What is being said here? That capital punishment, being an offense against “the dignity of the human person”, is intrinsically evil? That would indeed be a doctrinal statement, but that isn’t what is said. So what is the doctrine? That we shouldn’t use capital punishment when we don’t need to? If that is the case then surely you have to admit that the determination of when it is needed is prudential; it is not possible to doctrinally identify when something is needed.
Understand that both JPII and the catechism identify an exception when capital punishment may be used (“if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives”). This alone means its use cannot be intrinsically evil for the term means that the act to which it applies is evil without exception.
The phrase “defending human lives” is generally interpreted to mean physical defense, but we know that physical defense is not the most important aspect of punishment. It is a valid objective, but it is certainly not the primary one, so it is certainly reasonable to ask, if capital punishment is valid when necessary to achieve a secondary end, why would it not be equally as valid when necessary to achieve the primary end? If we can act against man’s dignity for a secondary purpose surely we can do so for an even more important reason.
So I ask again: what is the new doctrine here?
Ender