Creation Ex Nihilo

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Creation ex nihilo means creation out of nothing. However, the late Thomistic scholar and theologian W. Norris Clarke writes the following concerning the doctrine of creation:
"This metaphysical notion of creation says nothing about a beginning in time, only total dependence of a finite being on God for its existence. (pg. 237, “The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics” by W. Norris Clarke, S.J.)
"Creation is…seen as an ongoing process throughout cosmic history, God working with nature from his eternal Now outside of time. (pg. 206, “The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics” by W. Norris Clarke, S.J.)
“St. Thomas, following Aristotle, does not believe we can prove from reason alone that the universe must have had a beginning in time.” (pgs. 237-238, “The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics” by W. Norris Clarke, S.J.)
Question:

If reason alone cannot prove that the universe must have had a beginning in time, then is it reasonable to believe that the universe is co-eternal with God?
 
Clarke is correct; that is the Thomist position:
I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (Question 19, Article 4) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above (Question 19, Article 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration.
I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity (32, 1). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from “here” and “now”; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Question 19, Article 3). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.
Aquinas is still denying that the world could be “co-eternal” with God. He is allowing the possibility that time extends infinitely backwards, but that would not make the world “eternal” in the sense that God is (ie. as fundamentally atemporal).

Aquinas’s reasoning here (in the second paragraph) does not seem to exclude the possibility of an inductive or probabilistic argument (which is perhaps what modern science discloses), but it would not be a “demonstration or science.”
 
I’ll add: to say that God is a creation, at least on a classical metaphysical view, is to say that God continually sustains the existence of the universe at every moment at which it exists. As Clarke says, it is not a statement about the beginning of the universe in time.
 
I’ll add: to say that God is a creation, at least on a classical metaphysical view, is to say that God continually sustains the existence of the universe at every moment at which it exists. As Clarke says, it is not a statement about the beginning of the universe in time.
Is that a typo?
 
Aquinas is still denying that the world could be “co-eternal” with God. He is allowing the possibility that time extends infinitely backwards, but that would not make the world “eternal” in the sense that God is (ie. as fundamentally atemporal).
The term “eternal” has different meanings. Something could be eternal in the sense that it exists infinitely or everlastingly in time. Something could also be eternal in the sense that exists timelessly. But the question I am really attempting to ask here is whether or not it is reasonable to believe the universe has an infinite past or could exists everlastingly in time.
 
I’ll add: to say that God is a creator, at least on a classical metaphysical view, is to say that God continually sustains the existence of the universe at every moment at which it exists. As Clarke says, it is not a statement about the beginning of the universe in time.
Okay. But Catholicism does teach that the universe had a beginning in time (even though Thomas holds that it cannot be rationally demonstrated). Right?
 
The term “eternal” has different meanings. Something could be eternal in the sense that it exists infinitely or everlastingly in time. Something could also be eternal in the sense that exists timelessly. But the question I am really attempting to ask here is whether or not it is reasonable to believe the universe has an infinite past or could exists everlastingly in time.
I agree, that is why I said the universe could not be eternal in the sense that God is.

What Aquinas is saying is that on the basis of natural philosophy, it cannot be shown either that the universe existed through an infinite past or that it came into existence at some point in the past. He is saying that either position is consistent.

Is it reasonable to believe the universe existed through an infinite past? It’s not inconsistent with Aquinas’s philosophy, so one could hold it without contradiction on that count, but Aquinas would seem to be arguing that one could not have a philosophical basis for doing so. I’d say it is “not unreasonable,” but if one were to assert that the universe has always existed, (Aquinas says) he would not have a basis for doing so.
Okay. But Catholicism does teach that the universe had a beginning in time (even though Thomas holds that it cannot be rationally demonstrated). Right?
Yes.
 
Is it reasonable to believe the universe existed through an infinite past? It’s not inconsistent with Aquinas’s philosophy, so one could hold it without contradiction on that count, but Aquinas would seem to be arguing that one could not have a philosophical basis for doing so. I’d say it is “not unreasonable,” but if one were to assert that the universe has always existed, (Aquinas says) he would not have a basis for doing so.
But such a belief would seem to involve a logical fallacy, namely, an infinite regress.
 
But such a belief would seem to involve a logical fallacy, namely, an infinite regress.
An infinite regress is not a logical fallacy. Vicious regresses (ie. where each element depends on the last element for its present efficacy) are problematic, but one must argue that a given regress is vicious.
 
An infinite regress is not a logical fallacy. Vicious regresses (ie. where each element depends on the last element for its present efficacy) are problematic, but one must argue that a given regress is vicious.
Okay. Why doesn’t such a belief imply a vicious infinite regress?
 
As the first, and uncaused, cause, God terminates the regress.
Well, if God terminates the regress, then it isn’t infinite. (Remember, we are talking about the proposition that the universe has an infinite past.)
 
Well, if God terminates the regress, then it isn’t infinite. (Remember, we are talking about the proposition that the universe has an infinite past.)
Then that, terminated regress, would be evidence against the proposition.
 
Okay. Why doesn’t such a belief imply a vicious infinite regress?
Aquinas argues why in the second paragraph I posted.

An example of a non-vicious regress: Suppose p is true. Then it is also true that “it is true that p” and “it is true that it is true that p” and so on. The regress is non threatening.

The homunculus fallacy is an example of a vicious regress. Perception is explained by a sort of “person” working in your mind. But then the perception of that person (the homunculus) also requires an explanation, so you invoke another homunculus for that two. You must go on to infinity and in the end you really haven’t explained anything.

In the case of the temporal regress, there is not a dependence of a current object on objects that generated. Those objects had to exist, but if (for instance) a father passes away, his sons continue to exist. The series is (Aquinas would say) “accidentally ordered.”

There are other arguments for the impossibility of infinite temporal regresses. Alexander Pruss gives one here. In this case, it is not really the regress that is problematic, though, but a reductio based on what sort things would be metaphysically possible if an infinite temporal regress were possible. I don’t know whether or not I believe such arguments.
 
Then that, terminated regress, would be evidence against the proposition.
Of course. But you’re my making my point, namely, that Aquinas is wrong. We can rationally demonstrate that the universe does not have an infinite past.
 
In the case of the temporal regress, there is not a dependence of a current object on objects that generated. Those objects had to exist, but if (for instance) a father passes away, his sons continue to exist. The series is (Aquinas would say) “accidentally ordered.”
But the fact is that there could not have been an infinite number of past fathers. Whether my father (or grandfather, or great grandfather, etc.) is alive or not is irrelevant.
There are other arguments for the impossibility of infinite temporal regresses.
I’ll demonstrate the infinite regress.

Me: What caused the present state of affairs in the universe?

Materialist: A previous state of affairs in the universe?

Me: And what caused that previous state of affairs?

Materialist: Another previous state of affairs?

Me: And what caused that previous state of afairs?

Materialist: Another previous state of affairs?

Me: Do realize that you keep begging the question?

Materialist: Yes.

Me: Why do you think that is?

Materialist: Because I am caught in a vicious infinite regress.

Me: That’s right.

Also, we know that universe could not have had an infinite past in time because an infinite amount of time would have had to elapse to reach the present. That’s a logical impossibility.
 
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