Defense of the abortion/Discussion about Ethics

[kapp19]

Okay - so the rule you are proposing here, with respect to abortion, is what specifically? State the rule that guarantees the right set of consequences which maximizes utility in the best-case scenario, ceteris paribus.

I see I’ve gotten to the central nervous system here - if we can’t define “good,” then we must revert to - in this case - YOUR intuition about it. The problem is, we have deeply conflicting intuitions. Clearly, you do not value the “life, freedom, and well-being” of the unborn child as much as many other beings - which again strikes at the heart of the issue, which is “being” - as your criterion is a function, namely, “sentience/ability to feel pain.” Well, that is a criterion, but you have already started to try to define goodness: the absence of the awareness of pain. Quite an interesting definition. Am I on point?

 

[Nonatheist]

Just to clerify, l based the core of my system on consequentialism.
Pain, death and lack of freedom ought to be avoided and not caused.
But implementing that principle on the brute level would make as ask this question.
''If preserving life and well being is good, would destroying life in order to preserve life be justified/good?
To answer that question l must conclude that some life is more valuable the the other.
To determine that makes life more valuable l went with sentience approach. If pain and death are bad, which life can experience it to a highest extent.

Goodness and badness can’t be defined in my opinion, they just exist. Goodness is desirable while badness isn’t.
Life, well being and freedom will always be desirable and good. While death,pain lack of freedom will be the opposite.
Freedom cannot be applied to beings that lack personhood. Nature of what freedom is involves ability to choose and act as one wants. l think we can agree that fetus lacks the ability to want anything.

l cannot define goodness, l can just claim that some things are good.
Goodness is fundamentally an intuitive concept.
Well being/pleasure, life, and freedom cannot ever be not good at their core.

The way l see it, there are only three options here.

1. ‘All life has the same worth’, problem l have with that reasoning is that it totally ignores pain, focusing only on life, and also doesn’t answer that question of ‘destroying life to preserve life’.
2. Would be the idea of human exceptionalism.(natural law in this case). Which l have many problems with. And it usually fails to give a reason why humans are only beings with moral value.
3. Would be sentient based approach.

 

[Abrosz]

Goodness and badness can’t be defined in my opinion, they just exist.

Sorry, I have to contradict this. These are both derivatives of our biological nature. In a universe without “life” there is no “good” or “bad”. In general, we call something “good”, when it promotes life or enhances its quality. “Bad” is the opposite. Of course this is a very rudimentary distinction, because many things enhance the quality of someone’s life, while decreases the the quality of others.

The life and liberty of a psychopath is neither good, nor desirable for the victims. Difficult questions don’t have easy answers.

 

[kapp19]

l think we can agree that fetus lacks the ability to want anything.

There are many ways to respond to your last post - but I just want to zero in on this, because it unlocks what is going on here.

No - I do not agree that the fetus lacks the ability to want anything, and that in two ways.

1 - The in-built power of reason which is not currently in operation, just like the sleeping man…
2 - The other ways in which the fetus wants, which are the animal, the vegetal, and basic material desires, which are inclinations toward motion and sensory goods (including the avoidance of pain stimuli, by the way, in later stages of development), toward augmentation and nutrition (growing by feeding, like a plant) and toward… yup, you guessed it, the act of BEING, which all of this tends toward maximizing the “health” of according to the proper objects of the various powers of the soul and body.

The tendency toward the proper object of natural powers - this is what good actions are… provided the act is done in due weight, measure, and order.

Goodness: being as apprehended by the appetitive powers.

The first principle of the natural law: do good, avoid evil.

The second principles are the three basic drives of human nature: self-preservation, propagation of the species, and truth-seeking in community. These form the backbone of natural law theory… they are the fundamental precepts. Start there.

Why not give Thomas a read on the precepts of the natural law: SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The natural law (Prima Secundae Partis, Q. 94)

 

[Nonatheist]

It’s not really about life, but of our perspection.
Things that enhance life are good. But they are not goodenss it’s self.
Goodness is a quality, not something in of it’s self.

 

[Nonatheist]

1. Difference between the two is that sleeping man has a temporary reduction in it’s sentience, while fetus never had sentience to begin with. Fetus cannot want anything until that ability is gained.
2. When l say ‘wants’ l mean that as a conscience action, not just instinctual.
   l reject teleology in natural law theory.
   The core of natural law implies a design, which l don’t have a reason to believe in.

Also it runs into is/ought problem, getting normative ‘ought’ from common human behaviour ‘it’.

Natural law theory also mixed moral goodness with goodness as an attribute, which l have a problem with. The principle you said doesn’t make a lot of sense without appealing to other ethics outside natural law. If goodness and badness(evil) is understood by how much creature acts acording to it’s nature, than doing good and evil wouldn’t be possible. You could only be good or evil.
Or you could say that person is acting good by eating, because eating is part of it’s nature. But at that point, the common understand of goodness and badness is changed almost completely.

To my knowlage, it’s ‘God seeking’ not just ‘truth seeking’, as Aquinas believed that all humans are directed towards God.

 

[kapp19]

Difference between the two is that sleeping man has a temporary reduction in it’s sentience, while fetus never had sentience to begin with. Fetus cannot want anything until that ability is gained.

Which is your own arbitrary value. I could just as easily say, “the child has more sentience ahead of him.” There - now we are faced with something incommensurable. How do we solve the problem? Power.

When l say ‘wants’ l mean that as a conscience action, not just instinctual.
l reject teleology in natural law theory.
The core of natural law implies a design, which l don’t have a reason to believe in.

I know that’s what you meant. It’s an impoverished vision of “wanting”. That’s my point. If you wholesale reject the fact of teleology, then you are admitting, whether you know it or not, that “ethics” is an illusion - there are only wills, arbitrary values which sometimes match common intuition, and power games.

Also it runs into is/ought problem, getting normative ‘ought’ from common human behaviour ‘it’.

There is no gap when you see that teleology provides “ends” which are indicative of happiness, which is the point of ethics - not just “right/wrong.” In every thread like this on CAF, this is the most fundamental problem - ignoring that ethics is about happiness. Your thread is no different.

Natural law theory also mixed moral goodness with goodness as an attribute, which l have a problem with. The principle you said doesn’t make a lot of sense without appealing to other ethics outside natural law. If goodness and badness(evil) is understood by how much creature acts acording to it’s nature, than doing good and evil wouldn’t be possible. You could only be good or evil.

This is a very confusing set of sentences.

Or you could say that person is acting good by eating, because eating is part of it’s nature. But at that point, the common understand of goodness and badness is changed almost completely.

Yes, it’s good to eat - in the right proportion with self-preservation. What’s the problem?

To my knowlage, it’s ‘God seeking’ not just ‘truth seeking’, as Aquinas believed that all humans are directed towards God.

It seems you did not bother to read the link. Why? Do you just want to argue? If so, count me out. I have better things to do.

 

[Nonatheist]

l don’t see a difference between not having something, and losing something temporarily as arbitrary.

Impoverished? If the meaning of wanting is ‘biological need for something’ than l don’t think that’s relavent in this dicussion.

You would have to explain that in a more detailed way, but l don’t think that’s good idea as that’s a different conversation.

Happiness is a subjective feeling. l disagree that ethics are about happiness, happiness is usually a result of good ethics. Ethics are understanding of morality, metaethics asks what morality is while normative ethics ask how do we act morally.
l don’t see a place for happiness there.
Also, natural law is far from being the best ethical philosophy to maximize happiness .

l apologize, l see how massy it is. l think it’s better to just ignore it.

Natural law doesn’t make a difference between moral goodness and goodness as a quality.
Helping the poor, and eating would both be morally good under natural law.
Same with killing and using contraception, both would be morally bad.

l know what natural law is, from what i’ve read on that link, it doesn’t seem like it would make a big difference in this conversation. l plan to read it later

 

[kapp19]

l don’t see a difference between not having something, and losing something temporarily as arbitrary.

The difference isn’t arbitrary - the evaluation of them in this case IS. There is no reason why the one is better than the other, except that you like the one more and I like the other more (for the sake of argument).

Happiness is a subjective feeling.

I suggest that you focus on this - as it is, once again, at the very deepest part of the problem here… connected with natural purposes, normative principles which rest upon them, and the flourishing of one’s very BEING by achieving those purposes within the normative framework indicated by them through the use of reason.

The rest of your points are just a confused mess - if you want to talk about Thomistic natural law theory and virtue ethics, you will have to do some work… I am not in a position to go step by step with you today, though I am happy to start a longer discussion by personal message.

If you really want to get a grip on this, then you can start with the Prima Secundae (though much in the Prima Pars - especially relating to God’s goodness and creative act - is relevant)… See Questions 1-5, 55, 71, and 94… that is at least enough to get the ball rolling.

 

[Nonatheist]

Natural purposes imply a design.
So, for me to even start thinking about accepting a natural law theory, l have to be either a theist or a natural theist. l am neither(though l wouldn’t call myself an atheist either).
While also accepting Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphyiscs.
That’s why l usually dislike discussing, it doesn’t lead to anything most of the times.

l will check those questions later.

Also, if you didn’t watch this yet l would recommend this dicussion:

l find myself agreeing with Ben on most issues

 

[Elf01]

If being was able to feel pain in the past, and will be able to feel pain in the future, it’s value status that feeling pain gives will not be diminished by a temporarily state of painlessness.

Why not?

That’s maybe how they determined their values in the past, but l am looking for an objective theory for that.
Egypt didn’t have an ethical theory, they values cats and dung beetles purely because of their religion and culture.

Humans are animals, so for us to be above other animals, we have to have something other animals don’t. l can also point examples throughout history where animals were more valuable than other humans.
Examples from history don’t help us build something close to an objective ethical theory

Do you consider rats, dogs, and cattle to have equal sentience?

 

[Nonatheist]

Because being still has the ability to feel pain, it’s just suspended for temporary period of time.
When that time is over, being continues to feel pain as usually.

They are all very similar in sentience. It’s impossible to tell 100% which one is more senteint

 

[Elf01]

They are all very similar in sentience. It’s impossible to tell 100% which one is more senteint

This may be culture, but most people would kill a rat for little ir no reason, keep a cow for meat, and a dog as a pet.

The moral worth given to animals really does seem to depend on how humans view them.

 

[Elf01]

Because being still has the ability to feel pain, it’s just suspended for temporary period of time.
When that time is over, being continues to feel pain as usually.

Would the amount of time make a difference?

 

[Nonatheist]

Culture plays a biggest role is shaping someones beliefs.
l really don’t think that people in India could philosophically argue why cows are more worthy than dogs.

No. If we know that person in the future will regail it’s full sentience, than l don’t think time plays a part.

 

[Elf01]

No. If we know that person in the future will regail it’s full sentience, than l don’t think time plays a part.

Why does a beings sentience in the past matter?

 

[Abrosz]

Goodness is a quality, not something in of it’s self.

Goodness is a concept, which describes “good” things. From someone’s perspective in some situation. Of course it is not really relevant here.

 

[kapp19]

Then I will not bother discussing ethics anymore, as we’ve now found the root of the problem.

Feel free to have various people try to dead-end you on “sentience” and “value” - for another 400 posts - or we can have a separate discussion about God’s existence, and the act of creation, and how purposes (somewhat of the exitus/reditus variety) inhere in creation and determine norms.

-K

 

[Nonatheist]

l am quite familiar with 5 ways and other arguments for God.
l discussed in the past, and it never leads not anything.
So, l would rather not, but thanks for haveing a dicussion with me.

 

[Maximian]

one being to me depends on two factors,
how sentient that being is, and what reason was there to kill it.

That is because you don’t believe in objective right and wrong. That is why you are, despite your penname, an atheist