Defining Free Will

[Justin_W]

Can anyone point me to a precise definition of “Free Will” as it relates to Catholic theology and doctrine?

Free Will is obviously a concept of great theological importance (along with and related to Faith, Belief, Salvation, Sacrifice, and many other topics of great theological importance) and the precise definition of it has significant implications. And yet, I have been unable to locate any definitions which even remotely begin to address the complexity of the problem.

For example:

• What factors influence, affect, or determine the “Freedom” vs. non-freedom of the “Will”?
• What is “Will”? And how does “Will” compare/contrast with “Intellect”, “Intention”, “Willpower”, “Desire”, etc.?
• What is the difference between “willing” vs. “permitting” vs. “allowing” vs. “intending” vs. “desiring” vs. “wanting” vs. etc.? And how do these distinctions affect determination of causation? (cf. CCC #311)
• Similarly, what is the difference between the aforementioned synonyms when applied to things that are “Xed” for their own sake (i.e. as an End) vs. as an instrument (i.e. as a necessary Means to some other End)?
• To what extent is “Free Will” applicable to “rational” choices vs. irrational ones (e.g. choices that are made/influenced by emotional or subconscious factors, or are due to coercion or manipulation)?
• To what extent does a moral agent need to be able to (rationally, and by implication predictably/repeatably) affect/pick their choice for the choice to be considered “free”? (E.g. I am thinking of the influences of addictions, compulsive behaviors, various types of impairments of mind and body such as sleep deprivation or brain damage, genetic/physical constraints upon intellect, emotions and emotional bias, decision fatigue, etc.)
• To what extent does a moral agent need to be able to successfully and accurately understand the external factors (both preceding and consequent) related to the options for the choice to be “free”? (E.g. I am thinking of: choices that are made “rationally” but are based upon false/impaired/distorted perceptions or knowledge; the inability to accurately predict the consequences of choices and thus the inability to reliably correlate the chooser’s intent to the possible outcomes; etc.)
• Is “free will” a binary (i.e. yes/no) condition, or a spectrum/proportional condition (i.e. action X was 79% freely willed)? And if the latter, how does that then affect the determination of culpability, responsibility, causality, etc.?
• To what extent does an agent need to have “options” from which to choose between, and do the quality of those options matter? (E.g. In the standard “a robber has a gun pointed at you” scenario, is that type of “do it or die” coerced choice really a Free choice?)

Here are some of the particularly tricky areas which I am trying to understand in the light of answers to the above questions:

• Romans 7:15-20 ("…I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate…if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it…"). How does that describe a person exercising free will?
• At what point or in what situations can an individual be assessed as capable of having/exercising free will? E.g. Infants? Brain damaged adults? Drugged/hypnotized/traumatized people? People tricked or conned into an action?

If anyone can assist me in locating some resources with which I can improve my understanding of the specific details of Catholic teaching and belief on these matters, I’d greatly appreciate it.

 

[Aloysium]

Try:
vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P5M.HTM

 

[Robert_Sock]

Any definition of free will needs to convey that it certainly is not absolute, but a variable construct as it runs through time and across situations. Nobody is so free as to always maintain control over their will.

 

[Justin_W]

I probably should have added that I’ve already read the CCC’s sections on freedom, etc., and much of Aquinas’ ST. I found the former to be too vague and imprecise for my current purposes.

Admittedly, it has been a while since I read the ST sections re: free will, but I recall them to be both ‘scattered’ (in terms of any consolidated definition being spread among many different parts, and therefore difficult to work with as a consolidated concept as I am striving to avoid redefining free will on my own) and also incomplete in terms of satisfactorily distinguishing what “will” is vs. what “intellect” is, and generally not specifically answering my questions in the original post. But if anyone can point me to specific parts of either of those resources (or any other) that do precisely answer the original questions, that would be great.

 

[John_Martin]

Summa, First Part of the Second Part questions 1 - 21 has all the answers.

Of course, if you are looking to find the Will and Free Will in your conscious thinking, you will not be able to, since the Intellect and Will are powers in the soul, and not in the brain, other than a moving of the brain to have conscious thoughts that are moved into view in the brain by the will, from the soul.

Also, the will requires an “end” as its principle of willing or movement, which is why I started the suggested reading at question 1, so you keep the End in view for what the will loves and then makes use of free will to attain what it loves.

 

[Rhubarb]

plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

A theological concept of free will, at least to me, be able to address the philosophical problems of free will. From what I understand, Christian conceptions of free will fall into the soft-determinism camp.

 

[John_Martin]

plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

A theological concept of free will, at least to me, be able to address the philosophical problems of free will. From what I understand, Christian conceptions of free will fall into the soft-determinism camp.

Right Reason, Right Philosophy (there is such a thing), is never in conflict with True Faith, the teaching of the Catholic Church.
Your link showed no assertion of what is Free Will, but only an outsider’s view of what many say of free will. The author makes no attempt to teach you what is truth, but keeps you on the outside of knowing and looking in on those who assert that they know. From the outside where you are, you are looking in on philosophers disagreeing, looking in on Christians and trying to align them with “camps” of philosophers, as if you are “looking for a sign, and then you would believe”, but you will not until you embrace a philosophy and try it on for size, experiment with it as a definition of “you” to see if it is really real.

Those who put free will in the material phenomenon of the body (which includes the brain, conscious thought) will fail you in being a suited clothing of understanding because, in the end, it is in conflict with theology where we do know that the will and free will are in a spiritual substance (the soul) and not available for material measurement, but we can only perceive its actuation of its decisions, such as when the words “I choose this” appear in our thoughts. All the analyses for choice we do in our conscious thought are only experiments driven by our souls to “try out” scenarios in our thoughts to examine how various choices would play out in material reality. But the knowing, the choosing, and the movement of the body to live in the choice all happen in the soul, un-viewable by our conscious thought.

Also, free will is not about opting for A instead of B, as you can train dogs and monkeys to do, but is about good and evil, and basically only about good. It is about doing something not driven by appetites, that you would not normally do because there is no benefit in doing the thing in isolation, but making a non-appetitive thing real in the world based on understanding it must be real in the world and only you can do it at this moment so that the real goal of the will is well supported. I say well supported because the true goal is good, and good cannot be attained by an evil man doing evil works.

Free will is fully determined - determined to attain the end goal of the will, and reach it well. Undetermined choices of A over B are a sophistry.

 

[Justin_W]

From this handout, it appears that I may find some useful content (i.e. that goes beyond what is in the ST) in some of Aquinas’ Quaestiones Disputatae works. Specifically:

• De Malo (e.g. Question 6 “On Human Choice”)
• De Veritate (e.g. Qs 22-24)

Too bad I don’t have a copy of the De Malo, which apparently is one of the few of Aquinas’ works that is not freely available online.

And it would seem that several of Francisco Suárez’s works may also contain relevant content, but also with limited availability online.

Besides Aquinas and Suárez, it seems John Duns Scotus also wrote various works regarding the Will and Freedom, but I have not yet found a satisfactory summary of Scotus’ position on the topic since it seems (please correct me if I’m wrong) that some scholars differ in their interpretations of Scotus’ views on those topics.

And according to the IEP, it seems that there were various Medieval Theories of Free Will proposed by various philosophers and theologians over the centuries, and lists numerous sources. But I was really hoping to avoid having to personally read through all of the original source materials in full.

 

[Justin_W]

So my original questions/request remains:

Does anyone know where I can find good, precise summaries of the Church’s teachings (any or all of the still-valid ones that is) pertaining to Free Will, Free Choice, etc.? (Sources comparing/contrasting any of the competing/opposing theories would be very helpful, too.)

Ideally, I’d prefer something in argument diagram or proof format, but any format at all would be better than nothing.

Thanks!

 

[Aloysium]

Fr. John Hardon’s “The Catholic Catechism” might be a useful source.

 

[Rhubarb]

Right Reason, Right Philosophy (there is such a thing), is never in conflict with True Faith, the teaching of the Catholic Church.
Your link showed no assertion of what is Free Will, but only an outsider’s view of what many say of free will. The author makes no attempt to teach you what is truth, but keeps you on the outside of knowing and looking in on those who assert that they know. From the outside where you are, you are looking in on philosophers disagreeing, looking in on Christians and trying to align them with “camps” of philosophers, as if you are “looking for a sign, and then you would believe”, but you will not until you embrace a philosophy and try it on for size, experiment with it as a definition of “you” to see if it is really real.

Those who put free will in the material phenomenon of the body (which includes the brain, conscious thought) will fail you in being a suited clothing of understanding because, in the end, it is in conflict with theology where we do know that the will and free will are in a spiritual substance (the soul) and not available for material measurement, but we can only perceive its actuation of its decisions, such as when the words “I choose this” appear in our thoughts. All the analyses for choice we do in our conscious thought are only experiments driven by our souls to “try out” scenarios in our thoughts to examine how various choices would play out in material reality. But the knowing, the choosing, and the movement of the body to live in the choice all happen in the soul, un-viewable by our conscious thought.

Also, free will is not about opting for A instead of B, as you can train dogs and monkeys to do, but is about good and evil, and basically only about good. It is about doing something not driven by appetites, that you would not normally do because there is no benefit in doing the thing in isolation, but making a non-appetitive thing real in the world based on understanding it must be real in the world and only you can do it at this moment so that the real goal of the will is well supported. I say well supported because the true goal is good, and good cannot be attained by an evil man doing evil works.

Free will is fully determined - determined to attain the end goal of the will, and reach it well. Undetermined choices of A over B are a sophistry.

Oh I didn’t mean to suggest the SEP would give a definitive answer. It’s just an encyclopedia after all. Free will is a live and contentious topic, philosophically. The only thing I claim is that a Christian conception of free will has to deal with the philosophic problems of free will too.

And I do think that soft determinism is compatible with what I was taught about Christian free will.

 

[lmelahn]

So my original questions/request remains:

Does anyone know where I can find good, precise summaries of the Church’s teachings (any or all of the still-valid ones that is) pertaining to Free Will, Free Choice, etc.? (Sources comparing/contrasting any of the competing/opposing theories would be very helpful, too.)

Ideally, I’d prefer something in argument diagram or proof format, but any format at all would be better than nothing.

Thanks!

OK. Here is a short summary of St. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine on the will (which I think is the best one out there).

First, some background information.

I first mention some background about how we men are made. Many readers will be familiar with this, but I repeat it here because it is very important.

A human being is a spiritual creature that is incarnated in a body. What does that mean? First of all, a creature is “spiritual” if he does not depend on matter for his existence. Sub-human animals, plants, and inanimate objects simply disintegrate when their material realities—their bodies—disintegrate. Man, however, continues to exist—albeit in a state of severe deprivation, unless outside remedies are given him—even after the dissolution of his body—i.e., after death. All spiritual creatures are also “persons,” which means that they can be referred to as “who,” not merely as “what.”

Unlike the pure spirits—i.e., the angels—man is necessarily incarnate in a body. In that regard, his spirit is also his soul (Latin: anima, Greek: psyché); that is, the principle that animates his body. Just as man’s spiritual nature pervades every aspect of his body, his corporeity deeply colors the way that he expresses his spirituality. Man is one and whole, but lives, so to speak, simultaneously in the spiritual and corporeal worlds. This dependence on a body makes man weaker, by nature, than the angels.

Man’s spiritual faculties: the intellect and will

In order for a creature to perform any action, it must possess a capability to produce that action. In order to walk, we need legs with functioning muscles; in order to digest food, we need a stomach and intestines and so forth.

There are two actions in particular produced by man that are entirely spiritual in character; that is, they are produced entirely by man’s spiritual soul (even though the exercise of those actions is always done with the cooperation of the body). These actions are intellectual knowledge and love.

Knowledge is the act by which we come into contact with the reality that surrounds us. When we know something or someone; in a way, we actually become that thing. (We don’t turn into trees or turnips, of course, but our souls take on—as Aquinas says—the form of trees and turnips.) Love is that action by which we seek union with those things that are presented to us as good or beneficial.

I say “intellectual” knowledge and love, because, being corporeal, we also know and love things on the sensorial level. However, the highest and most important kind of knowledge and love is the intellectual kind.

The capabilites that allow us to produce those actions are the faculties of the soul: namely, the intellect (which allows us to know) and the will (which allows us to love). The will is also called the rational appetency, because through the will, we seek out those things which our intellects present to us a good: in other words, it is an “appetency” inasmuch as it seeks things out, and it is “rational” inasmuch as it acts based on what the intellect presents to it.

So we could define the will as that faculty of the soul that permits a spiritual creature (man or angel) to love; that is, to seek out those things that are good for him. In man, the will can also be characterized as the rational appetency, since (like the senorial appetencies) it allows man to seek out what is good and beneficial, but it is guided, not by sensory knowledge, but by the intellect.

Note that the will, by itself, does not have the power to choose between good and evil as such; the will can only be moved by something good. It does, however, have the freedom to opt in or opt out: it may choose a particular good, or it may refrain from doing so.

The liberum arbitrium, sometimes confusingly called “free-will”

Although the will can only opt in or out out (choose a good or refrain from doing so), man as a whole has the characteristic of liberum arbitrium: he is capable of choosing morally good and morally evil acts.

How does this work, since the will can only be moved by something that is, in itself, good?

In essence, because by his will, man can refuse to listen to what is intellect is telling him. The will is perfectly capable of refusing a moral good for the sake of obtaining a lesser, partial good. (E.g., when someone commits fornication or adultery, there is a partial, pleasurable good obtained, but it is obtained by sacrificing the moral good of chastity.)

Often, these moral disorders occur because the lower, sensorial appetencies are very strong and insistent. We are obliged to keep them under control, and to make sure that they are directed to their true ends (that were are angry at things that really deserve our anger, that we eat and drink in due measure, that the use of our sexuality always be chaste, and so on). Not controlling them is one way in which the will, absuing its freedom, can refuse to seek a good that it ought to seek.

Summary (TL;DR)

The will is the faculty by which we love, the rational appetency.

Liberum arbitrium (sometimes confusingly called “free-will”) is the freedom, characteristic of man and all spiritual creatures, to choose between moral good and moral evil.

 

[Justin_W]

Thank you lmelahn! Very helpful.

I guess I’m still confused, though, on when we can say that we have the ability to exercise our free will and when we do not, and I’m hampered in my search by imprecise and ambiguous language.

For example, if I attempt to exercise my freedom to hold my breath, at some point my physical body will override my rational choice and force me to breathe. Similarly, if I decide to not sleep, at some point I will fall asleep despite my best efforts to remain awake. These are simplistic examples that don’t really have moral components.

However, there are many similar scenarios in everyday life that do involve moral aspects. And in these situations many people often find their best efforts and desires and intent to choose Good and Morality frustrated by their apparent inability (and seeming lack of freedom) to control their own actions. Cf. Romans 7:15-20.

So according to Aquinas or other philosophers, how do you precisely describe that scenario? Is it correct to say that in those cases our Free Will is constrained/nullified by factors out of our control (even if they are internal factors like physical limitations of our senses or bodies)? Or does Aquinas assert that we have somehow “freely chosen” the lesser Good (i.e. The Evil) despite our Intellect’s objection/opposition? Because the latter doesn’t seem to be “freedom” to me.

 

[John_Martin]

Thank you lmelahn! Very helpful.

I guess I’m still confused, though, on when we can say that we have the ability to exercise our free will and when we do not, and I’m hampered in my search by imprecise and ambiguous language.

For example, if I attempt to exercise my freedom to hold my breath, at some point my physical body will override my rational choice and force me to breathe. Similarly, if I decide to not sleep, at some point I will fall asleep despite my best efforts to remain awake. These are simplistic examples that don’t really have moral components.

However, there are many similar scenarios in everyday life that do involve moral aspects. And in these situations many people often find their best efforts and desires and intent to choose Good and Morality frustrated by their apparent inability (and seeming lack of freedom) to control their own actions. Cf. Romans 7:15-20.

So according to Aquinas or other philosophers, how do you precisely describe that scenario? Is it correct to say that in those cases our Free Will is constrained/nullified by factors out of our control (even if they are internal factors like physical limitations of our senses or bodies)? Or does Aquinas assert that we have somehow “freely chosen” the lesser Good (i.e. The Evil) despite our Intellect’s objection/opposition? Because the latter doesn’t seem to be “freedom” to me.

I look forward to lmelahn’s answer, but til then, my thoughts are that in your examples of holding one’s breath and staying awake, one does not understand, in one’s intellect, that these acts are true and also good, and therefore one does not love them, does not move to them with determination. Holding your breath or staying awake are more like experiments your soul is carrying out in your body to see how the will works. But alongside that, there is one thing you do know is true and good and you do love - that is your life. So your will takes over, preserving you when the experiment goes beyond a healthy limit, and that would be your will acting morally for your life (breathing, dozing off by letting go of the plan). Or it could be that the natural appetites for air and rest act as a distraction to your reason, and take over (also in Aquinas).

In Romans 7, Paul is not saying it is hopeless - he is saying what lmelahn (and Aquinas) wrote about being obliged to keep our lower (sensitive) appetites under control (or guardianship). Under the control of what? - of reason, renewed in Christ reason. It is like giving your appetites what is reasonably appropriate rather than standing back and letting the appetites have their fill, as a way of life. Paul sees himself and the Roman Church as the People of God (they are justified in seeing themselves in that light, while before they were “no people”). And now he asks them to moderate their actions based on who they are justified in calling themselves, rather than reacting to appetites immoderately. Later, I think in Romans 12 he calls them to be transformed by the renewal of their minds - meaning to reason about what they do based on who they now are (as Christians, as the People), and act out their activities in accord with that understanding of who they are.

While the “flesh” distracts us from remembering who we are and acting accordingly, we can recognize it happening (conscience), and remember again who we are, and begin again acting from who we “know ourselves to be” rather than from reacting to the things that lure our sensitive appetites.

 

[Justin_W]

Forgive me, John, if it seems I am belaboring the point. I’m not trying to do so. But your answer strikes me as “feeling” a bit off. Let me attempt to explain (and please correct me if my terminology or reasoning is wrong)…

As I understand it, the Will is subordinate to the Intellect and Senses insofar as the Will itself is incapable of reason or perception, and can only exercise its proper function in the context of “stimuli” and knowledge (both intellectual knowledge and sense knowledge) provided by the Senses and the Intellect. Further, the Conscience is a fallible faculty that must be properly trained and honed in order to function properly, and is itself dependent upon the Intellect and (maybe?) the Will.

So my perplexity stems from the facts that if the Will can disregard the Intellect and Senses when it is performing its function, isn’t that effectively saying that it is performing in an irrational manner? That would seem to indicate a lack of any informed consent by the individual since the “informed” portion of the consent is based on Intellect. And even the Consent part, if disconnected from Intellect and therefore conscious awareness, seems like it would not by “me” consenting since “I” have no idea how to influence the decision/choice in such an irrationally-based act of the Will. And therefore it would seem that such an act of Will would be “unfree” in every way that I can imagine.

Conversely, if the Will cannot disregard the Intellect and Senses, and is essentially a 100% deterministic “function” with an “output” that is entirely dependent upon the “(name removed by moderator)uts” (e.g. knowledge, sensations, and the Intellect’s assessment of them and fallible ability to predict/correlate the choices to the Goods of the consequences of the choices), wouldn’t it be fair to say that my “freedom” of Will is dependent on my ability to provide “reliable (name removed by moderator)uts” to the choice function of the Will? And thus, if my Intellect desires the greatest Good but ends up getting “drowned out” or otherwise overridden by other factors (e.g. Impaired or deceived or faulty Senses, knowledge, etc.), that “I” am once again effectively “unfree” in such a scenario?

I really am not attempting to prove strict determinism is true. Strict determinism doesn’t feel “True” to me either. But I’m kind of stuck on understanding which (particular) faculties of “me-ness” my “freedom” resides in (according to Church teaching), and which faculties are antecedent and consequent of that faculty. Because it seems that understanding of such matters is essential to effectively “training” the Self to be able to more successful and reliable in pursuing Good and Virtue.

And while one might argue that such understanding is unnecessary, since the Church also provides us with “for dummies”-style training exercises (e.g. Prayers, virtues, etc.), I would argue that such understanding is necessary in order to fully understand the Why behind the Church’s teachings on the dignity of the human person, and even to fully understand and perfectly repent for the sins of the world, and to more fully appreciate the Goodness of God and His gift of Redemption. So pursuing such understanding seems like a very worthy task (in my mind).

I look forward to additional responses. Thanks again.

 

[MrSnaith]

I would like to add my $0.02, since this has been an excellent discussion thus far.

I concur with the majority of what Imelahn said, and I will reiterate most of it here, albeit in different words.

Again, we are a body/spirit union, whereby we are primarily spiritual creatures, and secondarily physical, in the sense that our existence is not dependent upon our bodies, but upon our spirits, but that our true nature is to be incorporated, not merely spiritual, as angels.

This understanding is important for two reasons. First, it proposes a correct understanding with respect to rational intellect and will in the question of freedom of will, and secondly it distinguishes an order of being with respect to our natures as human, specifically, the primacy of the spiritual faculties over the bodily faculties.

With that groundwork set, let me state further to what Imelahn did. The human will is not merely rational, it is also irrational. This is because we are both spiritual and physical beings. In effect, we have a dual-natured will. There is the spiritual will, which is the rational and free will. There is the physical will, which is irrational and non-free.

The human mind is also dual-natured. There is the rational intellect belonging to our spiritual mind, and there is the irrational sensation belonging to our physical mind.

Now, let me be clear. I am NOT positing that we have two wills and/or two minds. We have one. But we are a union of two natures opposite natures, and we therefore have opposing aspects within our faculties.

But they are actually only in opposition due to sin. This is because, in the natural created order of this, the physical is subject to the spiritual. Therefore, in our true, unfallen nature, the physical aspects of our mind and will were subject, and obedient to the spiritual aspects of our mind and will.

The Church’s teaching on concupiscence is that, in our fallen nature, we are inclined to sin. But, this inclination is directly related to the ordering of this spiritual/physical dichotomy within the human person. That is to say, it is because through sin, our natural order has become unbalanced, and our flesh has become rebellious to the spirit.

What this means is that our spiritual authority, so to speak, has been corrupted, and our bodily inclinations are not always obedient to our spiritual command. This is how you make sense out of that passage from Romans. Concupiscence causes St. Paul to do those things he hates.

So, what about the question of freedom, specifically?

Freedom of will is not the ability to choose moral good or moral evil, as is asserted by Imelahn. If this were true, then we would correctly say that God does not have free will. This is because God does not have the ability to choose moral evil, to suggest He does is to suggest an internal contradiction to His nature.

Rather, free will is the ability to act volitionally, rather than from a processional imperative. What I mean by this is that, in a series of causes and effects, all causes are also effects of some preceding cause. Cause and effect is primarily an element of the physical world, and everything in the physical world is first an effect before becoming a cause. Animals act because they’ve first been acted upon, and their “programming” causes them to respond in a particular manner.

Freedom of will implies the first cause in a series of causes and effects. That is to say, to be free in will means that you can act, not because you’ve been acted upon, but because you choose to act.

This reality is what allows us the option of moral evil, but the ability to choose moral evil is not the defining characteristic. This is because, if we did not have the capacity of free volition, then we would, de facto, always act as a result of first being acted upon. And since our “programming” is such that the will is always drawn toward the good, we would always choose the good in response.

But one may be free, and likewise always choose the good, and this freedom comes from the fact that we are rational, and therefore do not necessarily have to act in response, and that we can also act independent of whatever is acting upon us.

However, sin has caused two things in us. First, it darkens our intellect, so that truth is not clear to us, and second, it weakens our will (over our physical appetites), such that we are more inclined to react to external stimuli, rather than acting out of an understanding of rightness.

 

[Aloysium]

. . . As I understand it, the Will is subordinate to the Intellect and Senses insofar as the Will itself is incapable of reason or perception, and can only exercise its proper function in the context of “stimuli” and knowledge (both intellectual knowledge and sense knowledge) provided by the Senses and the Intellect. Further, the Conscience is a fallible faculty that must be properly trained and honed in order to function properly, and is itself dependent upon the Intellect and (maybe?) the Will.

So my perplexity stems from the facts that if the Will can disregard the Intellect and Senses when it is performing its function, isn’t that effectively saying that it is performing in an irrational manner? That would seem to indicate a lack of any informed consent by the individual since the “informed” portion of the consent is based on Intellect. And even the Consent part, if disconnected from Intellect and therefore conscious awareness, seems like it would not by “me” consenting since “I” have no idea how to influence the decision/choice in such an irrationally-based act of the Will. And therefore it would seem that such an act of Will would be “unfree” in every way that I can imagine.

Conversely, if the Will cannot disregard the Intellect and Senses, and is essentially a 100% deterministic “function” with an “output” that is entirely dependent upon the “(name removed by moderator)uts” (e.g. knowledge, sensations, and the Intellect’s assessment of them and fallible ability to predict/correlate the choices to the Goods of the consequences of the choices), wouldn’t it be fair to say that my “freedom” of Will is dependent on my ability to provide “reliable (name removed by moderator)uts” to the choice function of the Will? And thus, if my Intellect desires the greatest Good but ends up getting “drowned out” or otherwise overridden by other factors (e.g. Impaired or deceived or faulty Senses, knowledge, etc.), that “I” am once again effectively “unfree” in such a scenario?. . .

:twocents:

The will and the intellect are two aspects of the unity that is a human being.
Conscience represents one’s relationship with Goodness.
Action is the vehicle through which we become whom we choose.
There exists one whole person.

I can disregard what is truly good for me when I make a choice.
This can happen when I do what I want to do,
because I want to do it,
in spite of the fact that the nature of the action includes consequences I don’t want.

It is always myself deciding, acting, giving myself over to that goal.

Doing God’s will is to participate in freedom.
Sin enslaves us, deprives us of our freedom.

Faced with a lesser good,
one that is counter to the will of God,
what is an inclination,
can lead to a behaviour,
becoming a pattern of behaviour,
turning into a habit,
until it manifests as a full-blown addiction.

It is at this point that the self is broken;
split into an intellect desiring the Good
but overridden by ignorance and lies
and motivated by unquenchable lusts for what ultimately leads to death.

Ultimately, freedom is acheived not solely by our efforts, but through the saving grace of God, whose will we pray be done.

 

[John_Martin]

The principle of the moving will (in love) is the proposed union with the object loved.

How do I get there, the will asks.

The intellect answers, go via the road to A, next to B, then to D, then back to C, where you meet the road to your union.

These roads have no innate satisfaction of their own - nothing desirable at points A, B, or C. There is intense pleasure at point D.

The will would never desire any of them, except D, naturally. In other words, there is no innate principle of movement to A, B, or C (nothing good at those destinations). There is an object at D that is appetitive, desirable for union, which might be the first cause of moving the will to go there.

But there is no first cause for tending toward A, B, or C, other than the will loving them, moving to them, as a means of getting to its true love. Volitional choice of what is not appetitive in itself. That is free will. Also, there is point D, with intense pleasure available, highly desirable. Yet the volition here is to walk on to point C, bypassing one pleasure at D for the true love waiting, the true Good. Again, volitional choice to ignore an appetitive object, which normally moves the will to union with it - this “principle”, this “first cause” of movement had no effect on the movement. Free will is found in desiring to do what reason proposes as a set of means to what the will loves, even though the will would not choose to do it for its own sake, and its principle of movement is an verdict of reason rather than an “external object”. Self-directed rational movement rather than reaction to what is perceived.

The will can love, move to union, with an immediately near object, or love a “package deal” of gaining union with its principle through a known set of means, and voluntarily actualizes those means, unlovable though they are in themselves.

Romans 7 is about the distraction from the intent of the will at point D with the senses drooling, “This is good”, and about the distaste at A, B, and C with the senses shuddering.

 

[lmelahn]

Thank you lmelahn! Very helpful.

I guess I’m still confused, though, on when we can say that we have the ability to exercise our free will and when we do not, and I’m hampered in my search by imprecise and ambiguous language.

For example, if I attempt to exercise my freedom to hold my breath, at some point my physical body will override my rational choice and force me to breathe. Similarly, if I decide to not sleep, at some point I will fall asleep despite my best efforts to remain awake. These are simplistic examples that don’t really have moral components.

However, there are many similar scenarios in everyday life that do involve moral aspects. And in these situations many people often find their best efforts and desires and intent to choose Good and Morality frustrated by their apparent inability (and seeming lack of freedom) to control their own actions. Cf. Romans 7:15-20.

There are a couple of issues here.

First of all, our freedom is conditioned, not absolute. It would be very nice to fly (unaided by an airplane or similar device), but we can’t, because are bodies are not made that way. In a similar way, we are unable to hold our breath until we pass out, and we are unable to stay awake indefinitely. There are physical processes that take over, as you point out.

We are partly conditioned even in the moral sphere. Someone who acts in the heat of passion is clearly less free than someone who acts in cold blood. That is why, for example, the penalties for “crimes of passion” are less severe than for those crimes committed deliberately. (Ordinarily passion does not remove the culpability of concrete actions, but does diminish it.)

In a similar way, we are conditioned by original sin and its consequences. Like Saint Paul, we “do not do the good [we] want, but the evil [we] do not want is what [we] keep on doing” (to paraphrase the passage you mentioned). Clearly, then original sin, our bad habits, our inability to control our passions, and our ignorance all reduce our freedom (and hence our culpability).

Other things can also reduce our freedom: grave fear, for example, or being under the influence of chemicals. (Someone who is drunk or under the influence of drugs is probably guilty of taking too much alcohol or of deliberately taking mind-influencing drugs—which is already gravely sinful—but his is not directly responsible for his actions, or anyway less responsible, while he is under the influence. He is, of course, indirectly responsible, because he deliberately took the risk of being unable to control himself.)

So according to Aquinas or other philosophers, how do you precisely describe that scenario? Is it correct to say that in those cases our Free Will is constrained/nullified by factors out of our control (even if they are internal factors like physical limitations of our senses or bodies)? Or does Aquinas assert that we have somehow “freely chosen” the lesser Good (i.e. The Evil) despite our Intellect’s objection/opposition? Because the latter doesn’t seem to be “freedom” to me.

Our will is conditioned by all kinds of factors outside of our control, both internal and external, but never nullified. (Except, in a sense, in states of unconsciousness; even in those cases, the will as a capacity or faculty still exists—it is just unable to be exercised at all.) If those factors impede the action of the will in some way (as in the examples above), then they also reduce culpability, as I mentioned. (That applies to the culpability of the actions committed while those factors persist: the person might be guilty of getting himself into that compromised situation, as with alcohol or drug use.)

Remember that the lesser good is really a good, albeit only a partial one. We never choose evil directly. We merely accept evil as a consequence of choosing a lesser good that sacrifices an “honest” or authentic good. The adulterer does not, in general, set out to ruin his marriage; he seeks the pleasure of the moment and in so doing ruins his marriage. (I suppose someone might commit adultery out of spite or something, but even the spite has an element of goodness—the pleasure of getting even, or whatever it is—that his will is adhering to, not the evil as such.)

When we sin, we freely refuse an “honest” good (one that can really make us happy and fulfilled). That is the essense of the sin, which, like all evil, is a privation of a due good. We refuse that honest good for the sake of some partial good that attracts our attention in the moment.

Keep in mind, as well, that our freedom consists in much more than just choosing between good and evil acts. We are able to choose among all kinds of honest goods: consider, for example, someone who is considering a priestly or religious vocation. No one is ever obligated to become a priest or religious. But if God is calling him, that vocation is better for him than the married vocation.

 

[lmelahn]

The principle of the moving will (in love) is the proposed union with the object loved.

How do I get there, the will asks.

The intellect answers, go via the road to A, next to B, then to D, then back to C, where you meet the road to your union.

These roads have no innate satisfaction of their own - nothing desirable at points A, B, or C. There is intense pleasure at point D.

The will would never desire any of them, except D, naturally. In other words, there is no innate principle of movement to A, B, or C (nothing good at those destinations). There is an object at D that is appetitive, desirable for union, which might be the first cause of moving the will to go there.

But there is no first cause for tending toward A, B, or C, other than the will loving them, moving to them, as a means of getting to its true love. Volitional choice of what is not appetitive in itself. That is free will. Also, there is point D, with intense pleasure available, highly desirable. Yet the volition here is to walk on to point C, bypassing one pleasure at D for the true love waiting, the true Good. Again, volitional choice to ignore an appetitive object, which normally moves the will to union with it - this “principle”, this “first cause” of movement had no effect on the movement. Free will is found in desiring to do what reason proposes as a set of means to what the will loves, even though the will would not choose to do it for its own sake, and its principle of movement is an verdict of reason rather than an “external object”. Self-directed rational movement rather than reaction to what is perceived.

The will can love, move to union, with an immediately near object, or love a “package deal” of gaining union with its principle through a known set of means, and voluntarily actualizes those means, unlovable though they are in themselves.

Romans 7 is about the distraction from the intent of the will at point D with the senses drooling, “This is good”, and about the distaste at A, B, and C with the senses shuddering.

If C is the point of arrival, then there must be something attractive there. Otherwise, the will would never undertake the journey to C. There is sensual appetite (of two kinds, desire and courage, a.k.a. concupiscible and irascible), but also intellectual appetite (which is the will as such). The sensual appitite often clamors more strongly, which is one reason that it causes trouble when it is at odds with the “honest” (or authentic) good.