will be through love. Just this afternoon I had a post exchange with a guy asking about Aquinas’ famous dictum, “love picks up where knowledge leaves off.”

I am a little bit concerned that much of protestant theology and philosophy relies on deist assumptions about God, which is why, as I said in my last post, I prefer Aquinas’ model. Aquinas is not out to convert anyone with his argument. He wrote his Summa for clerics and theologians, to help them understand the relationship between faith and reason. But reason is not the cause of faith. As the famous medieval saying goes (of both Augustine and Anselm), “I don’t know in order to believe, I believe in order to know.” Aquinas does not try to establish personhood in his argument. In fact, when he does eventually treat of the personhood of God, he does so through the lens of analogical language: our language about God is, so to speak, inherently “unstable”.

Many proponents of the Kalam model of the argument seem to rely on univocal terminology so that “cause” means the same thing in the universe as it does between God and the universe; “Being” refers to God and the universe in the same sense; and so on. Aquinas is insistent that our word “cause” cannot refer to God in a univocal sense. We can not speak about the cause of the universe in the same way that we speak about God causing the universe (you can see which way I am leaning regarding the Kalam argument). I think, and I may be wrong, but it seems to me that Craig’s argument relies on a univocal use of the term ‘cause’. There doesn’t seem to be much use in the protestant tradition for analogical language.

Back to your point: I think your intuition about the instability of trying to derive the notion of personhood from the examination of a causal chain is a good one, and I may end up agreeing with you on it. Just so I know where you are coming from, perhaps you could clarify: is your objecting (or part of it) to the notion of necessity in God and freedom in God? In other words, that if God were eternal, and therefore his will is likewise eternal, he would have no choice other than to create? If that is the case, I might try and put a case (from a Thomistic point of view) that an eternal will can be free. Or are you (maybe as well as the above) objecting to the notion of the interaction between an atemporal cause with a temporal effect which can be both personal and free? Please feel free to add anything I may have overlooked.

Cheers, as they say over here!

 

[hicetnunc]

There are only 3 problems with this proposition.

1. 
   *]This is a metaphysical assumption, which is akin to the “no one has ever seen a black swan, therefore black swans do not exist” . Such unsubstantiated assumptions are dime a dozen.
   *]This is a physical assumption, which has not been substantiated. The Big Bang theory never stated that it was the beginning of the Universe, it merely stated that it was the beginning of the current form of the universe. Our physics cannot say anything about the internal state of the singularity.
   *]Since the two prerequisites are unsubstantiated assumptions, the corollary is unsubstantiated as well. There is only one more problem, the fallacy of composition. Since the universe is not an object, but a set of objects, it is a fallacy to try to generalize from the particular to the whole.

1. 
   Hi Tyrion;
   Just a couple of quick things: you can’t equate the claim that the universe began to exist (a positive turth claim) with “black swans do not exist” (a negation of a positive truth claim). This is a basic principle of logic. You need to swap like for like to demonstrate your analogy. Secondly, if you think the first claim is an assumption, you should define what you mean by assumption, since it has rather technical application in philosophy. Thirdly, the claim that the universe had a beginning in time is hardly an unsubstantiated claim in physics. But the cosmological argument does not rely on a premise drawn from physics. The argument is enthymetic, meaning each premise relies on a set of demonstrations not present in synopsis.
   
   This is not to say that the argument works or is convincing; but I do think it is important to try to understand the argument before dismissing it with what is, to be quite frank, rather simplistic criticisms.

 

[tdgesq]

Hello Tyrion.

There are only 3 problems with this proposition.

1. 
   *]This is a metaphysical assumption, which is akin to the “no one has ever seen a black swan, therefore black swans do not exist” . Such unsubstantiated assumptions are dime a dozen.

1. 
   If Hume’s problem of induction is valid, then virtually nothing is knowable; at least if you believe (as I do) that all knowledge comes to us through the senses. Not even the laws of logic are known a priori. Are we going to question those too? Craig’s argument is that there is no good reason to jettison the laws of causality (or the laws of logic) simply because we are speaking of the universe. I would put it this way: if the objector to the law of causality wants to reject all human experience in this regard and make a special exception for the beginning of the universe, then there needs to be a reason. Craig argues none are forthcoming.
   

   *]This is a physical assumption, which has not been substantiated. The Big Bang theory never stated that it was the beginning of the Universe, it merely stated that it was the beginning of the current form of the universe. Our physics cannot say anything about the internal state of the singularity.

   The last sentence is correct. The explanations of physics break down at the singularity. But one tends to wonder how this helps your argument. Why? Because Craig would adamantly reject the truth of the first sentence. He is speaking about efficient cause, not material cause. Yet I have no problem using your nomenclature, that the current form of the universe had a beginning, As long as the universe in which we find ourselves had a beginning, no problem. You can certainly assert a multiverse theory, but it still doesn’t have any implications for this particular premise. Although it might have some implications for what is the cause of our universe.
   

   *]Since the two prerequisites are unsubstantiated assumptions, the corollary is unsubstantiated as well. There is only one more problem, the fallacy of composition. Since the universe is not an object, but a set of objects, it is a fallacy to try to generalize from the particular to the whole.

   I have never understood this argument. Alongside the fact that informal fallacies are riddled with exceptions (the fallacy of appeal to authority being one example), I just don’t see how it applies here. When Craig defines the universe, he defines it like everybody else. Are all theologians, philosophers, cosmologists and scientists guilty of the fallacy of composition when they speak of the beginnings of our universe? Even if they speak of a lack-of-beginning of our universe, it seems that nobody can really say anything about “the universe.” My observation is that if the fallacy of composition applies, then nobody can speak about the origins of our universe at all; and any discourse concerning it is nonsense. Is that your view?

 

[Whit_Dupree]

“Over my head, but interesting.” Yep, but reading and understanding in baby steps gets you a little bit into the know, sufficient to have some fun.

Only "interested in secular, rational, reasonable." I am also so interested, but find that Catholic teaching and practice are rational, empirical, and have apparent knowledge that is either absurd or is extra ordinarily reasonable. 

"The argument violates its own premise?" I don't takes it as circular: no need to confuse or conflate a physical universe that stands in need of a first cause and a nog that does not. The regress halts when faced with a brute fact of an unmoved mover forcefully blocking its path in reverse and sending it forward again, as "not everything can not have a cause."

Cause to effect, with the outcome that is indeterminate; or effect of a cause that cannot be otherwise; is this a hypothetical if, then weak and strong? Where the distinction of x over y **is** in fact an inflationary magnitude of power greater, then if x, y is apparently certain to happen, and that would seem to fit the relation between God and Adam. Give Adam a strong dose of free will and then the weak version comes into play, the effect of which is the fall of mankind. That then cries out for a God-the-Father Plan B. Jesus is a partial answer, with mankind working off penance with a antidote of Holy Spirit grace and asking for and receiving -- when contrite -- forgiveness, seems to be a reasonable explanation to the human condition in that world.  

 Black swan, cyclical bangs, and concluding by induction rather than by deduction do not seem to be fallacies to me because: quants can correct for Black Swans in their algorithms; nog can create a bouncing universe as easily as the one we see today inside looking up; and from a Leibniz machine we can crank the handle forward for one kind of inference and given enough knowledge it will yield the same calculation as the crank in reverse from all-to-some.

Is a glass of water half-empty or half-full: So, does the last link requires an explanation? No, “not when it is the explanation”, i.e, depends upon one’s perspective, or in the case of the drinker, whether thirsty or overly full already.

 

[Tyrion]

Hi, Esquire.

If Hume’s problem of induction is valid, then virtually nothing is knowable; at least if you believe (as I do) that all knowledge comes to us through the senses.

Let’s be more precise: When it comes to the external reality, then there is always some degree of uncertainty. We must always be aware that there can be an error, either in the observation, or the interpretation. This, of course, does not invalidate the inductive method, it merely cautions us to be aware of the possible problems, or exceptions. As such it is a practical “warning”. On the other hand, in the formal, axiomatic systems, we know with absolute certainty that propositions from the axioms are valid (by definition). The Pythagoras theorem will never be invalidated.

The objection simply warns us not to elevate the “practically” certain method to the rank of “absolutely” certain, metaphysical principles. Yes, we can practically say that physical causation is universal. A billiard ball will not start rolling, unless it is pushed by the cue-stick. But from this, practical observation it does not follow that there cannot be an “uncaused” event. As a matter of fact, the “emergence” of virtual particles look like a good example of uncaused events.

Not even the laws of logic are known a priori.

Without the laws of logic there can be no reasoning. If “A is A” would be denied, then there would be no “true” or “false” propositions.

Are we going to question those too? Craig’s argument is that there is no good reason to jettison the laws of causality (or the laws of logic) simply because we are speaking of the universe. I would put it this way: if the objector to the law of causality wants to reject all human experience in this regard and make a special exception for the beginning of the universe, then there needs to be a reason. Craig argues none are forthcoming.

The reason is simple. The universe is not an object, it is abstract set. It is a collection of physical objects. The fallacy of composition is applicable here. Again precision is important. The fallacy of composition does not say that it is incorrect to generalize from the particular to the general, it merely states that such generalization cannot be “automatic”, it needs to be established. (Example: valid generalization: “the floor is composed from white tiles, therefore the floor is itself white”. Incorrect generalization: “the floor is composed of square tiles, therefore the floor is itself square”).

The last sentence is correct. The explanations of physics break down at the singularity. But one tends to wonder how this helps your argument. Why? Because Craig would adamantly reject the truth of the first sentence. He is speaking about efficient cause, not material cause.

As opposed to “inefficient” causes? Sorry, this thomistic concept is also rejected. Causation is experienced as a physical interaction. True it is not an absolute rule, theoretically there could be exceptions, but they need to be demonstrated. People who believe in the “paranormal” are welcome to demonstrate such non-physical causation using their “mental powers”.

Yet I have no problem using your nomenclature, that the current form of the universe had a beginning, As long as the universe in which we find ourselves had a beginning, no problem. You can certainly assert a multiverse theory, but it still doesn’t have any implications for this particular premise. Although it might have some implications for what is the cause of our universe.

I am not interested in the multiverse concept. My stance is simple. When it comes to the universe, concepts like “temporally before” or “spatially outside” or “externally caused” are nonsensical, undefined and undefinable. The universe is all there is, and one cannot speak meaningfully of “creation”.

Even if they speak of a lack-of-beginning of our universe, it seems that nobody can really say anything about “the universe.” My observation is that if the fallacy of composition applies, then nobody can speak about the origins of our universe at all; and any discourse concerning it is nonsense. Is that your view?

I explained about the problem of composition above. And, indeed to speak of the “origin” of the universe is an exercise in futility. The universe is the ontological foundation of existence, and to speak of “outside” or “before”, etc… exactly as unacceptable as speaking of an object that resides to the north from the North Pole.

Sometimes people state that the universe “does not explain itself”. Apart from the horrible linguistic form (the universe is not a teacher to explain anything ), this objection is unacceptable. If one wishes to avoid the infinite regress, there must be a “starting point”. For theists this starting point is God, unexplained and unexplainable. For the atheists it is the universe. The theistic starting point is more “complicated”. That would be no problem, if only it had “explanatory power”. But it explains nothing. As I said before: “an unknowable being using unimaginable means made the universe somehow happen”. That is not an explanation.

 

[belorg]

Thanks for that belorg. Let me begin to try the tease…

By way of a run-up to that, I want to point out that I am ambivalent myself about the Kalam argument. My ‘jury is out’ on it, so to speak, so I’m grateful for your probing the argument with me. Maybe I should start by outlining my own difficulties with the argument. I have a suspicion that it rests on a deist assumption about the nature of God. It will probably come as no surprise to you that I do in fact believe in God, but not on account of any argument of this kind. In fact, I have never met anyone who believed because of an argument drawn from logic. If God exists, and he is a God of love, then the only way to encounter him will be through love. Just this afternoon I had a post exchange with a guy asking about Aquinas’ famous dictum, “love picks up where knowledge leaves off.”

I am a little bit concerned that much of protestant theology and philosophy relies on deist assumptions about God, which is why, as I said in my last post, I prefer Aquinas’ model. Aquinas is not out to convert anyone with his argument. He wrote his Summa for clerics and theologians, to help them understand the relationship between faith and reason. But reason is not the cause of faith. As the famous medieval saying goes (of both Augustine and Anselm), “I don’t know in order to believe, I believe in order to know.” Aquinas does not try to establish personhood in his argument. In fact, when he does eventually treat of the personhood of God, he does so through the lens of analogical language: our language about God is, so to speak, inherently “unstable”.

Many proponents of the Kalam model of the argument seem to rely on univocal terminology so that “cause” means the same thing in the universe as it does between God and the universe; “Being” refers to God and the universe in the same sense; and so on. Aquinas is insistent that our word “cause” cannot refer to God in a univocal sense. We can not speak about the cause of the universe in the same way that we speak about God causing the universe (you can see which way I am leaning regarding the Kalam argument). I think, and I may be wrong, but it seems to me that Craig’s argument relies on a univocal use of the term ‘cause’. There doesn’t seem to be much use in the protestant tradition for analogical language.

Back to your point: I think your intuition about the instability of trying to derive the notion of personhood from the examination of a causal chain is a good one, and I may end up agreeing with you on it. Just so I know where you are coming from, perhaps you could clarify: is your objecting (or part of it) to the notion of necessity in God and freedom in God? In other words, that if God were eternal, and therefore his will is likewise eternal, he would have no choice other than to create? If that is the case, I might try and put a case (from a Thomistic point of view) that an eternal will can be free. Or are you (maybe as well as the above) objecting to the notion of the interaction between an atemporal cause with a temporal effect which can be both personal and free? Please feel free to add anything I may have overlooked.

Cheers, as they say over here!

hicetnunc

No, I am not objecting that if God were eternal he would have no choice other than to create. My objection is that if God wills to create IOW as soon as God had made the choice to create, he cannot then decide not to create.
If He could, what would the be the meanign of God’s will. It would mean God changes His mind, but a chnage entails temporality.

 

[Eleve]

There is also a fundamental misunderstanding about Thomas argument (ST 1a,q.2,a3), which he elaborates in the summa contra gentiles. His argument is not, as many people think, that everything must have a cause. His argument is completely the opposite! His argument is in fact that everyhitng can’t have a cause, since if everything had to have a cause, nothing would exist—since then, as an earlier post points out, we would be trapped in an infinite regress.

That’s a nice way of putting the argument. Thanks!

In fact, the incoherence lies in the arguments against Thomas…the incoherence lies in (1) the notion of an infinite period of time; the famous German mathematician Georg Cantor showed that infinite temporal sequence does not hold mustard as a concept. Here’s a great 8 minute snap of a video which explains the problem with the concept of infinity as a number:

Thomas certainly can’t mean to say that the notion of an infinite period of time is incoherent, since he believes no demonstration can show that the world began to exist - it’s instead an article of faith.

I also don’t see how Cantor’s diagonal argument is a problem for the notion of a universe
without a beginning (but I agree that it’s not a serious problem for the cosmological argument, since Kalaam can rely on science (rather than metaphysical arguments) that shows that the universe began to exist, and the really interesting cosmological arguments aren’t about the beginning of the universe at all).

Let’s be more precise: When it comes to the external reality, then there is always some degree of uncertainty. We must always be aware that there can be an error, either in the observation, or the interpretation. This, of course, does not invalidate the inductive method, it merely cautions us to be aware of the possible problems, or exceptions. As such it is a practical “warning”. On the other hand, in the formal, axiomatic systems, we know with absolute certainty that propositions from the axioms are valid (by definition). The Pythagoras theorem will never be invalidated.

The objection simply warns us not to elevate the “practically” certain method to the rank of “absolutely” certain, metaphysical principles.

I don’t think anyone making a cosmological argument has to claim that the metaphysical premises are certain. The argument doesn’t need to show that God exists and we couldn’t possibly be mistaken; it just needs to show that God exists.

No, I am not objecting that if God were eternal he would have no choice other than to create. My objection is that if God wills to create IOW as soon as God had made the choice to create, he cannot then decide not to create.

So? Do you think that God’s free will requires that he can change his mind?

 

[belorg]

So? Do you think that God’s free will requires that he can change his mind?

No, I don’t think that.

 

[hicetnunc]

Thomas certainly can’t mean to say that the notion of an infinite period of time is incoherent, since he believes no demonstration can show that the world began to exist - it’s instead an article of faith.

I also don’t see how Cantor’s diagonal argument is a problem for the notion of a universe
without a beginning (but I agree that it’s not a serious problem for the cosmological argument, since Kalaam can rely on science (rather than metaphysical arguments) that shows that the universe began to exist, and the really interesting cosmological arguments aren’t about the beginning of the universe at all).

Thanks for your contribution Eleve…you raise two excellent points which deserve clarification and answer.

You are correct I think in noting that for Aquinas, there is no logical inconsistency in holding that there could be an infinite period of time of duration of the universe and that the universe was also created (as he argues in the De Eternitate Mundi). He also considers the opinion that the rejection of infinite temporal regress is a matter of faith. Hence, in the De Eternitate, Thomas allows (as, I believe, a concession to Aristotle) that an infinite temporal regress is possible.

The reason Cantor’s treatment of infinity is relevant here is because he demonstrates that infinity is not a univocal term. There are different kinds of infinity. This is also the case for Thomas; infinite is not a univocal term, and so in one respect, infinite temporal regress is not a matter for philosophy. But in another application of the notion of temporal regress, it is impossible. Hence, in the De Veritate, he argues that an infinite temporal regress is not possible. Thomas is not being inconsistent; as Cantor would later, Thomas understands “infinite” to be an analogical term, with different applications. In the first instance, he allows that infinite time could exist if it is understood “in esse”. For example, an eternal tree casting an eternal shadow, we would still hold the eternal shadow to be contingent on the eternal tree. But he also appeals to the medieval principle that it is impossible to traverse an infinite sequence, including an infinite sequence of time. For if time were infinite, we would not be here today, since there would be an infinite amount of time between and infinitely distant time in the past and the present moment.

 

[Tyrion]

I don’t think anyone making a cosmological argument has to claim that the metaphysical premises are certain.

Why not look at an alternative, “weakened” version?
1a) Everything that started to exist, MAY have a cause for its existence.
as opposed to the original:
1b) Everything that started to exist, has a cause for its existence.

What would be the final corollary?
3a) Therefore, the universe MAY have a cause of its existence.
3b) Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

Would not be very “convincing”, would it?

The argument doesn’t need to show that God exists and we couldn’t possibly be mistaken; it just needs to show that God exists.

You mean: “God MAY POSSIBLY exist?”. Because that is the result of the version which does not assert that the metaphysical claim is certain.

 

[hicetnunc]

No, I am not objecting that if God were eternal he would have no choice other than to create. My objection is that if God wills to create IOW as soon as God had made the choice to create, he cannot then decide not to create.
If He could, what would the be the meanign of God’s will. It would mean God changes His mind, but a chnage entails temporality.

Thanks belorg.

Let me throw this out: this characterisation of God’s willing and choosing is anthropomorphic. It suggests that God’s process of willing and choosing is temporally discursive, like our own. We decide, we choose, then we will. All of this takes place as a temporal sequence. To attribute this process to God seems to be open to the charge that it is attributing human characteristics to God.

I agree that if God’s will is like our own, his inability to change his mind renders his will impotent. But perhaps our own experience of willing and choosing is not transferable to God.

This again is why I prefer the Thomistic model of the argument. Thomas holds that our language about God is analogical. We are the effect of a cause, and there is no direct correlation or shared characteristic between a cause and an effect. We can’t simply attribute the characteristics of our own nature to God.

What do you think?

 

[Eleve]

Why not look at an alternative, “weakened” version?
1a) Everything that started to exist, MAY have a cause for its existence.
as opposed to the original:
1b) Everything that started to exist, has a cause for its existence.

What would be the final corollary?
3a) Therefore, the universe MAY have a cause of its existence.
3b) Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

Would not be very “convincing”, would it?

You mean: “God MAY POSSIBLY exist?”. Because that is the result of the version which does not assert that the metaphysical claim is certain.

No, that isn’t what I take the cosmological argument to be. The first premise is (1b), not (1a). But saying “P, but I can’t be 100% certain” is different from saying “Maybe P,” in the sense of “P is consistent with everything else we know.” For example, if P is false, then the first statement is false, while the second statement could be true - there are situations where you don’t know enough to rule out a possibility, but it’s false anyway.

Compare with this argument:

1. If Barack Obama is the President, then Michelle Obama is the First Lady.
2. Barack Obama is the President.
   C. Therefore, Michelle Obama is the First Lady.

Now, I could be wrong about either of these premises; I’m not 100% certain. I was just on a long drive, and I haven’t checked the news. Perhaps Michelle Obama just filed for a divorce, in which case (1) is false. And maybe Barack Obama just resigned, in which case (2) is false. Stranger things have happened. But this is still a good argument. And, even though I can’t be absolutely certain of the premises, it is a different argument from this one:

1’. If Barack Obama is President, then Michelle Obama MAY be the First Lady.
2’. Barack Obama MAY be the President.
C’. Therefore, Michelle Obama MAY be the First Lady.

 

[belorg]

Thanks belorg.

Let me throw this out: this characterisation of God’s willing and choosing is anthropomorphic. It suggests that God’s process of willing and choosing is temporally discursive, like our own. We decide, we choose, then we will. All of this takes place as a temporal sequence. To attribute this process to God seems to be open to the charge that it is attributing human characteristics to God.

I Don’t attribute this process to God. If you analyze Craig’s argument for a personal cause , yoi will see that it is in fact Craig who does this.

I agree that if God’s will is like our own, his inability to change his mind renders his will impotent. But perhaps our own experience of willing and choosing is not transferable to God.

I am willing to concede that, but it doesn’t help Craig’s case.

This again is why I prefer the Thomistic model of the argument. Thomas holds that our language about God is analogical. We are the effect of a cause, and there is no direct correlation or shared characteristic between a cause and an effect. We can’t simply attribute the characteristics of our own nature to God.

What do you think?

I can accept that, for the sake of the argument, but the fact that X is the effect of a cause does not entail that X began to exist. In order a cause to be beginningless and the effect to begin, requires a temporal distinction, which contradict’s God a-temporality.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

The cosmological argument does test the limits of logic. But so does the Big Bang. Time and the universe began some 14 billions of years ago according to science. The principle of causality can be traced back that far, but scientifically it cannot be traced any farther back. There was no “before” before the Big Bang, because there was no time.

Thus we look to the Creator of the universe and everything in it (including the principle of causality) as an uncaused cause. How can the Creator be equal to the creation? How can the Creator exist in time, or space, or matter, or energy … or even inside the principle of causality, and still be the Creator of all these things?

 

[Whit_Dupree]

Assume the principle of causality is a Platonic form, universal and super real but behind the world of sense experience. Is this the realm of the Christian God? That is, the essence of God is to be or to possess the principles upon which the world is actualized? Or, is God’s realm yet a higher realm, from which God creates both the principles and the world as we know it? If God, then the regress would stop, at least for the Christian believer. Is this a valid picture?

 

[hicetnunc]

I Don’t attribute this process to God. If you analyze Craig’s argument for a personal cause , yoi will see that it is in fact Craig who does this.

This is a fair point, and one which–as I mentioned earlier–I am inclined to think myself. I will have to go back to Craig and examine it some more, but you may be on to something here.

I can accept that, for the sake of the argument, but the fact that X is the effect of a cause does not entail that X began to exist. In order a cause to be beginningless and the effect to begin, requires a temporal distinction, which contradict’s God a-temporality.

Another fair point. In fact, St Thomas allows for this possibility in his own argument. In his De Aeternitate Mundi, he considers the possibility that the universe/world has always existed. Thomas’ distinction is not a temporal one; it is more ‘hoerarchical’. An eternal shadow, for example, still requires an eternal cause since shadows are contingent on other things.

For me, the bottom line is that the cosmological argument has never convinced anyone that I have ever met of the existence of God. I tend to think that Craig wants the argument to be definitive, which I am not sure the Kalam argument can do. It may be rationally appealing but it is not an a priori argument, so can never yeild certainty.

If God exists, and he is in essence Love, then love will be the way we find him.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I Don’t attribute this process to God. If you analyze Craig’s argument for a personal cause , yoi will see that it is in fact Craig who does this.

I am willing to concede that, but it doesn’t help Craig’s case.

I can accept that, for the sake of the argument, but the fact that X is the effect of a cause does not entail that X began to exist. In order a cause to be beginningless and the effect to begin, requires a temporal distinction, which contradict’s God a-temporality.

I think it is better not to use the Kalem argument to prove your position since it is not highly thought of by many of us here. ST. Thomas provides many proofs for the necessity of God’s existence as a Personal God who is absolutely other than and transcendent to His effects. It is an absolute necessity that He is eternal ( a-temporal, as you would say ).
It is only your opinion that this involves a contradiction. But that is because you will not admit that there can be any causality that does not exist in time and limited by time.

So the contradiction exists only in your mind not in reality. For there would be no time bound universe ( the effects you see and measure ) unless this a-temporal God existed as the First Cause.

We are at an impass. You have proven nothing and we cannot force an unwilling mind to accept the necessity of such a God’s existence. So where do we go from here?

 

[hicetnunc]

I think it is better not to use the Kalem argument to prove your position since it is not highly thought of by many of us here. ST. Thomas provides many proofs for the necessity of God’s existence as a Personal God who is absolutely other than and transcendent to His effects. It is an absolute necessity that He is eternal ( a-temporal, as you would say ).
It is only your opinion that this involves a contradiction. But that is because you will not admit that there can be any causality that does not exist in time and limited by time.

So the contradiction exists only in your mind not in reality. For there would be no time bound universe ( the effects you see and measure ) unless this a-temporal God existed as the First Cause.

We are at an impass. You have proven nothing and we cannot force an unwilling mind to accept the necessity of such a God’s existence. So where do we go from here?

Well put Linus.

 

[tdgesq]

On the other hand, in the formal, axiomatic systems, we know with absolute certainty that propositions from the axioms are valid (by definition). The Pythagoras theorem will never be invalidated.

You mean as a valid theorem in the human mind, or valid as applied to reality? We can set forth axioms all day long that make a system internally consistent in the mind, but we are speaking here of laws that apply to reality - specifically that apply to the origins of the universe. Asserting that the laws of causality may not universally apply to reality makes no more sense than asserting Euclidian (and non-Euclidian) geometrical laws may also not apply.

The objection simply warns us not to elevate the “practically” certain method to the rank of “absolutely” certain, metaphysical principles. Yes, we can practically say that physical causation is universal. A billiard ball will not start rolling, unless it is pushed by the cue-stick. But from this, practical observation it does not follow that there cannot be an “uncaused” event. As a matter of fact, the “emergence” of virtual particles look like a good example of uncaused events

No more “practically certain” than that the Pythagorean theorem applies everywhere and for all time to reality, regardless of how many purely mathematical proofs we have for it. By the way, I believe it does always apply to reality, just as I do with the laws of causality.

Virtual particles speculatively “springing” into existence actually supports Craig’s argument. There are certain necessary conditions that attend such phenomena; the quantum vacuum. Far from leading one to the conclusion that there is no cause, it leads to the opposite.

Without the laws of logic there can be no reasoning. If “A is A” would be denied, then there would be no “true” or “false” propositions.

Right, but I’m not treating purely mental propositions. I’m asking if the law of identity (as that is what you have described above) continues to apply to reality, particularly to the origins of the universe. Should we begin to think that two objects can occupy the same space at the same time and in the same sense? I mean, after all, it’s the beginning of the universe where special pleading apparently allows us to suspend all metaphysical laws that might apply. Your conclusion that only some laws always apply to reality is arbitrary.

The reason is simple. The universe is not an object, it is abstract set. It is a collection of physical objects. The fallacy of composition is applicable here.

Craig’s argument has never been that because parts of the universe have a cause, therefore the entire universe has a cause. You simply won’t find him make that argument. He does argue that the class of things we experience that begin to exist (including virtual particles) have a cause, therefore, it is reasonable to infer that all things that begin to exist have a cause. It is an argument from induction, not an argument from composition.

More to the point though, the inductive argument isn’t Craig’s primary foundation for P(1). It is the improbability and unintelligibility of the contrary. If there is no cause to the beginning of the universe, then it is caused by “no thing,” by nothing. What does it mean to say that something comes from nothing? And why is it that only the universe springs into existence with no cause, in contrast to everything else we have ever observed? There aren’t an good reasons, evidentiary or metaphysical, to reject P(1).

As opposed to “inefficient” causes? Sorry, this thomistic concept is also rejected. Causation is experienced as a physical interaction. True it is not an absolute rule, theoretically there could be exceptions, but they need to be demonstrated.

Efficient cause was originally defined by Aristotle, not Aquinas. It has a defined meaning, while there is no such term as “inefficient cause.” Its most basic meaning is the source of change. The source of change is not required to be physical in nature, nor is it required to be non-physical. It is neutral in this regard. So, you are just mistaken that P(1) or P(2) make a physical (or even a non-physical) assumption. Of course, Craig does later assert in Kalaam a non-physical (immaterial) cause, but not in P(1) or P(2).

I explained about the problem of composition above. And, indeed to speak of the “origin” of the universe is an exercise in futility. The universe is the ontological foundation of existence, and to speak of “outside” or “before”, etc… exactly as unacceptable as speaking of an object that resides to the north from the North Pole.

Since neither P(1) nor P(2) state or infer anything about “outside” or “before” the universe, then I fail to see the problem. If you really do believe that speaking about the origin of the universe is futile, then I expect you to reject the conclusions of Big-Bang cosmology and any other scientific cosmological theory for that matter. Go ahead and swallow the reductio, if you can.

If one wishes to avoid the infinite regress, there must be a “starting point”. For theists this starting point is God, unexplained and unexplainable. For the atheists it is the universe.

So far as I can tell, this doesn’t have anything to do with your objections to P(1) & P(2). Nobody is referring to God yet. But at least we agree there can’t be an infinite regress. I really wonder what you mean then when you state that the starting point for atheists is “the universe.” Theists also believe that the universe exists, so that can’t be it. The claim “our starting point is the universe” certainly can’t ever be an answer to the question of how there came to be a universe. And since that’s the question, it doesn’t appear you have an answer.