Defending Catholic stance on gay marriage and business rights

[cargau]

OK, let’s go with your car analogy. Only this time you are a new car salesman. A gay couple comes in to your showroom and wants to buy a new car, and they tell you they plan on using it in their upcoming wedding, to drive to and from the ceremony. In a sense the car is more “aiding and abetting” than a cake, because you can have a wedding without a cake, but you can’t have a wedding if you can’t get to the wedding. So by your argument, you should not sell them the car, which of course is nonsense. So there must be more to it than that.

I don’t think you are looking critically enough at the degree of cooperation in sin. Baking a cake is not cooperating in sin. They don’t need it to sin. It only indirectly approves of the sin. And I think the level of involvement is quite indirect, not like, say, officiating at the ceremony. The only thing you can “proudly” say after refusing to bake a cake for a gay wedding is that you did not pass up an opportunity to make life miserable for gays. I would not be so proud of that.

The example I provided is clearly subjective in that this issue is a matter for the conscience. I would distinguish what I wrote from the new car salesman example because the purpose of the cake is the celebration of the sin. While the car may be used to transport guests or others, the purpose of the car is not exclusively for the wedding.
Further, it is possible that the use of the car for the wedding is never disclosed and need not be, but the when the baker is asked to put two grooms or two brides on the cake, they are aware of their role in the marriage ceremony.

My real beef is that as this “movement” has taken such a strong hold in society, people are not free to exercise their conscience. And the temptation is to always equate people who want to participate in gay sex with people of color. Apples and oranges and we should do everything we can to not get drawn into the comparison.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

I would distinguish what I wrote from the new car salesman example because the purpose of the cake is the celebration of the sin. While the car may be used to transport guests or others, the purpose of the car is not exclusively for the wedding.

The possible good uses of the car that may come after the wedding does not mitigate the cooperation in evil, if cooperation there was. Suppose a woman said to you “Please drive me to an abortion clinic where I will get an abortion. And immediately after that I am going to go shopping for some much-needed groceries in the store right next to the abortion clinic.” Are you saying that it would be OK to offer the ride on the grounds that it serves a dual purpose, one of which is perfectly fine and laudable?

 

[LeafByNiggle]

We could go with an even worse analogy to help make a clearer point - “I plan on using this to make pornographic films of me picking up women and paying them for favors on-camera while I drive.” Would you still sell?

I don’t know about the law, but personally I would feel there was a moral difference between selling something in a business on main street and providing something to my neighbor. If my neighbor asked to borrow my video camera to make smut, I would say no. But if had a store that sold video cameras to the public, I would sell to anyone, including that same neighbor.

 

[cargau]

The possible good uses of the car that may come after the wedding does not mitigate the cooperation in evil, if cooperation there was. Suppose a woman said to you “Please drive me to an abortion clinic where I will get an abortion. And immediately after that I am going to go shopping for some much-needed groceries in the store right next to the abortion clinic.” Are you saying that it would be OK to offer the ride on the grounds that it serves a dual purpose, one of which is perfectly fine and laudable?

No, the complicity is in the act itself (driving someone to the clinic), not the acquisition of the car. Just like if I bought a gun from a gun store, complicity is not found in the sale but rather the act of supporting any crime it might have been used for.

The baker is making a cake whose express purpose is for the celebration of an immoral act that is directly offensive to God. The cake clearly has no other use.

 

[cargau]

I don’t know about the law, but personally I would feel there was a moral difference between selling something in a business on main street and providing something to my neighbor. If my neighbor asked to borrow my video camera to make smut, I would say no. But if had a store that sold video cameras to the public, I would sell to anyone, including that same neighbor.

Yes, but it remains a matter of conscience. For you, it may be permissible but others maybe not. You may feel that providing birth control coverage to your workers is OK, but others may not.

That is hopefully a well informed conscience at work.

 

[Deltadeliquent]

I’m worried about this too.
Id like to start making custom made wedding gowns as a couture dress maker. In Canada. I think I can get around the man thing by only doing women’s garments… ( I dont wan to be selling corsets to men for men…) But I will be in a community with a large GLTB population. How to style myself so that I don’t wind up being take no court for refusing to make gowns for a lesbian “wedding”.

They forget, those ho wish to refuse service are not discrimating against gays, they don’t want to support " Gay Marriage". Would a graphic designer get I trouble for refusing to make a logo for a porno company? Both the “gay marriage” and the pronography i
are legal activities, but both are very offensive to me, and my religion. A religion which is common and very well established with a long history in our culture.
I’m scared.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

No, the complicity is in the act itself (driving someone to the clinic), not the acquisition of the car. Just like if I bought a gun from a gun store, complicity is not found in the sale but rather the act of supporting any crime it might have been used for.

The baker is making a cake whose express purpose is for the celebration of an immoral act that is directly offensive to God. The cake clearly has no other use.

OK, then suppose the woman asked to borrow my car so she could drive herself to the abortion clinic, and then to the grocery store. Is that any different than loaning the car to a woman who does not plan to go grocery shopping, but whose sole purpose is to go get an abortion?

And the cake does have other uses. Many people will eat and enjoy its taste without thinking of the event it is celebrating.

 

[losh14]

I fear we’re getting into the examples more than the principles.
In terms of how complicit are you in evil, if you provide something that’s essential to the evil, you are complicit. If you provide something without which the evil would not occur, you’re remotely complicit at worst.

I disagree here:

The possible good uses of the car that may come after the wedding does not mitigate the cooperation in evil, if cooperation there was… Are you saying that it would be OK to offer the ride on the grounds that it serves a dual purpose, one of which is perfectly fine and laudable?

I have two arguments, and they’re getting close to being conflated here:

1. My primary argument is that the law should not compel a person to do something that he or she finds to be morally offensive.
2. My argument here is not that using the car for good in addition to evil justifies my selling the car. My argument is rather that the primary use of the car is not the wedding. Renting a limo or car service is a proximate case because the sole use is to facilitate the wedding.

In the example you give:

Suppose a woman said to you “Please drive me to an abortion clinic where I will get an abortion. And immediately after that I am going to go shopping for some much-needed groceries in the store right next to the abortion clinic.”

The proximate evil is the purpose of the trip. Without the trip, the abortion will not take place. The purpose of buying a car is to have a car. The wedding will happen with or without the car - if they got to the dealership, they can get to the wedding hall.

And if the sole purpose of purchasing the car was for the wedding, I’d remind them that sales are final and please just rent a car if they intend on returning this one in four days, expecting a refund. Our dealership doesn’t rent cars (insurance and other reasons) but Mike at the rental place across the street does a good business. Tell him I sent you.

I don’t know about the law, but personally I would feel there was a moral difference between selling something in a business on main street and providing something to my neighbor. If my neighbor asked to borrow my video camera to make smut, I would say no. But if had a store that sold video cameras to the public, I would sell to anyone, including that same neighbor.

I think that’s a safe distinction, though we do have some responsibility, and we need to rely upon our own moral senses for that (say your neighbor was filming animal fights). I think at this point, I need to reiterate my central argument: the law should not compel a person to do something that he or she finds morally objectionable. You selling to that neighbor is less the issue than someone else *not wanting to * sell to that neighbor over the moral turpitude they feel from the intended use of the camera.

 

[losh14]

In Canada, I don’t know your protections:

I’m worried about this too.
Id like to start making custom made wedding gowns as a couture dress maker. In Canada. I think I can get around the man thing by only doing women’s garments…

What is fortunate is that men’s and women’s clothing are unequal. I can’t think of how you’d fit a man for a dress in the same way as for a women. They’re simply built differently. I think it’s entirely honest for you to tell a cross-dressing man “I really don’t know how to make a dress fit a man’s body type. It’s not going to look the same. You may want to look into someone who specializes in it.” You may also say “I’m not comfortable working in my shop by myself with a male customer.”

Do you find it morally objectionable to help in any way with a gay wedding? Have you prayerfully considered whether making the dresses is a sin and makes you fully complicit in the wedding day? I’d hate for the weight of the Provincial authorities to come down upon you for refusing to do so, but you are right to prepare yourself for the eventuality. From a moral standpoint, I will not fault you. From a legal standpoint you’d best be prepared, read up on the local laws and whether things like “discrimination by gender orientation in lodging” would apply to a niche business like a seamstress.

 

[cargau]

IAnd if the sole purpose of purchasing the car was for the wedding, I’d remind them that sales are final and please just rent a car if they intend on returning this one in four days, expecting a refund. Our dealership doesn’t rent cars (insurance and other reasons) but Mike at the rental place across the street does a good business. Tell him I sent you.

You worked so hard to avoid complicity and then in the end you were complicit by referring Mike. “We don’t rent cars” and leave it at that…

 

[LeafByNiggle]

You worked so hard to avoid complicity and then in the end you were complicit by referring Mike. “We don’t rent cars” and leave it at that…

The only clear case of complicity is assisting the sin in a way that with that help, the sin could not be committed. Cases that fall short of that criterion are more or less fuzzy. The cake is not essential to the commission of the sin. The “wedding” would probably go on with or without a cake at the reception. So I don’t think Catholic teaching compels you to refuse selling the cake.

However, as losh14 pointed out, this thread is not really about what we are compelled to do. It is about having the right of conscience to choose not to do it. In general I agree with that. However, even with that question, there are extreme cases where it is not so clear. Suppose someone who runs a lunch counter is genuinely offended at having to serve blacks. No matter how genuine his moral feelings may be, we don’t want to grant him the right to refuse such service. That is because we recognize the overriding need to provide reasonable accommodations for all people. Whether the right to buy a custom made wedding cake falls under that principle is the real question. My personal opinion is that the right to buy anything ready made, or anything made from a stock menu should not be refused to anyone. That is, the baker should be compelled by law to sell any cakes he has sitting on the shelf, or cakes that he makes the same way every day. But the law should not compel him to participate in any wedding planning or consultation or customization of the service if he chooses not to do it.

 

[losh14]

Granted, this is going a little to side in that I’m responding to a personal opinion, but I wanted to point out a question and set back from this and think for the weekend.

My personal opinion is that the right to buy anything ready made, or anything made from a stock menu should not be refused to anyone. That is, the baker should be compelled by law to sell any cakes he has sitting on the shelf, or cakes that he makes the same way every day. But the law should not compel him to participate in any wedding planning or consultation or customization of the service if he chooses not to do it.

Following the logic you outlined here, how do you feel about Arlene’s flowers, the florist who said she’ll sell flowers for the wedding but not arrange, design or set up flowers for the wedding? So she’d provide supply for someone else to do the work. That example seems close to what you posit. The menu would be a bit tough of an interpretation - could a racist be compelled to serve one of a race who draws his ire so long as its on the menu, but definitely no special orders or substitutions? I think you’re on a sensible route, otherwise.

As to your point - which is a very good one and should be taken seriously - about denying service to blacks at your lunch counter on the basis of having a moral objection to serving blacks, I think there is a distinction. Returning to the florist, she refused to take part in the wedding (other than selling flowers) but she did sell flowers to the same couple for other occasions. So we observe that she did not discriminate against all gays as a class, but rather chose not to participate in the ceremony itself. Her qualm was the ceremony, not the person. Abyssinia noted a baker who refused to make Halloween-themed treats, and I’m sure he’d refuse to make soul cakes for Samhain.

To return to the lunch counter - the proprietor’s objection to serving an entire protected class of people is objectively illegal. It would be the same if the proprietor were to refuse to serve Muslims, period.

However, consider the moral calculus of a proprietor of a restaurant who refuses a particular kind of meal. He is of a faith that has two branches, the branches having a deep enmity between them, but he serves anyone who comes in. He keeps his shop open on a day that his faith fasts, but those of the other branch celebrate with a meal. The reason for the difference - the day commemorates a military defeat of his branch by the other branch, so the other branch’s meal is a celebration of the killing of his forefathers. On that day, he himself fasts but serves all who come in … unless they ask for the traditional victory meal. Clearly there is moral offense, and the restauranteur is happy to serve the other branch any other day of the year, but does not wish to take part in a meal (indeed, he is preparing it for them) that commemorates the killing of his forefathers.* Is he discriminating against an entire protected class (those of another faith) on the basis of their faith, or is he lawfully discriminating against the day itself?

Much to think on and pray on. But I think there are more pressing issues worldwide that demand our prayers and courage.

• This actually isn’t that far off from the Day of Ashura, and how the Shi’a and Sunni Muslims celebrate differently. It is also one reason why this day often results in sectarian violence.

 

[cargau]

The only clear case of complicity is assisting the sin in a way that with that help, the sin could not be committed. Cases that fall short of that criterion are more or less fuzzy. The cake is not essential to the commission of the sin. The “wedding” would probably go on with or without a cake at the reception. So I don’t think Catholic teaching compels you to refuse selling the cake.

However, as losh14 pointed out, this thread is not really about what we are compelled to do. It is about having the right of conscience to choose not to do it. In general I agree with that. However, even with that question, there are extreme cases where it is not so clear. Suppose someone who runs a lunch counter is genuinely offended at having to serve blacks. No matter how genuine his moral feelings may be, we don’t want to grant him the right to refuse such service. That is because we recognize the overriding need to provide reasonable accommodations for all people. Whether the right to buy a custom made wedding cake falls under that principle is the real question. My personal opinion is that the right to buy anything ready made, or anything made from a stock menu should not be refused to anyone. That is, the baker should be compelled by law to sell any cakes he has sitting on the shelf, or cakes that he makes the same way every day. But the law should not compel him to participate in any wedding planning or consultation or customization of the service if he chooses not to do it.

I said in an earlier post that this is a subjective matter that should be decided with an informed conscience. These issues are not always black and white. And, I quite agree that we as a society are limited when our government presumes to decide these issues for us.

Responding to your comment about the lunch counter, a black person eating lunch is not a sin and thus cannot be considered as a rebuttal. Clearly, refusing to serve that person just because he is black is most uncharitable and in itself sinful.