How would you define “good”?
In general terms, the most proper definition of the good is just
that which is desirable, that toward which a thing by its nature is inclined, typically for fulfillment. A bit more specifically, it is anything external toward which a will
qua will essentially tends (or
extends, to be precise), as either the immediate or ultimate end of some mind, such as, say, the Pope’s or even simply God’s. (In fact, the good is primarily good insofar as it’s actually willed by God; secondarily, to the extent it’s a mere potential object of any contingent will; and finally, insofar as it’s actually willed by one or another created rational being.)
In Thomistic philosophy, “good” and “being” are convertible terms (although being is more fundamental). Thus being is good and the good is that which has being.
Goodness is
being-as-willed, or else
being-as-potentially-willed, considered in itself or in objective, external reality at least. I get this mostly from Aristotle and Aquinas (
1.1De Veritate), too.
Second. some [predicates] are said to add to being because the mode they express is one that is common, and consequent upon every being. This mode can be taken in two ways: first, in so far as it follows upon every being considered absolutely; second, in so far as it follows upon every being considered in relation to another. In the first, the term is used in two ways, because it expresses something in the being either affirmatively or negatively. We can, however, find nothing that can be predicated of every being affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely, with the exception of its essence by which the being is said to be. To express this, the term
thing is used; for, according to Avicenna,” thing differs from being because being gets its name from to-be, but thing expresses the quiddity or essence of the being. There is, however, a negation consequent upon every being considered absolutely: its undividedness, and this is expressed by
one. For the
one is simply undivided being.
If the mode of being is taken in the second way—according to the relation of one being to another—we find a twofold use. The first is based on the distinction of one being from another, and this distinctness is expressed by the word
something, which implies, as it were,
some other thing. For, just as a being is said to be
one in so far as it is without division in itself, so it is said to be
something in so far as it is divided from others. The second division is based on the correspondence one being has with another. This is possible only if there is something which is such that it agrees with every being. Such a being is the soul, which, as is said in
The Soul, “in some way is all things.” The soul, however, has both knowing and appetitive powers.
Good expresses the correspondence of being to the appetitive power, for, and so we note in the Ethics, the good is “that which all desire.” [Emphasis mine.]
Personally, I might characterize the good as
volitional extension when taking it to its most fundamental level, that is, as basically the real end of any free extension by a will insofar as the intention in the intellect motivating it has some substantial degree of truth.