Cutsinger's Ontological Argument

[reggieM]

Taking a look at St. Thomas’ objection from the Summa once again …

“Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word “God” understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word “God” is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.”

So, First we have this …

** Perhaps not everyone who hears this word “God” understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body.**

This doesn’t address the argument because it says that people reject the premise (that God is that which …).

We could say that “no everyone accepts that all effects must have a cause” – but that can’t be used as an argument against causality since you have to start with the premise that all effects do have causes.

But I think St. Thomas is right to bring this up first – and it’s the best reason why the Ontological argument is not accepted.

Atheists are saying: The God I don’t believe in is not the one that St. Anselm is proposing.

But “The fool says in his heart there is no God” – so that’s the problem. If the fool is claiming that God is a giant unicorn, then that’s absurd. If the fool accepts St. Anselm’s definition (that St. Thomas also accepted) – then he’s still a fool to reject the necessary consequences.

 

[reggieM]

Here’s the second part of St. Thomas’ objection:

Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word “God” is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

Here’s where I don’t follow:

1. St. Thomas grants the definition is accepted: God is something than which nothing greater can be thought
2. However, some will understand that what the word signifies does not exist actually, but only that it exists mentally … so the argument fails.

But if what the word signifies only exists mentally – then the definition would not describe something than which nothing greater can be thought – since it would only describe something that exists mentally and not actually.

I don’t think there’s any way to refute the argument within its own terms

If you accept the premise – then you have to accept that God exists.

So perhaps the best refutation is to reject the first premise of the argument. This means that you have to define the term God in a different way.

But you can’t use St. Thomas for that refutation because he would have to accept the definition as given in the argument.

 

[Kilbourne]

What does it mean to say that something is greater than something else? Why is something imagined less great than something real? What is the basis for this?

It sounds like a value judgement. If you have a value judgements you are presupposing the existence of God.

Hi John,

Here is a quote from Cutsinger’s paper on this question:

In affirming that real existence is greater than imaginary existence, we are affirming in the first place that existence itself is a matter of degrees. To use the language of the western tradition, we are attesting to the truth of a Great Chain of Being, and we are saying that certain links in that Chain have more existence or a greater reality than others. That this is St Anselm’s own meaning, and that it is in precisely this hierarchical way that he envisions the universe, is clear from what he tells us elsewhere, in a treatise called the Monologion:

“If we think of some substance that is alive and sentient and rational to be deprived
of its reason, then of its sentience, then of its life, and finally of the bare existence
that remains, who would not understand that the substance that is destroyed, little
by little, is gradually brought to less and less existence, and ultimately to
nonexistence? If what is removed, however, respectively reduces a being to less
and less existence, when added to it, in relevant order, it leads to greater and
greater existence.”

K

 

[Kilbourne]

See also reggie’s post at 35.

Cutsinger also suggests that ideas or imaginations are not nothing. They are a type of being, mental beings if you will. Mental beings occupy the lowest link in the chain of being. They lack independent existence. Mental beings need a thinking subject in order to exist. Thus any mental being, no matter how grandly conceived, will be defective compared to even the lowest form of being which exists independently.

 

[Kilbourne]

It sounds like a value judgement. If you have a value judgements you are presupposing the existence of God.

Both forms of Anselms ontological argument absolutely depend on a value judgement or “greater than” principle. The arguments don’t work without it.

The form of the argument from Prosl II, which is the subject of Cutsinger’s lecture, has been rejected since Kant as presupposing the existence of God, but I think Cutsinger has effectively dealt with that claim.

The form of the argument from prosl III, the so-called modal version, is not under discussion here except that I mentioned earlier in post no. 33. It relies on the principle that the property of existing necessarily is greater than the property of existing contingently.

 

[empther]

Right – but isn’t that the same as saying that “a First Cause necessarily exists since otherwise there would be an infinite regress”?

Every effect, necessarily must have a cause.
Every sequence of events, necessarily must have a beginning.
In an infinite period of time, every possibility must necessarily be realized.

You’re confusing the use of the word “necessary”.

As Aquinas uses the word, God is the Necessary Being. He cannot not exist.

You’re using the word to say God was necessary for the universe to exist. While I agree with that, it’s not the ontological argument.

 

[JohnAlexander]

Hi John,
Here is a quote from Cutsinger’s paper on this question:

Quote:
In affirming that real existence is greater than imaginary existence, we are affirming in the first place that existence itself is a matter of degrees. To use the language of the western tradition, we are attesting to the truth of a Great Chain of Being, and we are saying that certain links in that Chain have more existence or a greater reality than others. That this is St Anselm’s own meaning, and that it is in precisely this hierarchical way that he envisions the universe, is clear from what he tells us elsewhere, in a treatise called the Monologion:

“If we think of some substance that is alive and sentient and rational to be deprived
of its reason, then of its sentience, then of its life, and finally of the bare existence
that remains, who would not understand that the substance that is destroyed, little
by little, is gradually brought to less and less existence, and ultimately to
nonexistence? If what is removed, however, respectively reduces a being to less
and less existence, when added to it, in relevant order, it leads to greater and
greater existence.”

K

This is not sound reasoning. You can’t just affirm that existence is a matter of degree.

Existence of a particular thing is a matter of degree. But only because we define what the particular thing is.

For example take a cat. A cat has certain properties that make it a cat. If you start removing those properties then it is less of a cat. But the reason it is a cat in the first place is because we defined it as such. A cat without whiskers can be thought of as less than a cat with whiskers. But that is only because we define cats as having whiskers. Assume there exists an animal that was exactly like a cat but it doesn’t have whiskers, lets call it a dat. In what way could you say that a cat exists more than a dat?

 

[reggieM]

You’re confusing the use of the word “necessary”.

As Aquinas uses the word, God is the Necessary Being. He cannot not exist.

You’re using the word to say God was necessary for the universe to exist. While I agree with that, it’s not the ontological argument.

I was using the word as part of the logic and not as a form of the argument from necessary being. But you’re right that there’s a better way to phrase it.

If the “Fool” possesses the correct concept of God, then he is affirming that which exists.
St. Thomas’ first argument against this is that various “fools” will deny the definition of what God is. St. Thomas explains that some people think that God is a body.

I still marvel at that response by St. Thomas. In his example, he shows the Fool to be even more foolish by thinking that God is a body.

 

[Kilbourne]

Hi John,

This is not sound reasoning. You can’t just affirm that existence is a matter of degree.

Existence of a particular thing is a matter of degree. But only because we define what the particular thing is.

For example take a cat…

I take it to be intuitively obvious that a man is greater than a cat, which is greater than a worm, which is greater than an amoeba, which is greater than a rock, which is greater than an atom, which is greater than… a Higgs Boson.

There are real differences of richness of being between each that everyone would agree on. It is not just a matter of arbitrary definition.

 

[Kilbourne]

In post 27 Ch2 said:

In Question 2 Article 1 of the Summa Theologica Aquinas says this:

I’ve always had trouble understanding what the word “greater” even means for Anselm, since he does not define “greater” and anyway would have been giving a predicate to God before having proven God’s existence.

I think Cutsinger has given plausible explanation for anselm’s meaning of greater. I’ve summarized it in terms of “richness of being.” Just seems obvious to me that there is a hierarchy of being. It also seems obvious to me now, after I’ve gotten used to the idea, that actual beings are always greater than mental beings.

I still don’t get, though, your objection to anselm’s definition, namely that it gives a predicate to God before having proven God’s existence. As I said before, how can we talk about anything without ascribing some properties to it? And how can we first prove something exists if we don’t define what it is?

 

[Kilbourne]

For me, Anselm clears a lot of ground in the great God debate. In essence, he is telling us that if we get our thinking straight about God, the question of existence is settled. if ultimate greatness exists, God certainly exists, as reggie has been saying.

IOW, either the idea of God makes sense and He exists necessarily, or the very idea is nonsense and his existence if impossible.

 

[reggieM]

For me, Anselm clears a lot of ground in the great God debate. In essence, he is telling us that if we get our thinking straight about God, the question of existence is settled. if ultimate greatness exists, God certainly exists, as reggie has been saying.

IOW, either the idea of God makes sense and He exists necessarily, or the very idea is nonsense and his existence if impossible.

Great points, Kilbourne. I really like how you summarized that in your IOW.

Would it be true to say that if it is possible for God to exist, then He must necessarily exist because God is the fulfillment of all possibilities of being? And that there could be nothing outside of God that would make it more possible for Him to exist?

If there was one chance in billion that God exists – wouldn’t that chance necessarily come to fulfillment in an infinite amount of opportunities?

 

[reggieM]

I can conceive of something as existing in reality without it actually existing in reality. Thus, TTWNGCBT can still have the conceptual attribute of existing in reality while still being limited to my phantasm.

The problem here is that TTWNGCBT cannot be a concept alone. Since any actually existing thing is greater than every possible concept, then TTWNGCBT cannot be a concept alone – it must exist.

 

[reggieM]

I think Cutsinger has given plausible explanation for anselm’s meaning of greater. I’ve summarized it in terms of “richness of being.”

As Aquinas taught – irrefutably I would say – “a thing is good in that it has being”. A thing is perfect to the extent that it is made actual in being – to the extent that its potential is actualized. Thus, God is pure act - pure being - and therefore the greatest possible good.

Just seems obvious to me that there is a hierarchy of being. It also seems obvious to me now, after I’ve gotten used to the idea, that actual beings are always greater than mental beings.

That’s a key point. Anselm’s argument won’t work if a person disputes that point – so, the premises need to be argued and agreed-upon first.

1. To exist in reality is greater that to exist in the mind alone. [Take this to mean: existing things as a class, are greater than any purely mental being. So, for example, a speck of dust is greater than an imagined mansion.]

1. To exist in reality is a greater state of being (or just “greater”) than to exist in the mind alone.
2. Anything that exists in reality is, by virtue of that existence, greater in being than any possible thought.
3. That which nothing greater can be conceived, therefore, must necessarily exist in reality and not just in the mind.

Here’s another possible refutation and my counter-refutation:

Similar to what St. Thomas argues (about how some people have the wrong definition of God) – we could say:

“Some people are not capable of conceiving of TWNGCBT. They might think that greatness is in bodily strength, so that would mean that God is a great muscle-man.”

Counter-point: It’s the “CB” in the phrase that counts. It’s not just what “you, individual” conceives or thinks, but what “can be” conceived. That the greatest possible – and therefore it’s not subject to the ignorance of people who think of greatness as muscles or of greeting card slogans.

 

[reggieM]

Yet another exploration – does this work?

Claim: “The tallest tree on earth necessarily exists”.
Refutations:

1. We do not know what “tall” really is.
2. We have just defined things to be trees, but they might not be trees.
3. We cannot measure every tree on earth, so we can’t possibly know.
4. I may think in my mind that the tallest tree exists, but that doesn’t make it exist in reality.
5. There may not be a tallest tree.

Obviously, none of those are reasonable objections.
It’s a trivial fact – because we know that all trees are finite things having varying degrees of “tallness” – it follows necessarily that the tallest tree exists. [Don’t get bogged down with the idea that there are two or more exactly the same height – that is not the point].

So, by definition and by what we know of the world – we can rightly conclude with 100% certainty that “the tallest tree necessarily exists”. As soon as we understand the concepts, we know this thing must exist.

In the same way, as soon as we know that God is TWNGCBT we know that God must exist.

TWNGCBT must exist in reality because otherwise, if it was just a mental concept, it wouldn’t be TWNGCBT.

No thought, can be greater in being than an existing thing.

If the greatest thing a human being can think of, is just a mental concept which doesn’t actually exist – then any actual thing is greater than that thought.

If I think of a great car – it doesn’t need any fuel, it can fly, it can fold up and be saved in a cabinet, it can carry 20 people, it can go 250 mph, it costs $50. That “mental concept of a car” is greater than the mental concept of any actually existing car.
However, any actual car no matter how humble – is greater, as a car (as being) than the idea of that flying, fuel-less, fold-able car that I thought of.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Thomas Aquinas rejected the Ontological Argument because he contended that it is not self-evident that a Greatest Possible being existed. He, of course, agreed that it DOES exist. He just didn’t consider it self-evident. It is conceded by Thomist James Chastek that it’s not clear if Anselm would agree with this as a refutation, however.

Aquinas’s beef with it:

“St. Thomas Aquinas…criticized the ontological argument, claiming that the argument only had the ability to work for those who accepted the proposed definition of G-d given by Anselm, whereby many people felt that the definition of G-d might not necessarily be “that which none greater can be conceived,” but rather many believed G-d to be in the form of a body like the resurrected body of Jesus. (2) He continued to explain that G-d was an infinite being, and that finite beings such as ourselves might never come to fully comprehend such a greater being. Even if we take Anselm’s definition of G-d to be “that which none greater can be conceived,” literally, we as finite beings, could only turn to finite examples to be able to comprehend the definition of G-d, and might not fully be able to understand G-d through comparisons within our finite world and understanding of things.”

prometheus-journal.com/2009/02/a-critique-of-the-ontological-argument/

The blog author cites: 2. Himma, Kenneth E. “The Ontological Argument.” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2006. Seattle Pacific University. http://www.iep.utm.edu/o/ont-arg.htm.

 

[reggieM]

Thomas Aquinas rejected the Ontological Argument because he contended that it is not self-evident that a Greatest Possible being existed. He, of course, agreed that it DOES exist. He just didn’t consider it self-evident.

That’s an interesting point. St. Thomas uses St. Anselm’s argument as an example of a proof that the existence of God is self-evident. But as you said, it’s not clear that’s what St. Anselm meant by the argument. Since the ontological argument uses some knowledge to derive other knowledge, it’s not really a matter of a self-evident truth, but of a metaphysical demonstration from premises.

"St. Thomas Aquinas…criticized the ontological argument, claiming that the argument only had the ability to work for those who accepted the proposed definition of G-d given by Anselm, whereby many people felt that the definition of G-d might not necessarily be “that which none greater can be conceived,” but rather many believed G-d to be in the form of a body like the resurrected body of Jesus. (2)

I found that to be a strange comment so I went to read the blog (which offers a thoughtful commentary). The blog author, Matthew Rowe, adds this “in the form of a body like the resurrected body of Jesus”. I wondered where he came up with that. So I followed the footnote (thanks for posting that link also) to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and an excellent overview of St. Anselm’s argument and criticisms of it.

Ok – the evidence I was looking for wasn’t there. Mr. Himma says nothing about a resurrected body. That was something invented by Mr. Rowe – because St. Thomas also said nothing about “a body like the resurrection”. Instead, St. Thomas meant a body like a physical, corporeal body. The reason I’m so confident in saying that is the very next question in the Summa (after his opposition to St. Anselm’s argument) is the Simplicity of God where the first article is Article 1. Whether God is a body? Then, in the four objections given, St. Thomas says nothing about the resurrected body of Jesus.

The reason I find that important is that it St. Thomas is talking about someone who has a primative or pagan view of God. It’s one of the simplest arguments to prove that God is not a physical body. So, is anyone who believes that about God really giving a solid refutation of St. Anselm’s argument?

Personally, I don’t think so – for the reason I gave before. Just after St. Thomas states that some people might think God is a body, he gives a different refutation which grants that people would (should?) accept St. Anselm’s definition. So, it strikes me that the first objection was kind of a throw-away idea. Poorly paraphrasing: “Some idiots might think God is a body, so the argument wouldn’t convince them. Ok, forget that – granted that we’re talking about someone who understands that St. Anselm’s definition is correct…”

Ok, none of that can be proven and it’s just one man’s interpretation – but it really seems that way.

He continued to explain that G-d was an infinite being, and that finite beings such as ourselves might never come to fully comprehend such a greater being. Even if we take Anselm’s definition of G-d to be “that which none greater can be conceived,” literally, we as finite beings, could only turn to finite examples to be able to comprehend the definition of G-d, and might not fully be able to understand G-d through comparisons within our finite world and understanding of things."

I hadn’t seen that criticism before. Himma rejects it with this:

Nevertheless, the success of the argument doesn’t depend on our having a complete understanding of the concept of a being than which none greater can be conceived. Consider, for example, that, while we don’t have a complete understanding (whatever this means) of the concept of a natural number than which none larger can be imagined, we understand it well enough to see that there does not exist such a number. No more complete understanding of the concept of a maximally great being than this is required, on Anselm’s view, to successfully make the argument. If the concept is coherent, then even a minimal understanding of the concept is sufficient to make the argument.

I would add that the OA does not require that one fully comprehend the infinite. Of course, that’s an impossible task for a finite mind. It’s enough to know that God is a being which is greater than what can be conceived. We don’t need to know how much greater or be able to define fullness of God to understand the concept.

I read Kant’s criticism explained by Himma once again and it still doesn’t make sense to me – although Himma is impressed by it.

Another philosopher offers this:

It makes sense and is true to say that my future house will be a better one if it is insulated than if it is not insulated; but what could it mean to say that it will be a better house if it exists than if it does not?

This is a rejection of the Thomistic categories of potential and act. I do not see why it is hard to understand that a thought possesses less being than an actual existing thing does, and is therefore not as great as whatever exists is.

The house exists as an idea or a plan. So it’s easily understandable to see that the house has greater value once it is actually built than it did just as an idea.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Hm, interesting reggiem.I’d always heard that Aquinas rejected the ontological argument (I hesitate to say “refuted”, but definitely rejected).

Thomist James Chastek has a fascinating article that discusses whether or not Anselm’s argument is tied to mystical experience. Never heard that before, but here’s the article: thomism.wordpress.com/2012/07/13/anselms-argument-and-mystical-experience/

“To see Anselm’s argument in the way suggested here, we need to get beyond the mere words “that than which nothing greater can be thought” and try to reconstruct the experience by which one can come up with such an idea in the first place. What would be a single, unified experience of the that than which, etc. even if it is experienced within ourselves? To raise the question usually serves as a painful reminder that our appreciation of Anselm’s argument usually does not go much further than knowing the words and the syntactical relationships between them. Any of our experiences may or may not be illusory, but what is it to have the experience of that than which nothing greater can be thought?”

…Interesting. Seems like a very Thomist response.

…Ah, it seems as if Mr. Chastek might back you up on this one reggiem He writes in this article: thomism.wordpress.com/2012/07/06/my-philosophical-bugbears/

4.) St. Thomas refuted the ontological argument. St. Thomas’s refutations of what appear to be ontological arguments are always expressed in terms of denying the self-evidence of some relevant predicate about God, that is, STA denies it is self-evident to us to say “that than which nothing greater can be thought necessarily exists” or “A divine being is that than which nothing better can be thought”. This is true, but it’s not clear that Anselm would disagree.

This seems to lend some credence to what you said; St. Thomas agrees with the Ontological argument and is only refuting silly objections. Not sure if that’s true or not, but it makes sense.

 

[Kilbourne]

Great points, Kilbourne. I really like how you summarized that in your IOW.

Would it be true to say that if it is possible for God to exist, then He must necessarily exist because God is the fulfillment of all possibilities of being? And that there could be nothing outside of God that would make it more possible for Him to exist?

If there was one chance in billion that God exists – wouldn’t that chance necessarily come to fulfillment in an infinite amount of opportunities?

Thinking in terms of Anselm’s first argument, I would say that when we first entertain the idea of God as TTWNGCT, we are thinking that it is possible that the idea is conceivable or thinkable. IOW, we are not talking nonsense. After we get over that hurdle, then the conclusion of his necessary existence follows.

God as the fulfullment of all possibilities of being would be an attribute that we would conclude from his ultimate and unsurpassable greatness, I would say.

 

[Kilbourne]

Here’s another possible refutation and my counter-refutation:

Similar to what St. Thomas argues (about how some people have the wrong definition of God) – we could say:

“Some people are not capable of conceiving of TWNGCBT. They might think that greatness is in bodily strength, so that would mean that God is a great muscle-man.”

Counter-point: It’s the “CB” in the phrase that counts. It’s not just what “you, individual” conceives or thinks, but what “can be” conceived. That the greatest possible – and therefore it’s not subject to the ignorance of people who think of greatness as muscles or of greeting card slogans.

I agree. It has often been argued that what is “greater” is a matter of opinion or even taste, but that is silly. God is the embodiment of all value whatsoever, so my opinion as to what is great is kind of trivial. Charles Hartshorne, a big fan of Anselm’s second argument, says that Anselm conceives of greatness in the most general way possible: * “God is better than anyone or anything else in whatever way it is better to be.”]*