Cotigo Ergo Sum?

[Charlemagne_III]

Note to the above:

With “Cogito, ergo sum” is there an early formulation of “existence precedes essence”?

If your question is directed to me, the short answer is that Augustine and Aquinas would have found the roots of their existentialism in God’s way of defining himself to Moses:

“I Am that I Am.”

In other words, God’s preference is to be presented as Being rather than Essence.

In that sense existence precedes essence. God could have chosen to present himself in language more easily defined by essences, but he chose not to. Rather, he chooses to identify himself as Being itself, the Being from which all other beings flow.

This is why Descartes errs in proving his existence by the fact that he thinks. He has asserted an essential self prior to the assertion of the existent self.

 

[Thomas_White]

The way I read Descartes (and I might be mis-reading, I always admit) I don’t think so. I think Descartes is making an epistemic claim - that he can be sure of his existence because he is a thinking thing.

Thinking a bit more about it, the proposition “Cogito, ergo sum” has two subjects (I think; I am) but no predicate. Perhaps the error is in drawing a conclusion (“therefore”) from two assertions that both seem to assert the same thing (“I exist”).

 

[Rhubarb]

Thinking a bit more about it, the proposition “Cogito, ergo sum” has two subjects (I think; I am) but no predicate. Perhaps the error is in drawing a conclusion (“therefore”) from two assertions that both seem to assert the same thing (“I exist”).

Ergo is the “therefore.” But the question being asked in that section was how he can know he exists if he can’t trust his senses. He was questioning how he can know anything at all. He’s not arguing for his existence, he’s arguing for the knowledge** of his existence. He meant it to be a foundation to build his epistemology on. He isn’t talking metaphysics.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Ergo is the “therefore.” But the question being asked in that section was how he can know he exists if he can’t trust his senses. He was questioning how he can know anything at all. He’s not arguing for his existence, he’s arguing for the knowledge** of his existence. He meant it to be a foundation to build his epistemology on. He isn’t talking metaphysics.

I think you’ve made this point before as I recall, and it’s a valid point but the “ergo” gets in the way of limiting the argument to one of epistemic certainty.

Descartes actually draws a conclusion from the fact that he thinks, and the conclusion is that he exists. You cannot draw that conclusion as a matter of logic. The only way to approach the fact that you think is to assert first the axiom that you exist, and then draw from that axiom the conclusion that you can think, and that your certainty of your ability to think means that you can be certain of one thing, so why not be certain of other things as well? From this conclusion you can defeat the absolute skeptic, who in any case has already defeated himself by asserting the certainty that we can be certain of nothing.

When Moses asks God to identify himself, God does not say I am Love, as John makes him say. That would be to put essence before existence. One cannot say, God is love, therefore God exists. But one can say, God exists, and therefore God is love, or God is eternal, or God is infinite, or any other essence we want to attribute to God.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

He’s not saying that he exists because he thinks. All he’s saying is that he KNOWS he exists because he thinks.

Au contraire, mon ami!

Jacques Maritain nailed it when he said Descartes was the source and fountainhead of all subjectivism in modern philosophy. I think, therefore I am. I think God exists, therefore he exists. (Yes, Descartes affirmed Anselm’s argument) I think same-sex marriage is good, therefore it is good. I think abortion is good, therefore it is good. I think pornography is good, therefore it is good. I think there is no moral system superior to any other moral system, therefore all moralities are relative. On and on, all reality is what I think it is.

A stupid subjective epistemology.

God is truth, not because I think God is truth, but because God IS the existential source of all truth, as he tells us in Scripture. Only when we see that God IS can we say anything about the essences of God; that he is the true, loving, holy, eternal, infinite and loving Father of us all.

 

[Rhubarb]

I don’t know a lot about Jacques Maritain so I can’t comment on that. I do know that the Principles of Philosophy Descartes wrote “While we thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even imagine that it is false, we easily indeed suppose that there is neither God, nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves even have neither hands nor feet, nor, finally, a body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not while we doubt of the truth of these things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving that what thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Accordingly, the knowledge, I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophizes orderly.” The bold part is the Cogito. This is the statement the phrase comes from.

To me, he is clearly making an epistemic claim, not an existential one. He is concerned about what he can and cannot know. And from the certainty he can have of his own existence he derives everything else. He’s not saying the things we doubt DOESN’T exist. He’s saying we cannot be sure of them if we come from this position of doubt.

So I did some (very, very brief) research on Jacques Maritain. I don’t think the assumption that metaphysics precedes epistemology is necessarily contrary to what Descartes wrote above.

(Edit) Though, it seems Maritain wants to say we can come to know about being from sense perception. That is not what Descartes wants to say. Brain-in-a-Vat or the Cartesian Demon are supposed counter-examples. But again, this is a debate about epistemology, not metaphysics.

(Second Edit) I feel I should make it plain that I’m not defending Descartes’ overall philosophy. But, I think if we take “doubt everything” as a foundation for epistemology, his method of getting to the certain knowledge of our existence is appealing to me. I do tend towards infalibilism when it comes to what we can know.

 

[Thomas_White]

The propositions “I think” and “I am” are both subjective. Descartes simply means that since he knows he thinks, he can “be” certain he “exists”. The concept is wholly in reference to existence (the subjective), and as such I don’t think it concerns (or even could concern) what comes first, existence or essence. But it very much concerns what can be known (epistemic certainty). Since his certainty is entirely subjective, it means the concept of Immanence is “dead”–that is, dead in philosophy. God is incomprehensible and not knowable by reason (objectively). This does not, however, mean that God does not exist. This is the vast uncertainty that Descartes encounters as he begins to develop his philosophy.

By “I”, Descartes means Reason. The proposition “Cogito ergo sum” represents the end of scholasticism and the beginning of Idealism. For ethics this will, in modern philosophy, result in subjectivism and moral relativity.

With good reason, Ortega called Descartes the first modern man.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

The propositions “I think” and “I am” are both subjective. Descartes simply means that since he knows he thinks, he can “be” certain he “exists”. The concept is wholly in reference to existence (the subjective), and as such I don’t think it concerns (or even could concern) what comes first, existence or essence. But it very much concerns what can be known (epistemic certainty). Since his certainty is entirely subjective, it means the concept of Immanence is “dead”–that is, dead in philosophy. God is incomprehensible and not knowable by reason (objectively). This does not, however, mean that God does not exist. This is the vast uncertainty that Descartes encounters as he begins to develop his philosophy.

By “I”, Descartes means Reason. The proposition “Cogito ergo sum” represents the end of scholasticism and the beginning of Idealism. For ethics this will, in modern philosophy, result in subjectivism and moral relativity.

With good reason, Ortega called Descartes the first modern man.

Maritain agreed with Ortega that Descartes pushed philosophy entirely in the direction of subjectivity from which it has yet to recover.

This is one reason why Leo XIII sought to reinstate respect for the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, and Maritain was one of those who were glad to assist in that goal by attacking Descartes, Luther, and Rousseau, three great champions of subjectivism.

 

[a_priori]

Descartes was addressing the Skeptics who insisted that nothing was ultimately knowable. The proposition was “Is man a thinking thing”, a res cogitans. This is a proposition that, in the process of considering, affirms itself. Man must therefore indeed be a res cogitans. If this is knowable then it is possible to know things. He wasn’t working out his own ontology.

 

[Thomas_White]

It was Sarte who famously said that “Existence precedes essence”. The notion is that there is no predetermined essence in humans. The nature of man is not for instance cruel, but man can freely chose to act cruelly.

In “Existentialism is a Humanism”, Sarte has this to say: “First of all man exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world–and defines himself afterwards.” That is, a man’s essence is defined by his actions.

The difficulty is when this reasoning is extended to Ethics by the proposition that there are no essential (objective) values-- or absolute truths–that can be known by humans, such than man is free to act subjectively and to determine what is right and what is wrong solely by his actions.

For Plato, virtue is knowledge (e.g., Meno), and this thread persists throughout the Scholastic period. Descartes begins, with his ‘Cogito ergo sum’ proposition, by setting Plato “on his head”.

I have great difficulty in accepting the notion that St. Thomas Aquinas was an existentialist.

 

[lmelahn]

It was Sarte who famously said that “Existence precedes essence”. The notion is that there is no predetermined essence in humans. The nature of man is not for instance cruel, but man can freely chose to act cruelly.

In “Existentialism is a Humanism”, Sarte has this to say: “First of all man exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world–and defines himself afterwards.” That is, a man’s essence is defined by his actions.

The difficulty is when this reasoning is extended to Ethics by the proposition that there are no essential (objective) values-- or absolute truths–that can be known by humans, such than man is free to act subjectively and to determine what is right and what is wrong solely by his actions.

For Plato, virtue is knowledge (e.g., Meno), and this thread persists throughout the Scholastic period. Descartes begins, with his ‘Cogito ergo sum’ proposition, by setting Plato “on his head”.

I have great difficulty in accepting the notion that St. Thomas Aquinas was an existentialist.

Aquinas was not an existentialist in the same sense as Sartre was, but he did think that being (esse), absolutely speaking, has priority over essence. (He regards being as the act that actualizes essence.)

However, Sartre went considerably further than Aquinas: for all intents and purposes Sartre denied essence (or nature) altogether, at least in the “être-pour-soi” (i.e., man). Hence, man (according to Sartre) can determine himself completely; that is not at all what Aquinas thought. He believed in our freedom, certainly, but a freedom that is conditioned by our nature, our habits, and our circumstances.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Descartes was addressing the Skeptics who insisted that nothing was ultimately knowable. The proposition was “Is man a thinking thing”, a res cogitans. This is a proposition that, in the process of considering, affirms itself. Man must therefore indeed be a res cogitans. If this is knowable then it is possible to know things. He wasn’t working out his own ontology.

This does not obscure the fact that he was drawing an illogical syllogistic conclusion that would ultimately elevate subjectivism over the objective.

One certainly does not exist because one thinks.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

I have great difficulty in accepting the notion that St. Thomas Aquinas was an existentialist.

He certainly was not an existentialist of the Sartrean strain.

We do have to give Sartre credit for the belief in free will, which most atheists of his day were loathe to admit.

Unfortunately, his free will is worthless if its ultimate object is nausea and self-loathing.

Interestingly, Sartre gave up on atheism near the end, and by doing so had to have implicitly repudiated much of his own philosophy.

 

[Thomas_White]

Aquinas was not an existentialist in the same sense as Sartre was, but he did think that being (esse), absolutely speaking, has priority over essence. (He regards being as the act that actualizes essence.)

Yes, I understand. However, this formulation is not the way I have understood these concepts and their formulations. As I have understood Plato, Being is essence and existence is Becoming, and it is in this sense that essence precedes existence. This is the Platonic Form (essentia: being, essence).

What follows from this are the dichotomies of the categories of form and matter; mind and body; reason and belief; and, in Ethics, good and evil. This, as I have understood it, is Platonic Dualism, fundamental to the history of Western Philosophy.

There were in philosophy two principal meanings of the word Being, essence and existence, traditionally considered as relating to “being” and “becoming” respectively. I believe with Aquinas, as with Aristotle, that Being is the most universal of concepts. What comes first in apprehension is the Entity (being), and it is included in all things, in whatever one apprehends. I am thinking that for Aquinas there is no difference in the essence and existence of God, with God’s existence necessarily following from his essence. But man remains a contingent creature, and his existence in the temporal world is a Becoming, a procession from his Being. His essence, the essence of his nature (Being), is the soul. In this formulation, essence precedes existence.

The Latin word “ergo”, usually translated as “therefore”, is also defined as “because” or “consequently”. So, Cogito ergo sum: “I think because I am”; or, “I think consequently I am”. The proposition is ambiguous in this respect (as to the precedence of essence or existence) but not so to Descartes’ point. His certainty is that he exists. And it is of course a subjective certainty.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

The Latin word “ergo”, usually translated as “therefore”, is also defined as “because” or “consequently”. So, Cogito ergo sum: “I think because I am”; or, “I think consequently I am”. The proposition is ambiguous in this respect (as to the precedence of essence or existence) but not so to Descartes’ point. His certainty is that he exists. And it is of course a subjective certainty.

You raise an interesting point.

All certainty is subjective to the extent that the certainty is beheld in the mind; but some certainty is objectively certain.

We cannot be fooled into thinking we exist when we really don’t.

Or:

We can only be convinced we exist if we really do exist.

But if we really exist, why do we need to be convinced?

Our existence is axiomatic to ourselves and not subject to proof.

 

[lmelahn]

Yes, I understand. However, this formulation is not the way I have understood these concepts and their formulations. As I have understood Plato, Being is essence and existence is Becoming, and it is in this sense that essence precedes existence. This is the Platonic Form (essentia: being, essence).

What follows from this are the dichotomies of the categories of form and matter; mind and body; reason and belief; and, in Ethics, good and evil. This, as I have understood it, is Platonic Dualism, fundamental to the history of Western Philosophy.

There were in philosophy two principal meanings of the word Being, essence and existence, traditionally considered as relating to “being” and “becoming” respectively. I believe with Aquinas, as with Aristotle, that Being is the most universal of concepts. What comes first in apprehension is the Entity (being), and it is included in all things, in whatever one apprehends. I am thinking that for Aquinas there is no difference in the essence and existence of God, with God’s existence necessarily following from his essence. But man remains a contingent creature, and his existence in the temporal world is a Becoming, a procession from his Being. His essence, the essence of his nature (Being), is the soul. In this formulation, essence precedes existence.

The Latin word “ergo”, usually translated as “therefore”, is also defined as “because” or “consequently”. So, Cogito ergo sum: “I think because I am”; or, “I think consequently I am”. The proposition is ambiguous in this respect (as to the precedence of essence or existence) but not so to Descartes’ point. His certainty is that he exists. And it is of course a subjective certainty.

Plato and Aristotle had different understandings both of “being” (to on) and “essence” (which for Aristotle is exactly same thing as “substance”: ousia).

As you are probably aware, for Plato reality was to be found primarily in the Forms or Ideas; concrete, material things are, according to him, only “shadows” that participate in the Ideas. Thus, for Plato being or “entity” (to on) is simply one of the supreme Ideas, in which all things—both the “shadows” and the first rank of Ideas—participate. Plato does not give a precise, technical meaning to “essence” (ousia); Aristotle was the first to do that.

For Aristotle—ever the proponent of the concrete and individual—“essences” (ousiai) are nothing other than concrete, individual things: what Medieval philosophers would call substantiae (substances). For Aristotle, “being”*or “entity” (to on) is a concept with a plethora of meanings, which applies primarily to essences or substances, and secondarily to those substances’ characteristics (accidents).

At least in Aquinas, the terms being and essence take on a meaning that is similar to Aristotle’s, but there is a subtlety that is often lost in English.

“Being” can be understood as a principle that is the source of actuality in a thing (Latin: esse), or it can mean something that possesses such a principle, or is actuated by it—i.e., something that exists (Latin: ens; in English perhaps rendered by “entity”).

It is the second meaning of being (ens) that is the most universal concept, the first concept understood by the human intellect.

For Aquinas, “essence,” however, refers to a concrete individual, either as a whole, or else (more commonly) as that principle that makes the individual what it is. “Essence,” in this latter sense, is opposed to both “accident” (which merely determine the thing’s properties and characteristics) and “being” (esse, which is the intrinsic source of the thing’s actuality).

God, Aquinas would say, is different from His creatures because He is Being Itself (Ipsum Esse). He wouldn’t say that being (esse) follows from His essence, but that being is His essence. (However, God is all Essence; He has no accidents.)

Descartes seemed to think that we could deduce the existence of God by looking introspectively at our idea of God. Since—according to Descartes—we have a clear and distinct idea of God, and can see (also clearly and distinctly) that His existence follows from His essence (as I mentioned, this is an idea foreign to Aquinas), we can deduce that He exists.

 

[a_priori]

One certainly does not exist because one thinks.

One can exist without thinking. But one who thinks, exists.

 

[oldcelt]

One can exist without thinking. But one who thinks, exists.

Is it really possible for any sentient creature not to thunk? I think all the time. The thoughts may be minuscule and drab, but they are thoughts.

 

[Thomas_White]

Plato and Aristotle had different understandings both of “being” (to on) and “essence” (which for Aristotle is exactly same thing as “substance”: ousia).

Aristotle used the Greek word “ousia” to mean substance?

As I have understood it, the word is etymologically related to the Greek verb “to be” and means “being, nature, essence”. Latin, however, lacks a present active participle of the verb “to be” and the word is rendered in Latin as “substantia”. But the word “substantia”, unlike the Greek word “ouisa”, connotes both substance and being.

As I have understood it, it was not until the translation of “ouisa” (being) from Greek to Latin that the meaning came to also connote “substance”. It is a major thesis of Heidegger that the original meaning of the Greek word was “being” and that this original meaning was lost in its translation to Latin. For Heidegger, “Being” is not substance and not some “thing” or “being” that stood (-stance) under (-sub).

I had not been aware that Aristotle used the Greek word “ouisa” to mean “exactly the same thing as ‘substance’”.

The difference is not trivial.

From the Nicene Creed:

“one in Being with the Father”

“consubstantial with the Father.”

 

[lmelahn]

Aristotle used the Greek word “ousia” to mean substance?

Better said, both essentia and substantia have been used to translate the one Greek word ousia.

As I have understood it, the word is etymologically related to the Greek verb “to be” and means “being, nature, essence”. Latin, however, lacks a present active participle of the verb “to be” and the word is rendered in Latin as “substantia”. But the word “substantia”, unlike the Greek word “ouisa”, connotes both substance and being.

Classical Latin lacks a present participle for sum, but Medieval Latin made one up: ens. It translates what Aristotle called to on.

But Aristotle clearly gives to ousia what we usually mean by “substance”: things, beings that exist without being properties or characteristics of something else. (See, for example, Metaphysics book IV, 2.)

However, for Aristotle it is also “essence;” in his words, what something is simply because it is. (That is the topic of Book VII.)

As I have understood it, it was not until the translation of “ouisa” (being) from Greek to Latin that the meaning came to also connote “substance”. It is a major thesis of Heidegger that the original meaning of the Greek word was “being” and that this original meaning was lost in its translation to Latin. For Heidegger, “Being” is not substance and not some “thing” or “being” that stood (-stance) under (-sub).

I had not been aware that Aristotle used the Greek word “ouisa” to mean “exactly the same thing as ‘substance’”.

What I mean is, Aristotle did not have different words for “substance” and “essence;” that is a posterior development.

I have read Heidegger’s Being and Time (quite a beast of a book), and if I had to make an observation, I think that Heidegger is only considering the Modern philosophers’ definition of substance, as that which “underlies,” as you point out. (Actually, Aristotle had a name for that, too: to hypokeimenon).

But “substance” means much more than that: it meas a being (an ens or to on, i.e., something that is) that subsists, that exists independently. (Like trees, and dogs, and people; as opposed to blueness, barking, and our size and weight.)

The difference is not trivial.

From the Nicene Creed:

“one in Being with the Father”

“consubstantial with the Father.”

“Consubstantial” is preferable, since the term translated is homoousios: one in substance (or essence) with the Father.

The problem with “one in being”*in this particular context is that it fails to distinguish between God’s substance (a.k.a essence, a.k.a. nature) and the three Divine Persons (a.k.a. hypostases). In other words, there are technical theological terms at play here.