D
djeter
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I plucked this from an essay on why there is no “right to die” by the German Catholic philosopher Jörg Splett.
"The biblical creation account expresses this point in a series of double affirmations. First it reports the creator’s command that things should come to be; then it adds the confirmation God utters when he looks back over his work in the evening: “and he saw that it was good.” This approving declaration of goodness is an addition repeated at the end of the six days’ work. And according to a widespread rabbinic tradition, the Fall of the first human couple is supposed to have occurred right away, in other words, immediately after the beginning of their life in paradise. In spite of that: the world is good.
Committed Christians often champion nowadays an “option for the small and the weak.” In their prophetic engagement on behalf of this cause they appeal to Jesus’ example. And they are perfectly right, of course. But Jesus’ behavior toward the small and the weak is nothing other than the consequence of the event of creation; in this case, too, as in all others, he wished merely to restore his Father’s original ordering. To create, in fact, says and does just that: the finite and limited may, indeed, ought, to exist. It is not just the infinite, but also the limited that is good.
In order to reconcile us with the limits and lacks of the world, Leibniz tried to show that this creation is the best of all possible worlds. Otherwise, Leibniz reasoned, God would have created it even better than it is. For if we human beings attempt — sometimes, at least — to give our best, we ought a fortiori to be able to expect the same from the creator. This argument sounds obvious, even irrefutable. Allow me to take the liberty, though, of contradicting a great thinker.
In order to substantiate our disagreement, we do not need to develop subtle considerations here about the concept and reality of divine freedom and omnipotence. In my opinion, it is enough to point out that a best of all possible worlds, that would be best in itself, that is, simply and without qualification, is as impossible as the absolutely greatest number — indeed, it is not even conceivable. For every number n, there is the number n +1. For every world, no matter how glorious, it is possible to conceive another world with even profounder thinkers, even holier saints, and even more ardent angels. And the point is that it is possible to do more than just conceive of such a world. In other words, if the creator had bound himself strictly to create the best, or even just what in each given case was better, then it is not just our world that would not exist; there would be no world at all. For any and every world is capable of enhancement.
Let us impress clearly on our minds then how strictly true the old saying is: “the better is the enemy of the good.” — How good it is that the creator does not adopt it as a rule of action. If he did, none of us would exist for there is always someone better than any of us. It is also good, furthermore, that we too do not consistently adopt it as a rule of action. If you love, you keep your eyes gratefully on the good that encounters you in the Thou that comes your way instead of being always on the lookout for a better deal. Love does not sovereignly compare; its fundamental motto is “solely”; it allows itself to be laid hold of, collected and undistracted.
But why, or to what extent, is the actually existing created world good? It cannot be good in the sense of useful, by which I mean advantageous for someone or usable for some goal.
For in this respect, there are two alternatives. Either a best of all possible worlds could exist — that is, with a view to some limited objective. There is no greatest number, but there is certainly the best — the right — number for a particular endeavor, whether we are talking about a checkers match or a sailing party or a production of Beethoven’s Ninth. And yet if such a partial goal were not just one among many, but actually were the basis and point of our existence, then we would by that very fact be degraded to the level of slaves, of a mere means to an end. This is the case, for example, in Oriental “creation” myths, which represent human beings as being produced in order to serve the gods’ needs by means of their sacrifices. But if that were true, then what would be left of the value of human life?
Or — and this is the second alternative — we continue to understand creation as having some unrestricted and comprehensive goal (however we might imagine that goal in the concrete). In this case, there would indeed be no best of all possible worlds, but then even the best possible world would now not even be good. I am perfectly serious about this. Because, looking at it as a whole, we do not call something that is serviceable, even when it could be, in fact, in principle, infinitely more serviceable, “good.” Its modest value is far outweighed by everything that it is not, and does not accomplish. This is, to return to an earlier point, the source of the negative judgments about life pronounced by both East and West.
We thus have just one recourse: **if creation is to be good in spite of all this, then this can be only insofar as creation is willed — freely and without instrumental ordination to some objective — by God. Not good for something, but simply good: the world and we in it, its existence and ours, are good “prior to any merit,” and therefore also good “despite all sin.” **
